Skip to main content

Home/ Nyefrank/ Group items tagged constitutional

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Filter: All | Bookmarks | Topics Simple Middle
Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

www.docstoc.com/...-NYU-School-of-Law---Pildusdoc

mandamus judicial discretion

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

209.85.173.132/custom

tort emotional pain

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
  • ...4 more comments...
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

Winter, Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a j... - 0 views

www.constitution.org/...winter_standing.htm

standing selfgovernance

shared by Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09 - Cached
  • The democracy conundrum The most appealing justification of standing law is that, in preserving the separation of powers, it protects the majoritarian political process from undue intrusion by the unelected judiciary. But not all issues are amenable to the political process. All too often, the inevitable consequence of a decision denying standing is "that the most injurious and widespread Governmental actions c[an] be questioned by nobody." n60 In those cases, standing law undermines the notion of accountability that supports a constitutional system premised on the rule of law. In Sections VI C and D, I propose a means of recapturing these values.
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    The traditional answer places heavy emphasis on the function of the common law writ system to do the work now done by the concept of standing. n27 According to this analysis, the concept of standing could only arise after the breakdown of the writ system and of common law pleading. Standing then developed as an elaboration of the essence of the private causes of action previously embodied in the writs. n28 As such, the modern concept of standing, with its focus on injury-in-fact, is thought to be only the preservation of the private rights model n29 of adjudication known to the Framers.
  • ...5 more comments...
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...getcase.pl

1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the impo... - 0 views

www.fbi.gov/...apr976.htm

tort constitution lawsuits

shared by Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Assuming internal police guidelines are relevant...they are relevant only when one of their purposes is to protect the individual against whom force is used....Both the guidelines at issue here and the context in which they appear in the police manual show they were meant to safeguard the police and other innocent parties, not the suspect....A violation of these guidelines might be deserving of discipline, but it's irrelevant to [plaintiff's] case.16 It is important to note here that the appellate court did not decide that internal police guidelines are relevant in some instances; they only assumed that they might be relevant in the narrow instance described-i.e., when the policy was intended to safeguard the plaintiff.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Legal Duties It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.4 Thus, while negligence claims against a police officer or the department may be recognized under state law, the Supreme Court has held that simple negligence-or lack of due care-is insufficient to establish the violation of a federal constitutional right. These distinctions between state tort claims and federal constitutional tort claims can have a bearing on the different ways the courts treat allegations of policy violations. The basic formula for any lawsuit is 1) existence of a legal duty owed by one party to another, 2) an alleged breach of that duty, and 3) injury or loss resulting from that breach. Legal duties may arise in a variety of contexts, but most generally are established by custom, statute, or constitutional law. Whatever its source, a legal duty must be owed to the plaintiff by the named defendant in order for a civil suit to be viable. That being the case, a departmental policy must create a legal duty to a potential plaintiff before a violation of that policy can create liability. In reality, whether a policy violation is even relevant to the question of the legal liability of an officer or department depends to a large extent upon the nature of the claim and the forum in which it is brought. For example, policy violations in tort claims brought under state law alleging negligence will generally be treated differently than claims brought under federal law alleging violations of federal constitutional rights. The relevance of departmental policy also can depend upon whether a legal duty, or standard of conduct, is clearly delineated by law, or whether it is determined by reference to custom or practice.
Nye Frank

California Evidence Code Section 669 - California Attorney Resources - California Laws - 0 views

law.onecle.com/...669.html

evidence 669

shared by Nye Frank on 30 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Court Opinions US Supreme Court US Tax Court Board of Patent Appeals State Laws Alabama Arizona California Florida Georgia Illinois Indiana Massachusetts Michigan Nevada New Jersey New York North Carolina Oregon Pennsylvania Texas Virginia Washington US Code Copyrights Crimes Labor Patents Shipping US Constitution Preamble Art. I - Legislative Art. II - Executive Art. III - Judicial Art. IV - States' Relations Art. V - Mode of Amendment Art. VI - Prior Debts Art VII - Ratification California Evidence Code Section 669 Legal Research Home > California Lawyer > Evidence Code > California Evidence Code Section 669 Sponsored Links google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad); google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad); (a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if: (1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted. (b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that: (1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law; or (2) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation was a child and exercised the degree of care ordinarily exercised by persons of his maturity, intelligence, and capacity under similar circumstances, but the presumption may not be rebutted by such proof if the violation occurred in the course of an activity normally engaged in only by adults and requiring adult qualifications. Section: Previous  660  662  663  664  665  666  667  668  669  669.1  669.5  670  Next Last modified: January 12, 2009 google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad);border: medium none ; margin: 0pt; paddin
Nye Frank

Dormant Commerce Clause - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - 0 views

en.wikipedia.org/...Dormant_Commerce_Clause

dormant commerce clause states

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Dormant Commerce Clause From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search The "Dormant" Commerce Clause, also known as the "Negative" Commerce Clause, is a legal doctrine that courts in the United States have inferred from the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to enact legislation that affects interstate commerce. The idea behind the Dormant Commerce Clause is that this grant of power implies a negative converse - a restriction prohibiting a state from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. The restriction is self-executing and applies even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute. The premise of the doctrine is that the U.S. Constitution reserves for the United States Congress at least some degree of exclusive power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes" (Article I, § 8). Therefore, individual states are limited in their ability to legislate on such matters. The Dormant Commerce Clause does not expressly exist in the text of the United States Constitution. It is, rather, a doctrine deduced by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts from the actual Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Justice O'Connor has written that: The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent. See The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143-145 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2 Writings of James Madison 362-363 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dormant_Commerce_Clause
Nye Frank

538 F2d 10 Torres v. Sachs S Velez | Open Jurist - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

rico act case nye

shared by Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
Nye Frank

Civil Rights Claims In Wisconsin | Wisconsin Attorney's | PittsLaw.com - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

notice of claim 1983

shared by Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09 - Cached
  • 120 day notice of claim requirement, qualified immunities for discretionary conduct by governmental employees, and a limitation of damages provision in the amount of $50,000.00 that applies to most state law claims
  • Whether state or federal qualified immunity for discretionary acts might shield a defendant from liability under the civil rights act depends on whether the defendant violates a plaintiff’s clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Allen v. Guerrero, 276 Wis.2d 679, 688 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 2004)(deliberately holding a person in prison beyond a statutorily prescribed release date violates the 8th Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment). The plaintiff must prove unconstitutional conduct and that the applicable constitutional standards were clearly established at the time in question. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)(excessive force during an arrest); Newsome v McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003)(procurement of false testimony); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996)(high speed chase by police).  
  •   The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the $50,000.00 municipal liability cap on damages prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) does not apply in a civil rights lawsuit.  Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983). Wisconsin’s state law that puts a $350,000 cap on damages for loss of society and companionship arising out of the death of an adult family member or a $500,000 cap on damages for loss of society and companionship of a minor is likewise inapplicable in a civil rights case. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984
  • Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09
     
    Whether state or federal qualified immunity for discretionary acts might shield a defendant from liability under the civil rights act depends on whether the defendant violates a plaintiff's clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Allen v. Guerrero, 276 Wis.2d 679, 688 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 2004)(deliberately holding a person in prison beyond a statutorily prescribed release date violates the 8th Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment). The plaintiff must prove unconstitutional conduct and that the applicable constitutional standards were clearly established at the time in question. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)(excessive force during an arrest); Newsome v McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003)(procurement of false testimony); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996)(high speed chase by police). http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:mOG9ycDK1QwJ:www.pittslaw.com/_pittslaw.09_/Pages/civil_rights_claims.html+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a
Nye Frank

In Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S.Ct. 394 (1994), a suit under the Federa... - 0 views

searchjustice.usdoj.gov/search

tort cal. 14th pro bono crime victims

shared by Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Intense feelings of anger, fear, isolation, low self-esteem, helplessness, and depression are common reactions to victimization
  • ...8 more comments...
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    violence victims that are set forth in its Domestic Abuse Code. VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #22 Victims of crime should have rights at administrative proceedings, including the right to have a person of their choice accompany them to the proceedings, the right to input regarding the sanction, and the right to notification of the sanction. Agencies and institutions that seek to hold their employees or students accountable for their alleged criminal or negligent behavior often do so through administrative proceedings, including disciplinary hearings on college campuses in sexual assault cases and other crimes that violate college rules. Governmental and private sector organizations also conduct administrative hearings when an employee is accused of misconduct, which sometimes also constitutes a criminal act. These hearings are held to determine whether an employee or student should be dismissed or sanctioned. Victims often complain about their lack of rights and protections at these hearings. For example, at disciplinary hearings on college campuses and in schools, as well as administrative proceedings when criminal justice personnel are accused of conduct violations, victims are frequently not allowed such fundamental rights as the right to be accompanied by a person of their choice and the right to submit a victim impact statement before the offender is sanctioned.Agencies and institutions should review their disciplinary codes and ensure that From tribal police intervention to tribal court proceedings, the victims of violent crime in Indian country must have rights available to them. They must be informed of their rights, encouraged to exercise their rights, and be protected from further harm. This is the basic responsibility of a tribal criminal justice system. Joseph Myers, Executive Director, National Indian Justice Center In Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S.Ct. 394 (1994), a suit under the
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    * Substantial numbers of victims in states with both strong and weak protection were not notified of other important rights and services, including the right to be heard at bond hearings, the right to be informed about protection against harassment and intimidation, and the right to discuss the case with the prosecutor.44
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    While the majority of states mandate advance notice to crime victims of criminal proceedings and pretrial release, many have not implemented mechanisms to make such notice a reality.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #6 Victims and witnesses of crime should have the right to reasonable protection, including protection from intimidation. The safety of victims and witnesses should be considered in determining whether offenders should be released from custody prior to completing their full sentence. The right to protection from intimidation, harassment, and retaliation by offenders and the accused is becoming a major focus of public and law enforcement attention. Justice officials report an increase in the harassment and intimidation of witnesses, making it increasingly difficult to obtain convictions because crime victims and witnesses are afraid to testify.63 Legislatures have attempted to address this problem by mandating "no contact" orders as a condition of pretrial or posttrial release. In addition, victims' bills of rights generally require victims to be notified at the outset of the judicial process about legal action they can take to protect themselves from harassment and intimidation.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Congress made restitution mandatory in federal criminal cases involving violent crimes with the enactment of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act,Title II of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.73
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    All crime victims should have the right to a full range of services and support to help them recover physically, psychologically, and in practical ways from the effects of crime, whether or not they report the crime or become involved in related criminal prosecutions or juvenile adjudications. In the aftermath of victimization, victims may have many different needs.Victims who report crime need information, assistance and protection when they choose to participate in the criminal and juvenile justice process. Not only should victims have the right to be heard or consulted in decisions that affect them, but they should receive protection if they are witnesses and transportation to and from legal proceedings.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Victims should have standing to enforce their rights, and sanctions should be applied to criminal and juvenile justice professionals who deny victims their fundamental rights
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #19 States and the federal government should create compliance enforcement programs, sometimes referred to as victim ombudsman programs, to help facilitate the implementation of victims' rights. 29 Chapter 1: Victims' Rights State victims' rights compliance enforcement programs oversee justice officials' and agencies' compliance with crime victims' statutory and constitutional rights and investigate crime victim complaints relevant to those rights being violated.93 A few states have created such programs within an existing agency or have established a new, statelevel oversight authority. In initiating such a program, officials should consider the importance of meaningful remedies and sanctions for noncompliance with victims' rights laws; and ensure that victims, victim service providers, advocacy groups, and victim-sensitive justice professionals are involved in the program planning process. In addition, justice agencies should consider increasing crime or court surcharges to support a compliance enforcement functions, and should evaluate overall compliance enforcement system. Innovative approaches to victims' rights oversight have been implemented in several states: * The Minnesota Office of the Crime Victims Ombudsman (OCVO) protects the rights of victims by investigating statutory violations of victims' rights laws and mistreatment by criminal justice practitioners. OCVO is authorized to initiate its own investigation of alleged violations, recommend corrective action, and make its findings public to both the legislature and the press. * The South Carolina Office of the Crime Victims' Ombudsman is empowered to act as a referral entity for victims in need of services, a liaison between victims and the criminal and juvenile justice systems in the course of their interaction, and a resolver of complaints made by victims against elements of those systems and against victim assistance programs. In
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    The Supreme Court in Owen undertook a textual analysis. By the Court's methodology, broad statutory language -- coupled with silence on the subject of privileges, immunities, and defenses -- means that municipalities are liable in federal court for civil rights violations. Owen, 100 S.Ct. at 1407. Its [the statute's] language is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted. Rather, the Act [§ 1983] imposes liability upon "every person" who, under color of state law or custom, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities of the Constitution and laws." And Monell [supra] held that these words were intended to encompass municipal corporations as well as natural "persons."
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Seminole notwithstanding, these cases do not support the conclusion that a city is immune from suit under federal statutes. To the contrary, the Court has clearly established that municipalities can be amenable to civil rights suits in federal court. Owen, 100 S.Ct. at 1407; Monell, 98 S.Ct. at 2035- 2036; Mt. Healthy, 97 S.Ct. at 572. See also Howlett v. Rose, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2444 (1990) (holding that "Federal law makes governmental defendants that are not arms of the State, such as municipalities, liable for their constitutional violations," but acknowledging that the state and its arms are immune from the reach of § 1983).
Nye Frank

315 F.2d 312In that case we held that: "The statutory prerequisites to liabil... - 0 views

bulk.resource.org/...315.F2d.312.7066.html

color of law 1983

shared by Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09 - Cached
  • The purpose of Section 1979 is to create a right of action, enforceable in federal courts, against those who, "under color of" state law, deprive any person of any rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution and laws. Monroe v. Pape, supra.2 We are convinced that the legal principles involved in this case are not distinguishable from Monroe v. Pape, supra, and Stringer v. Dilger, supra, and that it was error to direct a verdict for the police officer defendants. See Hardwick v. Hurley, 7 Cir., 289 F.2d 529. A jury question was presented as to whether the conduct of the police officers on the different occasions was so arbitrary, unreasonable and without probable cause as to subject the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
    • Nye Frank
      Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09
       
      In that case we held that: "The statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the defendant act `under color of' state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' * * *" (Footnote omitted.) Stringer v. Dilger, supra.
  • Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09
     
    In that case we held that: "The statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the defendant act `under color of' state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' * * *" (Footnote omitted.) Stringer v. Dilger, supra.
Nye Frank

California Codes - California Attorney Resources - California Laws - 0 views

law.onecle.com/california

california law us constitution code amendments welfare

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    Court Opinions US Supreme Court US Tax Court Board of Patent Appeals State Laws Alabama Arizona California Florida Georgia Illinois Indiana Massachusetts Michigan Nevada New Jersey New York North Carolina Oregon Pennsylvania Texas Virginia Washington US Code Copyrights Crimes Labor Patents Shipping US Constitution Preamble Art. I - Legislative Art. II - Executive Art. III - Judicial Art. IV - States' Relations Art. V - Mode of Amendment Art. VI - Prior Debts Art VII - Ratification California Codes Legal Research Home > California Lawyer Sponsored Links California Constitution . (Cal. Const.) California Business and Professions Code . (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code) California Civil Code . (Cal. Civ. Code) California Code of Civil Procedure . (Cal. Civ. Proc.) California Commercial Code . (Cal. Com. Code) California Corporations Code . (Cal. Corp. Code) California Education Code . (Cal. Educ. Code) California Elections Code . (Cal. Elec. Code) California Evidence Code . (Cal. Evid. Code) California Family Code . (Cal. Fam. Code) California Financial Code . (Cal. Fin. Code) California Fish and Game Code . (Cal. Fish & Game Code) California Food and Agricultural Code . (Cal. Food & Agric. Code) California Government Code . (Cal. Gov't Code) California Harbors and Navigation Code . (Cal. Harb. & Nav. Code) California Health and Safety Code . (Cal. Health & Safety Code) California Insurance Code . (Cal. Ins. Code) California Labor Code . (Cal. Lab. Code) California Military and Veterans Code . (Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code) California Penal Code . (Cal. Penal Code) California Pr
Nye Frank

Links - September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 - 0 views

www.usdoj.gov/...re_legal.html

victim compensation 11th legal crime

shared by Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Links for state bar associations for some key victim states are listed below. State Bar of California Connecticut Bar Association District of Columbia Bar Maryland State Bar Association Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers,Office of the Bar Counsel New Jersey State Bar Association New York State Bar Association Pennsylvania Bar Association Virginia State Bar
  • Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09
     
    There is much litigation over the question whether a particular wrong allegedly perpetrated by a defendant upon a plaintiff is the type of conduct that the civil rights act was designed to remedy. Many claimed infractions of the law do not give rise to a civil rights violation. Suit is allowed only if the defendant deprives a person of his or her rights under the federal laws or the United States Constitution. Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 384 N.W.2d 333 (1986). The civil rights statute does not create any substantive rights. Penterman v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997). The procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment will only be triggered if state action implicates a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property. Board of Regents v. Roth, 498 U.S. 564 (1972)(no constitutional tort was involved in non-renewal of contract of non-tenured teacher). Nothing in the 14th Amendment protects against all government deprivations of life, liberty or property. Only deprivations without due process of law are protected. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, (1984)(shakedown of prison inmate not actionable unless solely for the purpose of harassing or humiliating plaintiff) http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:mOG9ycDK1QwJ:www.pittslaw.com/_pittslaw.09_/Pages/civil_rights_claims.html+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a
Nye Frank

Diigo & Google - 0 views

www.diigo.com/...g

equal protection civil rights

shared by Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09
     
    There is much litigation over the question whether a particular wrong allegedly perpetrated by a defendant upon a plaintiff is the type of conduct that the civil rights act was designed to remedy. Many claimed infractions of the law do not give rise to a civil rights violation. Suit is allowed only if the defendant deprives a person of his or her rights under the federal laws or the United States Constitution. Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 384 N.W.2d 333 (1986). The civil rights statute does not create any substantive rights. Penterman v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997). The procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment will only be triggered if state action implicates a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property. Board of Regents v. Roth, 498 U.S. 564 (1972)(no constitutional tort was involved in non-renewal of contract of non-tenured teacher). Nothing in the 14th Amendment protects against all government deprivations of life, liberty or property. Only deprivations without due process of law are protected. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, (1984)(shakedown of prison inmate not actionable unless solely for the purpose of harassing or humiliating plaintiff) http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:mOG9ycDK1QwJ:www.pittslaw.com/_pittslaw.09_/Pages/civil_rights_claims.html+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a
Nye Frank

Courthouse News Service - 0 views

www.courthousenews.com/...appellateopinions.aspx

two prior convictions counts

shared by Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09
     
    By shifting the attention of the courts to the injury suffered by individuals, constitutional tort actions have inºuenced courts, encouraging the establishment of constitutional rights that both protect individuals from governmental injury and regulate the discretion of the government to inºict injury.
Nye Frank

goverment agency mandates for internal affairs for riverside county sheriff - Google Se... - 0 views

www.google.com/search

mandates

shared by Nye Frank on 19 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 19 Apr 09
     
    Riverside County Sheriff's Department v. Louis Zigman, Astrid ... Real party in interest and appellant Riverside County Sheriff's Deputy Astrid Megan ... for writ of administrative mandate filed by the Riverside County Sheriff's .... who is interrogated during a law enforcement agency's internal affairs ... Government Code section 3304, subdivision (b),6 makes it clear that a law ... www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=E043187&s=CA&d=38412 - 46k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] 1 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH DISTRICT ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML Real party in interest and appellant Riverside County Sheriff's Deputy Astrid ... petition for writ of administrative mandate filed by the Riverside County Sheriff's .... during a law enforcement agency's internal affairs investigation of .... which constitutes the administrative appeal guaranteed by Government ... www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E043187.PDF - Similar pages - [PDF] SHERIFF-CORONER DEPARTMENT COUNTY OF ORANGE File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML practices, rather than through an external unfunded mandate. The Sheriffs Department is also subject to reviews and audits by many government agencies such as: ... completed internal affairs investigation. The Attorney General's Office ... Riverside and San Diego. Finally, through the Public Records Act. the ... www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/ocsd.pdf - Similar pages - About Lackie & Dammeier Michael makes his home in Orange County with his wife. .... Labor Experience: Chief negotiator and labor rep, Riverside Sheriff's Association, ... Mr. Lackie has extensive experience in internal affairs representation, ... including injunctions barring police agencies from violating the Bill of Rights. ... www.policeat
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...getcase.pl

uscs 1983 and wrongful death under california state law

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Plaintiffs Teri and Thomas Lewis, Philip Lewis's parents, filed suit in Sacramento County Superior Court against Sacramento County, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, and Officer Smith. The Lewises allege a deprivation of their son's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and wrongful death under California state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment on various grounds
  • The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the S 1983 claims. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Smith as to the state causes of action. The court denied summary judgment as to the pendent state law causes of action against the County and the Sheriff's department, dismissing those claims without prejudice. The district court's decisions are summarized below.
  • We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. We do not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • First, the district court assumed, without deciding, that Officer Smith had violated Lewis's constitutional rights. The court then addressed Smith's claim to qualified immunity. The court stated that plaintiffs had not presented, and it could not find, any "state or federal opinion published before May, 1990, when the alleged misconduct took place, that supports plaintiffs' view that they have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right in the context of high speed police pursuits." The court therefore found that the law regarding Lewis's Fourteenth Amendment right to life and personal security was not clearly established and granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Smith on qualified immunity grounds.
  • Because the court dismissed all federal claims, it declined to decide whether the county and the sheriff's department were also immune under California law. The court then dismissed without prejudice the state claims against the county and sheriff's department to allow plaintiffs to file those claims in state court.
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected right. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989))
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    LakinChapman, LLC Nationwide www.lakinlaw.com/PracticeAreas/Nursing-Home-Neglect.asp Pioneers in nursing home abuse law 866-839-2021 Statutory Protection of Older Persons Today, all states have laws concerning the abuse, neglect or exploitation of older people, but these states may follow different approaches. In most states, there is a system of adult protective services for investigating and remedying reported abuses. Moreover, some states have laws giving victims of abuse, neglect or exploitation a civil cause of action. Finally, in most states, the abuse or neglect of older people is also a crime. Adult Protective Services Typically, before any civil or criminal action is commenced against a nursing home, a report will have been made to your state's adult protective services agency, or other system in place for the reporting and investigation of allegations of the abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly. All states have a system for reporting allegations of abuse, neglect and exploitation of the elderly, for investigating the allegations and, if the allegations are founded, for providing services to the older person to remedy the problems and prevent their recurrence. In fact, most states have mandatory reporting requirements with respect to such allegations. If an agency concludes that an allegation is founded, it will respond by offering the older person appropriate services, such as medical assistance, counseling, special transportation, assistance with money management, or placement in a different residential setting. Civil Actions Based on Statutes Some state legislatures have created causes of action involving the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of older people, which allow victims to bring civil actions against the perpetrators and/or their employees. These causes of action may authorize damages awards to victims, but may also authorize the issuance of injunctions and restraining or protective orders, for immediate relief from ongoing abuse
Nye Frank

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Civil Rights Division Home Page - 0 views

www.usdoj.gov/...polmis.php

civil rights police misconduct deny color of the law

shared by Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Federal Criminal Enforcement It is a crime for one or more persons acting under color of law willfully to deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242). "Color of law" simply means that the person doing the act is using power given to him or her by a governmental agency (local, State, or Federal). A law enforcement officer acts "under color of law" even if he or she is exceeding his or her rightful power. The types of law enforcement misconduct covered by these laws include excessive force, sexual assault, intentional false arrests, or the intentional fabrication of evidence resulting in a loss of liberty to another. Enforcement of these provisions does not require that any racial, religious, or other discriminatory motive existed.
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Federal Criminal Enforcement It is a crime for one or more persons acting under color of law willfully to deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242). "Color of law" simply means that the person doing the act is using power given to him or her by a governmental agency (local, State, or Federal). A law enforcement officer acts "under color of law" even if he or she is exceeding his or her rightful power. The types of law enforcement misconduct covered by these laws include Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities on the basis of disability. (42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. and 29 U.S.C. § 794). These laws protect all people with disabilities in the United States. An individual is considered to have a "disability" if he or she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in all State and local government programs, services, and activities regardless of whether they receive DOJ financial assistance; it also protects people who are discriminated against because of their association with a person with a disability. Section 504 prohibits discrimination by State and local law enforcement agencies that receive financial assistance from DOJ. Section 504 also prohibits discrimination in programs and activities conducted by Federal agencies, including law enforcement agencies. These laws prohibit discriminatory treatment, including excessive force, sexual assault, intentional false arrests, or the intentional fabrication of evidence resulting in a loss of liberty to another. Enforcement of
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities on the basis of disability. (42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. and 29 U.S.C. § 794). These laws protect all people with disabilities in the United States. An individual is considered to have a "disability" if he or she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in all State and local government programs, services, and activities regardless of whether they receive DOJ financial assistance; it also protects people who are discriminated against because of their association with a person with a disability. Section 504 prohibits discrimination by State and local law enforcement agencies that receive financial assistance from DOJ. Section 504 also prohibits discrimination in programs and activities conducted by Federal agencies, including law enforcement agencies. These laws prohibit discriminatory treatment, including
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    What information should I include in a complaint to DOJ? Your complaint, whether alleging violations of criminal or civil laws listed in this document, should include the following information: Your name, address, and telephone number(s). The name(s) of the law enforcement agency (or agencies) involved. A description of the conduct you believe violates one of the laws discussed above, with as many details as possible. You should include: the dates and times of incident(s); any injuries sustained; the name(s), or other identifying information, of the officer(s) involved (if possible); and any other examples of similar misconduct. The names and telephone numbers of witnesses who can support your allegations. If you believe that the misconduct is based on your race, color, national origin, sex, religion, or disability, please identify the basis and explain what led you to believe that you were treated in a discriminatory manner (i.e., differently from persons of another race, sex, etc.). Reproduction of this document is encouraged.
Nye Frank

Department of Justice, State of Oregon - Links - 0 views

www.doj.state.or.us/links.shtml

legal links courts leg senate org law

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Legal | Consumer | Child Support (DCS) | Other Government Legal Oregon Courts Oregon Revised Statutes Links Oregon Constitution Links Oregon Administrative Rules Oregon State Bar Association United States Courts Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals United States Supreme Court Consumer American Association of Retired Persons Better Business Bureau Construction Contractors Board Federal Communication Commission Federal Trade Commission Food & Drug Administration Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Child Support DCS Links Other Government United States Department of Justice United States Senate United States House of Representatives Oregon Legislature Oregon Governor State of Oregon |Back to Top
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Legal | Consumer | Child Support (DCS) | Other Government Legal Oregon Courts Oregon Revised Statutes Links Oregon Constitution Links Oregon Administrative Rules Oregon State Bar Association United States Courts Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals United States Supreme Court Consumer American Association of Retired Persons Better Business Bureau Construction Contractors Board Federal Communication Commission Federal Trade Commission Food & Drug Administration Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Child Support DCS Links Other Government United States Department of Justice United States Senate United States House of Representatives Oregon Legislature Oregon Governor State of Oregon |Back to Top
1 - 20 of 44 Next › Last »
Showing 20▼ items per page