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Nye Frank

we asked for a safe way to report Building A Financial Abuse Case for the Criminal Just... - 0 views

  • Identify other sources of information Health care professionals Paramedics and EMTs Family and friends Who did victim tell first Importance of asking about and documenting the victim's demeanor and reason for making contact Not for police action but for safety, health needs, seek help
  • Crawford v. Washington  Critical importance of witnesses to whom victim and suspect have spoken Identify non governmental witnesses to statements Document spontaneous statements and demeanor Calls for help and medical care
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
Nye Frank

conspiracy case 99-6050 -- U.S. v. Rahseparian -- 11/07/2000 - 0 views

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    SEYMOUR , Chief Judge. After a joint jury trial, co-defendants Ardashir (aka Ardie) and Daryoush (aka Steve), along with Jalal (aka Jack) Rahseparian, were convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. All three appealed. Jack's appeal is addressed in the companion opinion, see United States v. Rahseparian, No. 99-6031 (Nov. 7, 2000). Ardie contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Ardie and Steve contend a new trial is necessary due to the prosecutor's comment on their failure to testify in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Steve further claims a new trial is required because of certain incriminating hearsay statements elicited by the prosecutor in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). We affirm. I BACKGROUND Ardie and Steve Rahseparian are the sons of Jack Rahseparian. At the time of the conduct for which they were charged, Steve resided in Altoona, Pennsylvania, Ardie resided in Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Jack resided and worked in Shawnee, Oklahoma. The government contended at trial that Ardie and Steve Rahseparian formed Genesis Marketing, a telemarketing company, through which they and their father conspired to commit and did commit mail fraud from May 1994 to May 1995. The government further successfully argued that Ardie, Steve, and Jack Rahseparian laundered the proceeds from the telemarketing scheme through Jack's business checking accounts. Brad Russell, the company's only employee other than the Rahseparians themselves, testified on behalf of the government. Mr. Russell was a personal friend of Ardie. The two worked out of Ardie's apartment in Fort Smith as the sole telemarketers for Genesis Marketing. Mr. Russell testified that he and Ardie would entice customers over the telephone to buy products, such as water purifiers and "Say No to Drugs" kits, at highly inflated pric
Nye Frank

Juris Publishing - Fine's Wisconsin Evidence -2nd Edition - 0 views

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    earchable access to it via our online collection of publications. Book Overview Table of Contents Chapter 901 General Provisions 901.01 Scope 901.02 Purpose and Construction 901.03 Rulings on Evidence 901.04 Preliminary Questions (1) Judge Determines Admissibility (2) Admissibility when Relevancy Conditioned on Fact (3) Hearing out of Jury's Presence (4) Testimony by Accused (5) Weight and Credibility 901.05 Admissibility of AIDS Test Results 901.053 Admissibility of Helmet - Wearing Evidence 901.055 Admissibility of Lead-in-Dust Testing Evidence 901.06 Limited Admissibility 901.07 Rule of Completeness Chapter 902 Judicial Notice 902.01 Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts 902.02 Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws 902.03 Ordinances and Administrative Rules Chapter 903 Presumptions 903.01 Presumptions in General 903.03 Presumptions in Criminal Cases Chapter 904 Relevancy 904.01 Definition of "Relevant Evidence" 904.02 Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible 904.03 Exclusion of Relevant Evidence 904.04 Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct (1) Character Evidence Generally (a) of the Accused (b) of the Victim (c) of the Witness (2) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 904.05 Methods of Proving Character (1) Reputation or Opinion (2) Specific Instances of Conduct 904.06 Habit, Routine 904.07 Subsequent Remedial Measures 904.08 Compromise and Offers to Compromise 904.085 Communications in Mediation 904.09 Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses 904.10 Offers to Plead Guilty or No Contest; Withdrawn Guilty Pleas 904.11 Liability Insurance 904.12 Statement of Injured Person 904.13 Information Concerning Crime Victims 904.15 Communications in Farmer Assistance Programs Chapter 905 Privileges 905.01 Privileges Recognized Only as Provided 905.015 Use of Interpreter for Privileged Communi
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    earchable access to it via our online collection of publications. Book Overview Table of Contents Chapter 901 General Provisions 901.01 Scope 901.02 Purpose and Construction 901.03 Rulings on Evidence 901.04 Preliminary Questions (1) Judge Determines Admissibility (2) Admissibility when Relevancy Conditioned on Fact (3) Hearing out of Jury's Presence (4) Testimony by Accused (5) Weight and Credibility 901.05 Admissibility of AIDS Test Results 901.053 Admissibility of Helmet - Wearing Evidence 901.055 Admissibility of Lead-in-Dust Testing Evidence 901.06 Limited Admissibility 901.07 Rule of Completeness Chapter 902 Judicial Notice 902.01 Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts 902.02 Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws 902.03 Ordinances and Administrative Rules Chapter 903 Presumptions 903.01 Presumptions in General 903.03 Presumptions in Criminal Cases Chapter 904 Relevancy 904.01 Definition of "Relevant Evidence" 904.02 Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible 904.03 Exclusion of Relevant Evidence 904.04 Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct (1) Character Evidence Generally (a) of the Accused (b) of the Victim (c) of the Witness (2) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 904.05 Methods of Proving Character (1) Reputation or Opinion (2) Specific Instances of Conduct 904.06 Habit, Routine 904.07 Subsequent Remedial Measures 904.08 Compromise and Offers to Compromise 904.085 Communications in Mediation 904.09 Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses 904.10 Offers to Plead Guilty or No Contest; Withdrawn Guilty Pleas 904.11 Liability Insurance 904.12 Statement of Injured Person 904.13 Information Concerning Crime Victims 904.15 Communications in Farmer Assistance Programs Chapter 905 Privileges 905.01 Privileges Recognized Only as Provided 905.015 Use of Interpreter for Privileged Communi
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

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    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
  • ...4 more comments...
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
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    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
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    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
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    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
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    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

standard of review evidence in elder homicide, victims rigtht to trial over 65 - Google... - 0 views

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    Did you mean: standard of review evidence in elder homicide, victims right to trial over 65 Search Results[DOC] Chapter 3 - 5 visits - Jan 3File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML For victims and survivors of violent crime and for homicide victims for current and ... Claimants use the compensation funds over the long term. ... of victim population groups for whom speedy trial rights are particularly important. ..... Elder protection programs that assist victims of elder abuse and neglect. ... https://www.ovcttac.gov/nvaa2008/documents/participants_text/03%20Basic%20Victims'%20Rights.doc - Similar pages - [PPT] Responding to Crimes Against Elder Victims: A Program for TrainersFile Format: Microsoft Powerpoint - View as HTML Others with highest percentages of folks over 65 are: ..... Found incompetent to stand trial and dangerous to self and others ... Standards. Civil v. Criminal. APS/Law Enforcement. Victim/Client .... Homicide and the ME refused to come to the scene. Evidence .... Right from wrong, truth vs.. lie, suggestibility ... elder.law.stetson.edu/Professionals/crimeprevention_powerpoints/Elder%20Abuse%20Trainer%20package.ppt - Similar pages - Homicidal smothering: vital histological confirmation of orofacial ...Apr 29, 2008 ... evidence in the subsequent criminal trial. Discussion ... Although homicides in those over 65 years ... be feasible and morphology was excellent using standard ... homicide victims: a 10-year medical examiner review. J Forensic ... elderly homicide victims in New York City. Am J Public Health. ... www.springerlink.com/index/q87305r037563323.pdf - Similar pages - by SM Wills - Related articles Hill v. State 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 52 (2008)Jul 24, 2008 ... The trial jury found Hill guilty and the district court imposed a sentence of life ... Standard of review. In Dettloff v. State, we noted that it is ... important procedural rights if there is substantial evidence in the ... and for committing a crime against an eld
Nye Frank

questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

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    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
Nye Frank

Victim Rights Manual - 0 views

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    A defendant may be released on bail for all offenses except capital crimes. Public safety is the primary consideration in setting the bail amount. The court must conduct a hearing before deviating from the scheduled bail for a violent felony or for threatening a witness in a rape, domestic violence or criminal threat case. The court must state its reasons for deviating from the bail schedule. (Cal.Const Art. 1 Sect. 28, PC 1270.1, and PC 1275.)In violent felony cases, the district attorneys office, Division of Victim Services and the probation department are responsible for notifying victims and witnesses that they can request notification regarding the defendant's release. The Division of Victim Services will provide the forms to those victims and witnesses. (PC 679.03(a).)Inmates convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, life cases, stalking or a case where the defendant inflicted great bodily injury, cannot be released on parole within 35 miles of a victim or witness. However, the victim or witness must file the appropriate form with CDCR, and CDCR must find there is a need to protect the safety and well being of the victim or witness. (PC 3003.)Upon request, when a defendant is sent to state prison, the victim or next of kin will be notified of the defendant's release to work furlough or a reentry program at least 60 days prior to placement. If the inmate escapes, the victim must be given immediate notification. The victim should keep his or her request and current address on file using a form that can be obtained through the Division of Victim Services. (PC 679.02(a)(6), PC 11155.)The Right to be Protected13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 An employer with more than 25 employees may not discriminate against an employee who has been a victim of a sex crime or domestic violence when that employee seeks medical attention or counseling. (LC 230.1.)Employers must allow crime victims or family members t
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Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 - 0 views

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    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
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    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
Nye Frank

Defense attorney claims he has proof of misconduct by Santa Clara County prosecutors - ... - 0 views

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    Sign In | Register | Newsletters Subscribe | e-Edition | Home Delivery | Mobile | Mobile Alerts | RSS HOME NEWS breaking news obituaries crime health science earthquakes politics nation / world ap headlines special reports education traffic weather weird news BUSINESS real estate green energy special reports financial markets personal finance venture capital drive / automotive data base press releases TECH news opinion sectors companies personal tech SPORTS 49ers raiders giants a's sharks warriors quakes gold pride high schools colleges stanford cal sjsu golf other sports scores / stats ENTERTAINMENT celebrities restaurants movies television music horoscopes comics puzzles and games lottery events arts books LIFE & STYLE food & wine home and garden travel fashion & style pets & animals green living religion OPINION columns editorials letters blogs discussion boards web votes article comments live chats MY CITY san jose / valley los gatos saratoga cupertino sunnyvale campbell central coast peninsula alameda county HELP contact us site map faq widgets start / stop paper advertising buy photos ethics policy past articles PLACE AD place display ad place classified ad SHOPPING newspaper
Nye Frank

My Bookmarks tagged tort - 0 views

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    SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, the California Supreme Court did away with the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence: ...we hold that there is no tort remedy for the intentional spoliation of evidence by a party to the cause of action to which the spoliated evidence is relevant, in cases which, as here, the spoliation victim knows or should have known of the alleged spoliation before the trial or other decision on the merits of the underlying action.... [18 Cal.4th 1, 17-18; fn. omitted.]
Nye Frank

California Evidence Code Section 669 - California Attorney Resources - California Laws - 0 views

  • Court Opinions US Supreme Court US Tax Court Board of Patent Appeals State Laws Alabama Arizona California Florida Georgia Illinois Indiana Massachusetts Michigan Nevada New Jersey New York North Carolina Oregon Pennsylvania Texas Virginia Washington US Code Copyrights Crimes Labor Patents Shipping US Constitution Preamble Art. I - Legislative Art. II - Executive Art. III - Judicial Art. IV - States' Relations Art. V - Mode of Amendment Art. VI - Prior Debts Art VII - Ratification California Evidence Code Section 669 Legal Research Home > California Lawyer > Evidence Code > California Evidence Code Section 669 Sponsored Links google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad); google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad); (a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if: (1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted. (b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that: (1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law; or (2) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation was a child and exercised the degree of care ordinarily exercised by persons of his maturity, intelligence, and capacity under similar circumstances, but the presumption may not be rebutted by such proof if the violation occurred in the course of an activity normally engaged in only by adults and requiring adult qualifications. Section: Previous  660  662  663  664  665  666  667  668  669  669.1  669.5  670  Next Last modified: January 12, 2009 google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad);border: medium none ; margin: 0pt; paddin
Nye Frank

foia damages, tort No. 03-1395: Doe v. Tenet - Appendix (Petition) - 0 views

  • While Totten and Reynolds are closely related in that both protect a state secret from disclosure, the rules announced in those cases differ in subtle but important respects. Most importantly, the state secrets privilege in Reynolds permits the government to withhold otherwise relevant discovery from a recognized cause of action (e.g., an FTCA case), while the Totten doctrine permits the dismissal of a lawsuit because it is non-justiciable before such evidentiary questions are ever reached.
  • In Kasza, we relied on the Reynolds rule that "the state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to deny discovery of military secrets." Id. at 1165. After reviewing the applicable law, we reasoned that the application of the state secrets privilege can have different effects, depending on whether it is used to exclude evidence or to dismiss a cause of action. Id. at 1166. First, we found that the government's invocation of the privilege over particular evidence may completely remove the evidence from the case. Id. If a plaintiff cannot make out her prima facie case without the secret evidence, the court may dismiss her claim. Id. Second, the privilege may deprive a defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim. Id. In these cases, the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant. Id.
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    IFurther, Weinberger concerned in the main an explicit statutory exemption to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). See Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 144, 102 S. Ct. 197. FOIA analysis is governed strictly by statute, while the state secrets privilege is governed solely by judge-made law. Also, FOIA cases involve a determination of what information can be released to the public without any restriction on the information's dissemination. In contrast, the state secrets privilege governs what material can be used by individual litigants who need such information to make their cases, under such restrictions of access as may be necessary, including in camera review, closed proceedings, and sealed records. Weinberger therefore dealt principally with the substantive question whether the sensitive material at issue could be made public and only as a subsidiary matter with the handling of that material within the confines of litigation. Weinberger did refer to Totten at the end of the opinion as an explanation, by analogy, concerning why the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") inquiry could not go forward in court. It also referred, however, in the same context, to Reynolds, the seminal state secrets privilege case. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 147, 102 S. Ct. 197. The brief reference to Totten in Weinberger therefore cannot be read as prescribing the application of Totten without regard to the later-developed state secrets privilege doctrine, and Kasza evidently did not so read it. We therefore conclude that Totten is applicable to the case before us only as applied through the prism of current state secrets doctrine. C. To invoke the state secrets privilege, a formal claim of privilege must be "lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration [of the evidence] by that officer." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8, 73 S. Ct. 528 (footnotes omitted); see also Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165. After that, "[t]he court itself
Nye Frank

Pictures TheHomicideOfNyeFrankOffRoadRacingDragRacingSheriff# - 0 views

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    Nye Frank worked all his life to build his reputation by results and hard work. Night before he was murdered he stated how important his reputation was. The Riverside Press Enterprise put a false story in the paper 5 months after Nye's death on the front page. The DA office released Nye's autopsy to the Press before the family. The family had to get the National Organization for Victims to call the Sheriff to say they are illegally not releasing the reports to the family. Autopsy states no heart attack and there is zero evidence of Nye Frank ever being in a fist fight. There is only evidence of a attack. Internal affairs also released the audio and video to the family. The audio has Phil Reddish the killers dad tell the head detective and the prosecutor about the DA Rod Pacheco's friend and how he is going to help him. Also the sheriff video has Ty bend down to avoid the video and ask the officers if he should tell how he choked the old guy with judo moves taught by his dad the Norco High wrestling coach.
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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

Officer Liability -- State Law Torts and the FTCA (podcast transcript) - Federal Law En... - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 16 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Miller:    Who’s considered a law enforcement officer for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act? Solari:    A law enforcement officer for purposes of the FTCA is anyone who can make arrests for violations of federal law, or seize evidence, or execute seizures.  If you qualify, then Uncle Sam will pay for intentional torts like assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process if those torts were committed while within scope.  Limiting that intentional tort provision to law enforcement officers makes sense, if you think about it.  The federal government asks its law enforcement officers to arrest people, conduct searches, and seize evidence.  And as we know, that often involves doing things like grabbing people, knocking them down, hitting them with an ASP… whatever.  So you’d expect law enforcement officers to be doing things that look like intentional torts.  On the other hand, you know, a person who gives out checks at the social security office shouldn’t be grabbing anybody or knocking them down, or hitting them with sticks.  Uncle Sam just doesn’t ask them to do that, so the federal government’s not going to pay when they do.
    • Nye Frank
       
      A law enforcement officer for purposes of the FTCA is anyone who can make arrests for violations of federal law, or seize evidence, or execute seizures. If you qualify, then Uncle Sam will pay for intentional torts like assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process if those torts were committed while within scope. Limiting that intentional tort provision to law enforcement officers makes sense, if you think about it. The federal government asks its law enforcement officers to arrest people, conduct searches, and seize evidence. And as we know, that often involves doing things like grabbing people, knocking them down, hitting them with an ASP… whatever. So you'd expect law enforcement officers to be doing things that look like intentional torts. On the other hand, you know, a person who gives out checks at the social security office shouldn't be grabbing anybody or knocking them down, or hitting them with sticks. Uncle Sam just doesn't ask them to do that, so the federal government's not going to pay when they do.
Nye Frank

California Codes - California Attorney Resources - California Laws - 0 views

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    Court Opinions US Supreme Court US Tax Court Board of Patent Appeals State Laws Alabama Arizona California Florida Georgia Illinois Indiana Massachusetts Michigan Nevada New Jersey New York North Carolina Oregon Pennsylvania Texas Virginia Washington US Code Copyrights Crimes Labor Patents Shipping US Constitution Preamble Art. I - Legislative Art. II - Executive Art. III - Judicial Art. IV - States' Relations Art. V - Mode of Amendment Art. VI - Prior Debts Art VII - Ratification California Codes Legal Research Home > California Lawyer Sponsored Links California Constitution . (Cal. Const.) California Business and Professions Code . (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code) California Civil Code . (Cal. Civ. Code) California Code of Civil Procedure . (Cal. Civ. Proc.) California Commercial Code . (Cal. Com. Code) California Corporations Code . (Cal. Corp. Code) California Education Code . (Cal. Educ. Code) California Elections Code . (Cal. Elec. Code) California Evidence Code . (Cal. Evid. Code) California Family Code . (Cal. Fam. Code) California Financial Code . (Cal. Fin. Code) California Fish and Game Code . (Cal. Fish & Game Code) California Food and Agricultural Code . (Cal. Food & Agric. Code) California Government Code . (Cal. Gov't Code) California Harbors and Navigation Code . (Cal. Harb. & Nav. Code) California Health and Safety Code . (Cal. Health & Safety Code) California Insurance Code . (Cal. Ins. Code) California Labor Code . (Cal. Lab. Code) California Military and Veterans Code . (Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code) California Penal Code . (Cal. Penal Code) California Pr
Nye Frank

how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor - Google Search - 0 views

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    Results 1 - 10 of about 140,000 for how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor . ( 0.38 seconds) Did you mean: how to provide specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor Search Results Conspiracy (crime) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Conspiracy law usually does not require proof of the specific intent by the ... based on the fact that the prosecutor would be unable to prove beyond a ... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Conspiracy _(crime) - 54k - Cached - Similar pages - 1. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda-genocide-conspiracy ... defendant's co-conspirators acted with specific intent would "tend to prove" that the. 40. See Prosecutor v. Bagasora et al., Case Nos. ICTR-98-41-AR93, ... papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID951847_code366348.pdf?abstractid=951847&rulid=263109&mirid=4 - Similar pages - by A Decision E Law: Conspiracy to Commit Genocide: Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda ... [48] In order to prove the existence of a conspiracy, ..... that an accused might have the specific intent required to commit genocide and also to act ... The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecutor relied on the same intent of the two ... www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v8n1/obote-odora81.html - 1k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML Where the prosecutor did not charge conspiracy as an offense, but introduced evidence of a conspiracy to prove liability, the court had a sua sponte duty to ... an agreement between two or more people with the specific intent to agree ... www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/archive/B199059.PDF - Similar pages - [PDF] [J-28-99] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENN
Nye Frank

FEDERAL RULES EVIDENCE - 0 views

  • Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts (a) Scope of rule.—This rule governs only judicial notice of adju- dicative facts. (b) Kinds of facts.—A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2
  • capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned
Nye Frank

http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/promoting%20effective%20homicide%20inv... - 0 views

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    6 - Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Homicides and Clearance Rates - 7 ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S (FBI) Annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for 2005, the number of homicides in the United States increased by 4.8 percent compared to 2004-the largest single-year increase for homicides in 14 years. And, for June 2006 the trend continued, with preliminary UCR data showing that homicide increased by 0.3 percent, with a much larger increase of 6.7 percent in cities with populations of 1 million or more. While the number of homicides in the U.S. has fluctuated since the 1960s, the number of homicides being solved has decreased in that time. Homicide clearance rates have decreased by approximately 30 percent since the 1960s.Despite this overall national decrease, however, some jurisdictions have maintained their ability to solve homicides at a high rate. This chapter provides an overview of homicide rates and clearance rates in the United States. It discusses the effect of unsolved homicides on the department and the community. This chapter also highlights trends affecting homicide investigations and investigative factors associated with cleared homicide cases. Strategies for improving homicide clearance rates are examined, as well. OVERVIEW OF HOMICIDE RATES AND CLEARANCE RATES Since 1930, the FBI has annually collected data on the number of crimes reported from more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United 2 Homicides and Clearance Rates States and the number of crimes that are cleared by an arrest. The FBI releases this information to the public through its UCRs. For the purposes of the UCR, a crime is considered cleared if at least one person has been 1. arrested, 2. charged with the crime, and 3. handed over to the courts for prosecution.1 The UCR also considers some cases cleared when certain "exceptional means" are met. For a case to be cleared by "exceptional means," the law enforcement agency must have identifi
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    6 - Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Homicides and Clearance Rates - 7 ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S (FBI) Annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for 2005, the number of homicides in the United States increased by 4.8 percent compared to 2004-the largest single-year increase for homicides in 14 years. And, for June 2006 the trend continued, with preliminary UCR data showing that homicide increased by 0.3 percent, with a much larger increase of 6.7 percent in cities with populations of 1 million or more. While the number of homicides in the U.S. has fluctuated since the 1960s, the number of homicides being solved has decreased in that time. Homicide clearance rates have decreased by approximately 30 percent since the 1960s.Despite this overall national decrease, however, some jurisdictions have maintained their ability to solve homicides at a high rate. This chapter provides an overview of homicide rates and clearance rates in the United States. It discusses the effect of unsolved homicides on the department and the community. This chapter also highlights trends affecting homicide investigations and investigative factors associated with cleared homicide cases. Strategies for improving homicide clearance rates are examined, as well. OVERVIEW OF HOMICIDE RATES AND CLEARANCE RATES Since 1930, the FBI has annually collected data on the number of crimes reported from more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United 2 Homicides and Clearance Rates States and the number of crimes that are cleared by an arrest. The FBI releases this information to the public through its UCRs. For the purposes of the UCR, a crime is considered cleared if at least one person has been 1. arrested, 2. charged with the crime, and 3. handed over to the courts for prosecution.1 The UCR also considers some cases cleared when certain "exceptional means" are met. For a case to be cleared by "exceptional means," the law enforcement agency must have identifi
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