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Alliance: Factsheets: Elder Abuse and the Law - 0 views

  • Elder Abuse Laws Numerous accounts of maltreatment led policy makers to pass a series of laws intended to protect elderly victim. The passage of the federal Older Americans Act of 1965 (OAA) (3) and the creation of the Vulnerable Elder Rights Protection Program (4) in 1992 were instrumental in promoting state laws to address the needs and concerns of the elderly. The Vulnerable Elder Rights Protection Program legislation promoted advocacy efforts through ombudsmen offices; abuse, neglect and exploitation prevention programs; and legal assistance on behalf of older Americans. It also offered federal funding incentives which made it possible for states to develop and maintain programs designed to assist the elderly. In many respects, state elder abuse laws are patterned after legislation designed to address the problem of child abuse and neglect, and, like the response to child maltreatment, often involve the combined efforts of both criminal justice officials and social services staff. Criminal Elder Abuse Laws In an effort to deter crimes against elderly victims, and to express society's abhorrence toward such offenses, many state legislatures have created special offenses involving crimes against the elderly. Laws criminalizing abuse of the elderly are in effect in all states and the District of Columbia. Generally, these laws define the conduct which constitutes a specific form of abuse, and may make a distinction between abuse committed in a domestic, as opposed to an institutional, setting. At least two states -- Massachusetts and North Carolina -- have laws which subject anyone over the age of 18 who has sufficient means, but neglects or refuses to support a parent who is unable to support him/herself due to age or disability, to a fine or imprisonment. (5)
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    ivil Remedies A few states have special provisions for the bringing of civil actions by the elderly. If an older person in Nevada suffers personal injury or death caused by abuse or neglect or suffers a loss of money or property by exploitation, the offender may be ordered to pay up to two times the actual damages incurred. If the offender acted with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice, the court shall order the person to pay the attorney's fees and costs of the person who initiated the lawsuit. In Georgia, the elderly may recover actual and punitive damages and attorney's fees for injury resulting from unfair or deceptive business practices.
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Search Results: elder homicide closed exceptional - 0 views

  • Sort by date / Sort by relevance Not finding it? Try our advanced search or look for ... statistics from BJS juvenile justice info from OJJDP victim and victim service provider info from OVC assistance programs from BJA abstracts and publications from NCJRS Search all Office of Justice Programs agencies. [PDF] National Evaluation of State Victims of Crime Act Assistance and ...... programs, rape crisis centers, child abuse programs, programs for homicide survivors, and programs for victims of drunk driving, hate crimes, elder abuse, and ... www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203198.pdf - 2005-02-11 - Text Version [PDF] Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence Research Part ...... victim, three law enforcement officers responding to the intimate homicide, 9 abusers ... members are significantly more likely to report abuse of elder women (60 ... www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222320.pdf - 2008-04-23 - Text Version [ More results from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants ] [PDF] Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence Research... According to the Supplementary Homicide Reports of the FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reporting Program in 2005, 1,181 females and 329 males were killed by their ... www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf - 2009-06-09 - Text Version [PDF] Presenter Biographies... of Three Cities: Labor Markets and Homicide,” “Racial and Ethic Disparities in Imprisonment,” “Racial/Ethnic Disparities and Exceptional Sentences in ... www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/events/nij_conference/2003/biographies.pdf - 2009-05-09 - Text Version In order to show you the most relevant results, we have omitted some entries very similar to the 4 already displayed.If you like, you can repeat the search with the omitted results included.
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we asked for a safe way to report Building A Financial Abuse Case for the Criminal Just... - 0 views

  • Identify other sources of information Health care professionals Paramedics and EMTs Family and friends Who did victim tell first Importance of asking about and documenting the victim's demeanor and reason for making contact Not for police action but for safety, health needs, seek help
  • Crawford v. Washington  Critical importance of witnesses to whom victim and suspect have spoken Identify non governmental witnesses to statements Document spontaneous statements and demeanor Calls for help and medical care
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
Nye Frank

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Civil Rights Division Home Page - 0 views

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    Federal Criminal Enforcement It is a crime for one or more persons acting under color of law willfully to deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242). "Color of law" simply means that the person doing the act is using power given to him or her by a governmental agency (local, State, or Federal). A law enforcement officer acts "under color of law" even if he or she is exceeding his or her rightful power. The types of law enforcement misconduct covered by these laws include excessive force, sexual assault, intentional false arrests, or the intentional fabrication of evidence resulting in a loss of liberty to another. Enforcement of these provisions does not require that any racial, religious, or other discriminatory motive existed.
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    Federal Criminal Enforcement It is a crime for one or more persons acting under color of law willfully to deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242). "Color of law" simply means that the person doing the act is using power given to him or her by a governmental agency (local, State, or Federal). A law enforcement officer acts "under color of law" even if he or she is exceeding his or her rightful power. The types of law enforcement misconduct covered by these laws include Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities on the basis of disability. (42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. and 29 U.S.C. § 794). These laws protect all people with disabilities in the United States. An individual is considered to have a "disability" if he or she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in all State and local government programs, services, and activities regardless of whether they receive DOJ financial assistance; it also protects people who are discriminated against because of their association with a person with a disability. Section 504 prohibits discrimination by State and local law enforcement agencies that receive financial assistance from DOJ. Section 504 also prohibits discrimination in programs and activities conducted by Federal agencies, including law enforcement agencies. These laws prohibit discriminatory treatment, including excessive force, sexual assault, intentional false arrests, or the intentional fabrication of evidence resulting in a loss of liberty to another. Enforcement of
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    Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities on the basis of disability. (42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. and 29 U.S.C. § 794). These laws protect all people with disabilities in the United States. An individual is considered to have a "disability" if he or she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in all State and local government programs, services, and activities regardless of whether they receive DOJ financial assistance; it also protects people who are discriminated against because of their association with a person with a disability. Section 504 prohibits discrimination by State and local law enforcement agencies that receive financial assistance from DOJ. Section 504 also prohibits discrimination in programs and activities conducted by Federal agencies, including law enforcement agencies. These laws prohibit discriminatory treatment, including
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    What information should I include in a complaint to DOJ? Your complaint, whether alleging violations of criminal or civil laws listed in this document, should include the following information: Your name, address, and telephone number(s). The name(s) of the law enforcement agency (or agencies) involved. A description of the conduct you believe violates one of the laws discussed above, with as many details as possible. You should include: the dates and times of incident(s); any injuries sustained; the name(s), or other identifying information, of the officer(s) involved (if possible); and any other examples of similar misconduct. The names and telephone numbers of witnesses who can support your allegations. If you believe that the misconduct is based on your race, color, national origin, sex, religion, or disability, please identify the basis and explain what led you to believe that you were treated in a discriminatory manner (i.e., differently from persons of another race, sex, etc.). Reproduction of this document is encouraged.
Nye Frank

Crime Compensation Program Directory Overview - 0 views

  • Most programs process claims through a staff centralized in one office in the state capital, but a few states have branch or regional offices or make use of locally based individuals in other agencies to perform preliminary work on applications, such as gathering documents. Typically, states request and analyze police reports to confirm that a crime took place and to determine whether the victim was involved in any illegal or contributory activity when victimized. Information from service providers like hospitals, doctors, counselors, and funeral homes, as well as employers if work loss is claimed, forms the basis for benefit determinations. Decision-making authority varies from state to state, with about a third of the states using part-time boards or commissions to determine eligibility and awards, and the rest authorizing full-time administrative staff (usually program directors) to make determinations. In three court-based programs, judges or court officials decide claims.
  • All of the programs are authorized to deny or reduce benefits to people who are injured while committing crimes or engaging in substantial misconduct contributing to their victimization. Programs rely primarily on police reports to make these determinations, and expend considerable effort to make careful and appropriate decisions on these issues. Five state compensation laws also authorize denial based on prior criminal activity unrelated to the current victimization. The eligibility of a victim's dependents or other secondary victims generally hinges on the eligibility of the "direct" victim (the one who suffered the injury or death). For example, if a homicide victim was engaged in criminal activity, the family generally would be ineligible for any benefits. Each state operates under its own law, rules, policies and procedures, and while all of the programs share broadly similar eligibility requirements, it's important for those accessing any program to check with the individual state to learn exactly how it operates.
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    While for most programs fund recovery is a minor source of total income , a few programs are beginning to recover close to 10% of their awards. VOCA . Federal funds provide about 20-25% of the state compensation programs' total budgets, through grants authorized by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA). Under VOCA, for every $100 a state awards to victims, it gets $40 in federal funds to spend; this results in a 72%-to-28% split in state-federal dollars spent each year (of every $140 awarded to victims, $100 is state money and $40 is federal funds). States also must bear all or nearly all of the administrative costs for operating their programs (only 5% of each state's VOCA grant is available for administrative purposes). While the large majority of funds spent in operating the programs and paying victims comes from state budgets, VOCA grants have enabled many states to expand coverage, and they make a significant difference in ensuring that there is enough money available to cover all eligible victims that may apply. VOCA will provide about $70 million to state compensation programs in federal fiscal year 1999. To be eligible for a federal grant, certain conditions must be met. Programs must cover medical expenses, mental health counseling, and lost wages for victims, as well as funeral expenses and lost support for families of homicide victims. They must consider drunk driving and domestic violence as compensable crimes, and must not categorically exclude domestic violence victims on the basis of their being related to or living with the offender. (Programs may deny claims when an award to the victim would unjustly enrich the offender.) Program must agree to consider for eligibility all U.S. citizens who are victims of crimes within their states, regardless of the residency of the victim . Each state also must offer benefits to its own residents who are victimized in states without compensa
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315 F.2d 312In that case we held that: "The statutory prerequisites to liabil... - 0 views

  • The purpose of Section 1979 is to create a right of action, enforceable in federal courts, against those who, "under color of" state law, deprive any person of any rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution and laws. Monroe v. Pape, supra.2 We are convinced that the legal principles involved in this case are not distinguishable from Monroe v. Pape, supra, and Stringer v. Dilger, supra, and that it was error to direct a verdict for the police officer defendants. See Hardwick v. Hurley, 7 Cir., 289 F.2d 529. A jury question was presented as to whether the conduct of the police officers on the different occasions was so arbitrary, unreasonable and without probable cause as to subject the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
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      In that case we held that: "The statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the defendant act `under color of' state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' * * *" (Footnote omitted.) Stringer v. Dilger, supra.
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    In that case we held that: "The statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the defendant act `under color of' state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' * * *" (Footnote omitted.) Stringer v. Dilger, supra.
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NDAA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY OUTLINE DRAFT - 0 views

  • The "Power and Control Wheel," illustrates that domestic violence is a cyclical pattern of physical and/or sexual violence by an abuser to exert power, establish control over, and diminish the independence of the victim. At the center of the wheel lies the cause of the violence -- the need for power and control. Violent acts or the threat of acts of violence serve as the rim of the wheel while varying types of behaviors, primarily psychological/emotional in nature, act as the spokes of the wheel to facilitate the establishment of power and control. 23 Specifically the abuser may use coercion and threats to harm a victim; intimidation through gestures or destruction of property; emotional abuse such as humiliation; isolation from family and friends; economic abuse; use of children as pawns in obtaining power and control; male privilege; or minimizing the abuse, denying that abuse occurred, and blaming the victim for the abuse, as means to control the victim. It is the use of violence that reinforces the ability of the abuser to use these various other psychological and emotional behaviors to dominate the victim. 24 Added to the complexity of the dynamics of domestic violence are the special fears, concerns, and needs of the victims of such violence
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      The tactics used against Lee Frank, family, neighbors by the Reddish family and authorities including the District Attorney Office and Sheriff. Not one agency has investigated this case and has let the stalking continue.
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Officer Liability -- State Law Torts and the FTCA (podcast transcript) - Federal Law En... - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 16 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Miller:    Who’s considered a law enforcement officer for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act? Solari:    A law enforcement officer for purposes of the FTCA is anyone who can make arrests for violations of federal law, or seize evidence, or execute seizures.  If you qualify, then Uncle Sam will pay for intentional torts like assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process if those torts were committed while within scope.  Limiting that intentional tort provision to law enforcement officers makes sense, if you think about it.  The federal government asks its law enforcement officers to arrest people, conduct searches, and seize evidence.  And as we know, that often involves doing things like grabbing people, knocking them down, hitting them with an ASP… whatever.  So you’d expect law enforcement officers to be doing things that look like intentional torts.  On the other hand, you know, a person who gives out checks at the social security office shouldn’t be grabbing anybody or knocking them down, or hitting them with sticks.  Uncle Sam just doesn’t ask them to do that, so the federal government’s not going to pay when they do.
    • Nye Frank
       
      A law enforcement officer for purposes of the FTCA is anyone who can make arrests for violations of federal law, or seize evidence, or execute seizures. If you qualify, then Uncle Sam will pay for intentional torts like assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process if those torts were committed while within scope. Limiting that intentional tort provision to law enforcement officers makes sense, if you think about it. The federal government asks its law enforcement officers to arrest people, conduct searches, and seize evidence. And as we know, that often involves doing things like grabbing people, knocking them down, hitting them with an ASP… whatever. So you'd expect law enforcement officers to be doing things that look like intentional torts. On the other hand, you know, a person who gives out checks at the social security office shouldn't be grabbing anybody or knocking them down, or hitting them with sticks. Uncle Sam just doesn't ask them to do that, so the federal government's not going to pay when they do.
Nye Frank

COURT OF APPEALS STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Minutes of a mee... - 0 views

  • udge Kaplan commented that at-will employees who have been discharged from working for the State government use mandamus, since there is no appeal authorized for an at-will employee who has been wrongfully discharged. Mr. Sykes pointed out this would come under regular mandamus, which is applicable when there is no record. When an agency makes a final decision affecting the rights of parties, an appeal is effected by administrative mandamus if there is no statutory right of appeal.
  • Mr. Gohn noted that he did not believe that under administrative or regular mandamus, there would be the necessity to file the entire file. Ms. Baron may have been looking at the certiorari rule, which does not apply.
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FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
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  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • Plaintiffs Teri and Thomas Lewis, Philip Lewis's parents, filed suit in Sacramento County Superior Court against Sacramento County, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, and Officer Smith. The Lewises allege a deprivation of their son's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and wrongful death under California state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment on various grounds
  • The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the S 1983 claims. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Smith as to the state causes of action. The court denied summary judgment as to the pendent state law causes of action against the County and the Sheriff's department, dismissing those claims without prejudice. The district court's decisions are summarized below.
  • We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. We do not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130
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  • First, the district court assumed, without deciding, that Officer Smith had violated Lewis's constitutional rights. The court then addressed Smith's claim to qualified immunity. The court stated that plaintiffs had not presented, and it could not find, any "state or federal opinion published before May, 1990, when the alleged misconduct took place, that supports plaintiffs' view that they have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right in the context of high speed police pursuits." The court therefore found that the law regarding Lewis's Fourteenth Amendment right to life and personal security was not clearly established and granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Smith on qualified immunity grounds.
  • Because the court dismissed all federal claims, it declined to decide whether the county and the sheriff's department were also immune under California law. The court then dismissed without prejudice the state claims against the county and sheriff's department to allow plaintiffs to file those claims in state court.
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected right. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989))
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    LakinChapman, LLC Nationwide www.lakinlaw.com/PracticeAreas/Nursing-Home-Neglect.asp Pioneers in nursing home abuse law 866-839-2021 Statutory Protection of Older Persons Today, all states have laws concerning the abuse, neglect or exploitation of older people, but these states may follow different approaches. In most states, there is a system of adult protective services for investigating and remedying reported abuses. Moreover, some states have laws giving victims of abuse, neglect or exploitation a civil cause of action. Finally, in most states, the abuse or neglect of older people is also a crime. Adult Protective Services Typically, before any civil or criminal action is commenced against a nursing home, a report will have been made to your state's adult protective services agency, or other system in place for the reporting and investigation of allegations of the abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly. All states have a system for reporting allegations of abuse, neglect and exploitation of the elderly, for investigating the allegations and, if the allegations are founded, for providing services to the older person to remedy the problems and prevent their recurrence. In fact, most states have mandatory reporting requirements with respect to such allegations. If an agency concludes that an allegation is founded, it will respond by offering the older person appropriate services, such as medical assistance, counseling, special transportation, assistance with money management, or placement in a different residential setting. Civil Actions Based on Statutes Some state legislatures have created causes of action involving the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of older people, which allow victims to bring civil actions against the perpetrators and/or their employees. These causes of action may authorize damages awards to victims, but may also authorize the issuance of injunctions and restraining or protective orders, for immediate relief from ongoing abuse
Nye Frank

New Directions from the Field: Chapter 16 - 0 views

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    9 See CAL. CIVIL CODE ¤1708.7 and WYO. STAT. ANN. ¤1-1-26. California's law allows victims of stalking to sue perpetrators for punitive damages.
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    Moreover, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted anti-stalking laws, most of which impose criminal sanctions against stalkers. A few state legislatures have also enacted laws that create a civil law tort of stalking allowing victims of stalking to sue perpetrators for monetary damages.9 Finally, many laws have been passed that provide legal recourse for hate-motivated violence based on a victim's race, color, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or age.10 Recommendations from the Field for Civil Remedies Civil Remedies Recommendation from the Field #1 Crime victims should be fully informed of their legal rights to pursue civil remedies. It is always the victim's decision whether or not to pursue a civil action against a
Nye Frank

Oregon Judicial Department Appellate Court Opinions - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09 - Cached
  • We pause to recall our standard of review. We review the denial of a motion to suppress for errors of law, deferring to the trial court's findings of historical fact when there is evidence in the record to support them. Ehly, 317 Or at 75.
    • Nye Frank
       
      standard of review motion to supress
Nye Frank

specific intent, obstuction of justice - 0 views

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    Criminal Resource Manual 1723 Protection of Government Processes ... The weight of authority, however, requires the government prove that the defendant had a specific intent to obstruct or impede a pending judicial proceeding ... www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01723.htm 5th Circuit: INTENT OF THREAT WILL DETERMINE SENTENCE | Article ... Therefore, sentencing enhancement would clearly...defendant had the specific intent to obstruct justice...threats he had the specific intent to ... www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-697020701.html 239 F.3d 159 Woodard argues on appeal that the district court failed to make a requisite finding that he had the "specific intent to obstruct justice," and erroneously ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/239/239.F3d.159.00-1323.823--.2000.html 5th Circuit: INTENT OF THREAT WILL DETERMINE SENTENCE | Organized ... A second issue before the court is whether the defendant had the specific intent to obstruct justice when he made his threats. ... findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4441/is_200408/ai_n16058940/ 557 F.2d 233 ... to establish White's specific intent to obstruct justice and whether the ... Having determined that White possessed the requisite specific intent the court ... with the requirement that White be shown to have had the specific intent ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/557/557.F2d.233.77-1015.html Behavior of the Defendant in a Competency-to-Stand-Trial ... The court concluded that Mr. Binion's substantial rights had not been affected. ... evidence to prove that he had specific intent to obstruct justice. ... www.jaapl.org/cgi/content/full/34/1/126 by S Darani - 2006 - Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 2 versions 86 F.3d 263 ... that the defendant must have a specific intent to obstruct justice, "i.e., ... We need not decide in this case whether this specific intent requirement should be ... we think that he had the requisite specific intent to obstruct the ... bulk
nyefrankracing frank

Lions Rare Photographic Memories presents historic sixties color and black and white dr... - 1 views

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    Lions raceway, Freight Train Dragster built by Nye Frank and John Peters. Nye Frank Riverside County Politics Homicide Cover up
Nye Frank

In Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S.Ct. 394 (1994), a suit under the Federa... - 0 views

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    Intense feelings of anger, fear, isolation, low self-esteem, helplessness, and depression are common reactions to victimization
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    violence victims that are set forth in its Domestic Abuse Code. VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #22 Victims of crime should have rights at administrative proceedings, including the right to have a person of their choice accompany them to the proceedings, the right to input regarding the sanction, and the right to notification of the sanction. Agencies and institutions that seek to hold their employees or students accountable for their alleged criminal or negligent behavior often do so through administrative proceedings, including disciplinary hearings on college campuses in sexual assault cases and other crimes that violate college rules. Governmental and private sector organizations also conduct administrative hearings when an employee is accused of misconduct, which sometimes also constitutes a criminal act. These hearings are held to determine whether an employee or student should be dismissed or sanctioned. Victims often complain about their lack of rights and protections at these hearings. For example, at disciplinary hearings on college campuses and in schools, as well as administrative proceedings when criminal justice personnel are accused of conduct violations, victims are frequently not allowed such fundamental rights as the right to be accompanied by a person of their choice and the right to submit a victim impact statement before the offender is sanctioned.Agencies and institutions should review their disciplinary codes and ensure that From tribal police intervention to tribal court proceedings, the victims of violent crime in Indian country must have rights available to them. They must be informed of their rights, encouraged to exercise their rights, and be protected from further harm. This is the basic responsibility of a tribal criminal justice system. Joseph Myers, Executive Director, National Indian Justice Center In Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S.Ct. 394 (1994), a suit under the
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    * Substantial numbers of victims in states with both strong and weak protection were not notified of other important rights and services, including the right to be heard at bond hearings, the right to be informed about protection against harassment and intimidation, and the right to discuss the case with the prosecutor.44
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    While the majority of states mandate advance notice to crime victims of criminal proceedings and pretrial release, many have not implemented mechanisms to make such notice a reality.
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    VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #6 Victims and witnesses of crime should have the right to reasonable protection, including protection from intimidation. The safety of victims and witnesses should be considered in determining whether offenders should be released from custody prior to completing their full sentence. The right to protection from intimidation, harassment, and retaliation by offenders and the accused is becoming a major focus of public and law enforcement attention. Justice officials report an increase in the harassment and intimidation of witnesses, making it increasingly difficult to obtain convictions because crime victims and witnesses are afraid to testify.63 Legislatures have attempted to address this problem by mandating "no contact" orders as a condition of pretrial or posttrial release. In addition, victims' bills of rights generally require victims to be notified at the outset of the judicial process about legal action they can take to protect themselves from harassment and intimidation.
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    Congress made restitution mandatory in federal criminal cases involving violent crimes with the enactment of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act,Title II of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.73
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    All crime victims should have the right to a full range of services and support to help them recover physically, psychologically, and in practical ways from the effects of crime, whether or not they report the crime or become involved in related criminal prosecutions or juvenile adjudications. In the aftermath of victimization, victims may have many different needs.Victims who report crime need information, assistance and protection when they choose to participate in the criminal and juvenile justice process. Not only should victims have the right to be heard or consulted in decisions that affect them, but they should receive protection if they are witnesses and transportation to and from legal proceedings.
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    Victims should have standing to enforce their rights, and sanctions should be applied to criminal and juvenile justice professionals who deny victims their fundamental rights
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    VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #19 States and the federal government should create compliance enforcement programs, sometimes referred to as victim ombudsman programs, to help facilitate the implementation of victims' rights. 29 Chapter 1: Victims' Rights State victims' rights compliance enforcement programs oversee justice officials' and agencies' compliance with crime victims' statutory and constitutional rights and investigate crime victim complaints relevant to those rights being violated.93 A few states have created such programs within an existing agency or have established a new, statelevel oversight authority. In initiating such a program, officials should consider the importance of meaningful remedies and sanctions for noncompliance with victims' rights laws; and ensure that victims, victim service providers, advocacy groups, and victim-sensitive justice professionals are involved in the program planning process. In addition, justice agencies should consider increasing crime or court surcharges to support a compliance enforcement functions, and should evaluate overall compliance enforcement system. Innovative approaches to victims' rights oversight have been implemented in several states: * The Minnesota Office of the Crime Victims Ombudsman (OCVO) protects the rights of victims by investigating statutory violations of victims' rights laws and mistreatment by criminal justice practitioners. OCVO is authorized to initiate its own investigation of alleged violations, recommend corrective action, and make its findings public to both the legislature and the press. * The South Carolina Office of the Crime Victims' Ombudsman is empowered to act as a referral entity for victims in need of services, a liaison between victims and the criminal and juvenile justice systems in the course of their interaction, and a resolver of complaints made by victims against elements of those systems and against victim assistance programs. In
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    The Supreme Court in Owen undertook a textual analysis. By the Court's methodology, broad statutory language -- coupled with silence on the subject of privileges, immunities, and defenses -- means that municipalities are liable in federal court for civil rights violations. Owen, 100 S.Ct. at 1407. Its [the statute's] language is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted. Rather, the Act [§ 1983] imposes liability upon "every person" who, under color of state law or custom, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities of the Constitution and laws." And Monell [supra] held that these words were intended to encompass municipal corporations as well as natural "persons."
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    Seminole notwithstanding, these cases do not support the conclusion that a city is immune from suit under federal statutes. To the contrary, the Court has clearly established that municipalities can be amenable to civil rights suits in federal court. Owen, 100 S.Ct. at 1407; Monell, 98 S.Ct. at 2035- 2036; Mt. Healthy, 97 S.Ct. at 572. See also Howlett v. Rose, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2444 (1990) (holding that "Federal law makes governmental defendants that are not arms of the State, such as municipalities, liable for their constitutional violations," but acknowledging that the state and its arms are immune from the reach of § 1983).
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