Skip to main content

Home/ Nyefrank/ Group items tagged claim

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Filter: All | Bookmarks | Topics Simple Middle
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

209.85.173.132/custom

tort emotional pain

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
  • ...4 more comments...
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/...deliverdocument.asp

victim statement of fact for summary judgement

shared by Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09
     
    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
Nye Frank

It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the impo... - 0 views

www.fbi.gov/...apr976.htm

tort constitution lawsuits

shared by Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Assuming internal police guidelines are relevant...they are relevant only when one of their purposes is to protect the individual against whom force is used....Both the guidelines at issue here and the context in which they appear in the police manual show they were meant to safeguard the police and other innocent parties, not the suspect....A violation of these guidelines might be deserving of discipline, but it's irrelevant to [plaintiff's] case.16 It is important to note here that the appellate court did not decide that internal police guidelines are relevant in some instances; they only assumed that they might be relevant in the narrow instance described-i.e., when the policy was intended to safeguard the plaintiff.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Legal Duties It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.4 Thus, while negligence claims against a police officer or the department may be recognized under state law, the Supreme Court has held that simple negligence-or lack of due care-is insufficient to establish the violation of a federal constitutional right. These distinctions between state tort claims and federal constitutional tort claims can have a bearing on the different ways the courts treat allegations of policy violations. The basic formula for any lawsuit is 1) existence of a legal duty owed by one party to another, 2) an alleged breach of that duty, and 3) injury or loss resulting from that breach. Legal duties may arise in a variety of contexts, but most generally are established by custom, statute, or constitutional law. Whatever its source, a legal duty must be owed to the plaintiff by the named defendant in order for a civil suit to be viable. That being the case, a departmental policy must create a legal duty to a potential plaintiff before a violation of that policy can create liability. In reality, whether a policy violation is even relevant to the question of the legal liability of an officer or department depends to a large extent upon the nature of the claim and the forum in which it is brought. For example, policy violations in tort claims brought under state law alleging negligence will generally be treated differently than claims brought under federal law alleging violations of federal constitutional rights. The relevance of departmental policy also can depend upon whether a legal duty, or standard of conduct, is clearly delineated by law, or whether it is determined by reference to custom or practice.
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...getcase.pl

1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

www.docstoc.com/...-NYU-School-of-Law---Pildusdoc

mandamus judicial discretion

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

Defense attorney claims he has proof of misconduct by Santa Clara County prosecutors - ... - 0 views

www.mercurynews.com/...ci_12102024

Mercury news Prosecutor misconduct Nye Frank Riverside County

shared by Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09 - No Cached
  • Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09
     
    Sign In | Register | Newsletters Subscribe | e-Edition | Home Delivery | Mobile | Mobile Alerts | RSS HOME NEWS breaking news obituaries crime health science earthquakes politics nation / world ap headlines special reports education traffic weather weird news BUSINESS real estate green energy special reports financial markets personal finance venture capital drive / automotive data base press releases TECH news opinion sectors companies personal tech SPORTS 49ers raiders giants a's sharks warriors quakes gold pride high schools colleges stanford cal sjsu golf other sports scores / stats ENTERTAINMENT celebrities restaurants movies television music horoscopes comics puzzles and games lottery events arts books LIFE & STYLE food & wine home and garden travel fashion & style pets & animals green living religion OPINION columns editorials letters blogs discussion boards web votes article comments live chats MY CITY san jose / valley los gatos saratoga cupertino sunnyvale campbell central coast peninsula alameda county HELP contact us site map faq widgets start / stop paper advertising buy photos ethics policy past articles PLACE AD place display ad place classified ad SHOPPING newspaper
Nye Frank

Radiation overexposure claims: fighting defense tactics creatively. | Trial | Find Arti... - 0 views

findarticles.com/...ai_n26578138

intentional tort emotional distress and fraud claim

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    The victory of workers and former workers at the uranium refinery in Fernald, OH, in reaching a settlement in Day v. National Lead Co. of Ohio suggests tactics for similar lawsuits elsewhere. Based primarily on a theory of intentional tort but also on emotional distress and a fraud claim, the workers overcame the workers' compensation bar to tort claims and won compensation, medical monitoring for the rest of their lives, and guarantees the employer will not oppose future claims. Defense tactics are explored. In July 1994, workers and former workers at the Fernald, Ohio, uranium refinery
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...getcase.pl

uscs 1983 and wrongful death under california state law

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Plaintiffs Teri and Thomas Lewis, Philip Lewis's parents, filed suit in Sacramento County Superior Court against Sacramento County, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, and Officer Smith. The Lewises allege a deprivation of their son's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and wrongful death under California state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment on various grounds
  • The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the S 1983 claims. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Smith as to the state causes of action. The court denied summary judgment as to the pendent state law causes of action against the County and the Sheriff's department, dismissing those claims without prejudice. The district court's decisions are summarized below.
  • We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. We do not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • First, the district court assumed, without deciding, that Officer Smith had violated Lewis's constitutional rights. The court then addressed Smith's claim to qualified immunity. The court stated that plaintiffs had not presented, and it could not find, any "state or federal opinion published before May, 1990, when the alleged misconduct took place, that supports plaintiffs' view that they have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right in the context of high speed police pursuits." The court therefore found that the law regarding Lewis's Fourteenth Amendment right to life and personal security was not clearly established and granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Smith on qualified immunity grounds.
  • Because the court dismissed all federal claims, it declined to decide whether the county and the sheriff's department were also immune under California law. The court then dismissed without prejudice the state claims against the county and sheriff's department to allow plaintiffs to file those claims in state court.
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected right. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989))
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    LakinChapman, LLC Nationwide www.lakinlaw.com/PracticeAreas/Nursing-Home-Neglect.asp Pioneers in nursing home abuse law 866-839-2021 Statutory Protection of Older Persons Today, all states have laws concerning the abuse, neglect or exploitation of older people, but these states may follow different approaches. In most states, there is a system of adult protective services for investigating and remedying reported abuses. Moreover, some states have laws giving victims of abuse, neglect or exploitation a civil cause of action. Finally, in most states, the abuse or neglect of older people is also a crime. Adult Protective Services Typically, before any civil or criminal action is commenced against a nursing home, a report will have been made to your state's adult protective services agency, or other system in place for the reporting and investigation of allegations of the abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly. All states have a system for reporting allegations of abuse, neglect and exploitation of the elderly, for investigating the allegations and, if the allegations are founded, for providing services to the older person to remedy the problems and prevent their recurrence. In fact, most states have mandatory reporting requirements with respect to such allegations. If an agency concludes that an allegation is founded, it will respond by offering the older person appropriate services, such as medical assistance, counseling, special transportation, assistance with money management, or placement in a different residential setting. Civil Actions Based on Statutes Some state legislatures have created causes of action involving the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of older people, which allow victims to bring civil actions against the perpetrators and/or their employees. These causes of action may authorize damages awards to victims, but may also authorize the issuance of injunctions and restraining or protective orders, for immediate relief from ongoing abuse
Nye Frank

we asked for a safe way to report Building A Financial Abuse Case for the Criminal Just... - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

safe way for victims to report criminal

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Identify other sources of information Health care professionals Paramedics and EMTs Family and friends Who did victim tell first Importance of asking about and documenting the victim's demeanor and reason for making contact Not for police action but for safety, health needs, seek help
  • Crawford v. Washington  Critical importance of witnesses to whom victim and suspect have spoken Identify non governmental witnesses to statements Document spontaneous statements and demeanor Calls for help and medical care
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
Nye Frank

Crime Compensation Program Directory Overview - 0 views

209.85.173.132/search

victim compensation funds must

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Most programs process claims through a staff centralized in one office in the state capital, but a few states have branch or regional offices or make use of locally based individuals in other agencies to perform preliminary work on applications, such as gathering documents. Typically, states request and analyze police reports to confirm that a crime took place and to determine whether the victim was involved in any illegal or contributory activity when victimized. Information from service providers like hospitals, doctors, counselors, and funeral homes, as well as employers if work loss is claimed, forms the basis for benefit determinations. Decision-making authority varies from state to state, with about a third of the states using part-time boards or commissions to determine eligibility and awards, and the rest authorizing full-time administrative staff (usually program directors) to make determinations. In three court-based programs, judges or court officials decide claims.
  • All of the programs are authorized to deny or reduce benefits to people who are injured while committing crimes or engaging in substantial misconduct contributing to their victimization. Programs rely primarily on police reports to make these determinations, and expend considerable effort to make careful and appropriate decisions on these issues. Five state compensation laws also authorize denial based on prior criminal activity unrelated to the current victimization. The eligibility of a victim's dependents or other secondary victims generally hinges on the eligibility of the "direct" victim (the one who suffered the injury or death). For example, if a homicide victim was engaged in criminal activity, the family generally would be ineligible for any benefits. Each state operates under its own law, rules, policies and procedures, and while all of the programs share broadly similar eligibility requirements, it's important for those accessing any program to check with the individual state to learn exactly how it operates.
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    While for most programs fund recovery is a minor source of total income , a few programs are beginning to recover close to 10% of their awards. VOCA . Federal funds provide about 20-25% of the state compensation programs' total budgets, through grants authorized by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA). Under VOCA, for every $100 a state awards to victims, it gets $40 in federal funds to spend; this results in a 72%-to-28% split in state-federal dollars spent each year (of every $140 awarded to victims, $100 is state money and $40 is federal funds). States also must bear all or nearly all of the administrative costs for operating their programs (only 5% of each state's VOCA grant is available for administrative purposes). While the large majority of funds spent in operating the programs and paying victims comes from state budgets, VOCA grants have enabled many states to expand coverage, and they make a significant difference in ensuring that there is enough money available to cover all eligible victims that may apply. VOCA will provide about $70 million to state compensation programs in federal fiscal year 1999. To be eligible for a federal grant, certain conditions must be met. Programs must cover medical expenses, mental health counseling, and lost wages for victims, as well as funeral expenses and lost support for families of homicide victims. They must consider drunk driving and domestic violence as compensable crimes, and must not categorically exclude domestic violence victims on the basis of their being related to or living with the offender. (Programs may deny claims when an award to the victim would unjustly enrich the offender.) Program must agree to consider for eligibility all U.S. citizens who are victims of crimes within their states, regardless of the residency of the victim . Each state also must offer benefits to its own residents who are victimized in states without compensa
Nye Frank

Victim Rights Manual - 0 views

209.85.173.132/search

crime victims rights disclosure foia manual

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    A defendant may be released on bail for all offenses except capital crimes. Public safety is the primary consideration in setting the bail amount. The court must conduct a hearing before deviating from the scheduled bail for a violent felony or for threatening a witness in a rape, domestic violence or criminal threat case. The court must state its reasons for deviating from the bail schedule. (Cal.Const Art. 1 Sect. 28, PC 1270.1, and PC 1275.)In violent felony cases, the district attorneys office, Division of Victim Services and the probation department are responsible for notifying victims and witnesses that they can request notification regarding the defendant's release. The Division of Victim Services will provide the forms to those victims and witnesses. (PC 679.03(a).)Inmates convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, life cases, stalking or a case where the defendant inflicted great bodily injury, cannot be released on parole within 35 miles of a victim or witness. However, the victim or witness must file the appropriate form with CDCR, and CDCR must find there is a need to protect the safety and well being of the victim or witness. (PC 3003.)Upon request, when a defendant is sent to state prison, the victim or next of kin will be notified of the defendant's release to work furlough or a reentry program at least 60 days prior to placement. If the inmate escapes, the victim must be given immediate notification. The victim should keep his or her request and current address on file using a form that can be obtained through the Division of Victim Services. (PC 679.02(a)(6), PC 11155.)The Right to be Protected13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 An employer with more than 25 employees may not discriminate against an employee who has been a victim of a sex crime or domestic violence when that employee seeks medical attention or counseling. (LC 230.1.)Employers must allow crime victims or family members t
Nye Frank

conspiracy, immunity court - 0 views

www.diigo.com/...g

court conspiracy

shared by Nye Frank on 07 Mar 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 07 Mar 09
     
    Results 1 - 10 for official immunity for conspiracy with Safesearch on. (0.16 seconds) Ads by Google Officiel at Amazon Great Deals On Magazines. Save Up To $10 Today! Amazon.com/magazines Immunity Symptoms, Causes, Treatments of Immunity www.Healthline.com Custom Search official immunity - definition of official immunity by the Free ... Meaning of official immunity. Pronunciation of official immunity. Translations of official immunity. ... Official Handbook of the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy ... www.thefreedictionary.com/official+immunity Official Government Conspiracy Theory - What does OGCT stand for ... Definition of Official Government Conspiracy Theory in the list of acronyms and abbreviations provided by the ... official immunity · official information ... acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/Official+Government+Conspiracy+Theory Does hospital's sovereign immunity cover its CEO? | North America ... ... defamation, conspiracy, and statutory violations that allegedly damages his ... Jacobson was entitled to official immunity as to all claims against him, ... www.allbusiness.com/human-resources/employee-development-leadership/855264-1.html 729 F.2d 1128 participated in the Defendants' conspiracy by accepting those bribes. .... Marino, 613 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.1980) (official immunity applies to civil damage and ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/729/729.F2d.1128.83-1819.html FindLaw | Cases and Codes Mowbray alleges a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate her civil rights, ... Police officers are entitled to official immunity from suits arising out of ... caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=5th&navby=case&no=0040504cv0 274 F.3d 269 Hesskew and Robertson cannot be liable under § 1983 for conspiracy to .... Police officers are entitled to official immunity from suits arising out of ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/274/274.F3d.269.00-41229.00-40504.html THE SUPREME COURT: OFFICI
Nye Frank

Civil Rights Claims In Wisconsin | Wisconsin Attorney's | PittsLaw.com - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

notice of claim 1983

shared by Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09 - Cached
  • 120 day notice of claim requirement, qualified immunities for discretionary conduct by governmental employees, and a limitation of damages provision in the amount of $50,000.00 that applies to most state law claims
  • Whether state or federal qualified immunity for discretionary acts might shield a defendant from liability under the civil rights act depends on whether the defendant violates a plaintiff’s clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Allen v. Guerrero, 276 Wis.2d 679, 688 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 2004)(deliberately holding a person in prison beyond a statutorily prescribed release date violates the 8th Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment). The plaintiff must prove unconstitutional conduct and that the applicable constitutional standards were clearly established at the time in question. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)(excessive force during an arrest); Newsome v McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003)(procurement of false testimony); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996)(high speed chase by police).  
  •   The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the $50,000.00 municipal liability cap on damages prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) does not apply in a civil rights lawsuit.  Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983). Wisconsin’s state law that puts a $350,000 cap on damages for loss of society and companionship arising out of the death of an adult family member or a $500,000 cap on damages for loss of society and companionship of a minor is likewise inapplicable in a civil rights case. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984
  • Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09
     
    Whether state or federal qualified immunity for discretionary acts might shield a defendant from liability under the civil rights act depends on whether the defendant violates a plaintiff's clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Allen v. Guerrero, 276 Wis.2d 679, 688 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 2004)(deliberately holding a person in prison beyond a statutorily prescribed release date violates the 8th Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment). The plaintiff must prove unconstitutional conduct and that the applicable constitutional standards were clearly established at the time in question. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)(excessive force during an arrest); Newsome v McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003)(procurement of false testimony); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996)(high speed chase by police). http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:mOG9ycDK1QwJ:www.pittslaw.com/_pittslaw.09_/Pages/civil_rights_claims.html+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a
Nye Frank

foia damages, tort No. 03-1395: Doe v. Tenet - Appendix (Petition) - 0 views

www.usdoj.gov/...2003-1395.pet.app.html

tort esstoppel court doctor client privlege

shared by Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09 - Cached
  • While Totten and Reynolds are closely related in that both protect a state secret from disclosure, the rules announced in those cases differ in subtle but important respects. Most importantly, the state secrets privilege in Reynolds permits the government to withhold otherwise relevant discovery from a recognized cause of action (e.g., an FTCA case), while the Totten doctrine permits the dismissal of a lawsuit because it is non-justiciable before such evidentiary questions are ever reached.
  • In Kasza, we relied on the Reynolds rule that "the state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to deny discovery of military secrets." Id. at 1165. After reviewing the applicable law, we reasoned that the application of the state secrets privilege can have different effects, depending on whether it is used to exclude evidence or to dismiss a cause of action. Id. at 1166. First, we found that the government's invocation of the privilege over particular evidence may completely remove the evidence from the case. Id. If a plaintiff cannot make out her prima facie case without the secret evidence, the court may dismiss her claim. Id. Second, the privilege may deprive a defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim. Id. In these cases, the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant. Id.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    IFurther, Weinberger concerned in the main an explicit statutory exemption to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). See Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 144, 102 S. Ct. 197. FOIA analysis is governed strictly by statute, while the state secrets privilege is governed solely by judge-made law. Also, FOIA cases involve a determination of what information can be released to the public without any restriction on the information's dissemination. In contrast, the state secrets privilege governs what material can be used by individual litigants who need such information to make their cases, under such restrictions of access as may be necessary, including in camera review, closed proceedings, and sealed records. Weinberger therefore dealt principally with the substantive question whether the sensitive material at issue could be made public and only as a subsidiary matter with the handling of that material within the confines of litigation. Weinberger did refer to Totten at the end of the opinion as an explanation, by analogy, concerning why the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") inquiry could not go forward in court. It also referred, however, in the same context, to Reynolds, the seminal state secrets privilege case. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 147, 102 S. Ct. 197. The brief reference to Totten in Weinberger therefore cannot be read as prescribing the application of Totten without regard to the later-developed state secrets privilege doctrine, and Kasza evidently did not so read it. We therefore conclude that Totten is applicable to the case before us only as applied through the prism of current state secrets doctrine. C. To invoke the state secrets privilege, a formal claim of privilege must be "lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration [of the evidence] by that officer." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8, 73 S. Ct. 528 (footnotes omitted); see also Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165. After that, "[t]he court itself
Nye Frank

are victim compensation funds property rights - Google Search - 0 views

www.google.com/search

victim funds state

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    The Federalist Society » Publications - The 9/11 Victim ... Profuse, critical, even bitter public comments followed the Government's publication in December of the interim rules by which the Victim Compensation Fund ... www.fed-soc.org/publications/PubID.136/pub_detail.asp - 13k - Cached - Similar pages - The Official Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund Home Page The CICF staff is committed to getting crime victim compensation claims ... The cost of property loss is not compensable through the Criminal ... Contact Us | Web Policy | © 2007, All Rights Reserved. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund. www.cicf.state.va.us/ - 10k - Cached - Similar pages - victim comp Funds to pay crime victim compensation claims do not come from taxpayers. ... Article 4.1, Crime Victim Compensation and Victim Witness Rights ... in which the victim sustains mental or bodily injury, dies, or suffers property damage to ... dcj.state.co.us/OVP/comp_english.htm - 20k - Cached - Similar pages - Lets have crime victims` compensation fund in Ghana - modernghana ... Jul 14, 2007 ... The victims might have lost his or her property or been injured or even lost a beloved one. .... involves the violation of one or the other of the victim's rights. A CALL FOR CRIME VICTIMS' COMPENSATION FUND Continued ... www.modernghana.com/blogs/139192/31/lets-have-crime- victims - compensation - fund -in-ghana.html - 42k - Cached - Similar pages - Crime Victim Compensation (16.576) | Federal Grants Wire Crime Victim Compensation (16.576) OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. ... for the Crime Victims Fund, other than amounts awarded for property damage. .... Fiscal year 2002 compensation funds may be carried forward for ... 2009 Federal Grants Wire, A
Nye Frank

victim restitution funds, victims right to jury trial if denied - Google Search - 0 views

www.google.com/search

right to jury trial for victim funds

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Results 1 - 10 of about 6,840 for victim restitution funds , victims right to jury trial if denied . ( 0.43 seconds) Did you mean: victim restitution funds, victims right to jury trial is denied Search Results [DOC] Chapter 3 - 6 visits - Apr 21 File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML It reminds the judge, jury, court personnel, and parole boards of the real ..... Restitution is the oldest victim right. The concept of restitution dates back ..... hearings at which they were denied the opportunity to receive notice, ..... by the Crime Victims Fund, which is administered by the Office for Victims ... https://www.ovcttac.gov/nvaa2008/documents/participants_text/03%20Basic%20 Victims '%20 Right s.doc - Similar pages - [DOC] Draft changes to Ohio Revised Code 2930 & related Victim Rights - 2 visits - Mar 28 File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML Oct 1, 2008 ... A few Ohio judges have denied the right of victims to present both an oral and ... 8) Summary - Victims will have the right to restitution through a mandatory ... If a motion is made for modification of a restitution order, ... the Ohio Victim Compensation Fund, that restitution amount shall be paid ... www.ovwa.org/_uploaded/69.doc - Similar pages - [PDF] THE VICTIM IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML then be communicated to the issuing body (judge or grand jury). ... sentencing, the judge denied victims the right to speak. ... noted earlier, victims controlled the trial of their victimizer, but as the state took on the .... received in crime victim compensation funds. Unlike restitution and compensation ... meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR300000/newsletterpubs/ victims report.pdf - Similar pa
Nye Frank

California Elder Abuse Act, Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA): S... - 0 views

www.preventelderabuse.com/alifornia-elder-abuse-act.html

elder abuse act legislative

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Jul 09
     
    California's Elder Abuse Act California's Elder Abuse Act has been in existence in its current state since 1991 and is officially known as the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (hereinafter "EADACPA" or simply, the "Elder Abuse Act"). The Elder Abuse Act, found at Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq., sets forth a very detailed body of law that has since been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as providing for a distinct and recognized cause of action - that being a statutory cause of action for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq. When properly proven, a claim for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect provides for certain enhanced remedies that are unwise unavailable under other common law causes of action. The Elder Abuse Act was created out of concern that the elderly members of our society are not receiving the care and attention they deserved - and are in fact being abused and neglected. In enacting the Elder Abuse Act, the California Legislature expressly recognized that elders (defined as a person greater than the age of 65) and dependent adults (generally defined as persons between the ages of 18 and 64 who confined to live in 24-hour medical facilities and/or who are not able to care for themselves due to medical disorders) are particularly subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and that the state has a distinct responsibility to protect these persons. In its preamble, the Elder Abuse Act expressly states that the Legislature "desires to direct special attention to the needs and problems of elderly persons, recognizing that these persons constitute a significant and identifiable segment of the population and that they are more subject to risks of abuse, neglect, and abandonment." (See, Welfare & Institutions Code §15600). The statute further states that most elders and dependent adults who are at the greatest risk of abuse or neglect by their caretakers suffer "physical impairment
  • Nye Frank on 23 Jul 09
     
    California's Elder Abuse Act California's Elder Abuse Act has been in existence in its current state since 1991 and is officially known as the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (hereinafter "EADACPA" or simply, the "Elder Abuse Act"). The Elder Abuse Act, found at Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq., sets forth a very detailed body of law that has since been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as providing for a distinct and recognized cause of action - that being a statutory cause of action for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq. When properly proven, a claim for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect provides for certain enhanced remedies that are unwise unavailable under other common law causes of action. The Elder Abuse Act was created out of concern that the elderly members of our society are not receiving the care and attention they deserved - and are in fact being abused and neglected. In enacting the Elder Abuse Act, the California Legislature expressly recognized that elders (defined as a person greater than the age of 65) and dependent adults (generally defined as persons between the ages of 18 and 64 who confined to live in 24-hour medical facilities and/or who are not able to care for themselves due to medical disorders) are particularly subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and that the state has a distinct responsibility to protect these persons. In its preamble, the Elder Abuse Act expressly states that the Legislature "desires to direct special attention to the needs and problems of elderly persons, recognizing that these persons constitute a significant and identifiable segment of the population and that they are more subject to risks of abuse, neglect, and abandonment." (See, Welfare & Institutions Code §15600). The statute further states that most elders and dependent adults who are at the greatest risk of abuse or neglect by their caretakers suffer "physical impairment
Nye Frank

Motion (legal) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - 0 views

en.wikipedia.org/...Motion_(law)

motion law case

shared by Nye Frank on 03 May 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 03 May 09
     
    Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is the rule which explains the mechanics of a summary judgment motion. As explained in the notes to this rule, summary judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Prior to its introduction in the US in 1934, it was used in England for more than 50 years. In England motions for summary judgments were used only in cases of liquidated claims, there followed a steady enlargement of the scope of the remedy until it was used in actions to recover land or chattels and in all other actions at law, for liquidated or unliquidated claims, except for a few designated torts and breach of promise of marriage. English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 3, r. 6; Orders 14, 14A, and 15; see also O. 32, r. 6, authorizing an application for judgment at any time upon admissions. New York was a leader in the adoption of this rule in the US and the success of the method helps account for its current importance as an almost indispensable tool in administrative actions (especially before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which adjudicates employment discrimination claims and the Merit Systems Protection Board which adjudicates federal employment matters).[2]
Nye Frank

Pictures of Nye and Ty, at the scene Picasa Web Albums - dbreedlove - TheHomicideOfNyeF... - 0 views

picasaweb.google.com/...OffRoadRacingDragRacingSheriff

baja baseball Coroner Corruption County Drag Elder Empire Frank Govenor High jet Norco Nye Pacheco Riverside Rod Score Sheriff wrestling

shared by Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09
     
    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
  • Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09
     
    Riverside DA office kept saying Nye had a heart attack and no injuries. They originally refused to release the sheriff report and autopsy. They said Lee Frank just imagined that Ty was beating him up for such a long time. The prosecutor Daiama Calhoun said she did not care what the autopsy showed she made up her mind. Mike Rushton her manager sealed the autopsy xrays and lab to prevent the family access to them. He claimed privacy. Imagine he is a judge now. See my letters to the DA victim advocate Kim Emmerling. Mike finally admitted Nye was strangled. But he was so confident in his ability to block Lee Frank from Justice he did not care.
Nye Frank

mickey thompson 1967 - Nye Built cars for Mickey Thompson - 0 views

www.google.com/search

Mickey Thompson Nye Frank Homicide Corruption

shared by Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09
     
    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09
     
    Nye Frank homicide, killers dad freinds with Riverside County DA factor in closing case period. Audio and video from sheriff prove point. DA Mike Rushton claimed his privacy and sealed case. Administrative closures occur when a suspect has been identified, but "circumstances exist that prevent the successful prosecution of the offender" and he or she is released, according to a D.C. Office of Inspector General audit of police department homicide closures.
  • Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09
     
    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
  • Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09
     
    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
1 - 20 of 56 Next › Last »
Showing 20▼ items per page