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FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

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1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

www.docstoc.com/...-NYU-School-of-Law---Pildusdoc

mandamus judicial discretion

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

Winter, Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a j... - 0 views

www.constitution.org/...winter_standing.htm

standing selfgovernance

shared by Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09 - Cached
  • The democracy conundrum The most appealing justification of standing law is that, in preserving the separation of powers, it protects the majoritarian political process from undue intrusion by the unelected judiciary. But not all issues are amenable to the political process. All too often, the inevitable consequence of a decision denying standing is "that the most injurious and widespread Governmental actions c[an] be questioned by nobody." n60 In those cases, standing law undermines the notion of accountability that supports a constitutional system premised on the rule of law. In Sections VI C and D, I propose a means of recapturing these values.
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    The traditional answer places heavy emphasis on the function of the common law writ system to do the work now done by the concept of standing. n27 According to this analysis, the concept of standing could only arise after the breakdown of the writ system and of common law pleading. Standing then developed as an elaboration of the essence of the private causes of action previously embodied in the writs. n28 As such, the modern concept of standing, with its focus on injury-in-fact, is thought to be only the preservation of the private rights model n29 of adjudication known to the Framers.
  • ...5 more comments...
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
Nye Frank

538 F2d 10 Torres v. Sachs S Velez | Open Jurist - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

rico act case nye

shared by Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
Nye Frank

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY - 0 views

74.125.155.132/custom

attorney da ethics

shared by Nye Frank on 03 Aug 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 03 Aug 09
     
    Page 1 Final Report CJ - 1 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION Prepared by 2001-2002 Orange CountyGrand Jury June, 2002 Page 2 CJ - 2 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury COMMENDATIONS There are many men and women: managers, deputy district attorneys, and investigators in the Office of the District Attorney who have demonstrated great professionalism and integrity. They have worked in their offices, entered the courts, and gone into the streets to insure that the criminal justice system in Orange County is held to the highest standards. The 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury extends its highest commendation to these dedicated public servants and asks that the electorate of the county join us in this commendation. Page 3 Final Report CJ - 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page COMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 5 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 7 Major Accomplishments of the District Attorney's Office under the Current Administration............................................................................................................ 7 INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION & METHOD OF STUDY ............................. 9 ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURE - Attorney Positions ....................................... 11 Factual Background - Post 1998 Campaign............................................................. 11 Findings..................................................................................................................... 15 Recommendations ......................................................................................
  • Nye Frank on 03 Aug 09
     
    Page 1 Final Report CJ - 1 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION Prepared by 2001-2002 Orange CountyGrand Jury June, 2002 Page 2 CJ - 2 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury COMMENDATIONS There are many men and women: managers, deputy district attorneys, and investigators in the Office of the District Attorney who have demonstrated great professionalism and integrity. They have worked in their offices, entered the courts, and gone into the streets to insure that the criminal justice system in Orange County is held to the highest standards. The 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury extends its highest commendation to these dedicated public servants and asks that the electorate of the county join us in this commendation. Page 3 Final Report CJ - 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page COMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 5 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 7 Major Accomplishments of the District Attorney's Office under the Current Administration............................................................................................................ 7 INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION & METHOD OF STUDY ............................. 9 ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURE - Attorney Positions ....................................... 11 Factual Background - Post 1998 Campaign............................................................. 11 Findings..................................................................................................................... 15 Recommendations ......................................................................................
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315 F.2d 312In that case we held that: "The statutory prerequisites to liabil... - 0 views

bulk.resource.org/...315.F2d.312.7066.html

color of law 1983

shared by Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09 - Cached
  • The purpose of Section 1979 is to create a right of action, enforceable in federal courts, against those who, "under color of" state law, deprive any person of any rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution and laws. Monroe v. Pape, supra.2 We are convinced that the legal principles involved in this case are not distinguishable from Monroe v. Pape, supra, and Stringer v. Dilger, supra, and that it was error to direct a verdict for the police officer defendants. See Hardwick v. Hurley, 7 Cir., 289 F.2d 529. A jury question was presented as to whether the conduct of the police officers on the different occasions was so arbitrary, unreasonable and without probable cause as to subject the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
    • Nye Frank
      Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09
       
      In that case we held that: "The statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the defendant act `under color of' state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' * * *" (Footnote omitted.) Stringer v. Dilger, supra.
  • Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09
     
    In that case we held that: "The statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the defendant act `under color of' state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' * * *" (Footnote omitted.) Stringer v. Dilger, supra.
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

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tort emotional pain

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
  • ...4 more comments...
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

In Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S.Ct. 394 (1994), a suit under the Federa... - 0 views

searchjustice.usdoj.gov/search

tort cal. 14th pro bono crime victims

shared by Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Intense feelings of anger, fear, isolation, low self-esteem, helplessness, and depression are common reactions to victimization
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  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    violence victims that are set forth in its Domestic Abuse Code. VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #22 Victims of crime should have rights at administrative proceedings, including the right to have a person of their choice accompany them to the proceedings, the right to input regarding the sanction, and the right to notification of the sanction. Agencies and institutions that seek to hold their employees or students accountable for their alleged criminal or negligent behavior often do so through administrative proceedings, including disciplinary hearings on college campuses in sexual assault cases and other crimes that violate college rules. Governmental and private sector organizations also conduct administrative hearings when an employee is accused of misconduct, which sometimes also constitutes a criminal act. These hearings are held to determine whether an employee or student should be dismissed or sanctioned. Victims often complain about their lack of rights and protections at these hearings. For example, at disciplinary hearings on college campuses and in schools, as well as administrative proceedings when criminal justice personnel are accused of conduct violations, victims are frequently not allowed such fundamental rights as the right to be accompanied by a person of their choice and the right to submit a victim impact statement before the offender is sanctioned.Agencies and institutions should review their disciplinary codes and ensure that From tribal police intervention to tribal court proceedings, the victims of violent crime in Indian country must have rights available to them. They must be informed of their rights, encouraged to exercise their rights, and be protected from further harm. This is the basic responsibility of a tribal criminal justice system. Joseph Myers, Executive Director, National Indian Justice Center In Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S.Ct. 394 (1994), a suit under the
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    * Substantial numbers of victims in states with both strong and weak protection were not notified of other important rights and services, including the right to be heard at bond hearings, the right to be informed about protection against harassment and intimidation, and the right to discuss the case with the prosecutor.44
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    While the majority of states mandate advance notice to crime victims of criminal proceedings and pretrial release, many have not implemented mechanisms to make such notice a reality.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #6 Victims and witnesses of crime should have the right to reasonable protection, including protection from intimidation. The safety of victims and witnesses should be considered in determining whether offenders should be released from custody prior to completing their full sentence. The right to protection from intimidation, harassment, and retaliation by offenders and the accused is becoming a major focus of public and law enforcement attention. Justice officials report an increase in the harassment and intimidation of witnesses, making it increasingly difficult to obtain convictions because crime victims and witnesses are afraid to testify.63 Legislatures have attempted to address this problem by mandating "no contact" orders as a condition of pretrial or posttrial release. In addition, victims' bills of rights generally require victims to be notified at the outset of the judicial process about legal action they can take to protect themselves from harassment and intimidation.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Congress made restitution mandatory in federal criminal cases involving violent crimes with the enactment of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act,Title II of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.73
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    All crime victims should have the right to a full range of services and support to help them recover physically, psychologically, and in practical ways from the effects of crime, whether or not they report the crime or become involved in related criminal prosecutions or juvenile adjudications. In the aftermath of victimization, victims may have many different needs.Victims who report crime need information, assistance and protection when they choose to participate in the criminal and juvenile justice process. Not only should victims have the right to be heard or consulted in decisions that affect them, but they should receive protection if they are witnesses and transportation to and from legal proceedings.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Victims should have standing to enforce their rights, and sanctions should be applied to criminal and juvenile justice professionals who deny victims their fundamental rights
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #19 States and the federal government should create compliance enforcement programs, sometimes referred to as victim ombudsman programs, to help facilitate the implementation of victims' rights. 29 Chapter 1: Victims' Rights State victims' rights compliance enforcement programs oversee justice officials' and agencies' compliance with crime victims' statutory and constitutional rights and investigate crime victim complaints relevant to those rights being violated.93 A few states have created such programs within an existing agency or have established a new, statelevel oversight authority. In initiating such a program, officials should consider the importance of meaningful remedies and sanctions for noncompliance with victims' rights laws; and ensure that victims, victim service providers, advocacy groups, and victim-sensitive justice professionals are involved in the program planning process. In addition, justice agencies should consider increasing crime or court surcharges to support a compliance enforcement functions, and should evaluate overall compliance enforcement system. Innovative approaches to victims' rights oversight have been implemented in several states: * The Minnesota Office of the Crime Victims Ombudsman (OCVO) protects the rights of victims by investigating statutory violations of victims' rights laws and mistreatment by criminal justice practitioners. OCVO is authorized to initiate its own investigation of alleged violations, recommend corrective action, and make its findings public to both the legislature and the press. * The South Carolina Office of the Crime Victims' Ombudsman is empowered to act as a referral entity for victims in need of services, a liaison between victims and the criminal and juvenile justice systems in the course of their interaction, and a resolver of complaints made by victims against elements of those systems and against victim assistance programs. In
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    The Supreme Court in Owen undertook a textual analysis. By the Court's methodology, broad statutory language -- coupled with silence on the subject of privileges, immunities, and defenses -- means that municipalities are liable in federal court for civil rights violations. Owen, 100 S.Ct. at 1407. Its [the statute's] language is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted. Rather, the Act [§ 1983] imposes liability upon "every person" who, under color of state law or custom, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities of the Constitution and laws." And Monell [supra] held that these words were intended to encompass municipal corporations as well as natural "persons."
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Seminole notwithstanding, these cases do not support the conclusion that a city is immune from suit under federal statutes. To the contrary, the Court has clearly established that municipalities can be amenable to civil rights suits in federal court. Owen, 100 S.Ct. at 1407; Monell, 98 S.Ct. at 2035- 2036; Mt. Healthy, 97 S.Ct. at 572. See also Howlett v. Rose, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2444 (1990) (holding that "Federal law makes governmental defendants that are not arms of the State, such as municipalities, liable for their constitutional violations," but acknowledging that the state and its arms are immune from the reach of § 1983).
Nye Frank

Actual Innocence awareness database - 0 views

web.austin.utexas.edu/...subject.cfm

Points of View: They Must Answer for What They've Done; Prosecutors Who Misuse Discretion or Abuse Power Should Be Held Accountable

shared by Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09 - No Cached
  • Nye Frank on 09 Apr 09
     
    Points of View: They Must Answer for What They've Done; Prosecutors Who Misuse Discretion or Abuse Power Should Be Held Accountable
Nye Frank

Victim Rights Manual - 0 views

209.85.173.132/search

crime victims rights disclosure foia manual

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    A defendant may be released on bail for all offenses except capital crimes. Public safety is the primary consideration in setting the bail amount. The court must conduct a hearing before deviating from the scheduled bail for a violent felony or for threatening a witness in a rape, domestic violence or criminal threat case. The court must state its reasons for deviating from the bail schedule. (Cal.Const Art. 1 Sect. 28, PC 1270.1, and PC 1275.)In violent felony cases, the district attorneys office, Division of Victim Services and the probation department are responsible for notifying victims and witnesses that they can request notification regarding the defendant's release. The Division of Victim Services will provide the forms to those victims and witnesses. (PC 679.03(a).)Inmates convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, life cases, stalking or a case where the defendant inflicted great bodily injury, cannot be released on parole within 35 miles of a victim or witness. However, the victim or witness must file the appropriate form with CDCR, and CDCR must find there is a need to protect the safety and well being of the victim or witness. (PC 3003.)Upon request, when a defendant is sent to state prison, the victim or next of kin will be notified of the defendant's release to work furlough or a reentry program at least 60 days prior to placement. If the inmate escapes, the victim must be given immediate notification. The victim should keep his or her request and current address on file using a form that can be obtained through the Division of Victim Services. (PC 679.02(a)(6), PC 11155.)The Right to be Protected13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 An employer with more than 25 employees may not discriminate against an employee who has been a victim of a sex crime or domestic violence when that employee seeks medical attention or counseling. (LC 230.1.)Employers must allow crime victims or family members t
Nye Frank

Position Outline for Elder Abuse Policy (Rough Draft) - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

district attorney elder draft rough

shared by Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09 - Cached
  • 29 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p. 94. 30 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.3, p. 93. 31 See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p.92
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
Nye Frank

Diigo & Google - 0 views

www.diigo.com/search/g?cx=partner-pub-7625644023173335%3Agqffh9-8lvc&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UTF-8&q=In%20one%20such%20due%20process%20case%2C%20we%20held%20that%20either%20%22gross%20negligence%2C%20recklessness%2C%20or%20%60deliberate%20indifference%27%

due process

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Judges have wide range of discretion in sentences : North County Times - Californian 08... - 1 views

www.nctimes.com/...22_32_998_5_06.txt

Ty Reddish 27 Phil Riverside County Norco High DA Dimmagio stragulation Calhoun

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    Even in Homicide of a Elder by a man 40 years younger. Sad to say that my dad was proud to be a American, a past fireman, and had a passion for his work. He took exceptional care of his property and a small business man in Riverside County. He built Race cars and was a famous builder of dragsters, off road cars and Jet cars that held 6 land speed records. The audio of the sheriff interview of the killers father has him tell who in the DA office will help him to get this covered up. Now even going to court the Supervisors are trying to have a false statement put into court to prevent justice. It is very ugly. People need to be active in holding officials accountable. Nye and lee Frank never had a problem with the law. They never guessed this would happen. The killer was so savvy he bent down and bragged how he strangled and used judo moves on the elder, avoiding the video he thought.
Nye Frank

laws for state liability in mandated duties - Google Search - 0 views

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mandates

shared by Nye Frank on 16 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 16 Apr 09
     
    The Changing Role of the Courts in Elder Abuse Cases These cases addressed a wide array of issues: immunity from liability for people .... The fraud units are mandated by the federal government and authorized to ... The growth of elder law as a practice specialty has fueled much of the ... Recommended Guidelines for State Courts Handling Cases Involving Elder Abuse. ... www.utahbar.org/sites/noecomm/html/the_changing_role_of_the_court.html - 35k - Cached - Similar pages Manual Call Of Duty 4 Pc - Manual Call Of Duty 4 Pc Apr 8, 2009 ... maryland state law jury duty masint analyst duties marriage duty ... massachusetts private duty elderly ... mandatory duty public entity liability for marine corp embassy duty ... maryland sheriff's duties marine locator non active duty ... Homicide? A muscle in Carol's arm twitched involuntarily ... technologise.com/search.php?q=manual-call-of- duty -4-pc - Similar pages The StandDown Texas Project: Law of Parties/Felony Murder Rule All of these issues give better cause to eliminate state executions, ... auxiliary sheriff's deputy, a fire marshal or an assistant fire marshal with ..... due process protections mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 decision, ...... state's law of parties, a conspirator liability statute that posits that if ... standdown.typepad.com/weblog/ law _of_partiesfelony_murder_rule/ - 179k - Cached - Similar pages North Country Gazette » Death In Pinellas County-Excited Delirium ... The medical examiner's office ruled Tipton's death a homicide, ... In such as state of "excited delirium", experts say that physical restraint by ... Last week in Ohio, retired visiting judge Ted Schneiderman who is long past the mandated ... sheriff's officers from any liability in McCullaugh's death and to cause ...
Nye Frank

It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the impo... - 0 views

www.fbi.gov/...apr976.htm

tort constitution lawsuits

shared by Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Assuming internal police guidelines are relevant...they are relevant only when one of their purposes is to protect the individual against whom force is used....Both the guidelines at issue here and the context in which they appear in the police manual show they were meant to safeguard the police and other innocent parties, not the suspect....A violation of these guidelines might be deserving of discipline, but it's irrelevant to [plaintiff's] case.16 It is important to note here that the appellate court did not decide that internal police guidelines are relevant in some instances; they only assumed that they might be relevant in the narrow instance described-i.e., when the policy was intended to safeguard the plaintiff.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Legal Duties It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.4 Thus, while negligence claims against a police officer or the department may be recognized under state law, the Supreme Court has held that simple negligence-or lack of due care-is insufficient to establish the violation of a federal constitutional right. These distinctions between state tort claims and federal constitutional tort claims can have a bearing on the different ways the courts treat allegations of policy violations. The basic formula for any lawsuit is 1) existence of a legal duty owed by one party to another, 2) an alleged breach of that duty, and 3) injury or loss resulting from that breach. Legal duties may arise in a variety of contexts, but most generally are established by custom, statute, or constitutional law. Whatever its source, a legal duty must be owed to the plaintiff by the named defendant in order for a civil suit to be viable. That being the case, a departmental policy must create a legal duty to a potential plaintiff before a violation of that policy can create liability. In reality, whether a policy violation is even relevant to the question of the legal liability of an officer or department depends to a large extent upon the nature of the claim and the forum in which it is brought. For example, policy violations in tort claims brought under state law alleging negligence will generally be treated differently than claims brought under federal law alleging violations of federal constitutional rights. The relevance of departmental policy also can depend upon whether a legal duty, or standard of conduct, is clearly delineated by law, or whether it is determined by reference to custom or practice.
Nye Frank

questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/...deliverdocument.asp

victim statement of fact for summary judgement

shared by Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09
     
    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
Nye Frank

conspiracy case 99-6050 -- U.S. v. Rahseparian -- 11/07/2000 - 0 views

209.85.173.132/search

conspiracy case

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    SEYMOUR , Chief Judge. After a joint jury trial, co-defendants Ardashir (aka Ardie) and Daryoush (aka Steve), along with Jalal (aka Jack) Rahseparian, were convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. All three appealed. Jack's appeal is addressed in the companion opinion, see United States v. Rahseparian, No. 99-6031 (Nov. 7, 2000). Ardie contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Ardie and Steve contend a new trial is necessary due to the prosecutor's comment on their failure to testify in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Steve further claims a new trial is required because of certain incriminating hearsay statements elicited by the prosecutor in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). We affirm. I BACKGROUND Ardie and Steve Rahseparian are the sons of Jack Rahseparian. At the time of the conduct for which they were charged, Steve resided in Altoona, Pennsylvania, Ardie resided in Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Jack resided and worked in Shawnee, Oklahoma. The government contended at trial that Ardie and Steve Rahseparian formed Genesis Marketing, a telemarketing company, through which they and their father conspired to commit and did commit mail fraud from May 1994 to May 1995. The government further successfully argued that Ardie, Steve, and Jack Rahseparian laundered the proceeds from the telemarketing scheme through Jack's business checking accounts. Brad Russell, the company's only employee other than the Rahseparians themselves, testified on behalf of the government. Mr. Russell was a personal friend of Ardie. The two worked out of Ardie's apartment in Fort Smith as the sole telemarketers for Genesis Marketing. Mr. Russell testified that he and Ardie would entice customers over the telephone to buy products, such as water purifiers and "Say No to Drugs" kits, at highly inflated pric
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how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor - Google Search - 0 views

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conspiracy

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Results 1 - 10 of about 140,000 for how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor . ( 0.38 seconds) Did you mean: how to provide specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor Search Results Conspiracy (crime) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Conspiracy law usually does not require proof of the specific intent by the ... based on the fact that the prosecutor would be unable to prove beyond a ... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Conspiracy _(crime) - 54k - Cached - Similar pages - 1. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda-genocide-conspiracy ... defendant's co-conspirators acted with specific intent would "tend to prove" that the. 40. See Prosecutor v. Bagasora et al., Case Nos. ICTR-98-41-AR93, ... papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID951847_code366348.pdf?abstractid=951847&rulid=263109&mirid=4 - Similar pages - by A Decision E Law: Conspiracy to Commit Genocide: Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda ... [48] In order to prove the existence of a conspiracy, ..... that an accused might have the specific intent required to commit genocide and also to act ... The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecutor relied on the same intent of the two ... www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v8n1/obote-odora81.html - 1k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML Where the prosecutor did not charge conspiracy as an offense, but introduced evidence of a conspiracy to prove liability, the court had a sua sponte duty to ... an agreement between two or more people with the specific intent to agree ... www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/archive/B199059.PDF - Similar pages - [PDF] [J-28-99] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENN
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COURT OF APPEALS STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Minutes of a mee... - 0 views

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writ mandamus administrative stading rules

shared by Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09 - Cached
  • udge Kaplan commented that at-will employees who have been discharged from working for the State government use mandamus, since there is no appeal authorized for an at-will employee who has been wrongfully discharged. Mr. Sykes pointed out this would come under regular mandamus, which is applicable when there is no record. When an agency makes a final decision affecting the rights of parties, an appeal is effected by administrative mandamus if there is no statutory right of appeal.
  • Mr. Gohn noted that he did not believe that under administrative or regular mandamus, there would be the necessity to file the entire file. Ms. Baron may have been looking at the certiorari rule, which does not apply.
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Civil Rights Claims In Wisconsin | Wisconsin Attorney's | PittsLaw.com - 0 views

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notice of claim 1983

shared by Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09 - Cached
  • 120 day notice of claim requirement, qualified immunities for discretionary conduct by governmental employees, and a limitation of damages provision in the amount of $50,000.00 that applies to most state law claims
  • Whether state or federal qualified immunity for discretionary acts might shield a defendant from liability under the civil rights act depends on whether the defendant violates a plaintiff’s clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Allen v. Guerrero, 276 Wis.2d 679, 688 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 2004)(deliberately holding a person in prison beyond a statutorily prescribed release date violates the 8th Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment). The plaintiff must prove unconstitutional conduct and that the applicable constitutional standards were clearly established at the time in question. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)(excessive force during an arrest); Newsome v McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003)(procurement of false testimony); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996)(high speed chase by police).  
  •   The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the $50,000.00 municipal liability cap on damages prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) does not apply in a civil rights lawsuit.  Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983). Wisconsin’s state law that puts a $350,000 cap on damages for loss of society and companionship arising out of the death of an adult family member or a $500,000 cap on damages for loss of society and companionship of a minor is likewise inapplicable in a civil rights case. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984
  • Nye Frank on 28 Jul 09
     
    Whether state or federal qualified immunity for discretionary acts might shield a defendant from liability under the civil rights act depends on whether the defendant violates a plaintiff's clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Allen v. Guerrero, 276 Wis.2d 679, 688 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 2004)(deliberately holding a person in prison beyond a statutorily prescribed release date violates the 8th Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment). The plaintiff must prove unconstitutional conduct and that the applicable constitutional standards were clearly established at the time in question. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)(excessive force during an arrest); Newsome v McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003)(procurement of false testimony); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996)(high speed chase by police). http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:mOG9ycDK1QwJ:www.pittslaw.com/_pittslaw.09_/Pages/civil_rights_claims.html+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a
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