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anonymous

The "1-10-100 Principle" for experimenters - 0 views

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    "Peter Tu of GE Global Research went to Maker Faire in San Mateo in May and wrote a piece about what he witnessed there. Like many others, he was impressed with Stephen Voltz and Fritz Grobe's talk about the "1-10-100 Principle" for experimenters. "
anonymous

Europe: A Shifting Battleground, Part 1 | STRATFOR - 0 views

  • Russia fundamentally opposes the system not because it threatens Moscow’s nuclear deterrent, but because it represents an entrenchment of U.S. forces near its buffer states — Ukraine and Belarus in particular.
  • The Central European corridor, comprising the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria — the so-called Intermarium Corridor — is emerging as the area of contention between Russia and U.S.-supported states in the region.
  • This transformation is the result of a two-step process.
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  • The first step was the end of the Cold War, when Soviet Russia withdrew from its positions established by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, and former Communist European states — including the Baltic states, eventually — entered the NATO alliance.
  • The second step was Russia’s resurgence into its former Soviet sphere of influence, a process that gained momentum in 2005 and culminated with the formal reversal of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine at the beginning of 2010 as well as the integration of Belarus further into Russian structures.
  • The first step formally released Central Europe from Soviet control; the second step showed that Moscow’s withdrawal was temporary.
  • The next phase in Europe’s geopolitical evolution was Germany’s response to the first two changes.
  • The end of the Cold War also moved the U.S. focus eastward to the Central European NATO member states.
  • Germany and to a lesser extent other Western European powers, such as France and Italy, have a fundamentally different view of Moscow’s resurgence. Unlike the Intermarium Corridor countries, on which foreign powers are now making geopolitical moves as they were in Germany during the Cold War, Berlin is not troubled by Moscow’s resurgence.
  • “Intermarium” is a term borrowed from inter-war Polish leader Gen. Jozef Pilsudski, who understood that Germany and the Soviet Union would not be permanently weak.
  • His solution was to propose an alliance stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, encompassing countries west of the Carpathians.
  • this term is useful as a way to group together countries abutting Russia’s sphere of influence that are wary of Berlin’s relationship with Moscow. This essentially includes the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
  • Although the BMD plan was later reconfigured, that initial trade-off between Washington and Moscow showed the Intermarium that the United States would not hesitate to put its more immediate concerns in the Middle East ahead of long-term strategic reassurances to Central Europe.
  • The Intermarium countries are responding to this situation with two main strategies.
  • The first is to maintain U.S. engagement as much as possible. The second is to create regional political and/or military alliances independent of NATO that can serve as alternatives to the preferred strategy of U.S. engagement in the region.
  • While Washington is extricating its forces from Iraq, it is still heavily engaged in Afghanistan. Given these circumstances, the Intermarium countries are also turning to two regional alliances to build relationships with one another and with other actors similarly concerned with Russia’s resurgence and Germany’s acquiescence: the Visegrad Group (V4)
  • The V4 decided in May to form a Visegrad Battlegroup under Polish command by 2016. The actual capacities of this battlegroup are yet to be determined, but the decision shows very clearly that the V4 is evolving from a primarily political grouping to one that places security at the forefront of its mission.
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    "Defense ministers from NATO members states will meet with Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov on June 9 to discuss the ballistic missile defense (BMD) network that will be set up in Europe. BMD is just one way Central Europe is responding to geopolitical shifts in Europe that have created a strengthening German-Russian relationship as Russia resurges into its former Soviet sphere of influence."
anonymous

Taxpayers Get Bilked For Sarah Palin's Diva Bus Tour Perks - 0 views

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    "Rep. Blumenauer wondered if the same perks that the Palins got were available to an average American family. More importantly, he wondered how much Sarah Palin's traveling road show cost federal taxpayers. He requested that the National Park Service provide an explanation of their policies towards the use of taxpayer funds for publicity events. He also wants an accounting of how much was spent giving Sarah Palin the celebrity treatment. As a private citizen Sarah Palin is allowed to visit any public place that she wants, but the taxpayers should not be responsible for her escort and security any more than they would be for any other citizen. Why are taxpayers footing the bill for Palin to get the VIP treatment? After all, she was supposed to be on a "family vacation." In these tough economic times America can't afford to make the transplanted Cactus Queen feel like a VIP. Sarah Palin is a millionaire many times over. She can afford her own escorts and security. I know that she believes that because she is a celebrity she doesn't have to stand in line like the rest of us, but taxpayers should not be picking up the tab for her decision to use historic locations as a backdrop for her publicity tour. What kind of fiscal conservative makes the federal government spend more tax payer money to pamper her? Sarah Palin's record of huge spending in Alaska blows the notion that she is a fiscal conservative to smithereens, so the idea that Sarah Palin even knows what a budget is, much less how to adhere to one is laughable. If Palin wants to reduce the size of government, she could start by not requiring our tax dollars pay for her diva act. Sarah Palin mooched off of the people of Alaska, and now she is taken her act national. Sarah Palin's brand of fiscal conservatism makes George W. Bush look like Ron Paul. Sarah Palin is a big spending publicity generating machine, and every American taxpayer is getting stuck with the bill."
anonymous

The Palinization of America - 0 views

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    "For many years America has been sliding into a dark abyss... ... succumbing to the lowest common-denominator -- spurning intelligence for 'cool.'" A good contribution to the notion that we're in the pre-crisis-portion of the Generational cycle.
anonymous

Europe: A Shifting Battleground, Part 2 | STRATFOR - 0 views

  • When Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov meets with NATO’s defense ministers June 9, the main focus of their talks will be the ballistic missile defense (BMD) network set to be installed in Europe.
  • Moscow is primarily concerned with the U.S. presence in the region, which is seen as a tangible threat. (The Visegrad, or V4, Battlegroup and the Nordic-Baltic security relationship are budding alliances, but U.S. F-16s and BMD installations near Ukraine and Belarus are real.)
  • Therefore, Russia has shifted its tactics — while retaining the option of responding militarily — to facilitating the ongoing fragmentation of the NATO alliance. In Moscow, this strategy is called “the chaos tactic.” In other words, the Kremlin will sow chaos within Europe by cooperating with Western Europe on security issues. The offer of a joint NATO-Russian BMD system is an example of this tactic; it makes Moscow appear willing to cooperate on the BMD issue while painting the Intermarium countries as belligerent and uncompromising (“paranoid,” as the Kremlin often puts it) when they protest Russia’s participation. Two other specific examples involve the European Security Treaty and the EU-Russia Political and Security Committee.
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  • The specifics of the treaty are irrelevant; the important point is that Moscow is negotiating with Western European countries. The mere act of Moscow’s talking to Western Europe about a new security framework irks the Intermarium; such talks show just how shaky the NATO alliance has become.
  • The current geopolitical shift in Europe will engender a crisis by the middle of the decade.
  • The Intermarium countries do not want to take Germany’s Cold War-era role as the chessboard upon which Russia and the United States play. Instead, the Intermarium and the Nordic countries — led by Poland and Sweden — want to move the buffer between Europe and Russia to Belarus and Ukraine. If they can get those two countries to be at the very least neutral — not formally within Russia’s political, economic and military sphere of influence — then Central Europe can feel relatively safe. This explains the ongoing Polish-Swedish coordination on issues such as the EU Eastern Partnership program, which is designed to reverse Russia’s growing influence in the former Soviet sphere, and the opposition of Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko.
  • Although Moscow is currently acting cooperatively — while concurrently creating chaos across the continent — it can easily resume using more aggressive tactics. Moscow has contingency plans, including moving troops against the Baltic and Polish borders in Belarus, potentially increasing its military presence in Ukraine and the Black Sea, and placing missiles in Kaliningrad and Belarus.
  • But the overall balance between the United States and Russia in Central Europe will depend on another country: Germany. The question at this point will be the extent to which Germany is willing to see the Intermarium draw in a U.S. military presence.
  • Like Russia, Germany does not want to see a U.S.-dominated continent, especially when Berlin is strong enough to command the region politically and economically. Nor does Germany want to see a more aggressive Russia in a few years. Berlin has limited options to prevent either scenario, but it could use NATO and EU structures to stall the process — though it would cause an identity crisis for both institutions. It will be important to watch how the United States and Russia use Germany against each other in the fight over Central Europe.
  • Unlike Cold War-era Germany, the Intermarium states will not quietly accept becoming the staging ground for a U.S.-Russian contest.
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    "As Central Europe works to counter Russia's resurgence in the region, Russia is responding with disruptive measures by cooperating with Western Europe on security issues, a tactic that both strengthens Moscow's ties with Western Europe (particularly Germany) and makes Central European countries look unreasonable. The growing rift between Western and Central Europe will eventually lead to a crisis as the Central European countries try to avoid serving as a buffer zone between Russia and the West."
anonymous

An Education - 0 views

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    "If this looks terribly adorable, then there are spoilers below. If not, then there are no spoilers below. Take a minute and think it over. The movie is about a 16 year old girl in 1961 Britain, in her final year of "gymnasium" or A-Levels or sixth form or whatever they call it over there, wanting to "read English at Oxford." Her father, an unsophisticated, stuffy, and concrete man, wants her to go to Oxford. Period. Not learn Latin or study mathematics or play the cello-- which he insists she do-- but do those things solely because they will get her into Oxford. He relaxes in a suit and tie and drinks only on Christmas. In other words, he's an American parent. Yes, just like Amy Chua, which is why your reactions to them are identical."
anonymous

Portfolio: Obstacles to a China-Russia Energy Deal - 0 views

  • Russia’s the largest exporter of raw commodities in the world. China’s the largest importer of raw commodities in the world. It seems that it should already be a very robust trading relationship between the two, but there’s not. Until now, most of the public and even private debate between the two, the negotiations of a natural gas deal, have focused on price.
  • The Chinese want to pay no more than about $100, $150 per thousand cubic meters, which they say is the domestic price of natural gas in their country, and they’re right. The Russians say they will accept nothing less than the European price, which is $350-$400 per thousand cubic meters, which is what they say they charge all their other customers, which is also right.
  • It’s not that price isn’t an issue but the real problem is not the price of natural gas but the price of the project.
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  • Russia and China, while they seem to be right next to each other on a map, are very large places. Their population centers are wildly divergent, several thousand kilometers apart, and the natural gas in Russia for the most part is nowhere near the population centers in China.
  • This is a huge project. Conservatively, very conservatively, this is $100 billion infrastructure project. More realistically it’s more like $300 billion and that doesn’t even include the cost of building a natural gas grid in China in order to take advantage of the gas. Even now the Chinese do not have a unified system like most states.
  • And so the future of energy cooperation between the two countries will undoubtedly grow but $2-$300 billion infrastructure tag? That’s pretty doubtful. And timing is a big issue here too. The Russians have been working for the last 35 years to build one of these megaprojects starting in the Yamal Peninsula going down the Europe. That project is now finally nearing operational status but it took 35 years and tens of billions of dollars of investment. Even if the Chinese do agree with the Russians on every aspect of what would be the world’s largest infrastructure project ever, it’s not going to come online until 2030.
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    "Vice President of Analysis Peter Zeihan discusses the logistical and geopolitical challenges to Sino-Russian energy integration."
anonymous

Dispatch: German-Russian Security Cooperation - 0 views

  • Russia and Germany are currently negotiating a potentially new institution within the European Union. It is the European Union and Russia Security and Political Committee. The actual organization — its name and its purpose — is quite vague. But what is clear is it would introduce Russia to the political and security decision-making of the European Union.
  • What’s interesting to watch is to what extent Germany is actually aligning itself with Russian interests on this specific issue. This is because Berlin doesn’t really care how the Transdniestria issue plays out in the region. What it does care about is to be able to prove to the rest of Europe that it can in fact control Russia, that it can in fact bring Russia to the table, and then once at the table Berlin can get Moscow to give some sort of conciliatory gestures towards the rest of Europe.
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    "Analyst Marko Papic looks at the strategies Berlin may use to facilitate greater security collaboration between Germany and Russia without the input of the United States."
anonymous

Images capture moment brain goes unconscious - 0 views

  • As the patient goes under, different parts of the brain seem to be "talking" to each other, a team told the European Anaesthesiology Congress in Amsterdam.
  • they caution that more work is needed to understand what is going on.
  • unconsciousness is a process by which different areas of the brain inhibit each other as the brain shuts down.
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    "For the first time researchers have monitored the brain as it slips into unconsciousness. The new imaging method detects the waxing and waning of electrical activity in the brain moments after an anaesthetic injection is administered."
anonymous

Russia's Chess Match In Libya - 0 views

  • Gadhafi has never displayed any intention of leaving Libya, a point he reportedly reiterated to Ilyumzhinov during his visit.
  • the best option he can hope for at this point is maintaining power of a rump Libya following a partition of the country (a course of action neither side has advocated publicly).
  • What is known is that no serious effort is being taken to arm and train rebel forces to do the job for the West. This means hopes for regime change ride on NATO planes or the possibility that members of Gadhafi’s own regime might overthrow him. Otherwise, negotiations will eventually have to take place, because no one is prepared to invade Libya or keep bombing it forever.
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  • Moscow knows this, and appears to be attempting to set itself up as the mediator in the Libyan conflict, not only between Tripoli and the rebel opposition, but more importantly between Tripoli and the West.
  • No other country is as well placed as Russia to fulfill this role, and Moscow is eager to take advantage of the opportunity. The Germans’ refusal to take part in the air campaign has exposed a major rift in the alliance that works in the Russian interest. Russia also has a strategic interest in positioning itself to be able to exploit Libya’s energy assets: By acting as a mediator to all sides, it can work toward its ultimate aim of scuttling European hopes that North Africa may present an opportunity to lessen the dependence on Russian energy supplies.
    • anonymous
       
      Dominating European energy needs has been a pretty strongly established objective for the Russians since Putin came to power.
  • Credibility is on the line, and that will be a powerful driver for these countries to succeed in their mission of regime change. It came as no surprise last Thursday to hear an anonymous NATO official concede that efforts are being made to assassinate Gadhafi in the course of selecting targets for bombing.
  • Ilyumzhinov may rival Gadhafi for personal eccentricity — Ilyumzhinov is famous for declaring that he was once taken aboard a UFO, and for claiming he can communicate through telepathy — but he is acting as a tool of Russian foreign policy in his dealings with Gadhafi.
  • A former president of the Russian Republic of Kalmykia, he has ties to the Kremlin as well as Russian intelligence. He claims his visit was not mandated by Moscow, yet admits that he informed President Dmitri Medvedev’s personal envoy for Africa, Mikhail Margelov, of his trip in advance.
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    "Russian businessman and politician Kirsan Ilyumzhinov told Russian media Tuesday that Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi is ready to begin immediate talks with NATO and Benghazi-based rebels over the settlement to the Libyan civil war. Ilyumzhinov claims Gadhafi told him this during their recent meeting in Tripoli, when the pair were filmed playing chess by Libyan state television. Ilyumzhinov, the president of the governing body of the international chess world and who has ties to the Kremlin, claims that he offered Gadhafi a draw in the match, not wanting to offend his host. In the same vein, the Russian government is trying to facilitate a draw for Gadhafi in the Libyan conflict, as it asserts itself as a mediator, and more importantly, positions itself to exploit the Libyan crisis for its own geopolitical aims."
anonymous

Dispatch: Moscow Gets Ahead on Missile Defense - 0 views

  • First, the Shanghai Corporation Organization, the SCO, issued a joint statement during its meeting in Kazakhstan regarding the Western plans for a missile defense system saying that any system that would threaten international security is opposed by the organization. Second, the Czech government also announced today that it would oppose any sort of a U.S. plan that was of minimal nature, essentially pulling Prague out of the U.S. plans for a ballistic missile defense system in central Europe.
  • The negative statement about the ballistic missile defense from the SCO is not surprising. Since it is essentially led by Russia, and Russia has in the past attempted to portray the SCO as some sort of a counter weight to NATO, although it is nothing of the sort at this moment.
  • But what is somewhat interesting about the statement is that it is the first time that Beijing has really publicly weighed in on the issue.
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  • Prague has always had a little more room to maneuver when it came to the BMD system. It is not positioned on the borders with a resurgent Russia nor would any of its buffer states such as Ukraine and Belarus.
  • Unlike Poland and Romania, which had missile components of the new BMD system, Prague was left with an early warning system, which really constituted nothing more than a room full of computers
  • As such the Czech government didn’t really see any reason why to put political capital behind a project that was A, unpopular and B, didn’t really have any large significance. At the end of the day, the BMD system from the perspective of the central Europeans is really about bringing the United States into the region, to offer greater security against Russian resurgence.
  • Moscow will be able to use the SCO statement to show that it’s not just Russia that has problems with the U.S. plans for BMD in Europe but also for another very important security player in the world - China.
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    "Analyst Marko Papic explains two separate statements made Wednesday that give Russia momentum against U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense in Europe."
anonymous

Wanting Foreign Governments to Have Different Preferences is Not a Strategy - 0 views

  • In the case of Israel, it's been obvious for decades that unconditional American support for Tel Aviv complicates U.S. policy in the rest of the Middle East, and that some kind of deal on Palestinian statehood is a practical means of dulling the contradiction inherent in America's approach to the situation.
  • It's clear that Israeli and American preferences just don't align, and hoping for that to suddenly change is not a coherent policy.
  • Likewise with Pakistan. America would like Pakistan to stop caring about the threat posed by India, be less concerned with gaining "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, abandon its quixotic fits over the status of Kashmir, and thus be less inclined to openly and tacitly support Islamic militant groups that complicate American policy.
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  • But, obviously, those in Pakistan's government have different preferences and priorities. And hoping for that to change isn't a strategy.
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    "For those who missed them, check out Andrew Sullivan's piece this morning on the bind into which the eventual UN vote on a Palestinian state has put U.S. foreign policy, as well as Josh Foust's post on the inanity of accepting further Friedman unit extensions to the war in Afghanistan. Stepping back a bit from the specifics of each situation, it's notable just how much crucial American policymaking seems to be based on asking/hoping/praying that foreign governments realign their policy preferences to better sync with U.S. interests. Not their policies, their preferences."
anonymous

Rand & Aesthetics 16 - 0 views

  • since few if any admirers of Beethoven find him to be malevolent, that should be enough to settle the question. Rand is merely trying to justify her dislike of a composer that even she has to admit is a "great musician."
  • This passage proves, more than any other, that when it comes to serious music, Rand was in way over her head. Classical musicians (i.e., those who are in the best position to judge) generally regard Wagner as one of the greatest composers. They would look upon Rand's criticisms of Wagner as ignorant and deeply prejudiced. Rand's avowal that she principally judges composer by their melodies would inspire deep contempt (the most important element in serious music tends to be harmony, not melody). Her assertion that most of Wagner's melodies are "street-organ" and "circus" music would yield howls of derision. And what is this comment about Wagner's "alleged virtuousity of orchestration": since when is Rand an expert on orchestration?This is, to be entirely frank, very embarrassing stuff; and the fact that Rand seems entirely oblivious as to how foolish she is coming off only makes it that much more cringe worthy.
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    "We get the full sense of the subjective and arbitrary character of Rand's aesthetics when we glance at Rand's pronouncements about specific composers. These pronouncements are often so thin and baseless that it their basis in sheer egotistic prejudice should be obvious." at Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature
anonymous

The Withdrawal Debate and its Implications - 0 views

  • The ballpark figure of this first reduction is said to be on the order of 30,000 U.S. troops — mirroring the 2009 surge — over the next 12-18 months. This would leave some 70,000 U.S. troops, plus allied forces, in the country.
  • Far more interesting are the rumors — coming from STRATFOR sources, among many others — suggesting that the impending White House announcement will spell out not only the anticipated reduction, but a restatement of the strategy and objectives of the war effort
  • The stage has certainly been set with the killing of Osama bin Laden
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  • Nearly 150,000 troops cannot and will not be suddenly extracted from landlocked Central Asia in short order. Whatever the case, a full drawdown is at best years away. And even with a fundamental shift in strategy, some sort of training, advising, intelligence and particularly, special-operations presence, could well remain in the country far beyond the deadline for the end of combat operations, currently set for the end of 2014.
  • Recall the rapid dwindling, in the latter years of the Iraq war, of the “coalition of the willing,” which, aside from a company of British trainers, effectively became a coalition of one by mid-2009
  • Potential spillover of militancy in the absence of a massive American and allied military presence in Afghanistan affects all bordering countries. Even in the best case scenario, from a regional perspective, a deterioration of security conditions can be expected to accompany any U.S. drawdown.
  • Others, like Russia, will be concerned about an expansion of the already enormous flow of Afghan poppy-based opiates into their country. From Moscow’s perspective, counternarcotics efforts are already insufficient, as they have been sacrificed for more pressing operational needs, and are likely to further decline as the United States and its allies begin to extricate themselves from this conflict.
  • Domestically, Afghanistan is a fractious country. The infighting and civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal ultimately killed more Afghans than the Soviets’ scorched-earth policy did over the course of nearly a decade.
  • But ultimately, for the last decade, the international system has been defined by a United States bogged down in two wars in Asia. For Washington, the imperative is to extract itself from these wars and focus its attention on more pressing and significant geopolitical challenges. For the rest of the world, the concern is that it might succeed sooner than expected.
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    "U.S. President Barack Obama met with the outgoing commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus, and Obama's national security team Thursday to review the status of the counterinsurgency-focused campaign. At the center of the discussion was next month's deadline for a drawdown of forces, set by Obama when he committed 30,000 additional troops at the end of 2009. An announcement on this initial drawdown is expected within weeks."
anonymous

Ten Reasons We Are Seeing An Excess of Lists of Ten Things We Should Know - 0 views

  • Lately I’ve noticed lots of articles with titles that are variations of “Ten Things You Should Know About X.”
  • 1. We don’t have time to read anymore.
  • 2. Ten is close to the approximate size of our working memory.
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  • 3. Since writers can’t make a living any more, we are sliding into an era of bullet point-ism.
  • 4. In many cases, there’s more than ten things that you should know, or fewer than ten things that you should know.
  • 5. It’s a way for pentadactyl animals to feel superior to unidactyl animals.
  • 6. At this point in the list, with four more to go, we enter the fat and boring midsection of the list of top ten things you should know about lists of ten things. It’s basically not remembered, so there’s really no point in putting anything here. Ditto for 7, and 8.
  • 9. Because of the well documented recency effect, it’s time to start having content in our list of ten things again.
  • 10. If we’ve maintained our concentration to this point in the list, we will be rewarded with a bit of humorous fluff that helps bind some of our anxiety about the essential meaninglessness of our lives, and — especially — our time spent on reading yet another list of ten things we should know.
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    Basically, we like numbers and bloggers have been told for years to create titles like that to generate hits. But, there's more. By Malcolm MacIver (at Science Not Fiction) in Discover Magazine.
anonymous

Above the Tearline: Fallout from the bin Laden Operation - 0 views

  • When the CIA operates overseas, they are primarily focused on developing human assets, foreign nationals, in four categories. The first would be the intelligence services; number two would be within the military services; number three would be the diplomatic corps of that respective country; and the fourth being the police or security services.
  • In most cases, the CIA develops informants in foreign countries simply by paying them, giving them cash under the table to provide that information to them. I would also think that due to the highly compartmented nature of this case that the individuals that were being used inside the Pakistani government to provide information were used in an unwitting fashion, meaning they would have no idea that bin Laden was the target set.
  • Another aspect to this story would be it is highly probable that the ISI, the Pakistani intelligence service, conducted their own internal security investigation — some would call it a witch hunt — to identify two different things: one, who helped hide bin Laden, if anybody; and the second being who has helped the CIA.
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    "Vice President of Intelligence Fred Burton uses the arrest of five Pakistani nationals for helping the CIA with the bin Laden safe-house surveillance to examine how the CIA operates in foreign countries."
anonymous

The end of the job - 0 views

  • Hiemstra’s model leaves plenty of space at the top for the global super-rich to maintain their current status at the top of a tall and ever-narrowing pyramid of wealth
  • Hiemstra’s vision has some worrying gaps, though, the most obvious of which being the fate of the working class, already reeling from the massive downscaling of manufacturing jobs in the Countries Formerly Known As The First World.
  • The most profound shift may be the disappearance of employers as we have known them, as they are replaced by amoeba-like networks that come together to complete certain projects and tasks. Consider a feature film production.
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    "Via Gerd Leonhard, here's Glen Hiemstra suggesting that the current unemployment trough in the US (and, by extension, much of the rest of the West) is here to stay. Grim news on the surface, but Hiemstra's theory - which I have a certain degree of sympathy for - is that it's the post-industrialisation notion of "a job" that's had its day, and that employment will become a far more fluid thing, with everyone becoming their own freelance "company of one"."
anonymous

Rand & Aesthetics 17 - 0 views

  • In her haste to find a pretext for calling "modern" music non-art, Rand, in her carelessness, has once again presented a hollow argument. It may be annoying and even aesthetically viscious for avant-garde composers to introduce taped sounds of machine and street noises into their musical compositions. But that, in itself, doesn't render the musical portions of such compositions any less musical. Before one denounces a given aesthetic style, one at least has to take the trouble to understand that style. Otherwise, one comes off as prejudiced rather than insightful, as an aesthetic ignoramus rather than a knowledgable critic.
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    "Ayn Rand's most extended published take on "modern music" appears in her "Art and Cognition" essay. It features all the usual Randian intellectual vices: tendency toward over-generalization, vagueness, lack of specific examples, and condemnation via implicit suggestion and innuendo:"
anonymous

Eurozone Crisis: Not a Greek Drama - 0 views

  • Lost in the coverage is the fact that Greece constitutes 2.5 percent of Eurozone GDP and Eurozone member states’ direct exposure to Greece is manageable.
  • After a year and a half of watching the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis unfold, we should put one notion to rest: no one event, crisis or decision will cause the Eurozone to collapse. Such a complex system of financial and monetary relationships will not unravel in a day, a month or a year.
  • Eurozone member states have proven highly flexible in their handling of the crisis.
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  • Skeptics contend that because the Eurozone was primarily a political creation, its economic logic is fundamentally flawed. A singular economic or political shock — such as the collapse of the Greek government — could therefore unravel the entire bloc by exposing a slew of economic problems.
  • Precisely because the Eurozone is a political creation, however, fundamental changes in the geopolitics of Europe are required to undermine it. Furthermore, the greater the imminent financial crisis, the greater the likelihood that Eurozone member states will find flexible means to resolve it. This resourcefulness has been evidenced throughout the crisis.
  • Therefore if all else fails, the ECB will print money.
  • The idea that the ECB would participate in its own dissolution because it is committed to its independence, or to maintaining 2 percent inflation, is a theoretical assumption that takes little account of the ECB’s behavior over the last 24 months.
  • This analysis leads us to two conclusions.
  • First, the Eurozone is not going to collapse in the middle of the sovereign debt crisis.
  • Second, fundamental political changes underway in Europe — such as the weakening of the NATO alliance, the regionalization of security alliances, and especially the developing Russian-German relationship — are far more important to the future of the Eurozone than a Greek confidence vote.
  • Because the Eurozone is fundamentally a political project, the weakening of the political bonds that tie Eurozone member states into a currency union are what will ultimately lead to its dissolution or modification.
  • Monumental shifts are underway in Europe. We have no reason to believe that Greece is at the center of them. What is most interesting is that the focus, both in terms of risks and solutions, continues to be on both short-term effects and singular events. This myopia is in part because Eurozone member states, in particular Germany, have not offered a long-term solution or plan.
  • The question that needs to be asked is: what do Europeans, and specifically the Germans, plan to do with Europe’s security and political architecture in the long term? The answer to that question cannot be found in the financial databases of Eurostat or the Bank of International Settlement, nor especially in the coverage of 24-hour investor-news stations.
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    "It has been 2,000 years since Athenian legislators last received the kind of global attention fixed upon them Tuesday. News coverage of the Greek parliament's June 21 confidence vote captivated the global financial sector. The vote was carried live on most global 24-hour investment-news stations and links to live online feeds of the Greek vote were posted across the world wide web. The vote passed, giving Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou the political authority to try to pass further austerity measures mandated by the Eurozone in another vote on June 28."
anonymous

U.S. and Pakistan: Afghan Strategies - 0 views

  • Any withdrawal from Afghanistan, particularly an accelerated one, will leave a power vacuum in Afghanistan that the Kabul government will not be able to fill.
  • There is a prior definition of success that shaped the Bush administration’s approach to Afghanistan in its early phases. The goal here was the disruption of al Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan and the prevention of further attacks on the United States from Afghanistan.
  • It was more modest and, in many ways, it was achieved in 2001-2002. Its defect, of course, was that the disruption of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, while useful, did not address the evolution of al Qaeda in other countries.
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  • The ultimate Iraq strategy was a political settlement framed by an increase in forces, and its long-term success was never clear. The Obama administration was prepared to repeat the attempt in Afghanistan, at least by using Iraq as a template if not applying exactly the same tactics.
  • However, the United States found that the Taliban were less inclined to negotiate with the United States, and certainly not on the favorable terms of the Iraqi insurgents, simply because they believed they would win in the long run
  • As we pointed out after the death of Osama bin Laden, his demise, coupled with the transfer of Petraeus out of Afghanistan, offered two opportunities.
  • The first was a return to the prior definition of success in Afghanistan
  • Second, the departure of Petraeus and his staff also removed the ideology of counterinsurgency
  • The conventional understanding of war is that its purpose is to defeat the enemy military. It presents a more limited and focused view of military power.
  • Counterinsurgency draws its roots from theories of social development in emerging countries going back to the 1950s.
  • In the view of this faction, defeating the Taliban was impossible with the force available and unlikely even with a more substantial force. There were two reasons for this.
  • First, the Taliban comprised a light infantry force with a superior intelligence capability and the ability to withdraw from untenable operations
  • Second, sanctuaries in Pakistan allowed the Taliban to withdraw to safety and reconstitute themselves, thereby making their defeat in detail impossible.
  • The United States can choose to leave Afghanistan without suffering strategic disaster. Pakistan cannot leave Pakistan.
  • while Afghanistan is a piece of American global strategy and not its whole, Afghanistan is central to Pakistan’s national strategy. This asymmetry in U.S. and Pakistani interests is now the central issue.
  • After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States became indifferent to Afghanistan’s future. Pakistan could not be indifferent. It remained deeply involved with the Islamist forces that had defeated the Soviets and would govern Afghanistan, and it helped facilitate the emergence of the Taliban as the dominant force in the country.
  • Sept. 11, 2001, posed a profound threat to Pakistan.
  • On one side, Pakistan faced a United States in a state of crisis, demanding Pakistani support against both al Qaeda and the Taliban.
  • On the other side Pakistan had a massive Islamist movement hostile to the United States
  • The Pakistani solution was the only one it could come up with
  • they did as much as they could for the United States without completely destabilizing Pakistan while making it appear that they were being far more cooperative with the Americans and far less cooperative with their public.
  • The United States wanted to disrupt al Qaeda regardless of the cost. The Pakistanis wanted to avoid the collapse of their regime at any cost. These were not compatible goals.
  • The United States accepted this publicly because it made Pakistan appear to be an ally at a time when the United States was under attack for unilateralism. It accepted it privately as well because it did not want to see Pakistan destabilize. The Pakistanis were aware of the limits of American tolerance, so a game was played out.
  • That game is now breaking down, not because the United States raided Pakistan and killed bin Laden but because it is becoming apparent to Pakistan that the United States will, sooner or later, be dramatically drawing down its forces in Afghanistan.
  • First, Pakistan will be facing the future on its western border with Afghanistan without an American force to support it.
  • Second, Pakistan is aware that as the United States draws down, it will need Pakistan to cover its withdrawal strategically.
  • Finally, there will be a negotiation with the Taliban, and elements of Pakistan, particularly the ISI, will be the intermediary.
  • Publicly, it is important for them to appear as independent and even hostile to the Americans as possible in order to maintain their domestic credibility.
  • From the American point of view, the war in Afghanistan — and elsewhere — has not been a failure. There have been no more attacks on the United States on the order of 9/11, and that has not been for al Qaeda’s lack of trying.
  • In the end, the United States will leave Afghanistan (with the possible exception of some residual special operations forces). Pakistan will draw Afghanistan back into its sphere of influence.
  • A play will be acted out like the New Zealand Haka, with both sides making terrible sounds and frightening gestures at each other.
  • The United States is furious at Pakistan for its willingness to protect American enemies. Pakistan is furious at the United States for conducting attacks on its sovereign territory. In the end it doesn’t matter. They need each other. In the affairs of nations, like and dislike are not meaningful categories, and bullying and treachery are not blocks to cooperation. The two countries need each other more than they need to punish each other. Great friendships among nations are built on less.
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    "U.S. President Barack Obama will give a speech on Afghanistan on June 22. Whatever he says, it is becoming apparent that the United States is exploring ways to accelerate the drawdown of its forces in the country. It is also clear that U.S. relations with Pakistan are deteriorating to a point where cooperation - whatever level there was - is breaking down."
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