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anonymous

Mubarak Stepping Down? - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...20110210-mubarak-stepping-down

egypt geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 10 Feb 11 - No Cached
  • Egyptian Prime Minister and former air force chief Ahmed Shafiq announced to BBC Arabic that discussions are under way for Mubarak to step down.
  • Gen. Hassan al-Roueini, the military commander for the Cairo area, reportedly told protesters in Tahrir Square, “All your demands will be met today.”
  • Then, Shafiq reportedly made a statement saying that Mubarak will in fact stay in his post as president and that Mubarak has not made a decision to step down.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • Curiously, no statements from Suleiman have been issued Feb. 10, even though Suleiman assumed de facto leadership of the regime Jan. 29.
  • The details are still extremely murky, but based on the conflicting statements thus far and rumors that have been circulating over the past several days of the army’s distrust of Suleiman as a successor to Mubarak, there appears to be a struggle under way within the regime elite, specifically between serving officers and former officers who have maintained close ties with Mubarak, such as Shafiq and Suleiman. The situation remains in flux, but the army appears ready to intervene in order to usher Mubarak out.
  • anonymous on 10 Feb 11
     
    "Conflicting statements out of Cairo on Feb. 10 suggest that a struggle is under way between the Egyptian military and civilian elite over Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's political exit."
anonymous

Mubarak Transfers Some Powers - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...0210-mubarak-refuses-step-down

egypt geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 10 Feb 11 - Cached
  • Mubarak may still be attempting to hang onto power, but that does not mean the military does not have a plan. The military likely has anticipated the opposition’s complete rejection of Mubarak’s minor concessions. Thus, the coming hours will tell whether this is the reaction that the army is waiting for to legitimize their intervention, for if the military does not act, the next likely scenario is for the demonstrations to spiral out of control.
  • anonymous on 10 Feb 11
     
    "Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak delivered a speech the evening of Feb. 10 in which he announced that, while he would not resign, he would transfer some of his powers to Vice President Omar Suleiman. Mubarak also said he would repeal a three-decade-long state of emergency once the current security situation stabilizes. Once again, the embattled Egyptian president insisted on upholding his duty to the constitution in safeguarding the country until he can peacefully transfer the presidency through elections."
anonymous

The Egyptian Military's Defining Moment - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...tian-militarys-defining-moment

egypt geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 11 Feb 11 - Cached
  • By the time the Egyptian ambassador to the United States cleared up the matter on CNN, the crowd felt betrayed and seemed no longer to care about the significant distinction. They did not want power to be ceded. They wanted Mubarak gone and they wanted the military to take care of the matter.
  • The fact that Mubarak was clinging to the constitution and the crowds were in effect calling for a coup represented a kind of irony, but ultimately not much of one.
  • There is a constitution and Mubarak is the president. If he is simply forced out, the status of the constitution is in doubt and with it, the regime that the military founded under Nasser. Mubarak wanted to serve out his term, but was prepared to cede practical power. That, from their point of view, should have been enough.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • The other argument was that at this point the crowds were not asking for regime change, remaining focused on Mubarak. If the military resisted and the crowds turned on them, they would be calling for regime change and with it, everything would be up in the air. Far better to violate the letter of the constitution and depose Mubarak, then risk destroying it all by protecting Mubarak; far better to capitulate to the crowds than to fire on them.
  • Both sides had the same fear — regime change.
  • The choices involved the fate of the nation and the military and one can imagine the arguments, people changing sides, decisions quickly reversed. The players were as confused as the observers.
  • anonymous on 11 Feb 11
     
    "It was a night of watching. What was being watched was the Egyptian military, faced with a defining moment. President Hosni Mubarak was expected to resign today. People ranging from the head of the CIA to Egyptian government officials to the crowds in the streets clearly expected it to happen. Obviously, word had leaked out from sources close to Mubarak that he had made the decision to go. Yet when he made his speech today, he did not resign. "
anonymous

The Strategy Behind the Military's Fourth Communique - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...nd-militarys-fourth-communique

geopolitics egypt

shared by anonymous on 13 Feb 11 - Cached
  • In other words, the military — and only the military — will be the one to prioritize the state’s agenda, which is likely to differ greatly from the order of priorities outlined by the opposition. The military council then vaguely expresses its “commitment” to the provisions of its previous statements (to meet the demands of the people) and then orders Egyptian citizens to return to work (and thus clear the streets).
  • the council is “committing the Egyptian Arab Republic to all regional and international obligations and treaties.” The military is specifically reassuring Israel and the United States that the 1978 peace accord will remain intact.
  • The military is being strategically vague in its promises to the people, yet direct in clearly articulating its demands to the people. The opposition’s reaction is thus critical to watch in the days ahead. If political forces begin to criticize the military for backtracking on promises and attempt to continue street demonstrations until their demands are met, they will not be met with the same tolerance the military exhibited while Muabrak was clinging onto power.
  • anonymous on 13 Feb 11
     
    "Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, now the caretakers of the state, issued its fourth communique Feb. 12. The language of the statement is deliberately vague enough to keep the opposition guessing, but, in line with STRATFOR's prediction, the military's interest in preserving the regime is overriding the opposition's demands for dismantling the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), revising the Constitution and, most importantly, holding fresh parliamentary elections in a timely manner."
anonymous

Egypt: The Distance Between Enthusiasm and Reality - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...between-enthusiasm-and-reality

egypt geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 14 Feb 11 - Cached
  • What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power. This isn’t incompatible with democratic reform. Organizing elections, political parties and candidates is not something that can be done quickly. If the military is sincere in its intentions, it will have to do these things. The problem is that if the military is insincere it will do exactly the same things. Six months is a long time, passions can subside and promises can be forgotten.
  • Power rests with the regime, not with the crowds. In our view, the crowds never had nearly as much power as many have claimed.
  • In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is odd to consider this a revolution.
  • ...11 more annotations...
  • The crowd in Cairo, as telegenic as it was, was the backdrop to the drama, not the main feature.
  • Mubarak’s decision to name his son represented a direct challenge to the Egyptian regime. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command, which had been the real power in the regime.
  • The demonstrators never called for the downfall of the regime. They demanded that Mubarak step aside. This was the same demand that was being made by many if not most officers in the military months before the crowds gathered in the streets.
  • What happened was not a revolution. The demonstrators never brought down Mubarak, let alone the regime. What happened was a military coup that used the cover of protests to force Mubarak out of office in order to preserve the regime. When it became clear Feb. 10 that Mubarak would not voluntarily step down, the military staged what amounted to a coup to force his resignation. Once he was forced out of office, the military took over the existing regime by creating a military council and taking control of critical ministries. The regime was always centered on the military. What happened on Feb. 11 was that the military took direct control.
  • We now face the question of whether the coup will turn into a revolution. The demonstrators demanded — and the military has agreed to hold — genuinely democratic elections and to stop repression. It is not clear that the new leaders mean what they have said or were simply saying it to get the crowds to go home.
  • First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society.
  • Second, the military is deeply enmeshed in running the country.
  • The largest number of protesters arrived in Tahrir Square after the Internet was completely shut down.
  • For all the chatter about the Egyptian people demanding democracy, the fact is that hardly anyone participated in the demonstrations, relative to the number of Egyptians there are, and no one really knows how the Egyptian people would vote on this issue.
  • The Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy as the man they forced out of office. They have promised democracy, but it is not clear that they mean it. If they mean it, it is not clear how they would do it, certainly not in a timeframe of a few months. Indeed, this means that the crowds may re-emerge demanding more rapid democratization, depending on who organized the crowds in the first place and what their intentions are now.
  • The week began with an old soldier running Egypt. It ended with different old soldiers running Egypt with even more formal power than Mubarak had. This has caused worldwide shock and awe. We were killjoys in 2009, when we said the Iranians revolution wasn’t going anywhere. We do not want to be killjoys now, since everyone is so excited and happy. But we should point out that, in spite of the crowds, nothing much has really happened yet in Egypt. It doesn’t mean that it won’t, but it hasn’t yet.
  • anonymous on 14 Feb 11
     
    "On Feb. 11, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned. A military council was named to govern in his place. On Feb. 11-12, the crowds that had gathered in Tahrir Square celebrated Mubarak's fall and the triumph of democracy in Egypt. On Feb. 13, the military council abolished the constitution and dissolved parliament, promising a new constitution to be ratified by a referendum and stating that the military would rule for six months, or until the military decides it's ready to hold parliamentary and presidential elections."
anonymous

Rand and Empirical Responsibility 13 - 0 views

aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/...pirical-responsibility-13.html

objectivism criticalthinking

shared by anonymous on 15 Feb 11 - Cached
  • How, for example, does she know that intellectual appeasement is merely an attempt to apologize for being concerned about intellectual matters? Where would she get such a notion? Where on earth does she come up with the idea that intellectual appeasement involves an "escape from loneliness"? What evidence does she have that such is the case?
  • “Tribalism is … a logical consequence of modern philosophy.” This is a specific application of Rand's theory of history. The trouble with such statements is that, because they are so broad and sweeping, they can neither be corroborated or refuted by empirical evidence.
  • it is far more plausible to suppose that tribalism is a hard-wired feature of human nature, prominent in many human beings, and only weaker or non-existent within the exceptional few.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Philosophy, as Nietzsche noticed more than hundred years ago and which cognitive science and experimental psychology continues to corroborate, often degenerates into a mere rationalization of the the desires, sentiments, and interests that afflict various strains of human nature.
  • anonymous on 15 Feb 11
     
    "Rand, despite her cluelessness about human nature, nevertheless couldn't help tossing off wildly speculative remarks about the more obscure motivations of the human animal."
anonymous

Unrest in the Middle East: A Special Report - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...est-middle-east-special-report

stratfor geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 17 Feb 11 - Cached
  • High youth unemployment, a lack of political representation, repressive police states, a lack of housing and rising commodity prices are among the more common complaints voiced by protesters across the region.
  • Regime responses to those complaints also have been relatively consistent, including subsidy handouts; changes to the government, in many cases cosmetic; promises of job growth, electoral reform, and a repeal of emergency rule
  • states also has unique circumstances
  • ...18 more annotations...
  • In the past several days Egypt has not witnessed a popular revolution but a carefully managed succession by the military.
  • It must be recognized that the succession crisis in Egypt was playing out between the country’s military elite and Mubarak well before protests began in Egypt on Jan. 25.
  • The demonstrators, encouraged by both internal and external pro-democracy groups, were in fact a critical tool the military used to maneuver Mubarak out while preserving the regime.
  • Though Tunisia had some domestic pro-democracy groups before unrest began in December 2010, Tunisia saw one of the region’s more organic uprisings.
  • The ouster of Ben Ali and his family and a reshuffling of the government for now have calmed most of the unrest. A sense of normalcy is gradually returning as Tunisians look ahead to as-yet unscheduled elections due sometime in 2011.
  • In all likelihood, Tunisia will end up with another government dominated by many of the former Ben Ali elites, albeit with a democratic face.
  • While the civil unrest will continue to capture the cameras’ attention, the real struggle in Algeria is not playing out in the streets. A power struggle has long been under way between the country’s increasingly embattled president, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, and the head of the Military Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DRS), Gen. Mohamed “Toufik” Mediene.
  • Not by coincidence, one of the main organizers of the demonstrations, Saeed Saidi (a Berber) is known to be on excellent terms with Mediene, also a Berber. The call for Berber rights — Berbers make up roughly one-third of the Algerian population — has been one of the leading drivers of the demonstrations thus far.
  • Now, however, a recently-created Facebook group known as “Moroccans for Change” has called for a nationwide protest Feb. 20, something the government of King Mohammed VI has responded to by meeting with opposition parties and promising to speed up the pace of economic, social and political reforms.
  • In one of its main demands, the opposition has called for a new constitution that would strip power from the monarchy and from the network of state and business elites known as the Makhzen.
  • In sum, the planned demonstrations in Morocco are illustrations of opportunism as opposed to a serious potential popular uprising — much less regime change.
  • King Abdullah II acted quickly to pre-empt major civil unrest in the country by handing out millions of dollars in subsidies and by forming a new government.
  • Bahrain was the first among Persian Gulf countries to witness significant demonstrations, and protesters clashed with riot police early on. After two days of demonstrations led by Shiite opposition groups, a heavy crackdown was launched on Pearl Square in the heart of Manama late Feb. 16 on mostly Shiite protesters who were camping overnight.
  • The ruling Sunni family may be a minority in the Shiite-majority country, but some 54 percent of the population is made up of foreign guest workers, who are notably not taking part in the demonstrations.
  • Poor socio-economic conditions, high youth unemployment (around 26 percent) and disillusionment with the regime are all notable factors in the development of Iran’s opposition movement, but as STRATFOR stressed in 2009, the primarily youth-driven, middle- and upper-class opposition in Tehran is not representative of the wider population, a significant portion of which is supportive of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
  • The civil unrest in Libya is unlikely to pose a meaningful threat to the regime, but it could impact the country’s ongoing power-struggle between Gadhafi’s two sons.
  • In attempt to take the steam out of the political opposition, Saleh has announced that he will not run for re-election in 2013, and that he would do away with pending amendments that would have abolished presidential term limits.
  • Soon after the unrest in Egypt broke out, Syrian opposition youth activists (most of whom are based outside the country) attempted to organize their own “Day of Rage” via social media to challenge the al Assad regime.
  • anonymous on 17 Feb 11
     
    "Footage of self-immolations in Algeria, clashes between police and protesters in Yemen and Bahrain, government reshufflings in Jordan and fledgling street demonstrations in Iran could lead to the impression of a domino effect under way in the Middle East in which aging autocrats are on the verge of being uprooted by Tunisia-inspired revolutionary fervor. A careful review of unrest in the Middle East and North Africa , however, exposes a very different picture. "
anonymous

Libya: Signs of an Army-led Ouster in the Works | STRATFOR - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...ya-signs-army-led-ouster-works

stratfor geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 23 Feb 11 - Cached
  • Based on allegations that Gadhafi ordered the Libyan air forces to bomb civilian opposition targets, many high-level Libyan defectors, including Libyan Ambassador to the United States Ali Suleiman Aujali, have been calling on the UNSC to declare a no-fly zone over Libya and for the United States to enforce the zone.
  • Ultimately, without a strong regime at the helm, the loyalties of Libya’s army officers are more likely to fall to their respective tribes. At that point, the potential for civil war increases considerably.
  • the Libyan situation cannot be viewed as a replication of the crisis management employed by the military in Egypt.
  • anonymous on 23 Feb 11
     
    "STRATFOR has picked up on a number of signs that an army-led faction in Libya is attempting to oust Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi and install a new Revolutionary Command Council made up of public and military figures to administer the country. Unlike the situation in Egypt, a military intervention in Libya has a much lower chance of success."
anonymous

Revolution and the Muslim World - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...21-revolution-and-muslim-world

stratfor geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 23 Feb 11 - Cached
  • There have been moments in history where revolution spread in a region or around the world as if it were a wildfire.
  • Each had a basic theme.
  • But in the end, the reasons behind them could reasonably be condensed into a sentence or two.
  • ...28 more annotations...
  • The key is that in each country where they took place, there were significant differences in the details — but they shared core principles at a time when other countries were open to those principles, at least to some extent.
  • The Muslim countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have been the prime focus of these risings, and in particular North Africa where Egypt, Tunisia and now Libya have had profound crises.
  • The key principle that appears to be driving the risings is a feeling that the regimes, or a group of individuals within the regimes, has deprived the public of political and, more important, economic rights — in short, that they enriched themselves beyond what good taste permitted.
  • Why has it come together now?
  • One reason is that there was a tremendous amount of regime change in the region from the 1950s through the early 1970s, as the Muslim countries created regimes to replace foreign imperial powers and were buffeted by the Cold War.
  • More than anything, if we want to define this wave of unrest, particularly in North Africa, it is a rising against regimes — and particularly individuals — who have been in place for extraordinarily long periods of time.
  • In this case, the question of greatest importance is not why these revolutions are taking place, but who will take advantage of them.
  • In this case, whatever the cause of the risings, there is no question that radical Islamists will attempt to take advantage and control of them. Why wouldn’t they? It is a rational and logical course for them.
  • Whether they will be able to do so is a more complex and important question, but that they would want to and are trying to do so is obvious.
  • But while there is no question that Islamists would like to take control of the revolution, that does not mean that they will, nor does it mean that these revolutions will be successful. Recall that 1848 and 1968 were failures and those who tried to take advantage of them had no vehicle to ride. Also recall that taking control of a revolution is no easy thing. But as we saw in Russia in 1917, it is not necessarily the more popular group that wins, but the best organized. And you frequently don’t find out who is best organized until afterwards.
  • Democratic revolutions have two phases.
  • The first is the establishment of democracy. The second is the election of governments.
  • So there are three crosscurrents here.
  • The first is the reaction against corrupt regimes. The second is the election itself. And the third? The United States needs to remember, as it applauds the rise of democracy, that the elected government may not be what one expected.
  • pictures of peaceful demonstrators are not nearly as significant as the media will have you believe, but pictures of demonstrators continuing to hold their ground after being fired on is very significant.
  • This leads to the key event in the revolution. The revolutionaries cannot defeat armed men. But if those armed men, in whole or part, come over to the revolutionary side, victory is possible. And this is the key event.
  • In Libya, the military has split wide open.
  • If the split in the military is roughly equal and deep, this could lead to civil war.
  • Far more common is for the military to split. If the split creates an overwhelming anti-regime force, this leads to the revolution’s success.
  • It is this act, the military and police coming over to the side of the demonstrators, that makes or breaks a revolution.
  • Therefore, looking at the students on TV tells you little. Watching the soldiers tells you much more.
  • The danger is not radical Islam, but chaos, followed either by civil war, the military taking control simply to stabilize the situation or the emergence of a radical Islamic party to take control — simply because they are the only ones in the crowd with a plan and an organization. That’s how minorities take control of revolutions.
  • Only in the case of Eastern Europe do we see broad revolutionary success, but that was against an empire in collapse, so few lessons can be drawn from that for the Muslim world.
  • democracy and pro-Western political culture do not mean the same thing.
  • There are three possibilities.
  • One is that this is like 1848, a broad rising that will fail for lack of organization and coherence, but that will resonate for decades.
  • The second is 1968, a revolution that overthrew no regime even temporarily and left some cultural remnants of minimal historical importance.
  • The third is 1989, a revolution that overthrew the political order in an entire region, and created a new order in its place.
  • anonymous on 23 Feb 11
     
    "The Muslim world, from North Africa to Iran, has experienced a wave of instability in the last few weeks. No regimes have been overthrown yet, although as of this writing, Libya was teetering on the brink."
anonymous

The Significance of Libya's Gulf of Sidra Energy Assets | STRATFOR - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...ibyas-gulf-sidra-energy-assets

stratfor geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 23 Feb 11 - Cached
  • The directors of several oil companies in the Gulf of Sidra region of eastern Libya announced they were splitting from embattled leader Moammar Gadhafi and had “pledged loyalty to the people,” Zawya Dow Jones reported Feb. 23.
  • Currently, the fluid situation in eastern Libya makes it difficult to draw boundaries between cities controlled by pro- and anti-Gadhafi forces. While there appears to be an east-to-west domino effect, protests are still contained in individual cities, and their success in recruiting the support of local tribes, military forces or business leaders is different from city to city. Geographic limitations will further constrain the ability of protesters in these cities to coalesce for a push westward.
  • It is still very early in the conflict, and there is no indication that anti-Gadhafi forces are consolidating in eastern Libya, but control of the Gulf of Sidra could provide crucial strategic depth to a region of Libya that is breaking away from Tripoli’s control.
  • anonymous on 23 Feb 11
     
    "The heads of several oil companies in eastern Libya's Gulf of Sidra region announced Feb. 23 they had "pledged loyalty to the people" and were splitting from Moammar Gadhafi's regime. The Gulf of Sidra is critical to Libya's energy exports and its major ports handle approximately 77 percent of Libya's oil exports. It is still very early in the conflict, but if eastern forces gain control over this region, it could provide crucial strategic depth in their fight against Tripoli."
anonymous

Rand and Empirical Responsibility 14 - 0 views

aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/...pirical-responsibility-14.html

objectivism criticalthinking

shared by anonymous on 24 Feb 11 - Cached
  • If Rand's statement was meant as a definition, she is guilty of equivocation; for she does not always stick to that particular usage.
  • Whether such esteem is based on a reliance of one's power to think is an assertion about matters of fact that requires evidence.
  • “Only a rationally selfish man, a man of self-esteem, is capable of love.”
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • This statement packs three assertions, any one of which could easily be dismissed on empirical grounds. It assumes that, in order to be capable of love, one must be (1) rational, (2) selfish and (3) a man of self-esteem. Does Rand provide any evidence of these assertions? No. Indeed, they are hardly plausible. If Rand's view was true, we would have to conclude that most people are incapable of love. Would any sane person actually believe such a thing?
  • “Humility is not a recognition of one’s failings, but a rejection of morality.”
  • Rand's tendency to redefine terms, not merely for herself, but for others, constitutes an egregious intellectual vice. She is, in effect, putting words in other people mouths and then condemning them on that basis.
  • anonymous on 24 Feb 11
     
    ""Self-esteem is reliance on one's power to think." It's not clear whether this is meant as a definition or as a statement of fact. Objectivists often confuse the one with the other. A definition merely defines how a term is used. One may define one's terms as one pleases, but once a definition is granted, one needs to stay consistent to the usuage. If Rand's statement was meant as a definition, she is guilty of equivocation; for she does not always stick to that particular usage."
anonymous

Is crime a virus or a beast? How metaphors shape our thoughts and decisions - 0 views

blogs.discovermagazine.com/...ape-our-thoughts-and-decisions

shared by anonymous on 24 Feb 11 - No Cached
  • As with all complex issues, crime is suffused with metaphors.
    • anonymous
      anonymous on 24 Feb 11
       
      This is oddly understandable, and not hard for me to mentally extrapolate further: that our politics is swayed by our characterization of events.
  • In a series of five experiments, Paul Thibodeau and Lera Boroditsky from Stanford University have shown how influential metaphors can be.
  • First, Thibodeau and Boroditsky asked 1,482 students to read one of two reports about crime in the City of Addison.
  • ...7 more annotations...
  • The second report was exactly the same, except it described crime as a “virus infecting the city” and “plaguing” neighbourhoods.
  • After reading these words, 75% of the students put forward solutions that involved enforcement or punishment
  • After reading this version, only 56% opted for more enforcement, while 44% suggested social reforms.
  • But these words have no weight on their own; it’s their context that gives them power.
  • If the critical sentence came at the end of the report, it didn’t have any effect.
  • As you might expect, men and Republicans were more likely to emphasise enforcement, while women and Democrats leant towards social reforms. But these factors only created differences of around 8 to 9 percentage points. The metaphors, on the other hand, created shifts of between 18 to 22 percentage points!
  • I agree with Richard Dawkins that DNA is a recipe more than a blueprint
  • anonymous on 24 Feb 11
     
    In 1990, in a depressed area of Buffalo, New York, eleven schoolgirls were raped. According to George Kelling, a criminal justice scholar, eight of these incidents could have been prevented. After the third case, police knew that a serial rapist was on the loose but, even though they had a description and modus operandi, they issued no warning to local parents. They saw their job as catching the criminal rather than preventing more girls from being raped. Kelling argued that the cops hadn't wilfully neglected their duties. Their actions were swayed by their views of police-work, which were in turn affected by metaphors. They saw themselves as crime-fighters who trod the "thin blue line" protecting innocent civilians from criminal marauders. With this role entrenched in their minds, they saw their job as catching the rapist, even at the expense of preventing further crimes. As Kelling said, the eight Buffalo schoolgirls "were victims, though no one realized it at the time, not only of a rapist, but of a metaphor."
anonymous

Upper Toronto - 0 views

quietbabylon.com/...upper-toronto

shared by anonymous on 24 Feb 11 - Cached
  • This is especially useful in the context of an administration that seems bent on stalling or preventing change at all. The current mayor is hard at work trying to undo an already-funded plan to develop a network of light rail. He characterizes that plan as part of a “war on the car”, a war he’s declared “over”. The cars won, apparently. In the mayor’s defence, he is proposing a new subway line, itself a project of massive cost and scale.
  • anonymous on 24 Feb 11
     
    "It's kind of late as I write this. I'm trying to get it done quickly because through my window I can see the dormant construction machinery that's going to be startling me awake in a few hours. Annoying? Yes, but a daily reminder that cities change. All the time."
anonymous

Malta in the Mediterranean, or the Meaning of Maps - 0 views

historyandfutility.wordpress.com/...rranean-or-the-meaning-of-maps

shared by anonymous on 24 Feb 11 - Cached
  • But there are also subtler mental maps, predispositions to view the world in certain ways which predisposes the map user to see some patterns and not others, to identify certain relationships as important and to ignore altogether others.
  • anonymous on 24 Feb 11
     
    "I made two posts at Demography Matters about Malta, that Mediterranean archepelagic republic that has been ensconced since 2004 in the European Union and now finds itself identified as a southern bulwark of Europe against Africa. That's how it's seen now: my second post of the day related the story of how a century ago, a poor and overpopulated Malta provided large numbers of immigrants to the adjacent French-conquered territories of North Africa. One century, a source of migrants and a support of colonialism, the next, a destination of migrants and supposed target for empire; life changes."
anonymous

Tools Never Die, the Finale - 0 views

www.npr.org/...tools-never-die-the-finale

shared by anonymous on 24 Feb 11 - No Cached
  • So what Kevin found is not exactly what I asked him to find; the original tool is no longer being made, but the idea, the concept, lives on in new, adaptive forms. Was that our bet? "Remember," he wrote me a little defensively," I did not say 'no technological device' but rather 'no species of technology' [has disappeared] so my emphasis is on the underlying technology rather than the physical device."
  • But the deeper lesson of this whole exercise is that — to a degree I didn't appreciate until Kevin forced me to look — technology does indeed persist. Tools, machines, they change, they adapt, they morph, but they continue to be made. I hadn't noticed this tenaciousness before.
  • Kevin would go further. He has a radical notion, and he talks about it in his book What Technology Wants. He says most living things eventually go extinct. But technology, perhaps, is immortal.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • Also when comparing tools to life, the time scales are ridiculously different. Trilobites ranged the Earth for 270 million years. The Paleolithic axe is an infant by comparison, merely 100,000 years old. The homo sapiens who made that axe are only a 200,000 years old. Who's to say that our ideas won't vanish long before the trilobites did?
  • Ideas, what do they use? Not chemicals. Richard Dawkins says they leap from, "brain to brain, via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation." People see a new invention, then they tell friends about it, or they put it onto a cave wall, papyrus, into song, or a book, newspaper, radio, TV, movies, poems, the internet. That way, the invention can be stored and copied.
  • Or is it possible that technology is inherently persistant, that it just won't be thrown out? That's what Kevin is suggesting. That's "What Technology Wants." It "wants" to be copied, to last. I find this idea a bit too mystical for my tastes.
  • "I don't know about you, but I am not initially attracted by the idea of my brain as a sort of dung heap in which the larvae of other people's ideas renew themselves, before sending out copies of themselves in an informational diaspora...Who's in charge, according to this vision — we or our memes?
  • anonymous on 24 Feb 11
     
    "A few weeks ago, Kevin, founding editor of Wired Magazine and world-class gadget geek, made me this bet: I bet, he said, "there is no species of technology that's gone globally extinct on this planet." By which he meant - or I took him to mean - there is no tool, no invention ever manufactured by humans that isn't still being made new today."
anonymous

Montgomery Ward Catalogue of 1895 - 0 views

store.doverpublications.com/0486223779.html

shared by anonymous on 24 Feb 11 - Cached
  • anonymous on 24 Feb 11
     
    "Tea gowns, yards of flannel and pillow-case lace, stereoscopes, books of gospel hymns, the New Improved Singer Sewing Machine, side saddles, milk skimmers, straight-edged razors, high-button shoes, spittoons - some 25,000 items in all, most illustrated. "A priceless resource." - Histor... read more"
anonymous

Cairo and Riyadh Working to Stem Regional Unrest - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...orking-to-Stem-Regional-Unrest

geopolitics stratfor

shared by anonymous on 24 Feb 11 - Cached
  • anonymous on 24 Feb 11
     
    "A stream of meetings and messages relayed in recent days illustrate a concerted effort by Egyptian and Saudi leaders to advise embattled Arab regimes on how to contain unrest in their countries. Saudi Arabia and the United States, in particular, appear to be attempting to create a strategy in an attempt to contain Shiite disturbances and thus deny Iran an opportunity to destabilize its Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf."
anonymous

Dispatch: Why the Outcome of Bahrain's Unrest Matters - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...utcome-bahrains-unrest-matters

shared by anonymous on 24 Feb 11 - Cached
  • anonymous on 24 Feb 11
     
    "While the world is focusing on the fighting in Libya, there is a much more profound development taking place in the Persian Gulf, particularly in the country of Bahrain, where the government is negotiating with the opposition. And the outcome of those negotiations will be far more geopolitically relevant and significant than the fighting that is taking place in Libya."
anonymous

Never Fight a Land War in Asia - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...0228-never-fight-land-war-asia

shared by anonymous on 01 Mar 11 - Cached
  • First, why is fighting a land war in Asia a bad idea? Second, why does the United States seem compelled to fight these wars? And third, what is the alternative that protects U.S. interests in Asia without large-scale military land wars?
  • Let’s begin with the first question, the answer to which is rooted in demographics and space. The population of Iraq is currently about 32 million. Afghanistan has a population of less than 30 million. The U.S. military, all told, consists of about 1.5 million active-duty personnel (plus 980,000 in the reserves), of whom more than 550,000 belong to the Army and about 200,000 are part of the Marine Corps. Given this, it is important to note that the United States strains to deploy about 200,000 troops at any one time in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that many of these troops are in support rather than combat roles. The same was true in Vietnam, where the United States was challenged to field a maximum of about 550,000 troops (in a country much more populous than Iraq or Afghanistan) despite conscription and a larger standing army. Indeed, the same problem existed in World War II.
  • When the United States fights in the Eastern Hemisphere, it fights at great distances, and the greater the distance, the greater the logistical cost. More ships are needed to deliver the same amount of materiel, for example. That absorbs many troops. The logistical cost of fighting at a distance is that it diverts numbers of troops (or requires numbers of civilian personnel) disproportionate to the size of the combat force.
  • ...29 more annotations...
  • Regardless of the number of troops deployed, the U.S. military is always vastly outnumbered by the populations of the countries to which it is deployed. If parts of these populations resist as light-infantry guerrilla forces or employ terrorist tactics, the enemy rapidly swells to a size that can outnumber U.S. forces, as in Vietnam and Korea. At the same time, the enemy adopts strategies to take advantage of the core weakness of the United States — tactical intelligence. The resistance is fighting at home. It understands the terrain and the culture. The United States is fighting in an alien environment. It is constantly at an intelligence disadvantage. That means that the effectiveness of the native forces is multiplied by excellent intelligence, while the effectiveness of U.S. forces is divided by lack of intelligence.
  • The United States compensates with technology,
  • from space-based reconnaissance and air power to counter-battery systems and advanced communications. This can make up the deficit but only by massive diversions of manpower from ground-combat operations. Maintaining a helicopter requires dozens of ground-crew personnel. Where the enemy operates with minimal technology multiplied by intelligence, the United States compensates for lack of intelligence with massive technology that further reduces available combat personnel. Between logistics and technological force multipliers, the U.S. “point of the spear” shrinks. If you add the need to train, relieve, rest and recuperate the ground-combat forces, you are left with a small percentage available to fight.
  • The paradox of this is that American forces will win the engagements but may still lose the war.
  • the United States is well-suited for the initial phases of combat, when the task is to defeat a conventional force. But after the conventional force has been defeated, the resistance can switch to methods difficult for American intelligence to deal with.
  • The example of the capitulation of Germany and Japan in World War II is frequently cited
  • The back of the Wehrmacht was broken by the Soviets on their own soil with the logistical advantages of short supply lines.
  • The Germans had no appetite for continuing a resistance against the Russians and saw surrendering to the Americans and British as sanctuary from the Russians.
  • As for Japan, it was not ground forces but air power, submarine warfare and atomic bombs that finished them — and the emperor’s willingness to order a surrender.
  • Had the Japanese emperor been removed, I suspect that the occupation of Japan would have been much more costly.
  • Neither Germany nor Japan are examples in which U.S. land forces compelled capitulation and suppressed resistance.
  • The problem the United States has in the Eastern Hemisphere is that the size of the force needed to occupy a country initially is much smaller than the force needed to pacify the country.
  • Some people argue that the United States is insufficiently ruthless in prosecuting war, as if it would be more successful without political restraints at home.
  • The guerrilla has built-in advantages in warfare for which brutality cannot compensate.
  • Given all this, the question is why the United States has gotten involved in wars in Eurasia four times since World War II.
  • In each case it is obvious: for political reasons.
  • In each case, the military was given an ambiguous mission. This was because a clear outcome — defeating the enemy — was unattainable.
  • There are two problems with American strategy.
  • The first is using the appropriate force for the political mission.
  • Moreover, it requires an offensive mission. Defensive missions (such as Vietnam and Korea) by definition have no terminal point or any criteria for victory.
  • Having destroyed the conventional forces of Iraq, the United States was unprepared for the Iraqi response, which was guerrilla resistance on a wide scale.
  • The purpose of a military is to defeat enemy conventional forces. As an army of occupation against a hostile population, military forces are relatively weak.
  • By having an unclear mission, you have an uncertain terminal point. When does it end?
  • Donald Rumsfeld once said, “You go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” I think that is a fundamental misunderstanding of war. You do not engage in war if the army you have is insufficient.
  • Diplomacy can find the common ground between nations. It can also be used to identify the hostility of nations and use that hostility to insulate the United States by diverting the attention of other nations from challenging the United States.
  • Diplomacy for the United States is about maintaining the balance of power and using and diverting conflict to manage the international system. Force is the last resort, and when it is used, it must be devastating.
  • The argument I have made, and which I think Gates is asserting, is that at a distance, the United States cannot be devastating in wars dependent on land power. That is the weakest aspect of American international power and the one the United States has resorted to all too often since World War II, with unacceptable results.
  • An elective war in which the criteria for success are unclear and for which the amount of land force is insufficient must be avoided. That is Gates’ message
  • As with the Monroe Doctrine, it should be elevated to a principle of U.S. foreign policy, not because it is a moral principle but because it is a very practical one.
  • anonymous on 01 Mar 11
     
    "U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speaking at West Point, said last week that "Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.""
anonymous

The Evolving Modern Egyptian Republic: A Special Report - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...yptian-republic-special-report

geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 01 Mar 11 - Cached
  • The modern Egyptian state is a new polity, founded a mere 60 years ago in the wake of a military coup organized by midranking officers under the leadership of Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser.
  • The provisional military authority, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, led by the country’s top general, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, will play the pivotal role in the post-Mubarak era. To understand what Egypt’s future holds, one must examine the evolution of the incumbent political arrangement, the central role played by the military in the formation of the state, previous transitions, and the reasons behind the regime’s need to oust one of its own.
  • anonymous on 01 Mar 11
     
    "The Egyptian establishment faced internal strife over the transition of power from President Hosni Mubarak even before massive public unrest demanding regime change erupted in mid-January. With Mubarak now out of office, some hope for democracy while others fear the rise of radical Islamist forces. Though neither outcome appears likely, the Egyptian state plainly is under a great deal of stress and is being forced to make changes to ensure its survival. "
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