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The Air Force is seeking an entrepreneurial innovator to develop technology to analyze the conduct of insiders to determine if they pose a threat to government IT systems. In a call for proposals aimed at small businesses, posted on Tuesday, the Air Force is asking outside developers to "define, develop and demonstrate innovative approaches for determining 'good' (approved) versus 'bad' (disallowed/subversive) activities, including insiders and/or malware." For their initial efforts, the Air Force will pay up to $100,000. The proposal says current techniques that monitor illicit activities only address the most blatant violations of policy or the grossest deviations from accepted behavior. Most systems concentrate their resources on repelling attacks at the network borders with little attention devoted to threats that evade detection and/or emanate from within. The proposal states: "As such, there currently exists a great need across the federal, military and private sectors for a viable and robust means to provide near-real-time detection, correlation and attribution of network attacks, by content or pattern, without use of reactive previously-seen signatures. Many times, these trusted entities have detailed knowledge about the currently-installed host and network security systems, and can easily plan their activities to subvert these systems."

Yet another breach of sensitive, unencrypted data is making news in the United Kingdom. This time the breach puts Royal Air Force staff at serious risk of being targeted for blackmail by foreign intelligence services or others. The breach involves audio recordings with high-ranking air force officers who were being interviewed in-depth for a security clearance. In the interviews, the officers disclosed information about extra-marital affairs, drug abuse, visits to prostitutes, medical conditions, criminal convictions and debt histories - information the military needed to determine their security risk. The recordings were stored on three unencrypted hard drives that disappeared last year. The interviews were conducted to ensure that the officers "can be trusted with sensitive government information and property," the Ministry of Defense said. But the interviews have now become a huge security risk for the officers and the Ministry of Defence, which has proven itself to be untrustworthy when it comes to guarding sensitive information and property.

A group of federal agencies and private organizations, including the National Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security, has released a set of guidelines defining the top 20 things organizations should do to prevent cyberattacks. The Consensus Audit Guidelines (CAG) describe the 20 key actions, referred to as security controls, that organizations should take to defend their computer systems. The controls are expected to become baseline best practices for computer security, following further public- and private-sector review. CAG is being led by John Gilligan, formerly the CIO for both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Department of Energy, and a member of the Obama transition team dealing with IT in the Department of Defense and various intelligence agencies. "We are in a war, a cyberwar," Gilligan said on a media conference call. "And the federal government is one of many large organizations that are being targeted. Our ability at present to detect and defend against these attacks is really quite weak in many cases." Borrowing an analogy he attributed to an unnamed federal CIO, Gilligan said, "We're bleeding badly and we really need triage and we need to focus on things that will keep this patient alive." The CAG initiative represents part of a larger effort, backed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., to implement recommendations from the CSIS Commission report on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency.

Should responsibility for defending against cyberattacks be moved from the Dept. of Homeland Security to the military? Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton suggested as much at a Congressional hearing where he warned of U.S. vulnerability to cyberwarfar "across the spectrum." Such attacks "potentially threaten not only our military networks, but also our critical national networks," Chilton told a House Armed Services subcommittee, the Washington Post reported. As head of Strategic Command, the general isn't responsibel for defending civilian networks, just government computers. [Stratcom's responsibility is] "to operate and defend the military networks only and be prepared to attack in cyberspace when directed. I think the broader question is, who should best do this for the other parts of America, where we worry about defending power grids, our financial institutions, our telecommunications, our transportation networks, the networks that support them." Well, that's where the 60-day interagency overview of cybersecurity comes in. At the end of that, Chilton said, responsibility for protecting private sector networks may well fit under Stratcom's duties. So what impact in having the military at the center of cybersecurity? Importantly, it brings offensive ops into the defense game. And where the military is involved, can NSA be far behind? No. Operational control over both [offensive and defensive ops], Chilton said, has been delegated to Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency. … NSA, according to Chilton, already has a role in information security, and the agency's support "has been instrumental in our efforts to operate and particularly to defend our networks," he said. Combining oversight of cyber defense and offense made sense, Chilton said, "because they're so interconnected. . . . As you consider offensive operations, you want to make sure your defense are up."