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33rd Regiment Infantry Organized February 8, 1864, from 1st South Carolina Colored Infantry. Attached to U.S. Forces, Port Royal Island, S.C., 10th Corps, Dept. of the South, to April, 1864. District of Beaufort, S.C., Dept. of the South, to July, 1864. Folly Island, S.C., Northern District, Dept. of the South, to October, 1864. 1st Separate Brigade, Dept. of the South, to March, 1865. District of Savannah, Ga., and Dept. of the South, to January, 1866. SERVICE.--Duty at Port Royal Island, S.C., District of Beaufort, S.C.. until July, 1864. Expedition to James Island, S.C., June 30-July 10. James Island near Secessionville July 2. Duty on Folly and Morris Islands operating against Charleston, S.C., to November. Demonstration on Charleston & Savannah Railroad December 6-9. Devaux's Neck December 6. Tillifinny Station December 9. Ordered to Folly Island December 9. Near Pocotaligo Road December 20. At Pocotaligo, S. C., until February, 1865. Occupation of Charleston until March 8. Moved to Savannah, Ga., March 8, and duty there until June 6. Moved to Augusta, Ga. Duty there and at various points in the Dept. of the South until January, 1866. Mustered out January 31, 1866.

The Under Secretary's rebuttal of the IG's report is withering. It takes the IG's report apart, brick by brick, and shows it to be false in every material respect. Much of the Under Secretary's response is devoted to bureaucratic matters; e.g., the Inspector General was simply wrong in asserting that the work in question was carried out by the Under Secretary for Policy's office. On the merits, the Under Secretary points out that the IG has no expertise to determine that the effort to re-evaluate the intelligence gathered by the CIA and other agencies was "improper," even though it was both legal and directed by the Secretary of Defense: The work found "inappropriate" was an exercise in alternative thinking that the second most senior civilian in this Department directed his subordinates to prepare and brief to the most senior official of this Department. The latter, after receiving the draft briefing, directed that it be shared with the [Director of Central Intelligence]. When the Deputy National Security Advisor requested the briefing, the Deputy Secretary's office directed that it be given to him. These are the activities that the Draft Report characterizes as "inappropriate," because it considers them to be "production" and "dissemination" of an "alternative intelligence assessment" contradicting assessments of the "chartered-intelligence community." If the OIG actually believes that it was inappropriate for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to have some non-[intelligence community] staff members do a critical assessment of some [intelligence community] work on a subject of major significance for national security, inappropriate for the Secretary of Defense to share the OSD work with the [Director of Central Intelligence], and inappropriate for the Deputy Secretary to share the work with the Deputy National Security Advisor when requested by the latter, the OIG should say so directly instead of finding fault with subordinate OSD offices and staff members who did as they were instructed to do.

For some time, there have been claims of Iran's direct involvement in attacks against Iraqi and U.S. troops, but without the presentation of sufficient actual evidence to persuade Congress or the American public at large. Congress - Members of both parties and key staff - have been very reluctant to trust any such claims ever since the Iraqi WMD intelligence debacle. That might change after today, when U.S. officials on the ground in Iraq - not just at the CIA or the Pentagon in Washington - revealed reliable evidence of Iran's direct involvement, from the highest levels in the government, in the attacks.