Skip to main content

Home/ CULF 3331: "Middle Eastern Revolutions"/ Group items tagged the

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Filter: All | Bookmarks | Topics Simple Middle
wmulnea

Libya's civil war: That it should come to this | The Economist - 3 views

www.economist.com/...factional-chaos-it-should-come

shared by wmulnea on 11 Apr 15 - No Cached
  • It is split between a government in Beida, in the east of the country, which is aligned with the military; and another in Tripoli, in the west, which is dominated by Islamists and militias from western coastal cities
  • Benghazi is again a battlefield.
  • The black plumes of burning oil terminals stretch out over the Mediterranean.
  • ...69 more annotations...
  • Libya looked like the latest fragile blossoming of the Arab spring
  • Army commanders, mostly of Arab Bedouin origin, refused orders to shoot the protesters
  • the revolutionaries cobbled together a National Transitional Council (NTC) claiming to represent all of Libya
  • Volunteers from students to bank managers took up arms, joining popular militias and only sometimes obeying the orders of defecting army commanders trying to take control
  • In August Western bombing of government bases surrounding Tripoli cleared an avenue for the revolutionaries to take the capital.
  • Recognised abroad, popular at home and enjoying the benefits of healthy oil revenues—97% of the government’s income—the NTC was well placed to lay the foundations for a new Libya
  • he judges, academics and lawyers who filled its ranks worried about their own legitimacy and feared confrontation with the militias which, in toppling Qaddafi, had taken his arsenals for their own.
  • militia leaders were already ensconced in the capital’s prime properties
  • The NTC presided over Libya’s first democratic elections in July 2012, and the smooth subsequent handover of power to the General National Congress (GNC) revived popular support for the revolution.
  • Islamist parties won only 19 of 80 seats assigned to parties in the new legislature, and the process left the militias on the outside
  • The Homeland party, founded by Abdel Hakim Belhad
  • tried to advertise its moderation by putting an unveiled woman at the head of its party list in Benghazi
  • The incumbent prime minister, Abdurrahim al-Keib, a university professor who had spent decades in exile, fretted and dithered
  • He bowed to militia demands for their leaders to be appointed to senior ministries, and failed to revive public-works programmes
  • which might have given militiamen jobs
  • Many received handouts without being required to hand in weapons or disband, an incentive which served to swell their ranks
  • the number of revolutionaries registered with the Warriors Affairs Commission set up by the NTC was about 60,000; a year later there were over 200,000. Of some 500 registered militias, almost half came from one city, Misrata.
  • In May 2013 the militias forced parliament to pass a law barring from office anyone who had held a senior position in Qaddafi’s regime after laying siege to government ministries.
  • In the spring of 2014, Khalifa Haftar, a retired general who had earlier returned from two decades of exile in America, forcibly tried to dissolve the GNC and re-establish himself as the armed forces’ commander-in-chief in an operation he called Dignity
  • The elections which followed were a far cry from the happy experience of 2012. In some parts of the country it was too dangerous to go out and vote
  • Such retrenchment has been particularly noticeable among women. In 2011 they created a flurry of new civil associations; now many are back indoors.
  • Turnout in the June 2014 elections was 18%, down from 60% in 2012, and the Islamists fared even worse than before
  • Dismissing the results, an alliance of Islamist, Misratan and Berber militias called Libya Dawn launched a six-week assault on Tripoli. The newly elected parliament decamped to Tobruk, some 1,300km east
  • Grasping for a figleaf of legitimacy, Libya Dawn reconstituted the pre-election GNC and appointed a new government
  • So today Libya is split between two parliaments—both boycotted by their own oppositions and inquorate—two governments, and two central-bank governors.
  • The army—which has two chiefs of staff—is largely split along ethnic lines, with Arab soldiers in Arab tribes rallying around Dignity and the far fewer Misratan and Berber ones around Libya Dawn.
  • Libya Dawn controls the bulk of the territory and probably has more fighters at its disposal.
  • General Haftar’s Dignity, which has based its government in Beida, has air power and, probably, better weaponry
  • the Dignity movement proclaims itself America’s natural ally in the war on terror and the scourge of jihadist Islam
  • Libya Dawn’s commanders present themselves as standard-bearers of the revolution against Qaddafi now continuing the struggle against his former officers
  • Ministers in the east vow to liberate Tripoli from its “occupation” by Islamists, all of whom they denounce as terrorists
  • threatens to take the war to Egypt if Mr Sisi continues to arm the east. Sleeping cells could strike, he warns, drawn from the 2m tribesmen of Libyan origin in Egypt.
  • Yusuf Dawar
  • The struggle over the Gulf of Sirte area, which holds Libya’s main oil terminals and most of its oil reserves, threatens to devastate the country’s primary asset
  • And in the Sahara, where the largest oilfields are, both sides have enlisted ethnic minorities as proxies
  • ibya Dawn has drafted in the brown-skinned Tuareg, southern cousins of the Berbers; Dignity has recruited the black-skinned Toubou. As a result a fresh brawl is brewing in the Saharan oasis of Ubari, which sits at the gates of the al-Sharara oilfield, largest of them all.
  • Oil production has fallen and become much more volatile
  • oil is worth half as much as it was a year ago
  • The Central Bank is now spending at three times the rate that it is taking in oil money
  • The bank is committed to neutrality, but is based in Tripoli
  • Tripoli may have a little more access to cash, but is in bad shape in other ways
  • Fuel supplies and electricity are petering out
  • Crime is rising; carjacking street gangs post their ransom demands on Twitter
  • In Fashloum
  • residents briefly erected barricades to keep out a brigade of Islamists, the Nuwassi
  • “No to Islamists and the al-Qaeda gang” reads the roadside graffiti
  • Libya’s ungoverned spaces are growing,
  • Each month 10,000 migrants set sail for Europe
  • On January 3rd, IS claimed to have extended its reach to Libya’s Sahara too, killing a dozen soldiers at a checkpoint
  • The conflict is as likely to spread as to burn itself out.
  • the Western powers
  • have since been conspicuous by their absence. Chastened by failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, they have watched from the sidelines
  • Obama washed his hands of Libya after Islamists killed his ambassador
  • Italy, the former colonial power, is the last country to have a functioning embassy in Tripoli.
  • Even under Qaddafi the country did not feel so cut off
  • Dignity is supported not just by Mr Sisi but also by the United Arab Emirates, which has sent its own fighter jets into the fray as well as providing arms
  • The UAE’s Gulf rival, Qatar, and Turkey have backed the Islamists and Misratans in the west
  • If oil revenues were to be put into an escrow account, overseas assets frozen and the arms embargo honoured he thinks it might be possible to deprive fighters of the finance that keeps them fighting and force them to the table
  • Until 1963 Libya was governed as three federal provinces—Cyrenaica in the east, Fezzan in the south and Tripolitania in the west
  • The old divisions still matter
  • the marginalised Cyrenaicans harked back to the time when their king split his time between the courts of Tobruk and Beida and when Arabs from the Bedouin tribes of the Green Mountains ran his army
  • Tensions between those tribes and Islamist militias ran high from the start.
  • July 2011 jihadists keen to settle scores with officers who had crushed their revolt in the late 1990s killed the NTC’s commander-in-chief, Abdel Fattah Younis, who came from a powerful Arab tribe in the Green Mountains. In June 2013 the Transitional Council of Barqa (the Arab name for Cyrenaica), a body primarily comprised of Arab tribes, declared the east a separate federal region, and soon after allied tribal militias around the Gulf of Sirte took control of the oilfields.
  • In the west, indigenous Berbers, who make up about a tenth of the population, formed a council of their own and called on larger Berber communities in the Maghreb and Europe for support
  • Port cities started to claim self-government and set up their own border controls.
  • Derna—a small port in the east famed for having sent more jihadists per person to fight in Iraq than anywhere else in the world
  • opposed NATO intervention and insisted that the NTC was a pagan (wadani) not national (watani) council
  • Some in Derna have now declared their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq.
  • In December the head of America’s Africa command told reporters that IS was training some 200 fighters in the town.
fcastro2

A daring plan to rebuild Syria - no matter who wins the war - Ideas - The Boston Globe - 0 views

www.bostonglobe.com/...story.html

syria plan war politics china russia the west

shared by fcastro2 on 23 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • The first year of Syria’s uprising, 2011, largely spared Aleppo, the country’s economic engine, largest city, and home of its most prized heritage sites. Fighting engulfed Aleppo in 2012 and has never let up since, making the city a symbol of the civil war’s grinding destruction
  • Rebels captured the eastern side of the city while the government held the wes
  • , residents say the city is virtually uninhabitable; most who remain have nowhere else to go
  • ...28 more annotations...
  • In terms of sheer devastation, Syria today is worse off than Germany at the end of World War II
  • ven as the fighting continues, a movement is brewing among planners, activists and bureaucrats—some still in Aleppo, others in Damascus, Turkey, and Lebanon—to prepare, right now, for the reconstruction effort that will come whenever peace finally arrives.
  • In a glass tower belonging to the United Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, a project called the National Agenda for the Future of Syria has brought together teams of engineers, architects, water experts, conservationists, and development experts to grapple with seemingly impossible technical problems
  • It is good to do the planning now, because on day one we will be ready,”
  • The team planning the country’s future is a diverse one. Some are employed by the government of Syria, others by the rebels’ rival provisional government. Still others work for the UN, private construction companies, or nongovernmental organizations involved in conservation, like the World Monuments Fund
  • As the group’s members outline a path toward renewal, they’re considering everything from corruption and constitutional reform to power grids, antiquities, and health care systems.
  • Aleppo is split between a regime side with vestiges of basic services, and a mostly depopulated rebel-controlled zone, into which the Islamic State and the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front have made inroads over the last year
  • The population exodus has claimed most of the city’s craftsmen, medical personnel, academics, and industrialists
  • It took decades to clear the moonscapes of rubble and to rebuild, in famous targets like Dresden and Hiroshima but in countless other places as well, from Coventry to Nanking. Some places never recovered their vitality.
  • Of course, Syrian planners cannot help but pay attention to the model closest to home: Beirut, a city almost synonymous with civil war and flawed reconstructio
  • We don’t want to end up like Beirut,” one of the Syrian planners says, referring to the physical problems but also to a postwar process in which militia leaders turned to corrupt reconstruction ventures as a new source of funds and power
  • Syria’s national recovery will depend in large part on whether its industrial powerhouse Aleppo can bounce back
  • The city’s workshops, famed above all for their fine textiles, export millions of dollars’ worth of goods every week even now, and the economy has expanded to include modern industry as well.
  • Today, however, the city’s water and power supply are under the control of the Islamic State
  • Across Syria, more than one-third of the population is displaced.
  • A river of rubble marks the no-man’s land separating the two sides. The only way to cross is to leave the city, follow a wide arc, and reenter from the far side.
  • Parts of the old city won’t be inhabitable for years, he told me by Skype, because the ground has literally shifted as a result of bombing and shelling
  • The first and more obvious is creating realistic options to fix the country after the war—in some cases literal plans for building infrastructure systems and positioning construction equipment, in other cases guidelines for shaping governanc
  • They’re familiar with global “best practices,” but also with how things work in Syria, so they’re not going to propose pie-in-the-sky idea
  • If some version of the current regime remains in charge, it will probably direct massive contracts toward patrons in Russia, China, or Iran. The opposition, by contrast, would lean toward firms from the West, Turkey, and the Gulf.
  • At the current level of destruction, the project planners estimate the reconstruction will cost at least $100 billion
  • Recently a panel of architects and heritage experts from Sweden, Bosnia, Syria, and Lebanon convened in Beirut to discuss lessons for Syria’s reconstruction—one of the many distinct initiatives parallel to the Future of Syria project.
  • “You should never rebuild the way it was,” said Arna Mackic, an architect from Mostar. That Bosnian city was divided during the 1990s civil war into Muslim and Catholic sides, destroying the city center and the famous Stari Most bridge over the Neretva River. “The war changes us. You should show that in rebuilding.”
  • Instead, Mackik says, the sectarian communities keep to their own enclaves. Bereft of any common symbols, the city took a poll to figure out what kind of statue to erect in the city center. All the local figures were too polarizing. In the end they settled on a gold-colored statue of the martial arts star Bruce Lee
  • “It belongs to no one,” Mackic says. “What does Bruce Lee mean to me?
  • is that it could offer the city’s people a form of participatory democracy that has so far eluded the Syrian regime and sadly, the opposition as well.
  • “You are being democratic without the consequences of all the hullabaloo of formal democratization
  • A great deal of money has been invested in Syria’s destruction— by the regime, the local parties to the conflict, and many foreign powers. A great deal of money will be made in the aftermath, in a reconstruction project that stands to dwarf anything seen since after World War II.
  • fcastro2 on 23 Feb 15
     
    While it is still unclear as to who will win the Syrian conflict, there are people who are already looking towards the future and a better Syria. Plans are being made but, of course, these plans will entirely depend on who wins the war. 
amarsha5

How long can Saudi Arabia afford Yemen war? - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East - 14 views

www.al-monitor.com/...ia-economic-repercussions.html

saudi yemen war economics

shared by amarsha5 on 07 Apr 16 - No Cached
  • long history of political animosity; this is a history that continues until our present day.
    • joepouttu
      joepouttu on 07 Apr 16
       
      "However, as Saleh continued to kill, these countries had no choice but to issue a forceful declaration to show that they were not in favor of Saleh's relentless, murderous campaign to ignore a civil war in Yemen." pg 128
  • Yemen's treasury was burdened by the costs of unification such as paying for southern civil servants to move to the new capital, Sanaa, and paying interest on its massive debt. On top of its other economic challenges, Yemen was to absorb the shock of 800,000 returnees and their pressure on the already weak job market. With their return, the estimated $350 million a month in remittances
    • joepouttu
      joepouttu on 07 Apr 16
       
      "My father had decided to leave Eritrea and return to Yemen, his homeland, after long years of exile..." pg 110
  • Civil war broke out in the summer of 1994 in what could be interpreted as a symptom of economic failure.
  • ...20 more annotations...
  • By 1995 the Yemeni government implemented a program of macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms with support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and reduced spending on defense and civil service and cut subsidies. The Yemeni economy started showing signs of recovery and stability.
  • Masood Ahmed, director of the IMF’s Middle East and Central Asia Department, wrote in 2012 that “fiscal sustainability will be an issue” for Gulf Cooperation Council countries. In its 2012 regional economic outlook, the IMF recommended to “curtail current expenditures while protecting the poor” as a response to the risk of declining oil prices.
  • Policies to cut spending were unlikely to be introduced in a monarchy like Saudi Arabia, especially after the Arab Spring, where tax-paying citizens along with non-tax-paying Bahrainis and next-door Yemenis went out on the streets to claim their rights in shaping the policies that govern their daily lives. The risk of people demanding more political rights was growing and cutting spending was not the optimal strategy for the kingdom.
    • joepouttu
      joepouttu on 07 Apr 16
       
      "The students of Sanaa were unique, marching straight out onto the street from their classrooms and chanting, 'The people demand the fall of the President and the regime.'" pg 126
  • As the kingdom continued its generous fiscal policy by providing more benefits to its citizens in response to the people’s dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation, it ran a deficit of 3.4% of GDP in 2014 due to a fall in oil revenues.
  • The kingdom's economic reforms of raising gas and diesel prices, cutting fuel subsidies in half and supporting the introduction of a GCC-wide value-added tax might ease the pressure of sustaining a war for nine months and perhaps longer. These structural reforms were long overdue and their introduction at this time is revealing.
    • amarsha5
      amarsha5 on 07 Apr 16
       
      CIG pg. 120 -> "We live in a world with many layers of linkages between countries. Nations will exchange goods and services through trade and will engage in cross-border investments from bank loans to setting up businesses. Each of these linkages can serve as a transmission mechanism in a time of crisis."
  • the political inclusion of the taxpaying citizen. It's a price the kingdom is now willing to pay, as we have seen Saudi women not only
  • and suffered an uprising fueled by anger at economic failure. The Saudi economy is trying to absorb
  • As they introduce revenue-collecting mechanisms, they should also reform mechanisms of capital transfer to the public to minimize the gap between the rich and the poor, as it is known that the poor are the most affected by tighter revenue-collecting policies. Otherwise, the Saudi war on Yemen will mark the beginning of an economic downturn that will surely spill over onto its political system in the long run.
    • joepouttu
      joepouttu on 07 Apr 16
       
      "So the young revolutionaries fight on, until all their demands are met and they are free to build their State: a state founded on social justice and equality between all citizens where Saleh's reign is just a page in the history books." pg 129
    • amarsha5
      amarsha5 on 07 Apr 16
       
      CIG pg. 116 -> "Globalization, in the shape of freer trade and multinational investments, has been generally a force for good and economic prosperity. But it has also advanced, rather than harmed, social agendas"
    • ccfuentez
      ccfuentez on 07 Apr 16
       
      But it became apparent that Saleh was not going to leave me to my own devices. He declared war in mid-1994, occupying the South and defeating the Socialist Party. Everything was finished, or so I believed. Its property stolen by the regime, the paper shut down, and once more I found myself broken, defeated and without hope. Worse, I was a known employee of the Socialist Party through my work at the paper. In the region where I lived agents for the regime had been hunting down and detaining anyone who had belonged to the Socialist Party or getting them fired from their jobs. Although I had not been a party member myself, just worked at a party newspaper, the regime made no distinction. My mother intervened, however, and hid me. She wouldn't let me out of the house. My mother always protects me.   (2013-12-31). Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices from Tunis to Damascus (p. 115). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 
    • atownen
      atownen on 07 Apr 16
       
      Civil War: in 1994 Jamal currently in high school, describes the times as a world, when the color of his skin would define him. The Civil War, "interpreted as a symptom of economic failure", was evident in the reading when Jamal described the lack of jobs as a college graduate, members of the socialist party were completely shut out when Saleh took the presidency, depriving hard workers the ability to integrate into the economy. 
    • ccfuentez
      ccfuentez on 07 Apr 16
       
      CIG Ch. 4 -> in relation to international rulemaking on fiscal policy -> is international intervention needed to contain and reverse financial crises in countries, esp. when it comes to the human rights and economic equality of citizens
    • mcooka
      mcooka on 07 Apr 16
       
      Relating to page 120 Sanaa could not find work after college. While his degree wasn't very fluid, he was unable to find work for about 5 years. He got into journalism which blacklisted him against the government. Now he is unemployed again. 
    • mcooka
      mcooka on 07 Apr 16
       
      This paragraph, while not highlighted, is important to the idea of globalization and why the war is not stopping. There is a flow of revenue from these oil prices that Yemen is reliant on, but they are also competing with countries that produce higher amounts of oil. This would have happened during the time Sanaa was in College writing scathing articles
    • mcooka
      mcooka on 07 Apr 16
       
       On page 113 around this time the author was working as a journalist for the newspaper. 
    • mcooka
      mcooka on 07 Apr 16
       
      Related to page 129 Sanaa is still living in hiding and in poverty. The animosity keeps him in fear. 
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      Market liberalization outlook
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      When Saleh came to power he and the leader of the southern part of Yemen, Salem al-Beid, agreed to coesxist as leaders of Yemen.  WIthin weeks of this in play, Saleh began to try to make the south his and this created the civil war.  
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      Jamal notes that the standard of living in Yemen was decreasing gradually the longer Saleh stayed in power.  
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      People, including Jamal, were writing about the Saleh regime and how they were upset with them.  
    • csherro2
      csherro2 on 07 Apr 16
       
      When Saleh's son was coming into power, Jamal saw that Yemen was moving towards a monarchy, realizing that his and the country's future was in the hands of an unqualified person.  
wmulnea

Strife in Libya Could Presage Long Civil War - NYTimes.com - 1 views

www.nytimes.com/...libyan-unrest.html

shared by wmulnea on 21 Sep 14 - No Cached
  • Salah Badi, an ultraconservative Islamist and former lawmaker from the coastal city of Misurata.
  • Mr. Badi’s assault on Libya’s main international airport has now drawn the country’s fractious militias, tribes and towns into a single national conflagration that threatens to become a prolonged civil war. Both sides see the fight as part of a larger regional struggle, fraught with the risks of a return to repressive authoritarianism or a slide toward Islamist extremism.
  • the violence threatens to turn Libya into a pocket of chaos destabilizing North Africa for years to come.
  • ...37 more annotations...
  • Ansar al-Shariah, the hard-line Islamist group involved in the assault on the American diplomatic Mission in Benghazi in 2012
  • Their opponents, including the militias stocked with former Qaddafi soldiers
  • The ideological differences are blurry at best: both sides publicly profess a similar conservative but democratic vision.
  • an escalating war among its patchwork of rival cities and tribes.
  • Motorists wait in lines stretching more than three miles at shuttered gas stations, waiting for them to open. Food prices are soaring, uncollected garbage is piling up in the streets and bicycles, once unheard-of, are increasingly common.
  • Tripoli, the capital and the main prize, has become a battleground
  • The fighting has destroyed the airport
  • Constant shelling between rival militias has leveled blocks
  • Storage tanks holding about 25 million gallons of fuel have burned unchecked for a month
  • with daily blackouts sometimes lasting more than 12 hours.
  • many Libyans despaired of any resolution
  • In Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city, the fighting has closed both its airport and seaport, strangling the city.
  • the rush toward war is also lifting the fortunes of the Islamist extremists of Ansar al-Shariah, the Benghazi militant group.
  • The United Nations, the United States and the other Western powers have withdrawn their diplomats and closed their missions
  • “We cannot care more than you do,” the British ambassador, Michael Aron, wrote
  • Until now, a rough balance of power among local brigades had preserved a kind of equilibrium, if not stability
  • the transitional government scarcely existed outside of the luxury hotels where its officials gathered, no other force was strong enough to dominate. No single interest divided the competing cities and factions.
  • But that semblance of unity is now in tatters, and with it the hope that nonviolent negotiations might settle the competition for power and, implicitly, Libya’s oil.
  • In May, a renegade former general, Khalifa Hifter, declared that he would seize power by force to purge Libya of Islamists, beginning in Benghazi. He vowed to eradicate the hard-line Islamists of Ansar al-Shariah, blamed for a long series of bombings and assassinations.
  • General Hifter also pledged to close the Parliament and arrest moderate Islamist members
  • he has mustered a small fleet of helicopters and warplanes that have bombed rival bases around Benghazi, a steep escalation of the violence.
  • moderate Islamists and other brigades who had distanced themselves from Ansar al-Shariah began closing ranks, welcoming the group into a newly formed council of “revolutionary” militias
  • a broad alliance of Benghazi militias that now includes Ansar al-Shariah issued a defiant statement denouncing relative moderates like the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. “We will not accept the project of democracy, secular parties, nor the parties that falsely claim the Islamic cause,”
  • the general’s blitz has now stalled, it polarized the country, drawing alarms from some cities and tribes but applause from others.
  • the loudest applause came from the western mountain town of Zintan, where local militia leaders had recruited hundreds of former Qaddafi soldiers into special brigades
  • the rival coastal city of Misurata, where militias have allied with the Islamists in political battles and jostled with the Zintanis for influence in the capital
  • the Misurata and Islamist militias developed a reputation for besieging government buildings and kidnapping high officials to try to pressure the Parliament. But in recent months the Zintanis and their anti-Islamist allies have stormed the Parliament and kidnapped senior lawmakers as well.
  • the newly elected Parliament, led at first, on a seniority basis, by a member supportive of Mr. Hifter, announced plans to convene in Tobruk, an eastern city under the general’s control.
  • About 30 members, most of them Islamists or Misuratans, refused to attend,
  • Tripoli’s backup airport, under the control of an Islamist militia, has cut off flights to Tobruk, even blocking a trip by the prime minister.
  • a spokesman for the old disbanded Parliament, favored by the Islamists and Misuratans, declared that it would reconvene in Tripoli
  • In Tobruk, a spokesman for the new Parliament declared that the Islamist- and Misuratan-allied militias were terrorists, suggesting that Libya might soon have two legislatures with competing armies
  • Each side has the support of competing satellite television networks financed and, often, broadcast from abroad, typically from Qatar for the Islamists and from the United Arab Emirates for their foes.
  • Hassan Tatanaki, a Libyan-born business mogul who owns one of the anti-Islamist satellite networks, speaking in an interview from an office in the Emirates. “We are in a state of war and this is no time for compromise.”
  • Fighters and tribes who fought one another during the uprising against Colonel Qaddafi are now coming together on the same side of the new fight, especially with the Zintanis against the Islamists. Some former Qaddafi officers who had fled Libya are even coming back to take up arms again.
  • “It is not pro- or anti-Qaddafi any more — it is about Libya,” said a former Qaddafi officer in a military uniform
  • Beneath the battle against “extremists,” he said, was an even deeper, ethnic struggle: the tribes of Arab descent, like the Zintanis, against those of Berber, Circassian or Turkish ancestry, like the Misuratis. “The victory will be for the Arab tribes,”
  • andrea_hoertz on 21 Sep 14
     
    Article explains the civil war that is erupting in Libya. Islamist extremists are trying to take over the country and towns and tribes of Libya are choosing sides. Tripoli has been the biggest battle ground and its airport was destroyed.
  • wmulnea on 11 Apr 15
     
    This NYT article gives an excellent outline of the prominent factions fighting in Libya, and the purpose and goals of those factions as of Aug, 2014.
  • wmulnea on 11 Apr 15
     
    This NYT article gives an excellent outline of the prominent factions fighting in Libya, and the purpose and goals of those factions as of Aug, 2014.
allieggg

Can Libya Rebuild Itself After 40 Years of Gaddafi? - 0 views

www.newsweek.com/f-after-40-years-gaddafi-68601

Gaddafi libya Arab Nationalism recontruction political tabula rasa Revolution politics middle east

shared by allieggg on 12 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • the man has hollowed out the Libyan state, eviscerated all opposition in Libyan society, and, in effect, created a political tabula rasa on which a newly free people will now have to scratch out a future.
  • Jamahiriya, a political system that is run directly by tribesmen without the intermediation of state institutions
  • the problem is, of course, that much like in the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, virtually everyone at one point or another had to deal with the regime to survive.
  • ...25 more annotations...
  • Libya is truly a case apart.
  • the disastrous Italian legacy in Libya, has been a constant element in Gaddafi’s speeches since he took power
  • inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser, neighboring Egypt’s president, whose ideas of Arab nationalism and of the possibility of restoring glory to the Arab world, would fuel the first decade of Gaddafi’s revolution.
  • he was unimpressed with the niceties of international diplomacy,
  • In a brilliant move that co-opted tribal elders, many of whom were also military commanders, he created the Social Leadership People’s Committee, through which he could simultaneously control the tribes and segments of the country’s military.
  • When it turned out that Libya, which was still a decentralized society in 1969, had little appetite for his centralizing political vision and remained largely indifferent to his proposals, the young idealist quickly turned activist.
  • Green Book, a set of slim volumes published in the mid-1970s that contain Gaddafi’s political philosophy, a blueprint is offered for a dramatic restructuring of Libya’s economy, politics, and society. In principle, Libya would become an experiment in democracy. In reality, it became a police state where every move of its citizens was carefully watched by a growing number of security apparatuses and revolutionary committees that owed loyalty directly to Gaddafi.
  • Having crushed all opposition by the mid-1970s, the regime systematically snuffed out any group that could potentially oppose it—any activity that could be construed as political opposition was punishable by death, which is one reason why a post-Gaddafi Libya, unlike a post-Mubarak Egypt, can have no ready-made opposition in a position to fill the vacuum.
  • The tribes—the Warfalla, the Awlad Busayf, the Magharha, the Zuwaya, the Barasa, and the smallest of them all, the Gadafa, to which he belonged—offered a natural form of political affiliation, a tribal ethos that could be tapped into for support. And perhaps, in the aftermath of Gaddafi, they could serve as a nucleus around which to build a new political system.
  • Gaddafi feared they might coalesce into groups opposing his rule. So, during the first two decades after the 1969 coup, he tried to erase their influence, arguing that they were an archaic element in a modern society.
  • comprehensive reconstruction of everything civic, political, legal, and moral that makes up a society and its government.
  • After systematically destroying local society, after using the tribes to cancel each other out, after aborting methodically the emergence of a younger generation that could take over Libya’s political life—all compounded by the general incoherence of the country’s administrative and bureaucratic institutions—Gaddafi will have left a new Libya with severe and longstanding challenges.
  • the growing isolation of Libya as international sanctions were imposed.
  • Lockerbie was the logical endpoint for a regime that had lost all international legitimacy.
  • while the regime still had the coercive power to put down any uprisings that took place in the 1990s, it became clear to Gaddafi’s closest advisers that the potential for unrest had reached unprecedented levels.
  • way out was to come to an agreement with the West that would end the sanctions, allow Libya to refurbish an aging oil infrastructure, and provide a safety valve by permitting Libyans to travel abroad once more.
  • intent to renounce weapons of mass destruction in December 2003—after a long process of behind-the-scenes diplomacy initially spearheaded by Britain
  • “The Revolution Everlasting” was one of the enduring slogans of his Libya, inscribed everywhere from bridges to water bottles.
  • regime that had, for four decades, mismanaged the country’s economy and humiliated its citizens
  • country was split in half, with eastern Cyrenaica and its main city Benghazi effectively independent—a demonstration of the kind of people’s power Gaddafi had always advocated. Reality, in effect, outgrew the caricature.
  • used a set of divide-and-rule policies that not only kept his opponents sundered from each other, but had also completely enfeebled any social or political institution in the country.
  • Beyond Gaddafi, there exists only a great political emptiness, a void that Libya somehow will need to fill.
  • the creation of a modern state where Libyans become true citizens, with all the rights and duties this entails.
  • the terrorist incidents
  • Regimes can use oil revenues strategically to provide patronage that effectively keeps them in power.
  • allieggg on 12 Nov 14
     
    This article from News Week basically paints a picture of Libyan history and how Gaddafi's reign devastated the state economically, socially, and politically. Author Dirk Vandewalle uses the phrase "a political tabula rasa" which in Latin means a blank slate, to describe the fate of Libya after Gaddafi's rule and convey the extent to which the country has to literally reconstruct every component that makes up a society and its government. He highlights major events that led to the downfall of both the Gaddafi regime and the Libyan state as a whole such as Arab nationalism, Jamahiriya, the Green Book, security apparatuses snuffing all opposition, terrorist incidents, isolation and international sanctions, the Lockerbie bombing, weapons of mass destruction, human right violations, divide and rule policies, and his use of oil revenue to fuel his insurgency. Vandewalle concludes the article with uncertain ideas thoughts towards Libya's future and the way the state is going to literally rebuild themselves from this "blank slate" that Gaddafi left behind. 
mcooka

Lebanon - Educational System-overview - Schools, Private, Students, and Lebanese - Stat... - 0 views

education.stateuniversity.com/...UCATIONAL-SYSTEM-OVERVIEW.html

lebanon system overview schools private public

shared by mcooka on 02 Mar 16 - No Cached
  • The Lebanese educational system is divided in two sectors: private schools and universities, for which there is a charge for admission, and public (government) schools and universities that are practically free of charge.
  • Education was once almost exclusively the responsibility of religious communities or foreign groups, but because the number of students in public schools has risen to more than two-fifths of the total school enrollment, the government was pressured to open more public schools to meet the demands of the general public.
  • While public schools have not paid much attention to the preschool phase and have required students to be five-years-old to be accepted in kindergarten until the 1990s, private schools have always had a preschool phase and have accepted students as young as three-years-old
  • ...18 more annotations...
  • The total duration in school remains intact, 12 years. The primary cycle of general education has been increased by one year, and is divided into two modules of three years each, while the intermediary cycle was reduced to three years instead of four. The first year of general education's secondary cycle must be considered common for all four different series of instruction, and the second year is common to only two out of four series. Lebanese students are not allowed to enter formal technical education before age 12, which is the age limit of obligatory education. The scholastic year was changed to 36 weeks, and 4 supplementary hours per week were added at the intermediary and secondary cycles.
  • The new school curricula was launched in September 1998, and the Educational Center for Research and Development had trained 16,000 teachers in public schools and 6,000 teachers in private schools on the new uses and principles of the new program. The new system took into account economic, social, and national perspectives. The principle characteristics of this new system consist of the following:
  • The Lebanese educational system has usually relied heavily on private schooling to accommodate the evergrowing demand for learning in the country
  • In short, the new formal educational system of Lebanon, like in many other countries, divides the years of instruction as follows: 6-3-3 (six years for the primary cycle, three years for the intermediate cycle, and three years for the secondary cycle), followed by the higher education cycle. Primary school education is followed either by a six-year intermediary and secondary program, leading to the official Lebanese baccalaureate certificate, which was originally based on the equivalent French school diploma, or by a three- to six-year technical or vocational training program.
  • There are 1508 public and private intermediary and secondary schools for the general instruction program in Lebanon, while there are only 262 schools for the technical and professional instruction program divided between the public sector (29 schools) and the private sector (233 schools).
  • Education is compulsory until the end of the intermediate cycle, is available to all Lebanese students, and is attended by nearly 95 percent of school-age children
  • The school year starts in early October and ends in late June. The school day consists of six hours starting at 8:00 a.m. with two hour lunch break and ends at 4:00 p.m. The length of class periods ranges from 50 to 55 minutes. Both public and private schools are supposed to observe official holidays, which are decided by the government; however, Christian-administered, religious private schools take Saturday and Sunday off every week, while Moslem-run religious private schools take Friday and Sunday, and Jewish-run private schools take off all of Saturday and Sunday afternoon only.
  • As to special education concerning handicapped students, there were about 10,000 handicapped people in 1975 (prior to the Lebanese civil war). During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, this number reached 13,000; it is more than 15,000 in 2001. About 2,500 handicapped people were being educated and made ready to enter the work market.
  • In addition, females appeared to have a slightly higher percentage than males with regard to attending schools and universities. After age 25 male attendance becomes almost double that of female attendance.
  • the literacy rate was 88.4 percent in 1997
  • ue to the Lebanese people's negative attitude toward manual work, especially in industry and agriculture, students of lower socioeconomic status enroll mostly in vocational and technical schools. Therefore, there is a big difference between the two major types of instruction, as well as the relative numbers of schools and students enrolled in each of these types
  • The brevet certificate is only required by public schools, vocational schools, and teacher training institutes. The baccalaureate part I exam has two main tracks: literary and scientific. The baccalaureate part II has four main tracks: literature and humanities, which includes language, literature, history, philosophy, education, arts, and religion; sociology and economy, which includes economic sciences, politics, business and management, law, and sociology; general sciences, which includes mathematics, physics, chemistry, and their applications at the level of engineering; and life sciences, which includes biology and life sciences, chemistry and their applications in the area of medicine, health, agriculture, and other related subjects.
  • Most institutions of higher education require entrance examinations besides the baccalaureate part II, which is required by law.
  • The grading system is generally based on scales of 0 to 20 or 0 to 100, with 10 or 60, respectively, as passing grades
  • he curriculum in Lebanese schools is somewhat rigid, for all students must pursue the same programs in all three cycles
  • rivate schools can choose textbooks that meet their syllabi, except in the civics area where the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport requires them to use the center's textbooks.
  • rabic and either French or English are the languages of instruction in the Lebanese schools.
  • The United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA) provides funds supporting a private nonsectarian school system for Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East. This type of private schooling has been very effective in offering education and social services for children of Palestinian Refugees residing in Lebanon
  • mcooka on 02 Mar 16
     
    This article gave a great general overview to the education in Lebanon. One of the major components of Lebanon's education system is when they changed it 1999 to reflect the style of French education systems. Additionally, Lebanon has a high rate of 95% attendance for its students and it also has a high rate of literacy at 89%
allieggg

http://mgt.guc.edu.eg/wpapers/005mohamed_hamdy2008.pdf - 2 views

DIIGO_FILE_HOME/4xj2f/byi0

watsa cronyism nepotism guanxi social norms middle east

shared by allieggg on 05 Oct 14 - No Cached
  • Jordanian survey, 87% of the respondents wanted to eradicate wasta.
  • Cunnigham and Sarayrah (1994) suggest that the modern oil boom in the Arab world may have perpetuated wasta by reducing the need for hard work.
  • human resource departments in the Arab world depend heavily on subjective assessment tools such as unstructured interviews.
  • ...21 more annotations...
  • most Arab economies suffer from very high levels of unemployment. Good jobs are scarce. This motivates applicants to use every mean possible to improve their chances of being hired.
  • For example, sons of police and military officers are given preference in admission to the Egyptian police academy or military college, respectively.
  • study conducted by Whiteoak, Crawford and Mapstone (2006) showed the young UAE citizens believed that wasta is more useful than do their older citizens. This finding may imply that wasta is strengthening rather than diminishing in Arab societies. Commenting on the spread of wasta in Egypt, a senior bank official told one of the authors that up to 25% of his staff were hired only because of their wasta.
  • many top governmental positions are reserved for members of the ruling families or members of their supporting tribes
  • First, to maintain their grip on authority, Arab political regimes tend to place close confidants in key positions even if they are not the most qualified for such positions.
  • In Syria, the key argument made in favor of selecting Basher Al Asad as the country’s president was that he was the son of the late president Hafez Al Asad.
  • study conducted by Kilani and Sakija in Jordan showed that 90% of the respondents believed that they would use wasta in the future.
  • In the Quran, Muslims are instructed that “the best that you can hire employee is one who is competent and trustworthy” (Quran, 28, 26). Prophet Mohamed is also reported to have said “He who is in a leadership position and appoints knowingly a person who is not qualified to manage, than he violates the command of God and His messenger”. He also stated “when a person assumes an authority over people and promotes one of them because of personal preferences, God will curse him for ever”.
  • Rising to high levels requires important connections. Receiving important privileges or benefits is contingent upon using the right connections.
  • Intercessory wasta on the other hand, involves someone intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage or 2overcome a barrier from an authority figure. It is this type of wasta that affects hiring decisions.
  • Those who are supported by strong others will not be put down or rejected. Only the unconnected or unsupported are punished.
  • people who are related to important others (especially in government) are fortunate as they will have their demands or needs fulfilled. People serve those that are related to important people.
  • People tend to serve those that they know. Without knowing anybody, you will have difficulty getting the service you want.
  • The turban symbolizes a senior respected person. If you know a senior person, your demands will be meet. Similar to the second proverb
  • Intermediary wasta is utilized to facilitate the resolution of intergroup or interpersonal conflicts. In this system, wasta improves human relations and reinforces social norms.
  • Intermediary wasta is utilized to facilitate the resolution of intergroup or interpersonal conflicts. In this system, wasta improves human relations and reinforces social norms. Intercessory wasta on the other hand, involves someone intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage or 2overcome a barrier from an authority figure. It is this type of wasta that affects hiring decisions.
  • feed feelings of injustice and frustration among those who are qualified for the job but do not have a wasta. Wasta is also different from the more popular nepotism and cronyism. While nepotism involves hiring of relatives and friends, wasta is not restricted to such groups and may involve strangers
  • may lead to poor job performance and economic decline.
  • Indeed, wasta is blamed for Arab world’s poor economic performance and brain drain (Al Maeena, 2003; Cunnigham & Sarayrah, 1994). Kilani and Sakijha (2002) stress that wasta is becoming a burden on its seeker, its granter and the government.
  • Arab wasta has been compared to the Chinese concept of guanxi. Both wasta and guanxi use social networks to influence the distribution of advantages and resources. However, while guanxi is based on Confucian ethics which focus on strengthening collective ties (Hutchings & Weir, 2006a; Hutchings & Weir, 2006b); wasta violates Muslim ethics which prescribe hiring the most qualified.
  • Wasta plays a critical role in hiring and promotion decisions in Arab organizations. Before applying to a position, applicants may seek out a wasta to improve their chances of being hired. A person with poor qualifications but a strong wasta will be favored over a person who is more qualified but does not have a wasta. Because many people may apply with wasta, the applicant with the most important wasta often gets the position.
  • allieggg on 05 Oct 14
     
    Compiled by faculty members at the German University in Cairo, this working paper series addresses the effect that watsa has on competence and morality in Middle Eastern economics and society. The authors define watsa as, "the intervention of a patron in favor of a client to obtain benefits and/or resources from a third party." In simpler terms it is a system of social networking in Arab culture in which family and social ties play a significant role in the attainment of economic advantages and resources, largely in the hiring process in businesses and organizations. A person applying for a job seeks out watsa to increase their chances of getting hired. Comparable to nepotism and cronyism, but is not restricted to friends and associates, watsa can also involve strangers linked through some social web of people. Watsa runs somewhat parallel to a Chinese concept of guanxi, based on Confucian ethics and focusing on strong collective ties. While guanxi is a part of Chinese ethics it actually defies Muslim ethical values, which advocates hiring the person most capable. In a Jordanian survey, 87% of respondents want watsa eradicated. While we know that unemployment in the Arab region is widespread, we can assume that this motivates people to do anything they can to improve their chances of obtaining a job. However, the practice of watsa as a whole is actually degrading the economic systems in the Arab sates even further. The article explains the linkage between watsa and poor job performance, economic decline, and the festering of injustice and frustration among the masses in Arab countries.
  • micklethwait on 07 Oct 14
     
    This looks super interesting, but I can't get the link to open. Thanks for writing a thorough summary of it!
katelynklug

Where are the youth of the Egyptian revolution? - 0 views

www.middleeastmonitor.com/...th-of-the-egyptian-revolution-

shared by katelynklug on 15 Sep 14 - No Cached
  • motivated by the knowledge they gained from the internet and social networking sites
  • combat tyranny and human rights violations
  • non-violent resistance movements abroad.
  • ...59 more annotations...
  • broadcast information on human rights violations
  • mobilise the masses
  • rejecting tyranny
  • calling for freedom
  • refused any and all partial solutions
  • did not care to make an intellectual presence
  • clearly defined political project
  • no leadership
  • sufficient time to prepare themselves
  • elite and the military took over during the transitional
  • period
  • balance of power
  • did not succeed in establishing new parties
  • participate
  • accountability and trial
  • for killing youth
  • social justice
  • political elite became more polarised
  • until the youth became polarised
  • how to topple tyrannical regimes
  • information about human rights violations
  • too preoccupied with side issues
  • true nature of revolutionary change
  • not necessarily mean the fall of the system
  • lacked the focus necessary to achieve any of their strategic goals
  • application of Shari'ah law
  • Enabling the youth
  • did not allow the youth to engage in the public domain or contribute
  • military imposed their presence
  • failed to keep pace
  • in terms of democracy itself
  • endorsing the army
  • aggravating an already sensitive situation
  • media
  • bribing the youth with money
  • violent Islamist groups have emerged as a way of confronting the state
  • youth do not see the dangers of politicising the military and are calling for military intervention to resolve their political differences with the Muslim Brotherhood
  • military intervention as the only solution
  • oust the first elected civilian president in the history
  • main responsibility
  • nascent democratic experience
  • aggravating the political situation
  • deepening the political divisions in society
  • universal pillars that are needed for making political changes
  • engage the community and educate
  • restore national unity
  • bigger picture
  • valuable information
  • media platform
  • policy for communication
  • infuse the entire
  • society with the values and goals of the revolution
  • community awareness
  • revolutions
  • several phases
  • common political vision and strategy
  • advice of experts in situations where there is a shortage of expertise on a particular subject pertaining to state
  • respects differences
  • political etiquette
  • katelynklug on 15 Sep 14
     
    This author gives an analysis of where the Egyptian youth failed and succeeded in their revolution. He applauds their original motivation: overthrowing the oppressive regime and seeking political freedom. However, he criticizes the movement for not having organized goals with practical implications. Their focus was so set on overthrowing Mubarak that they did not have a plan once that was achieved. As a result, the youth allowed the military to become politicized and enforce their political ideas. The author claims this move set a dangerous precedent for the future and took away the attention of the military from places it was needed. The author claims that by endorsing the army to act militarily against the first civilian elected president of the country, the youth is undermining their original goals. He goes on to explain his suggestions for the Egyptian youth to get back on track and follow through in the remaining phases of the revolution.
katelynklug

Government, Brotherhood fail to attract Egyptian youth - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the M... - 0 views

www.al-monitor.com/...therhood-youth-referendum.html

shared by katelynklug on 29 Sep 14 - No Cached
micklethwait liked it
  • youth decided to protest on the anniversary of Jan. 28, 2011, which was called the "Friday of Anger."
  • low participation of youth
  • been the fuel of the two popular revolutions
  • ...21 more annotations...
  • frustration over the return of Mubarak-era figures
  • submit a file that includes the names of the persons arbitrarily arrested
  • the youth must suggest replacements and alternative cadres who are not associated
  • We objected to
  • tarnishing of the image of the January 25 Revolution
  • apology was rejected by various revolutionary movements
  • return of remnants of the Mubarak regime
  • tarnishes our image in the media,
  • frustration, the arrests of activists
  • prevented the youth from demonstrating
  • we can only manage this homeland for all its people
  • through genuine participation of all segments
  • arrest of every person calling for a “no” vote o
  • not be participating in the Brotherhood’s protests
  • en in the referendum, compared to the low youth turnout. In a speech addressed t
  • o women on the day
  • women looking for safety and stability,
  • treating them with injustice
  • prefer peace and tolerance
  • youth’s low participation
  • a silent protest to abstain from taking part
  • katelynklug on 29 Sep 14
     
    Both the current Egyptian authorities and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to attract the support of the youth, while women participated in the recent referendum to support stability. The youth see the remnants of Mubarak's administration through the government structure. The revolution wouldn't be important without changes to the government. Many political groups are trying to coax the youth to being on "their side," and meanwhile, the Egyptian youth are struggling to find any positives. Gaining the vote of the youth generally means a win or loss for the politicians.
  • katelynklug on 29 Sep 14
     
    Both the current Egyptian authorities and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to attract the support of the youth, while women participated in the recent referendum to support stability. The youth see the remnants of Mubarak's administration through the government structure. The revolution wouldn't be important without changes to the government. Many political groups are trying to coax the youth to being on "their side," and meanwhile, the Egyptian youth are struggling to find any positives. Gaining the vote of the youth generally means a win or loss for the politicians.
allieggg

The U.S. Is Giving Up on Middle East Democracy-and That's a Mistake - The Atlantic - 0 views

www.theatlantic.com/...282890

middle east democracy institutions Bush Obama Congress

shared by allieggg on 29 Sep 14 - No Cached
  • democracy assistance to the region, which will drop from $459.2 million to $298.3 million
  • Today’s Middle East is a product, at least in part, of failed democratization, and one of the reasons it failed was the timid, half-hearted support of the Obama administration.
  • the significant impact Western leverage and “linkage” can have on democratic transitions.
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • “it was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s.” They find that “states’ vulnerability to Western democratization pressure… was often decisive.”
  • it is also worth noting that President Bush acknowledged the existence of a “tyranny-terror” link—the notion that the root causes of extremism and terrorism can be found in the region’s enduring lack of democracy.
  • the administration’s approach to the region is characterized almost entirely by ad-hoc crisis management and traditional counterterrorism approaches. Its one larger-scale reform initiative—a half-hearted proposal for a
  • We argue that the U.S. and its partners now need to consider a very different approach to Middle East democracy assistance.
  • Conventional democracy promotion activities tend to focus on the process and “retail” aspects of democratic politics—things like elections, political party training, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns, and civil society enhancement. While these are undoubtedly important, they are insufficient to deliver lasting reforms. Authoritarianism in the Arab world has proven time and time again—even in supposedly post-revolutionary settings such as Egypt today—that it can weather the annoyances of elections and civil society.
  • What is needed are more systematic reforms focused on fundamental institutions. These include things like constraining the military’s role in civilian domains of governance, deep reform in the security and justice sectors including law enforcement and policing, and comprehensive “renovation” of the civil service sector. These are large-scale, long-term, and expensive undertakings that far transcend the modest parameters of most U.S. democracy promotion programs.
  • we make the case for a new Multilateral Endowment for Reform (MER) that would tie significant levels of financial assistance—in the billions of dollars—to reform commitments and benchmarked implementation performance by partner nations.
  • provide a real incentive for countries to embark down a path to deeper and more enduring political reforms while retaining the ability to pull back funding if they do not deliver.
  • allieggg on 29 Sep 14
     
    This article begins by illuminating the regional democracy assistance cuts that are dropping from $459.2 million to $298.3 million It explains that the Bush Administration began the quest for democracy in the Middle East, and the Obama administration has only continued in his footsteps. The author presents the viewpoint that the U.S. approach to Arab democratization has been in the form of "ad-hoc crisis management" rather than "large scale reform initiatives." Promoting democracy in the form of democratic politics are insufficient, elections and political parties have consistently proved to weather away and fester further civil strife. Consequently, the article proposes a new approach to the region conflict. This approach calls for "systematic reforms" focusing on basic institutions such as the civil service sector, justice and law enforcement, and the military's role in governance. The idea is that addressing these lacking departments in the arab world will eventually pave the way to a smoother democratic transition. 
fcastro2

Syria keen on Russian expansion in Middle East - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East - 0 views

www.al-monitor.com/...se-intervention-expansion.html

syria russia politics

shared by fcastro2 on 09 Apr 15 - No Cached
  • Syria has called on its Russian ally to expand in the Middle East, by expanding its small pier in the city of Tartus and turning it into a base
  • This has coincided with Saudi Arabia leading a coalition against Ansar Allah in Yemen, with a cover by the United States
  • meeting with a group of Russian journalists March 27, and in response to a question on Damascus’ desire to see a wider Russian activity in the Middle East, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said he certainly welcomes “any expansion of Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, precisely on the Syrian shores and ports.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Assad said: “The Russian presence in different parts of the world, including the Eastern Mediterranean and the Syrian port of Tartus, is very necessary, in order to create a sort of balance, which the world has lost after the dissolution of the Soviet Union more than 20 years ago.
  • Syrian president welcomed the Russian presence in his country and the region. “For us, the stronger this presence is in our region, the better it is for stability [in the region], because Russia is assuming an important role in world stability,”
  • Syrian nod is only a repetition of a former call made under the rule of late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who saw that the presence of a Russian military representation in Syria in the Mediterranean region contributes to the promotion of the idea of “the balance of terror” against Israel and the United States
  • The talk was, however, halted, until the last two years, when an actual need to promote Russian presence in the Mediterranean emerged in light of the reignition of the Cold War.
  • deployment of missile systems on the Mediterranean coast, as a sort of “symbolic deterrence.” The rumors were repeated as the NATO missile defense project was announced, which was supposed to be deployed in different countries, including Turkey and other countries bordering Russia
  • e US invasion of Iraq, as the US desire to change the face of the Middle East seemed free of any rational considerations. Assad made several visits to Moscow, and although this has not been publicly mentioned, Syrian diplomats and officials stressed to As-Safir that Syria expressed its desire to expand the Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly through Tartus, so that it turns into a military presence with limited standards
  • , Russia and Syria signed the biggest deal of its kind to explore oil in the Syrian waters, which covers a 2,190 square-kilometer surface area, and to achieve economic ambitions, namely extracting 2.5 billion barrels of oil and 8.5 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves, the oil and gas magazine said back then
  • is understandable, without neglecting the importance of other political and military issue
  • “any decision to modernize the infrastructure of the Russian Material-Technical Support Point in Tartus can only be made after a political decision is taken in this regard, in coordination with the Syrian side.” He explained that any modernization should “take into account the political and military situation in the Mediterranean region,” and therefore “it will include the promotion of all sorts of protection in the facility, including surface-to-air missiles and anti-riots weapons, and will be in coordination with the Syrian side.”
  • fcastro2 on 09 Apr 15
     
    Syria is determined to keep Russia in the loop when it comes to its presence in the Middle East. As the United States increases its presence so to those Russia and Syria claims that they encourage Russian presence solely to "keep the balance" in the Middle East. 
fcastro2

Putin brings China into Middle East strategy - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East - 0 views

www.al-monitor.com/...-consequences-middle-east.html

putin china middle east syria strategy politics

shared by fcastro2 on 04 Feb 15 - No Cached
    • fcastro2
      fcastro2 on 04 Feb 15
       
      Russia & China's negotiations involving Syria
  • one of China’s main strategic regional projects was the economic region (or belt) of the 21st century Great Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road, which intends to create a wide area of Chinese economic presence from China’s western borders to Europe
  • clearly comprises the countries of Western Asia (i.e., the Middle East)
  • ...22 more annotations...
  • Chinese leader opened the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum on June 5 in Beijing
  • energy cooperation; infrastructure construction and creation of favorable conditions for trade and investment; and high-tech domains of nuclear energy, the space rocket sector and new energy sources
    • fcastro2
      fcastro2 on 04 Feb 15
       
      China & Arabian cooperation
  • suggested that the creation of a free trade zone between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) be accelerated
  • China supports the peace process and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the borders of June 4, 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital, "enjoying full sovereignty."
  • , why shouldn’t Russia and China in the current situation — given the proximity of their interests and positions — undertake joint initiatives to unblock the peace process, while initiating steps to "introduce this activity within an institutional framework?
  • , the unilateral efforts by US Secretary of State John Kerry to promote the Israeli-Palestinian peace process are not bearing fruit
  • Russia is interested in using this unprecedented convergence with China in its operations on the Middle East arena, where Moscow has in many ways already been acting in unison with Beijing
  • , the Middle East Quartet is one of few international platforms where Russia can constructively engage with the United States and the EU
  • China's growing economic cooperation with Arab countries not a cause for concern in Moscow, but it is also viewed in a very favorable light
  • will not one day replace the United States as the security guarantor for the transportation routes of these resources
  • Moscow’s and Beijing’s interests converge in the joint countering of terrorism, extremism and separatism
  • . Among the militants from radical groups fighting against government troops in Syria, there are people hailing not only from Russia and Central Asia (fewer in numbers to those coming from Arab and Islamic as well as Western countries), but also from the Uighur minority in China.
  • recently, Beijing came under harsh criticism from Ankara for its actions in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region against the Uighur population, which the Turks believe to be their next of kin
  • . Disappointed by the failure of EU accession, the Turkish leadership has even started talking about the desire to join the SCO as an observer
  • Ankara expresses its willingness to cooperate with China in the fight against terrorists and condemns the separatism coming from some groups in Xinjiang
  • There is no doubt that a comprehensive strategic partnership, in which Russia and China would act in concert along the political consensus reached by their two leaders, would in the short term
  • According to both, this convergence is neither a union nor a tournament of predators, but a very pragmatic integrationist instrument of protection and projection of interests by the two powers, including in the Middle East.
  • the Middle East was not the focus of the talks between the two leaders
  • roughly 50 agreements ushering in a period of unprecedented convergence between the two countries
  • seems to allow the two parties to seek further coordination in their actions
  • Such consensus includes Syria, despite Beijing’s lesser involvement on this issue, relative to Moscow; Iran, within the P5+1 (the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program; the fight against terrorism and extremism; the creation of a weapons of mass destruction-free Middle East; the condemnation of external intervention and the strategy of "regime change" as well as the push for "color revolutions;" the policy to reach a settlement in the Middle East; and relations with the new Egyptian regime and with respect to the Sudanese issues.
allieggg

Islamists Aren't the Obstacle | Foreign Affairs - 0 views

www.foreignaffairs.com/...islamists-arent-the-obstacle

middle east democracy Islamists institutions egypt politics tunisia

shared by allieggg on 28 Sep 14 - No Cached
micklethwait liked it
  • A minority of the population -- 26 percent of Tunisians and 28 percent of Egyptians -- believes that Islam should play a large role in government.
  • Both secularists and Islamists associate democracy with economic prosperity
  • Islamist parties received considerable support in both countries' recent elections -- not only because there is a broad ideological affinity for Islamism among the population but also because of Islamist parties' effective campaigning.
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • When asked about the most important feature of a democracy, 69 percent of Egyptians and 32 percent of Tunisians put providing people with basic necessities or narrowing the gap between rich and poor at the top of their lists.
  • On a related note, Islamist parties have shown a remarkable ability to maintain their base.
  • Tunisia has fared better than Egypt so far in the post-Arab Spring transition, with less violence, fewer demonstrations, and greater political stability. This is in part because challenges are easier to confront in a country of only 11 million, 98 percent of whom are Sunni Muslim, compared to the more diverse and populous Egypt. But Tunisia's success is primarily a result of its stronger institutions, which provide a conduit for political debate.
  • Many onlookers claim that Egypt's more tumultuous post-revolution trajectory is because of the country's legacy of religiosity and Islamism.
  • Egyptians, in fact, are no more religious than Tunisians.
  • Egypt's institutions are weak and have been routinely undermined by entrenched interests. The countries' different geopolitical situations play a role here. Tunisia's minimal strategic importance means that foreign countries have less reason to intervene. But Egypt's proximity to Israel and the Palestinian territories, its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and its role as an intermediary between Israel and Hamas make its political developments important to Israel and the United States. Consequently, Egypt is vulnerable to foreign interference, particularly to attempts to prop up its military. Furthermore, beyond serving as a pillar to Egypt's authoritarian regimes, the Egyptian military has significant business interests and accounts for ten to 30 percent of Egypt's gross domestic product.
  • Egypt's judicial branch, which is also more powerful than Tunisia's, has at times undermined democratic processes.
  • Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the Islamist-dominated parliament and the Constituent Assembly it elected were unconstitutional, because Islamist parties contested seats intended for independent candidates. The move polarized the country and pushed the executive branch to take extreme measures.
  • Egyptian democracy is undermined by the inability of institutions to address citizens' demands and the impulse of powerful actors to interfere, not by the divide between Islamists and secularists. Institutions in Egypt fail to provide a meaningful forum for debate. As a result, violent street protesters and extremist sheiks are gaining power.
  • U.S. policy must support institutions rather than actors, and processes rather than outcomes, in order to help Egypt and Tunisia achieve their democratic potential.
  • allieggg on 28 Sep 14
     
    The Council on Foreign Relations published an article about democratization in the middle east and the major obstacles that are present in the process. While most assume Islamists and Islamic embedded institutions are the root of the delayed democratic transition, the problems are much bigger than that. While Islamist regimes do indeed stunt the growth of democratic progress in terms of creating a stable government, Arab countries struggle with economic and social factors as well. The Arab Spring Revolutions have caused economic and social degradation across the region, resulting in a road block of political leadership. Without a reliable and capable government structure, the states are unable to progress economically. However, in order to have a stable government, social and economic institutions must be in place to create this capitalist economy that they strive for. Because most wealth resides in oil, the revenue that the states bring in isn't distributed properly throughout society and is concentrated within few business elites. The article stresses that instead of foreign aid going into the hands of an unstable leader or regime, it should be invested in institutions in order to spur economic growth and eliminate corruption. Rather than focusing on the Islamist-secularist divide, the world should be working towards the strengthening of institutions to create a stable foundation for governance. 
allieggg

Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East's 30 year war » The Spectator - 0 views

www.spectator.co.uk/...armageddon-awaits

proxy wars leadership polarization US Saudi Iran the middle east war

shared by allieggg on 21 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • There are those who think that the region as a whole may be starting to go through something similar to what Europe went through in the early 17th century during the Thirty Years’ War, when Protestant and Catholic states battled it out. This is a conflict which is not only bigger than al-Qa’eda and similar groups, but far bigger than any of us. It is one which will re-align not only the Middle East, but the religion of Islam.
  • Either way there will be a need for a Treaty of Westphalia-style solution — a redrawing of boundaries in a region where boundaries have been bursting for decades.
  • But for the time being, a distinct and timeless stand-off between two regional powers, with religious excuses and religiously affiliated proxies will in all probability remain the main driver of this conflict.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • ‘Saudi Arabia is the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the birthplace of Islam. As such, it is the eminent leader of the wider Muslim world. Iran portrays itself as the leader of not just the minority Shiite world, but of all Muslim revolutionaries interested in standing up to the West.’
  • ‘Saudi Arabia will oppose any and all of Iran’s actions in other countries, because it is Saudi Arabia’s position that Iran has no right to meddle in other nations’ internal affairs, especially those of Arab states.’
  • Saudi officials more recently called for the Iranian leadership to be summoned to the International Criminal Court in The Hague for war crimes. Then, just the month before last, as the P5+1 countries eased sanctions on Iran after arriving at an interim deal in Geneva, Saudi saw its greatest fear — a nuclear Iran — grow more likely. And in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva deal, Saudi sources darkly warned of the country now taking Iranian matters ‘into their own hands’. There are rumours that the Saudis would buy nuclear bombs ‘off the shelf’ from their friends in Pakistan if Iran ever reaches anything like the nuclear threshold. In that  case, this Westphalian solution could be prefaced with a mushroom cloud.
  • allieggg on 21 Nov 14
     
    This article touches on an array of ideas but for the sake of my research I focused on the "Thirty Years War" section. Douglass Murray from The Spectator conveys the perspective that the Middle East is likely to be going through a similar 17th century European 30 years war, when Protestant and Catholics launched a full fledged war against one another. This means that religious war in the Middle East is so much bigger than just al-Qaeda and similar groups. The conflict will re-align the region, but also the entire religion of Islam. Douglass says the outcome would call for a Treaty of Westphalia-style solution, redrawing boundaries of a region where they've been bursting for decades.  For the time being the drivers of the conflict is a standoff between the two regional powers and their affiliated proxies, Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
allieggg

Libya has become the latest Isil conquest - Telegraph - 0 views

www.telegraph.co.uk/...-the-latest-Isil-conquest.html

ISIL militias armed groups syria Iraq Jihad Benghazi

shared by allieggg on 17 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • If the conditions remain unchallenged and, hence, unchanged, it will turn into another Syria or Iraq.
  • Nowhere is this threat more profound than with the rise of radical Islam in Libya
  • The ongoing low-level insurgency in Benghazi is driven by two factors. The first is the radical Islamist ideology of certain groups that refuse to recognise the modern state and its institutions. For example, according to the leader of AS’s Benghazi branch, Mohammed al-Zahawi, his group will not disarm and demobilise until its version of sharia is imposed. The realisation of such an Islamic state constitutes the group’s main aim. In other words, it is the nature of their Jihad.
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • The second reason is the Islamists’ history with the state security forces. During the 1990s, Muammar Gaddafi unleashed a crackdown on all expressions of Islamism, which saw thousands of youths arrested and jailed as political prisoners. Many were incarcerated in the notorious Abu-Saleem prison. Today’s rejection of state institutions has its roots in that brutality.
  • However, Benghazi is not the only Islamist stronghold in Libya: the city of Derna, which has historically been a strong recruiting ground for Jihadi fighters to Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently Syria, is of serious concern
  • Derna’s Shura Council of Islamic Youth and Ansar al-Sharia have decided to declare Derna an “Islamic emirate” and publicly announce their allegiance to ISIL and its leader and so called “Caliphate” of Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. This means that ISIL now has its terrorist tentacles in Libya.
  • If the international community continues to overlook the current Libyan crisis, the country is likely to become an incubator of militant Islamist groups.
  • In addition to a military response, however, we need a holistic and proactive approach that focuses on achieving reconciliation and stability. This involves forcing all rival political parties to the negotiation table to agree that a newly elected parliament is the sole representative body in the country.
  • allieggg on 17 Nov 14
     
    This article basically accentuates the driving factors to the ongoing insurgency of ISIL in Libya and how the threat is even more extreme than that of Iraq and Syria. One is the Islamist ideology in itself, rejecting any form of a modern state and the institutions that accompany its success. For example in Libya the leader of the AS branch declares that his militants will not disarm or demobilize until sharia law is imposed. Second, during Gaddafi's rule he unleashed a crackdown on all Islamic expression. The brutality shown towards Islamic groups during this time has fueled their resentment towards sectarian rule and has urged them to push for the rejection of state institutions even more so. The article explains how Islamic groups have claimed power in both Benghazi and Derna, the latter being the historic recruiting ground for Jihad fighters to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The author makes it clear that both military and diplomatic force from the international community is crucial for the reconciliation of security.
allieggg

Mapping Libya's armed groups - Middle East - Al Jazeera English - 0 views

www.aljazeera.com/...lained-201452293619773132.html

libya armed groups middle east Revolution recontruction war militias

shared by allieggg on 12 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • Haftar accuses Congress of allowing "terrorists" to flourish in Libya and has vowed to "wipe them out", gaining support from much of the regular armed forces and nationalist militias. Other militias have lined up to oppose him, insisting his attacks amount to a "coup".
  • 1. National Army
  • 2. Regular forces
  • ...23 more annotations...
  • re-formed to help fight in the uprising against Gaddafi in 2011.
  • composed of non-Islamist fighters and former soldiers
  • Haftar used it to launch Operation Libyan Dignity on May 16, saying his mission was to dissolve the General National Congress, which he labelled Islamist, and to destroy "terrorists" he said Congress had allowed to establish bases in Libya.
  • National Army is a nationalist armed group controlled by Khalifa Haftar, rather than Libya’s national army.
  • small army and air force have mostly defected to Haftar. Libya’s armed forces fought on both Gaddafi and the rebel side in the 2011 uprising. Since then, the army has been rebuilding, with most of its units in training.
  • fighting a tit-for-tat battle against Islamist militias for more than a year.
  • 3. Zintan
  • Zintan's militias are the second most powerful armed force in Libya, after Misrata, and based in the Nafusa mountains 144km southwest of Tripoli.
  • regard themselves as opponents of both Congress and Islamists.
  • Zintan formed one of the three fronts in the uprising and by the end of that uprising, Zintan brigades surged into Tripoli, with several maintaining bases in the city and holding the international airport.
  • 2. Ansar al-Sharia
  • 1. LROR 
  • Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room was formed in 2013 as the headquarters of the Libya Shield, an alliance of pro-Congress militias.
  • accused by opponents of being Islamist,
  • LROR led a powerful Shield force to Tripoli last year to defend Congress.
  • 3. Misrata
  • With strong affiliations with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party, LROR will have much to lose if Haftar takes power.
  • dedicated to establishing a caliphate in Libya
  • The US blamed Ansar al-Sharia for the assault on the US consulate in Benghazi that saw the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens in 2012.
  • On May 18, two days after Hiftar’s forces attacked Benghazi, two Zintan militias stormed the national congress building in Tripoli.
  • Misrata’s 235 militia brigades are collectively the most powerful single force in Libya, fighting through a six-month siege during the uprising.
  • They are equipped with heavy weapons, tanks and truck-launched rockets and have the power to be a decisive force in any struggle between Haftar and Islamist forces.
  • Many Misratan leaders back the Islamists in Congress, and Misratan brigades once formed a key part of the Libya Shield force in Tripoli.
  • allieggg on 12 Nov 14
     
    After the ousting of the Gaddafi regime the country pivoted into civil chaos. Because of the deficiency of structure and state autonomy, armed militias have become the dominant force in determining Libya's future governmental system. While the UN has internationally recognized the NTC as the interim government to ultimately turn the country into a democratic one, militias have taken things into their own hands tipping the country towards the brink of civil war. General Khalifa Haftar launched his Operation Dignity campaign accusing congress of allowing terrorists flourish in Libya and vowed to wipe them out, gaining much support from the regular armed forces and nationalist militias. The opposition to Haftar insist that his attacks are aiming for a military coup. This article was helpful in highlighting the armed groups and dividing them by Pro-Haftar and Pro-Congress sections. 
allieggg

I watched Libya seize its freedom. Now I have to flee its new chaos | World news | The ... - 0 views

www.theguardian.com/...bya-freedom-now-flee-new-chaos

libya armed groups middle east Revolution recontruction war militias chaos the guardian revolutionaries

shared by allieggg on 13 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • the first democratically elected parliament, the General National Congress, rather than disband the militias, funded them, each faction seeing its own forces as insurance against those of everyone else.
  • An Islamist-led coalition came to dominate parliament, but as the squabbling grew worse it realised it would lose an election, so delayed having one.
  • Then, in May, a former Gaddafi-era general turned rebel leader, Khalifa Hiftar, launched an offensive against Islamist brigades in the east while his allies stormed congress in Tripoli. An election was duly called in June, and the Islamists duly lost, or expect to lose when parliament assembles this week. The result has seen some of their militias grab what Tripoli real estate they can, triggering civil war.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • "Within Libya it is region against region, within regions, tribe against tribe, within tribes, family against family."
  • The Islamists call themselves revolutionaries, implying that anyone opposed to them is against the revolution. Their opponents also call themselves revolutionaries, labelling the Islamists "terrorists", while the Islamists accuse their opponents of following Gaddafi. Neither label is true: both sides have plenty to give that is positive. But the time for giving in Libya seems past.
  • "We are like a class of kids where the bad teacher is suddenly dead," he said. "Now we all fight each other."
  • "My problem is, it's hard to be a radical moderate."
  • Flying away, I leave the country as I found it, back at war. It is a country so rich in possibility and so undone by a chaos you can unpick for ever without getting to the nub.
  • My photographer friend had the answer. "Confused?" he told me. "Then you understand Libya."
  • allieggg on 13 Nov 14
     
    This article illuminates the aftermath of Gaddafi's reign from a first person perspective of a citizen fleeing the country due to its devastating chaos. He offers a short version of the conflict and the rise in militant groups. The root of the issue is the fact that when the GNC took power, the factions funded the militant groups for their own insurance rather than working towards their disbandment. The Islamist coalition dominated parliament, and as chaos deepened when they realized they would loose the election so they just delayed having one. This is where General Khalifa Haftar chimed in, launching his offense against islamic insurgency by storming the capitol in Tripoli leading the country to slip into civil war. The Author says "We are like a class of kids where the bad teacher is suddenly dead," he said. "Now we all fight each other." When the light finally comes to a country that was for so long in the dark, its blinding. 
fcastro2

Turkish Military Evacuates Soldiers Guarding Tomb in Syria - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...turky-syria-tomb-isis.html

ISIS syria politics turkey

shared by fcastro2 on 23 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • The Turkish Army sent armored troops deep into Syria late Saturday on a rescue mission, to recover the remains of a major historical figure and to evacuate the guards at his besieged tomb
  • The tomb of Suleyman Shah, grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire, is 20 miles south of the Turkish border, but it has been considered Turkish territory under a 1921 treaty with France
  • there were no clashes during the mission and only one casualty, a soldier who was killed in an accident
  • ...16 more annotations...
  • He said Turkey notified the Syrian government, rebel leaders and the coalition forces fighting the Islamic State about the operation.
  • 572 troops, 39 tanks, 57 armored vehicles and 100 other vehicles were involved
  • Turkish flag was lowered, and the tomb and security station were destroyed to prevent any possible use by extremists.
  • operation was prompted by the chaos and instability in Syria
  • clashes were likely to erupt nearby between forces of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, and Kurdish troops known as pesh merga, and that the tomb could become a target.
  • “The Suleyman Shah tomb has been a point of vulnerability for Turkey for a long time, and with this operation, such weakness has been eliminated
  • crisis discouraged Turkey from joining the United States-led military coalition conducting strikes against the Islamic State, though Turkey has cooperated with the United States in other ways,
  • in accordance with the 1921 treaty, a new tomb for Suleyman Shah was being established in a part of Syria that is under Kurdish control
  • when conditions in Syria permitted, the tomb would be moved back again to the site that was evacuated, near the village of Karakozak
  • Tensions have mounted around the tomb since March, when the Islamic State took control of the surrounding area and began threatening to destroy the tomb unless guards there lowered the Turkish flag.
  • The militant group raided Turkey’s consulate in Mosul, Iraq, last June and seized 46 Turks and 3 Iraqis as hostages; they were released three months later on terms that were not disclosed
  • “The Islamic State could have used the presence of the tomb as leverage in case of any confrontation with Turkey
  • Turkey has lobbied intensively for international military action in Syria, including no-fly zones and a presence on the ground to strengthen the more moderate Syrian rebel groups who are fighting both the extremists and the Syrian government.
  • Syrian government issued a statement on Sunday calling the military operation a “flagrant aggression” because Turkey did not wait for permission from Damascus to mount i
  • The Kurds were aided by airstrikes and other support from the American-led coalition
  • Mr. Ulgen, the analyst, said the choice of route was a sign of some improvement in relations between the Turkish government in Ankara and the Syrian Kurds, whom the Turks have regarded with deep suspicion.
  • fcastro2 on 23 Feb 15
     
    The Turkish government recently went into an extremist-controlled territory in order to evacuate a tomb of a major historical figure, and the soldiers who guarded it. The safe passage of this mission has shown that the relations between Turkey and Syria have gotten a bit better. 
allieggg

What Happened to the Humanitarians Who Wanted to Save Libyans With Bombs and Drones? - ... - 0 views

firstlook.org/...nted-save-libyans-bombs-drones

humanitarian libya civil war politics US Intervention NATO revolution

shared by allieggg on 23 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • “Libya is a reminder that sometimes it is possible to use military tools to advance humanitarian causes.”
  • intervention was a matter of upholding “universal values,” which itself advanced America’s strategic goals. In justifying the war to Americans (more than a week after it started), President Obama decreed: “Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.”
  • But “turning a blind eye” to the ongoing – and now far worse – atrocities in Libya is exactly what the U.S., its war allies, and most of the humanitarian war advocates are now doing.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • “this was a rare military intervention for humanitarian reasons, and it has succeeded” and that “on rare occasions military force can advance human rights. Libya has so far been a model of such an intervention.”
  • What’s most notable here isn’t how everything in Libya has gone so terribly and tragically wrong. That was painfully predictable: anyone paying even casual attention now knows that killing the Bad Dictator of the Moment (usually one the U.S. spent years supporting) achieves nothing good for the people of that country unless it’s backed by years of sustained support for rebuilding its civil institutions.
  • As the country spun into chaos, violence, militia rule and anarchy as a direct result of the NATO intervention, they exhibited no interest whatsoever in doing anything to arrest or reverse that collapse. What happened to their deeply felt humanitarianism? Where did it go?
  • But the most compelling reason to oppose such wars is that – even if it all could work perfectly in an ideal world and as tempting as it is to believe – humanitarianism is not what motivates the U.S. or most other governments to deploy its military in other nations.
  • If there were any authenticity to the claimed humanitarianism, wouldn’t there be movements to spend large amounts of money not just to bomb Libya but also to stabilize and rebuild it? Wouldn’t there be just as much horror over the plight of Libyans now: when the needed solution is large-scale economic aid and assistance programs rather than drone deployments, blowing up buildings, and playful, sociopathic chuckling over how we came, conquered, and made The Villain die?
  • The way most war advocates instantly forgot Libya existed once that fun part was over is the strongest argument imaginable about what really motivates these actions. In the victory parade he threw for himself, Kristof said the question of “humanitarian intervention” will “arise again” and “the next time it does, let’s remember a lesson of Libya.”
  • allieggg on 23 Nov 14
     
    This article basically lays out the faults in US intervention in Libya during the fall of Gaddafi and condemns the US officials for their lack of hindsight in their agenda. The US claimed that they could not "turn a blind eye" to atrocities and human right violations in other countries and to intervene in Libya was a matter of upholding "universal values." After the successful ousting of Gaddafi, the US hypocritically turned their back on the country as a whole, leaving them to pick up the pieces and re-build themselves in the midst of socio-political and economic chaos. The US claims that military intervention is sometimes necessary to address human right violations, but in the case of Libya more violations have occurred as a result of a fallen regime rather than because of its reign. The author basically says that the US should have predicted that short-term intervention strategies achieves nothing without years of sustained support for rebuilding the civil institutions. 
katelynklug

We Were Born From the Womb of the Revolution - 0 views

www.tahrirdocuments.org/...rom-the-womb-of-the-revolution

shared by katelynklug on 14 Sep 14 - No Cached
  • 25 January 2011
  • energy of a struggle
  • thanks to the youths
  • ...47 more annotations...
  • feelings of social injustice
  • biased toward the rich
  • millions of Egyptians live in slums
  • mansions and resorts
  • collapse of educational and public health services
  • stealing of pension
  • reduction of all social safety nets
  • unemployment
  • risk death
  • fleeing an inhuman life
  • culture and art were turned into commodities
  • transferring power to a temporary, civil government
  • ignite sectarian strife
  • isolate Christians from political action
  • Tahrir Square
  • inspiring example
  • face of Fighting Egypt
  • forces of the Egyptian Left
  • equal
  • socialism
  • will to change
  • met with the powers of the Egyptian Left
  • distortion of consciousness and existence
  • We insist upon the realization of all the demands related to democracy and political reform
  • “Popular Alliance” party is born from the womb of the revolution
  • revoking Emergency Law
  • releasing all prisoners
  • new constitution
  • separation of powers
  • social change
  • human rights
  • plan for growth
  • rights to food, shelter, education, work, fair wages, and health care must be guaranteed
  • Minimum and maximum wage
  • Progressive taxes
  • subordination to Zionism
  • must be opposed
  • resistance to normalization with Israel
  • supporting instead the Arab people
  • Palestinian people’s struggle to achieve their freedom and establish a state
  • civil state
  • oppose all forms of discrimination
  • separation of religion from politics
  • opposed to capitalist exploitation
  • supports the interest of the poor
  • open, democratic party
  • diversity of platforms
  • katelynklug on 14 Sep 14
     
    This article describes the position and demands of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party of Egypt. The relationship of the youth protesters with the Egyptian Left was solidified when the Left provided the youth with the political power to make their revolution successful. The Socialist Popular Alliance demands a new constitution and a new government structure that is based on democracy, human rights, and freedoms. Their political position and ideal social structure are very similar to typical American ideals, especially those of the American left political parties. However, the Public Alliance seems very angered over Mubarak's previous friendly relations with Israel. This population feels as though they were forced to abandon the Arab people and support Israel instead of Palestine. This is interesting because Egypt's relations with Israel has garnered tremendous political and economic support from the United States. Having an Arab ally has been an advantageous point of negotiation for Israel and the US. With the Popular Alliance in severe opposition to this position of Israeli sympathy, it is a surprise that they seem to embrace "Americanized" ideas. In addition, it is worth noting that the youth finds a great identity with the Arab culture, although not so much with a specific religion.
1 - 20 of 2493 Next › Last »
Showing 20▼ items per page