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allieggg

What Happened to the Humanitarians Who Wanted to Save Libyans With Bombs and Drones? - ... - 0 views

  • “Libya is a reminder that sometimes it is possible to use military tools to advance humanitarian causes.”
  • intervention was a matter of upholding “universal values,” which itself advanced America’s strategic goals. In justifying the war to Americans (more than a week after it started), President Obama decreed: “Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.”
  • But “turning a blind eye” to the ongoing – and now far worse – atrocities in Libya is exactly what the U.S., its war allies, and most of the humanitarian war advocates are now doing.
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  • “this was a rare military intervention for humanitarian reasons, and it has succeeded” and that “on rare occasions military force can advance human rights. Libya has so far been a model of such an intervention.”
  • What’s most notable here isn’t how everything in Libya has gone so terribly and tragically wrong. That was painfully predictable: anyone paying even casual attention now knows that killing the Bad Dictator of the Moment (usually one the U.S. spent years supporting) achieves nothing good for the people of that country unless it’s backed by years of sustained support for rebuilding its civil institutions.
  • As the country spun into chaos, violence, militia rule and anarchy as a direct result of the NATO intervention, they exhibited no interest whatsoever in doing anything to arrest or reverse that collapse. What happened to their deeply felt humanitarianism? Where did it go?
  • But the most compelling reason to oppose such wars is that – even if it all could work perfectly in an ideal world and as tempting as it is to believe – humanitarianism is not what motivates the U.S. or most other governments to deploy its military in other nations.
  • If there were any authenticity to the claimed humanitarianism, wouldn’t there be movements to spend large amounts of money not just to bomb Libya but also to stabilize and rebuild it? Wouldn’t there be just as much horror over the plight of Libyans now: when the needed solution is large-scale economic aid and assistance programs rather than drone deployments, blowing up buildings, and playful, sociopathic chuckling over how we came, conquered, and made The Villain die?
  • The way most war advocates instantly forgot Libya existed once that fun part was over is the strongest argument imaginable about what really motivates these actions. In the victory parade he threw for himself, Kristof said the question of “humanitarian intervention” will “arise again” and “the next time it does, let’s remember a lesson of Libya.”
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    This article basically lays out the faults in US intervention in Libya during the fall of Gaddafi and condemns the US officials for their lack of hindsight in their agenda. The US claimed that they could not "turn a blind eye" to atrocities and human right violations in other countries and to intervene in Libya was a matter of upholding "universal values." After the successful ousting of Gaddafi, the US hypocritically turned their back on the country as a whole, leaving them to pick up the pieces and re-build themselves in the midst of socio-political and economic chaos. The US claims that military intervention is sometimes necessary to address human right violations, but in the case of Libya more violations have occurred as a result of a fallen regime rather than because of its reign. The author basically says that the US should have predicted that short-term intervention strategies achieves nothing without years of sustained support for rebuilding the civil institutions. 
mcooka

News & Broadcast - Education: Improving access and quality of education in Yemen - 0 views

  • For almost three decades, the International Development Association (IDA) has actively helped increase access to, and the quality of, educational services in Yemen. The main achievements are the expansion of the education system at all levels, which helped halve the illiteracy rate to 45 percent from 90 percent
  • This is particularly challenging given the country’s significant population growth and deep poverty
  • Fewer girls than boys enrol in school (particularly in rural areas), many tend to be over-age and most drop out before completing basic education.
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  • lack of female teachers is one of the factors resulting in low enrolment and retention of girls in schools, particularly in higher grades when parents tend to object to male teachers
  • The sector also suffers from a lack of efficiency and effectiveness in using limited financial resources and weak management capacity.
  • DA has provided assistance for development of all education system sub-sector
  • both building on the success of the Basic Education Expansion Project of 2001-2007
  • The Secondary Education Development and Girls Access Project provides a platform to address broader sector governance and management issues by bringing together the Ministries of Planning, Finance, Civil Service and Insurance and Local Officials to jointly sign a Protocol of Participation in this Project.
  • men is also part of the Education For All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI). FTI focuses on increasing access of children to primary education in line with the MDG target of achieving universal primary education, and its interventions target the most remote areas in the country where no other IDA project, government intervention or donor project has gone before
  • Increase in enrolment in primary education to 87 percent in 2008-09 from 68 percent in 1998-99.Gains in girls’ enrolment were even higher with an increase to 78% in 2008-09 from 49% in 1998-99, reducing by half the gap with male enrolment
  • The Education sector in Yemen is one of oldest and largest sectors of IDA investment in Yemen.
  • otal Bank financing for the five projects amounts to US$133 million, comprising Basic Education Development Project (US$68.66 million), Secondary Education Development and Girls Access project (US$20 million), Fast Track Initiative – Phase III (US$20 million), Second Vocational Training Project (US$ 15 million), and Second Higher Education Project (US$13 million).
  • he basic education sector in Yemen is characterized by a high degree of donor harmonization. Education receives a large share of the comparatively small amount of Official Development Assistance per capita recipient (just US$13 in 2006).
  • The Yemen Country Status Report set the stage for the development of a national vision for education. The national vision is to be developed in coordination with line ministries and aims to develop the foundations for a national education system that is linked to the labor market
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    This article is about the improvement of education in Yemen. Yemen is a very poor country with a large population growth. These programs have created platforms and finances to attract teachers, advocates for girls groups, advocates for education, and have pushed the literacy rate up towards 90%
atownen

Turkey's Erdoğan asks UN: Are you mocking us? - POLITICS - 0 views

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    In Feb. the United Nations demanded Turkey to open its borders to thousands of Syrian refugees. Erdogan responded "are you mocking us?" and accused the UN for overstepping its powers and to basically back off from the Syrian conflict.
allieggg

The U.S. Is Giving Up on Middle East Democracy-and That's a Mistake - The Atlantic - 0 views

  • democracy assistance to the region, which will drop from $459.2 million to $298.3 million
  • Today’s Middle East is a product, at least in part, of failed democratization, and one of the reasons it failed was the timid, half-hearted support of the Obama administration.
  • the significant impact Western leverage and “linkage” can have on democratic transitions.
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  • “it was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s.” They find that “states’ vulnerability to Western democratization pressure… was often decisive.”
  • it is also worth noting that President Bush acknowledged the existence of a “tyranny-terror” link—the notion that the root causes of extremism and terrorism can be found in the region’s enduring lack of democracy.
  • the administration’s approach to the region is characterized almost entirely by ad-hoc crisis management and traditional counterterrorism approaches. Its one larger-scale reform initiative—a half-hearted proposal for a
  • We argue that the U.S. and its partners now need to consider a very different approach to Middle East democracy assistance.
  • Conventional democracy promotion activities tend to focus on the process and “retail” aspects of democratic politics—things like elections, political party training, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns, and civil society enhancement. While these are undoubtedly important, they are insufficient to deliver lasting reforms. Authoritarianism in the Arab world has proven time and time again—even in supposedly post-revolutionary settings such as Egypt today—that it can weather the annoyances of elections and civil society.
  • What is needed are more systematic reforms focused on fundamental institutions. These include things like constraining the military’s role in civilian domains of governance, deep reform in the security and justice sectors including law enforcement and policing, and comprehensive “renovation” of the civil service sector. These are large-scale, long-term, and expensive undertakings that far transcend the modest parameters of most U.S. democracy promotion programs.
  • we make the case for a new Multilateral Endowment for Reform (MER) that would tie significant levels of financial assistance—in the billions of dollars—to reform commitments and benchmarked implementation performance by partner nations.
  • provide a real incentive for countries to embark down a path to deeper and more enduring political reforms while retaining the ability to pull back funding if they do not deliver.
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    This article begins by illuminating the regional democracy assistance cuts that are dropping from $459.2 million to $298.3 million It explains that the Bush Administration began the quest for democracy in the Middle East, and the Obama administration has only continued in his footsteps. The author presents the viewpoint that the U.S. approach to Arab democratization has been in the form of "ad-hoc crisis management" rather than "large scale reform initiatives." Promoting democracy in the form of democratic politics are insufficient, elections and political parties have consistently proved to weather away and fester further civil strife. Consequently, the article proposes a new approach to the region conflict. This approach calls for "systematic reforms" focusing on basic institutions such as the civil service sector, justice and law enforcement, and the military's role in governance. The idea is that addressing these lacking departments in the arab world will eventually pave the way to a smoother democratic transition. 
allieggg

Wasta, Work and Corruption in Transnational Business | CONNECTED in CAIRO - 0 views

  • Girgis worked for a company that insisted as part of their global corporate culture that there be no “corruption.” Six years after opening its office in Egypt, they continued to be plagued by behaviors they understood to be “corrupt.”
  • I explained that wasta referred to a network of informal loans and favors traded by Arab men in order to move up in the world.
  • Encouraged by my open, neutral tone, Girgis opened up further. “My father mortgaged family lands to pay for my college,” Girgis said. “I owe him everything. If he asks me to find a job for his brother’s son, how can I say no?”
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  • families are economic units.
  • “You can send me anywhere else in the world and I’ll run the office by the book,” Girgis told his supervisor. “But I can’t do that here.”
  • any Egyptian man they hired to run the office would be equally suspended in webs of wasta obligations
  • “investment and return” frame I created for understanding, emphasizing the economic parallels between Arab families and running a business
  • , I’ve known several Egyptian businessmen who thought wasta was an improvement on Western models of hiring.
  • Net result: greater loyalty, less likelihood of theft, less likelihood of negotiating for new jobs behind your back and leaving you in the lurch, etc, he claimed.
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    This article is from the point of view of an anthropologist who was brought in as a cultural consultant to mediate an issue of "watsa" for a corporation in the Middle East. The company prides itself on its lack of internal corruption, and in turn hired a man named Girgis who grew up in the Middle East but lived and received an education in the US. In Girgis's first year he hired one of his cousins, which the supervisors saw as corrupt hiring practice. The author, and hired consultant, explained to the company supervisors that watsa was an "investment and return" framework in Arab culture, and that there are economic parallels between Arab families and businesses, families existing as economic units. Girgis conveyed that anywhere else in the world he would run the office by the book, but in the Arab world he must also adhere to social norms. The result of watsa through Arab eyes leads to greater loyalty, and less likelihood for deception and theft. The article basically introduces the idea that while in the Western world this may be seen as corruption, it is an embedded part of culture in the Middle East. 
allieggg

Lessons from the Libyan War | The American Conservative - 0 views

  • In the Libyan case, this involved attributing to anti-regime forces the “values” that Americans wanted to believe that they had, and it meant investing the conflict in Libya with far greater global significance than it actually possessed.
  • The earlier assumption that the “Arab Spring” was something that the U.S. ought to be encouraging went unexamined, once again because our “values” dictated that Washington must do this.
  • the idea that a Libyan intervention would allow the U.S. “to realign our interests and our values” was reportedly a significant factor in the decision to take military action. Thus one faulty assumption (that our “values” were at stake) led to another (we must “realign our values and our interests”) and that led to a terrible decision.
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  • U.S. intervention in Libya was unpopular throughout the region because most people in these countries don’t trust the U.S. and resent our government’s interference no matter which side Washington chooses to take.
  • One more lesson that the Libyan war should teach us is that the U.S. and its allies are far too quick to want to take sides in foreign disputes and conflicts, and they are then far too eager to throw their weight behind that side in order to make sure that “our” side wins.
  • That ought to put the U.S. in a position where it can serve as a neutral mediator to find a way to resolve the conflict without further bloodshed. Instead the U.S. too often chooses to pick a side and helps to intensify and escalate conflicts that might be limited and contained through mediation.
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    This article basically condemns the intentions of US intervention in Libya. Larison conveys that the assumption that US intervention was crucial in Libya to oust Gaddafi was based on attributing "values" that Americans wanted to believe that they had, putting far more significance on the conflict than it truly possessed. US intervention was unpopular in the region because of distrust in the US and resentment to interference regardless of the side Washington chooses to take. The author says this tells us that the US is far too quick to take sides in foreign conflict, and far too eager to throw their weight behind their side to make sure it wins. The US ought to serve as a neutral mediator resolving conflict rather than initiating further bloodshed through their impulse to "do something" immediately. 
hkerby2

Barrel bomb - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - 0 views

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    This link leads to a Wikipedia article that gives the basic information regarding barrel bombs. Through the link you can find information on barrel bomb history, countries who have used them, reactions, specific incidents, and how they pertain to chemical weaponry.
allieggg

Oil Extends Drop on Libyan Field Restart, OPEC Outlook - Bloomberg - 1 views

  • Libya should resume pumping “soon” at Sharara, its biggest-producing oil field prior to the disruption, following an attack yesterday, an official said.
  • “The Sharara disruption highlights the current chaos in Libya, and also how fragile the production is.”
  • climbed $1.49 to $78.68 a barrel yesterday.
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    This article basically highlights the significance of Libyan oil fields in terms of the international community. Chaos in Libya not only affects the eastern region, but all OPEC members and importers of crude oil across the globe. After the recent attacks on Sharara, the biggest field in Libya, production has significantly slowed down. Libya's elected parliament assures the global community that they will resume normal outputs soon, but as the country deepens further into civil war, international actors remain skeptical.
allieggg

Libya has become the latest Isil conquest - Telegraph - 0 views

  • If the conditions remain unchallenged and, hence, unchanged, it will turn into another Syria or Iraq.
  • Nowhere is this threat more profound than with the rise of radical Islam in Libya
  • The ongoing low-level insurgency in Benghazi is driven by two factors. The first is the radical Islamist ideology of certain groups that refuse to recognise the modern state and its institutions. For example, according to the leader of AS’s Benghazi branch, Mohammed al-Zahawi, his group will not disarm and demobilise until its version of sharia is imposed. The realisation of such an Islamic state constitutes the group’s main aim. In other words, it is the nature of their Jihad.
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  • The second reason is the Islamists’ history with the state security forces. During the 1990s, Muammar Gaddafi unleashed a crackdown on all expressions of Islamism, which saw thousands of youths arrested and jailed as political prisoners. Many were incarcerated in the notorious Abu-Saleem prison. Today’s rejection of state institutions has its roots in that brutality.
  • However, Benghazi is not the only Islamist stronghold in Libya: the city of Derna, which has historically been a strong recruiting ground for Jihadi fighters to Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently Syria, is of serious concern
  • Derna’s Shura Council of Islamic Youth and Ansar al-Sharia have decided to declare Derna an “Islamic emirate” and publicly announce their allegiance to ISIL and its leader and so called “Caliphate” of Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. This means that ISIL now has its terrorist tentacles in Libya.
  • If the international community continues to overlook the current Libyan crisis, the country is likely to become an incubator of militant Islamist groups.
  • In addition to a military response, however, we need a holistic and proactive approach that focuses on achieving reconciliation and stability. This involves forcing all rival political parties to the negotiation table to agree that a newly elected parliament is the sole representative body in the country.
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    This article basically accentuates the driving factors to the ongoing insurgency of ISIL in Libya and how the threat is even more extreme than that of Iraq and Syria. One is the Islamist ideology in itself, rejecting any form of a modern state and the institutions that accompany its success. For example in Libya the leader of the AS branch declares that his militants will not disarm or demobilize until sharia law is imposed. Second, during Gaddafi's rule he unleashed a crackdown on all Islamic expression. The brutality shown towards Islamic groups during this time has fueled their resentment towards sectarian rule and has urged them to push for the rejection of state institutions even more so. The article explains how Islamic groups have claimed power in both Benghazi and Derna, the latter being the historic recruiting ground for Jihad fighters to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The author makes it clear that both military and diplomatic force from the international community is crucial for the reconciliation of security.
allieggg

The New Arab Cold War - 0 views

  • It stretches from Iraq to Lebanon and reaches into North Africa, taking lives in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt's Western Desert, and now Libya
  • this violence is the result of a nasty fight between regional powers over who will lead the Middle East
  • The recent Egyptian and Emirati airstrikes on Libyan Islamist militias is just one manifestation of this fight for leadership among Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). All these countries have waded into conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, and now Libya in order to establish themselves as regional leaders.
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  • Yet these regional contenders for power have rarely achieved their goals. Instead, they have fueled violence, political conflict, and polarization, deepening the endemic problems in the countries they have sought to influence. 
  • Barack Obama's attempt to disentangle the United States from the Middle East's many conflicts has only intensified these rivalries. From a particular perspective, Iraq's chaos, Syria's civil war, Libya's accelerating disintegration, and Hosni Mubarak's fall all represent failures of American leadership.
  • Turkish government has become a leading advocate of regime change in Syria. Unwilling to intervene in the Syrian civil war and unable to coax the United States to do so, Ankara turned a blind eye to extremist groups that used Turkish territory to take up the fight against Assad.
  • Yet the war of words between Ankara and Cairo since then and the support that the Turkish government has extended to the Muslim Brotherhood
  • has only contributed to the political polarization and instability in Egypt
  • Qatar has been less circumspect than others in its support for groups fighting in Syria and Iraq, both offering official funding to Islamist groups in Syria and allowing private contributions to groups including al-Nusra Front, al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate.
  • These conflicts have less to do with Iran and the Sunni-Shiite divide than widely believed. Rather, they represent a fracturing of Washington's Sunni allies in the Middle East. Left to their own devices, the proxy wars the Saudis, Emiratis, Qataris, and Turks are waging among themselves will continue to cause mayhem
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    This article basically states that since the US's withdrawal from Middle Eastern affairs, regional actors were left to fight over who will lead the region's future. The fight is baiscally a run off between Turkey, Qatar, Saudi, and the UAE, each country doing their part intervening in conflicts aiding their supported side. Rather than achieving goals, these proxy wars have fueled the violence, chaos, and polarization deepening the problems they originally sought to mend. While the US has succeeded in abstaining from Mid East affairs, the question now is whether or not they should continue this resignation or step in to urge for order and peace. 
cbrock5654

Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process - 0 views

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    This is a report published on November 6, 2014 by the International Crisis Group about the current peace talks between Turkey's President Ergodan and leaders of the PKK. It discusses how after decades of conflict which cost tens of thousands of people their lives, neither Turkey nor the PKK believe that military victory is possible, and are meeting to discuss a peaceful resolution. However, the events in Syria has reignited ever-present tensions between the two groups, and a fruitful compromise between them is seeming less likely. In this report, the International Crisis Group details the parameters of a possible peace deal, and states that differences need to be put aside so that basic issues like "transitional justice, disarmament and decentralization" can be resolved.
allieggg

Can Libya Rebuild Itself After 40 Years of Gaddafi? - 0 views

  • the man has hollowed out the Libyan state, eviscerated all opposition in Libyan society, and, in effect, created a political tabula rasa on which a newly free people will now have to scratch out a future.
  • Jamahiriya, a political system that is run directly by tribesmen without the intermediation of state institutions
  • the problem is, of course, that much like in the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, virtually everyone at one point or another had to deal with the regime to survive.
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  • Libya is truly a case apart.
  • the disastrous Italian legacy in Libya, has been a constant element in Gaddafi’s speeches since he took power
  • inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser, neighboring Egypt’s president, whose ideas of Arab nationalism and of the possibility of restoring glory to the Arab world, would fuel the first decade of Gaddafi’s revolution.
  • he was unimpressed with the niceties of international diplomacy,
  • In a brilliant move that co-opted tribal elders, many of whom were also military commanders, he created the Social Leadership People’s Committee, through which he could simultaneously control the tribes and segments of the country’s military.
  • When it turned out that Libya, which was still a decentralized society in 1969, had little appetite for his centralizing political vision and remained largely indifferent to his proposals, the young idealist quickly turned activist.
  • Green Book, a set of slim volumes published in the mid-1970s that contain Gaddafi’s political philosophy, a blueprint is offered for a dramatic restructuring of Libya’s economy, politics, and society. In principle, Libya would become an experiment in democracy. In reality, it became a police state where every move of its citizens was carefully watched by a growing number of security apparatuses and revolutionary committees that owed loyalty directly to Gaddafi.
  • Having crushed all opposition by the mid-1970s, the regime systematically snuffed out any group that could potentially oppose it—any activity that could be construed as political opposition was punishable by death, which is one reason why a post-Gaddafi Libya, unlike a post-Mubarak Egypt, can have no ready-made opposition in a position to fill the vacuum.
  • The tribes—the Warfalla, the Awlad Busayf, the Magharha, the Zuwaya, the Barasa, and the smallest of them all, the Gadafa, to which he belonged—offered a natural form of political affiliation, a tribal ethos that could be tapped into for support. And perhaps, in the aftermath of Gaddafi, they could serve as a nucleus around which to build a new political system.
  • Gaddafi feared they might coalesce into groups opposing his rule. So, during the first two decades after the 1969 coup, he tried to erase their influence, arguing that they were an archaic element in a modern society.
  • comprehensive reconstruction of everything civic, political, legal, and moral that makes up a society and its government.
  • After systematically destroying local society, after using the tribes to cancel each other out, after aborting methodically the emergence of a younger generation that could take over Libya’s political life—all compounded by the general incoherence of the country’s administrative and bureaucratic institutions—Gaddafi will have left a new Libya with severe and longstanding challenges.
  • the growing isolation of Libya as international sanctions were imposed.
  • Lockerbie was the logical endpoint for a regime that had lost all international legitimacy.
  • while the regime still had the coercive power to put down any uprisings that took place in the 1990s, it became clear to Gaddafi’s closest advisers that the potential for unrest had reached unprecedented levels.
  • way out was to come to an agreement with the West that would end the sanctions, allow Libya to refurbish an aging oil infrastructure, and provide a safety valve by permitting Libyans to travel abroad once more.
  • intent to renounce weapons of mass destruction in December 2003—after a long process of behind-the-scenes diplomacy initially spearheaded by Britain
  • “The Revolution Everlasting” was one of the enduring slogans of his Libya, inscribed everywhere from bridges to water bottles.
  • regime that had, for four decades, mismanaged the country’s economy and humiliated its citizens
  • country was split in half, with eastern Cyrenaica and its main city Benghazi effectively independent—a demonstration of the kind of people’s power Gaddafi had always advocated. Reality, in effect, outgrew the caricature.
  • used a set of divide-and-rule policies that not only kept his opponents sundered from each other, but had also completely enfeebled any social or political institution in the country.
  • Beyond Gaddafi, there exists only a great political emptiness, a void that Libya somehow will need to fill.
  • the creation of a modern state where Libyans become true citizens, with all the rights and duties this entails.
  • the terrorist incidents
  • Regimes can use oil revenues strategically to provide patronage that effectively keeps them in power.
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    This article from News Week basically paints a picture of Libyan history and how Gaddafi's reign devastated the state economically, socially, and politically. Author Dirk Vandewalle uses the phrase "a political tabula rasa" which in Latin means a blank slate, to describe the fate of Libya after Gaddafi's rule and convey the extent to which the country has to literally reconstruct every component that makes up a society and its government. He highlights major events that led to the downfall of both the Gaddafi regime and the Libyan state as a whole such as Arab nationalism, Jamahiriya, the Green Book, security apparatuses snuffing all opposition, terrorist incidents, isolation and international sanctions, the Lockerbie bombing, weapons of mass destruction, human right violations, divide and rule policies, and his use of oil revenue to fuel his insurgency. Vandewalle concludes the article with uncertain ideas thoughts towards Libya's future and the way the state is going to literally rebuild themselves from this "blank slate" that Gaddafi left behind. 
katelynklug

Egypt's Student Protests: The Beginning or the End of Youth Dissent? - 0 views

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    Oct. 22. As the Egyptian government's crackdown on dissent broadened over the last year, university campuses have increasingly been in the crosshairs as one of the last remaining spaces for dissent. Despite efforts to quell political activity on college campuses, there have been at least 58 protests on college campuses since the first week of classes at the beginning of October. As campuses like Cairo University crack down on security and bans on political activity, Egyptian authorities are also attempting to control the activities of the youth. Sisi reinstated the law of appointing university presidents. The administration knows its weakness is the youth population, since all its support comes from the older generation of Egyptians. However, although he acknowledges there grievances, he basically tells them to stay out of the politics that should be reserved for the older generation. By taking this tone with the Egyptian youth, Sisi risks alienating the population and pushing them to join back in alliances between secular and religous groups.
kbrisba

New Tunisian PM promises growth, reform and new hope - 0 views

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    Prime Minister Habib Essid of Tunisian promised to stimulate growth. Tunisians are worried about other issues; public spending, including cutting subsidies on basic foods and fuel. Jobs, high living costs, and economic opportunities. The government sees economic growth increasing to 3 percent in 2015 from an estimated 2.5 percent in 2014.
aavenda2

The New Saudi King's Basic Problem: Saudi Arabia Has A Malthusian Economy - 0 views

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    This article focuses on the unstable demographics of Saudi Arabia in respect to the future of oil and Saudi's private sector. 50% of the population is under 25.
hkerby2

Everything you need to know about Syrias chemical weapons - The Washington Post - 0 views

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    Super helpful link! This website answers many basic as well more in depth questions regarding the chemical weapons in Syria. The questions include but are not limited to the following: what are chemical weapons? Why are chemical weapons so dangerous? Who possesses/has used chemical weapons? How did Bashar al-Assad get them? And what would happen to the weapons stockpiles if the Syrian government collapsed? What is the Obama Administration Proposing?
rlindse3

For Silicon Valley, NSA may be kind of parasite, eventually kills its host | Customs To... - 0 views

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    Even though not relating to Iran, this article talks about the power the NSA has in penetrating computer data. It basically explains how no computer hardware or firmware is safe from NSA penetration and illustrates the power America has over other countries cyberspace.
tdford333

Why Yemen has come undone - CNN.com - 0 views

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    As the United States has closed its embassy and withdrawn its last troops, Yemen has slid into total chaos, with rebels and jihadists on both sides capturing military bases and seizing tanks and heavy weapons.
jshnide

Hamas, Palestinian Authority Step Up Human Rights Violations - 0 views

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    Hamas and Palestine have further violated the basic human rights of their own people. Hamas's war crimes against the Palestinians are numerous.
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