Androids Zombies Brains

"What follows is an overview of the literature on the KA [Knowledge Argument]. I will begin in section 1 with a sketch of the KA, followed by a discussion of the historical background in section 2. In section 3, the third and longest section, I will provide a taxonomy of objections to the KA, along with brief descriptions of them. In section 4 I will compare the KA to related arguments. I will close in section 5 by briefly raising a question about the extent to which the KA can be generalized."

"Following certain kinds of brain lesions, patients report an inability to see objects, but if pressed to guess at their location they display a capacity to point at them with reasonable accuracy. The phenomenon, called "blindsight", is one of the more dramatic of a number of lines of evidence suggesting that being aware of doing something is distinguishable from doing something, that areas of the brain underlying the experience of doing at least some things are distinct from those needed to actually do those things."

"This web page explores the function of the brain's hemispheres, how information is shared between them via the largest of the interhemispheric commissures, and what symptoms result as a consequence of a split brain operation in which the commissure is severed."

"Chapters on various issues relating to the nature of consciousness. Plus papers on video and other matters of interest, including language, cybernetics, interactivity and computing machines."

"The brain and its 'agent' debate the provenance of thoughts in the charming language of an old Readers Digest article." Also found in Journal of Consciousness Studies 2, 1995.

"The human brain is an incredibly impressive information processor, even though it "works" quite a bit slower than an ordinary computer. Many researchers in artificial intelligence look to the organization of the brain as a model for building intelligent machines. Think of a sort of "analogy" between the complex webs of interconnected neurons in a brain and the densely interconnected units making up an artificial neural network (ANN), where each unit--just like a biological neuron--is capable of taking in a number of inputs and producing an output."

"Perhaps no aspect of mind is more familiar or more puzzling than consciousness and our conscious experience of self and world. The problem of consciousness is arguably the central issue in current theorizing about the mind. Despite the lack of any agreed upon theory of consciousness, there is a widespread, if less than universal, consensus that an adequate account of mind requires a clear understanding of it and its place in nature. We need to understand both what consciousness is and how it relates to other nonconscious aspects of reality."

A one-act play by Terry Bisson

"Language, foresight, musical skills and other hallmarks of intelligence are connected through an underlying facility that enhances rapid movements. Creativity may result from a Darwinian contest within the brain." Published in Scientific American 271(4):100-107, October 1994

"Confronted by the discoveries of artificial intelligence, some philosophers are questioning the very minds that keep their profession afloat."

"The time honoured star of the B grade horror flick - the Zombie, the brain-eating living dead, a body without a soul - has entered the world of philosophy. The Zombie sits at the centre of a charged debate about the mystery of human consciousness. Whilst you can be confident that you're not a Zombie, how can you be sure about the next person? Your mother, neighbour or boss? Join two of the world's great philosophers of the mind, Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, and a B grade movie maker...it's zombie mania."

"The problem of `conscious inessentialism' is examined in the literature, and an argument is presented that the presence of consciousness is indeed marked by a behavioural difference, but that this should be looked for at the _cultural_ level of speech communities." Published in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 196-200.

"Zombies are hypothetical creatures of the sort that philosophers have been known to cherish. A zombie is physically identical to a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience. Zombies look and behave like the conscious beings that we know and love, but 'all is dark inside.' There is nothing it is like to be a zombie."

"A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind."

"I have a plan. Other zombies -- good (qualia eating) zombies -- can battle their evil (behavior eating) cousins to a standoff. Perhaps even defeat them. Familiar zombies and supersmart zombies resist disqualefication, making the world safe, again, for materialism. Behavioristic materialism. Alas for functionalism, good zombies still eat programs. Alas for identity theory, all zombies -- every B movie fan knows -- eat brains."

"To say one has an experience that is conscious (in the phenomenal sense) is to say that one is in a state of its seeming to one some way. In another formulation, to say experience is conscious is to say that there is something it's like for one to have it. Feeling pain and sensing colors are common illustrations of phenomenally conscious states. Consciousness has also been taken to consist in the monitoring of one's own states of mind (e.g., by forming thoughts about them, or by somehow "sensing" them), or else in the accessability of information to one's capacities for rational control or self-report. Intentionality has to do with the directedness or aboutness of mental states -- the fact that, for example, one's thinking is of or about something. Intentionality includes, and is sometimes taken to be equivalent to, what is called 'mental representation.'"

"I have argued that Kirk's efforts do not succeed, but perhaps there are other ways to show that zombies are no more possible than square circles, or colourless green ideas."

"I shall argue that, when certain implications of the zombie concept are carefully examined, zombies are revealed as either failing to support the zombiphile argument, or as simply impossible, conceptually contradictory. "

"... it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it." Published in The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4 (October 1974): 435-50.

"Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. "