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Rudy Garns

Some Questions on Heterophenomenology - 0 views

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    From the blog Brains
Rudy Garns

Making Sense of Dennett's Views on Introspection - 0 views

  • our judgments about our experience
  • what's in stream of experience behind those judgments
  • One can be wrong about what he sees, but can't be wrong about what he thinks he sees.
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    Dan Dennett and I have something in common: We both say that people often go grossly wrong about even their own ongoing conscious experience (for my view, see here). Of course Dennett is one of the world's most eminent philosophers and I'm, well, not. But another difference is this: Dennett also often says (as I don't) that subjects can no more go wrong about their experience than a fiction writer can go wrong about his fictions (e.g., 1991, p. 81, 94) and that their reports about their experience are "incorrigible" in the sense that no one could ever be justified in believing them mistaken (e.g., 2002, p. 13-14). - The Splintered Mind:
Rudy Garns

Dennett, Consciousness Explained: Three Theses - 0 views

  • I'm worried about the verificationism here
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    "Dennett has various targets in his book; they all seem to get lumped together, but in fact some seem distinct from others. Here are three that it might be useful to distinguish." Curtis Brown
Rudy Garns

Dennett on the "Cartesian Theater" - 0 views

  • The central "Cartesian" claim Dennett targets is that there is a specific location in the brain "arrival at which is the necessary and sufficient condition for conscious experience"
  • The only question is how large that center is.
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    "The central "Cartesian" claim Dennett targets is that there is a specific location in the brain "arrival at which is the necessary and sufficient condition for conscious experience" (p. 106). His argument consists mainly in denying that there's always a fact of the matter about when, exactly, an experience occurs, if one considers events at very small time scales (on the order of tenths of a second). He appears to draw from this argument what seems to be the fairly radical anti-"Cartesian" conclusion that there are, in general, no definitive facts of the matter about the flow of conscious experiences independent of the changing "narratives" we construct about them." The Splintered Mind
Rudy Garns

Daniel Dennett Multiple-Drafts Model of Consciousness (1991) - 0 views

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    Discussion Board on Dennett's thesis
Rudy Garns

Multiple Drafts: An eternal golden braid? - 0 views

  • Enough information may often be available to fuel more than one version of reality. Then drafts compete in Pandemonium-like rivalry (Dennett 1991) and the rivalry is resolved in favor of one over the rest (the one that "makes most ecological sense")--but not for good. The competition is never- ending. There is no definitive or archival draft.
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    Response to Glicksohn and Salter in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 18, no. 4, 1995, pp. 810-11.

    "We have learned that the issues we raised are very difficult to think about clearly, and what "works" for one thinker falls flat for another, and leads yet another astray. So it is particularly useful to get these re-expressions of points we have tried to make. Both commentaries help by proposing further details for the Multiple Drafts Model, and asking good questions. They either directly clarify, or force us to clarify, our own account. They also both demonstrate how hard it is for even sympathetic commentators always to avoid the very habits of thought the Multiple Drafts Model was designed to combat. While acknowledging and expanding on their positive contributions, we must sound a few relatively minor alarms. "
Rudy Garns

Daniel Dennett's theory of consciousness - the intentional stance and multiple drafts. - 0 views

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    " Dennett is the great demystifier of consciousness. According to him there is, in the final analysis, nothing fundamentally inexplicable about the way we attribute intentions and conscious feelings to people. We often attribute feelings or intentions metaphorically to non-human things, after all. We might say our car is a bit tired today, or that our pot plant is thirsty. At the end of the day, our attitude to other human beings is just a version - a much more sophisticated version - of the same strategy. Attributing intentions to human animals makes it much easier to work out what their behaviour is likely to be. It pays us, in short, to adopt the intentional stance when trying to understand human beings. "
Rudy Garns

Multiple Drafts - 0 views

  • cognitive discriminations need only be made once. The information does not then need to travel to any special area of the brain in order to become conscious. Without the 'theatre', there is no need for such a 'presentation' to take place
  • our brains can represent time using a medium other than time itself
  • you cannot 'freeze' time and ask what is being consciously represented at any given instant.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • there is no natural distinction between pre-experiential (Stalinesque) and post-experiential (Orwellian) revisions.
  • The "unconscious driving" phenomenon is better seen as a case of rolling consciousness with swift memory loss.
  • report feeling a series of equidistant taps along their arm
  • what we are conscious of is dependent upon how and when our stream(s) of consciousness is 'probed'.
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    "Dennett maintains that cognitive discriminations need only be made once. The information does not then need to travel to any special area of the brain in order to become conscious. Without the 'theatre', there is no need for such a 'presentation' to take place." - Philosophy, et cetera
Rudy Garns

Who's on First? Heterophenomenology Explained - 0 views

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    Dennett, D. "Who's On First? Heterophenomenology Explained" Journal of Consciousness Studies, Special Issue: Trusting the Subject? (Part 1), 10, No. 9-10, October 2003, pp. 19-30
Rudy Garns

Heterophenomenology Reconsidered - 0 views

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    Draft for Phenomenology and Cognition (2006); Dennett replies to critics
Rudy Garns

Time and the Observer | Dennett and Kinsbourne - 0 views

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    Two models of consciousness are contrasted with regard to their treatment of subjective timing. The standard Cartesian Theater model postulates a place in the brain where "it all comes together": where the discriminations in all modalities are somehow put into registration and "presented" for subjective judgment. In particular, the Cartesian Theater model implies that the temporal properties of the content-bearing events occurring within this privileged representational medium determine subjective order. The alternative, Multiple Drafts model holds that whereas the brain events that discriminate various perceptual contents are distributed in both space and time in the brain, and whereas the temporal properties of these various events are determinate, none of these temporal properties determine subjective order, since there is no single, constitutive "stream of consciousness" but rather a parallel stream of conflicting and continuously revised contents. Four puzzling phenomena that resist explanation by the standard model are analyzed: two results claimed by Libet, an apparent motion phenomenon involving color change (Kolers and von Grunau), and the "cutaneous rabbit" (Geldard and Sherrick) an illusion of evenly spaced series of "hops" produced by two or more widely spaced series of taps delivered to the skin. The unexamined assumptions that have always made the Cartesian Theater model so attractive are exposed and dismantled. The Multiple Drafts model provides a better account of the puzzling phenomena, avoiding the scientific and metaphysical extravagances of the Cartesian Theater.
Rudy Garns

Consciousness Explained Review - 0 views

  • This is of course a topic rich enough to supply interest independantly
    upon the light it could possible shed on consciousness. The empirically minded might even
    hope that in due time enough empirical understanding might have been amassed as to
    allow the emergence of an understanding of consciousness, or at least the illusion of such a
    thing. But there is a very long way to go, and books like Dennetts really makes very little
    progress in elucidating the issue to critical readers
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    Chalmers reviews
Rudy Garns

Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained": Philosophy Forums - 0 views

  • Welcome to a discussion of Daniel Dennett's "Consciousness Explained", Chapter 1 (Prelude: How are hallucinations possible?).
Rudy Garns

Stage Effects in the Cartesian Theater: A review of Daniel Dennett's Consciousness Expl... - 0 views

  • I hope to have given some impression of the range of topics, without pretending to have surveyed them. As I have made clear, there is much in this book that is disputable. And Dennett is at times aggravatingly smug and confident about the merits of his arguments (comparing his `revelations' about consciousness to a magician's revealing the operation of stage tricks, for example; p. 434). All in all Dennett's book is annoying, frustrating, insightful, provocative and above all annoying. Unfortunately---in this age of academic overproduction---I must conclude that for now Consciousness Explained is unavoidable reading for those who intend to think seriously about the problems of consciousness.
Rudy Garns

"Consciousness Explained" Review - 0 views

  • Daniel C. Dennett, the director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, is one of a handful of philosophers who feel this quest is so important that they have become as conversant in psychology, neuroscience and computer science as they are in philosophy. "Consciousness Explained" is his attempt, as audacious as its title, to come up with a scientific explanation for that feeling, sometimes painful, sometimes exhilarating, of being alive and aware, the object of one's own deliberations.
Rudy Garns

The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition? (Dennett) - 0 views

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    "Must we talk about zombies? Apparently we must. There is a powerful and ubiquitous intuition that computational, mechanistic models of consciousness, of the sort we naturalists favor, must leave something out-something important. Just what must they leave out? The critics have found that it's hard to say, exactly: qualia, feelings, emotions, the what-it's-likeness (Nagel) or the ontological subjectivity (Searle) of consciousness."
Rudy Garns

Quining Qualia (Dennett) - 0 views

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    "My goal is subversive. I am out to overthrow an idea that, in one form or another, is "obvious" to most people--to scientists, philosophers, lay people. My quarry is frustratingly elusive; no sooner does it retreat in the face of one argument than "it" reappears, apparently innocent of all charges, in a new guise." Found in in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds, Consciousness in Modern Science, Oxford University Press 1988. Reprinted in W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader, MIT Press, 1990, A. Goldman, ed. Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, MIT Press, 1993.
Rudy Garns

Did HAL Commit Murder? - 0 views

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    "If HAL believed (we can't be sure on what grounds) that his being so rendered comatose would jeopardize the whole mission, then he would be in exactly the same moral dilemma a human being in the same predicament would face. Not surprisingly, we figure out the answer to our question by figuring out what would be true if we put ourselves in Hal's place. If you believed the mission to which your life was devoted was more important, in the last analysis, than anything else, what would you do?"
Rudy Garns

Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds (Dennett) - 0 views

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    "The best reason for believing that robots might some day become conscious is that we human beings are conscious, and we are a sort of robot ourselves. That is, we are extraordinarily complex self-controlling, self-sustaining physical mechanisms, designed over the eons by natural selection, and operating according to the same well-understood principles that govern all the other physical processes in living things: digestive and metabolic processes, self-repair and reproductive processes, for instance."
Rudy Garns

Daniel Dennett's Publications List - 0 views

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    Available reprints by Daniel Dennett
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