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Rudy Garns

Qualia (Tye) - 0 views

plato.stanford.edu/qualia

qualia consciousness mind Tye AZB

shared by Rudy Garns on 30 Aug 08 - Cached
  • something it is like
  • I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character.
  • a mental picture-like representation
  • ...38 more annotations...
  • its content and its intrinsic, non-representationational features
  • relations to sensory objects
  • identified with neural events
  • irreducible
  • intrinsic, consciously accessible features that are non-representational
  • introspection
  • counterparts
  • intrinsic properties of experiences that are also ineffable, nonphysical, and ‘given’ to their subjects incorrigibly
  • something it is like for you subjectively to undergo
  • The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience.
  • experience of understanding a sentence
  • some thoughts have qualia.
  • desires
  • feeling angry that the house has been burgled or seeing that the computer is missing
  • Mary acquires certain abilities,
  • Talk of the ways things look and feel is intensional.
  • provide further support for the contention that some sort of representational account is appropriate for qualia.
  • qualities represented by experiences
  • belong to external things
  • qualia are really representational contents of experiences into which the represented qualities enter
  • just as meaning is something a word has
  • there can be differences in the representational contents of experiences without any phenomenal difference.
  • Phenomenally, our experiences are all very much alike, notwithstanding certain higher-level representational differences
  • This content is plausibly viewed as nonconceptual. It forms the output of the early, largely modular sensory processing and the input to one or another system of higher-level cognitive processing
  • properties represented by experiences.
  • my current visual experience of a red object not only represents the object as red (this is my focal awareness) but also represents itself as red
  • Representationalists about qualia are often also externalists about representational content
  • If these differences in content are of the right sort then, according to the wide representationalist, microphysical twins cannot fail to differ with respect to the phenomenal character of their experiences.
  • Qualia are not intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which their subjects are directly aware, qualities that are necessarily shared by internal duplicates however different their environments may be. Rather, they are representational contents certain inner states possess, contents whose nature is fixed at least in part by certain external relations between individuals and their environments
  • qualia are supposedly one and the same as certain representational contents.
  • qualia are one and the same as certain representational properties of experiences;
  • experiences have the same representational content but different phenomenal character
  • experience of one sort or another is present but in which there is no state with representational content.
  • deny that there really is any change in normal tracking with respect to color,
  • The sensory state that nature designed in your species to track blue in the setting in which your species evolved will continue to do just that even if through time, on Inverted Earth, in that alien environment, it is usually caused in you by looking at yellow things.
  • feeling pain or having a visual sensation of red are phylogenetically fixed
  • Swampman is not human
  • His inner states play no teleological role.
  • Rudy Garns on 30 Aug 08
     
    "Philosophers often use the term 'qualia' (singular 'quale') to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem."
Rudy Garns

How we know our own minds... - 0 views

mindblog.dericbownds.net/...how-we-know-our-own-minds.html

mind self-knowledge AZB

shared by Rudy Garns on 24 Oct 08 - Cached
  • Rudy Garns on 24 Oct 08
     
    Carruthers defends the idea that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves, not from introspection for propositional attitudes. (Deric Bownds' MindBlog)
Rudy Garns

Making Sense of Dennett's Views on Introspection - 0 views

schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/...ense-of-dennetts-views-on.html

dennett introspection AZB

shared by Rudy Garns on 09 Feb 10 - Cached
  • our judgments about our experience
  • what's in stream of experience behind those judgments
  • One can be wrong about what he sees, but can't be wrong about what he thinks he sees.
  • Rudy Garns on 09 Feb 10
     
    Dan Dennett and I have something in common: We both say that people often go grossly wrong about even their own ongoing conscious experience (for my view, see here). Of course Dennett is one of the world's most eminent philosophers and I'm, well, not. But another difference is this: Dennett also often says (as I don't) that subjects can no more go wrong about their experience than a fiction writer can go wrong about his fictions (e.g., 1991, p. 81, 94) and that their reports about their experience are "incorrigible" in the sense that no one could ever be justified in believing them mistaken (e.g., 2002, p. 13-14). - The Splintered Mind:
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