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aqconces

Adrian Carton de Wiart: The unkillable soldier - BBC News - 0 views

  • Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart was a one-eyed, one-handed war hero who fought in three major conflicts across six decades, surviving plane crashes and PoW camps.
  • Carton de Wiart served in the Boer War, World War One and World War Two.
  • In the process he was shot in the face, losing his left eye, and was also shot through the skull, hip, leg, ankle and ear.
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  • In WW1 he was severely wounded on eight occasions and mentioned in despatches six times.
  • "His story serves to remind us that not all British generals of WW1 were 'Chateau Generals' as portrayed in Blackadder. He exhibited heroism of the highest order.
  • "Frankly, I had enjoyed the war."
  • "I honestly believe that he regarded the loss of an eye as a blessing as it allowed him to get out of Somaliland to Europe where he thought the real action was."
Javier E

'The Fourth Revolution,' by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • along the way the authors raise important questions. “The state is in trouble,” they note. “The mystery is why so many people assume that radical change is unlikely.” They’re right to see this as a mystery: If the last 500 years have shown us anything, it is that radical change happens, repeatedly.
  • Yet in their cheery tour of the last few centuries, they never grapple with a still more troubling truth: The evolution of the “ever-­improving” Western system of governance is inextricably bound up with mass carnage.
manhefnawi

Charles V | Biography, Reign, Abdication, & Facts | Britannica.com - 0 views

  • the problem of the succession in Spain became acute, since by the terms of Ferdinand’s will, Charles was to govern in Aragon and Castile together with his mother (who, however, suffered from a nervous illness and never reigned).
  • Making the most of their candidate’s German parentage and buying up German electoral votes (mostly with money supplied by the powerful Fugger banking family), Charles’s adherents had meanwhile pushed through his election as emperor over his powerful rival, Francis I of France.
  • Gradually, the other chief task of his reign also unfolded: the struggle for hegemony in western Europe. That goal was a legacy of his Burgundian forefathers, including his ancestor Charles the Bold, who had come to naught in his fight against the French Valois Louis XI. His great-grandfather’s quest was to become a fateful problem for Charles as well.
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  • The Roman Catholics, however, condemned the Augsburg Confession—the basic confession of the Lutheran doctrine faith presented to Charles at the Diet of Augsburg—and responded with the Confutation, which met with Charles’s approval.
  • In 1526 Charles married Isabella, the daughter of the late king Manuel I of Portugal.
  • In 1522 his teacher Adrian of Utrecht became pope, as Adrian VI. His efforts to reconcile Francis I and the emperor failed, and three years later Charles’s army defeated Francis I at the Battle of Pavia, taking prisoner the king himself.
  • Although Ferdinand, having lost his Hungarian capital in August 1541, pleaded for a land campaign against Süleyman I, Charles again decided on a naval venture, which failed dismally after an unsuccessful attack on Algiers.
  • North Germany was now on the brink of revolt. The new king of France, Henry II, was eagerly awaiting an opportunity to renew the old rivalry between the houses of Valois and Burgundy, while the German princes believed that the moment was at hand to repay Charles for Mühlberg.
  • In order to save what he could of that hegemony, Charles, already severely racked by gout, tried new paths by preparing the ground for his widowed son’s marriage with Mary I of England.
  • There he laid the groundwork for the eventual bequest of Portugal to the Habsburgs after the eventual death of King Sebastian (who was then still a child) with the help of his sister Catherine, grandmother of Sebastian and regent of Portugal. He aided his son in procuring funds in Spain for the continuation of the war against France, and he helped his daughter Joan, regent of Spain during Philip’s absence in the Netherlands, in persecuting Spanish heretics.
abbykleman

The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S. - 0 views

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    WASHINGTON - When Special Agent Adrian Hawkins of the Federal Bureau of Investigation called the Democratic National Committee in September 2015 to pass along some troubling news about its computer network, he was transferred, naturally, to the help desk. His message was brief, if alarming. At least one computer system belonging to the D.N.C.
Cecilia Ergueta

The Revenge of Karl Marx - The Atlantic - 0 views

  • As I write this, every newspaper informs me of frantic efforts by merchants to unload onto the consumer, at almost any price, the vast surplus of unsold commodities that have accumulated since the credit crisis began to take hold. The phrase crisis of over-production, which I learned so many long winters ago in “agitational” meetings, recurs to my mind.
  • On other pages, I learn that the pride of American capitalism has seized up and begun to rust, and that automobiles may cease even to be made in Detroit as a consequence of insane speculation in worthless paper “derivatives.” Did I not once read somewhere about the bitter struggle between finance capital and industrial capital?
  • The lines of jobless and hungry begin to lengthen, and what more potent image of those lines do we possess than that of the “reserve army” of the unemployed—capital’s finest weapon in beating down the minimum wage and increasing the hours of the working week?
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  • A disturbance in a remote corner of the world market leads to chaos and panic at the very center of the system (and these symptoms are given a multiplier effect when the pangs begin at the center itself), and John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, doughty champions of capitalism at The Economist, admit straightforwardly in their book on the advantages of globalization that Marx, “as a prophet of the ‘universal interdependence of nations,’ as he called globalization … can still seem startlingly relevant … His description of globalization remains as sharp today as it was 150 years ago.
  • The falling rate of profit, the tendency to monopoly … how wrong could that old reading-room attendant have been?
  • Marx is so embedded in our Western cast of thought that few people are even aware of their debt to him. Everybody I know now believes that their attitudes are to an extent a creation of their material circumstances … “that, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness”, as Marx wrote—and that changes in the way things are produced profoundly affect the affairs of humanity even outside the workshop or factory.
  • “It’s the economy, stupid.”
  • What he postulated, and what made him different from any previous theorist of materialism whether historical or dialectical, was a sharp distinction between the forces and the relations of production. Within the integument of one system of exploitation, in other words, was contained a systemic conflict that, if not resolved, would lead to stagnation and decline but, if properly confronted, might lead to a higher synthesis of abundance and equality.
  • there was an underlying love-hate relationship between Marx and capitalism. As early as the Manifesto, he had written of capitalism’s operations with a sort of awe, describing how the bourgeoisie had revolutionized all human and social and economic relations, and had released productive capacities of a sort undreamed-of in feudal times.
  • In my opinion, therefore, the most powerful Marxist book of the past four decades was Rudolf Bahro’s The Alternative, which showed how and why the East German state and economy were certain to implode. Communism, said Bahro—one of its former functionaries—was compelled to educate and train people up to a certain level. But beyond that level, it forbade them to think, or to inquire, or to use their initiative. Thus, while it created a vast amount of “surplus consciousness,” it could find no way of employing this energy except by squandering and dissipating and ultimately repressing it. The conflict between the forces and relations of production in the eastern part of the homeland of Karl Marx thus became a locus classicus of the sort of contradiction he had originally identified.
  • Marx was a keen admirer of that other great Victorian Charles Darwin, and according to Engels he wanted to do for the economic system what the author of The Origin of Species had done for the natural order: lay bare its objective laws of motion and thus make it possible at last to dispense with subjective and idealist interpretations.
  • The term exploitation, for example, should be not a moralizing one but a cold measure of the difference between use value and exchange value, or between the wages earned at the coal face and the real worth of that labor to the mine owner
  • (War between competitive capitalist states, for example, would be an instance of the negative. Seizure of power by an educated working class that understood and could transcend the logic of private ownership would be an example of human progress.
  • it does not quite explain Marx’s later failure, in Capital, to grasp quite how revolutionary capitalist innovation really was. (The chapter on new industrial machinery opens with a snobbish quotation from John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political Economy: “It is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day’s toil of any human being.” This must have seemed absurd even at the time, and it appears preposterous after the third wave of technological revolution and rationalization that modern capitalism has brought in its train.
  • There’s also the not-inconsiderable question of capitalism’s ability to decide, if not on the value of a commodity, at least on some sort of price for the damn thing. Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and the other members of the Austrian school were able to point out this critical shortcoming of Capital—no pricing policy—during Marx’s lifetime
  • John Cassidy wrote of Marx, “His books will be worth reading as long as capitalism endures.” That would appear to mean that Marxism and capitalism are symbiotic, and that neither can expect to outlive the other,
Javier E

H-Net Reviews-"Adrian R. Lewis. The American Culture of War: A History of U.S. Military... - 0 views

  • In effect, Lewis’s book is a manifesto that calls for a revolutionary change in thinking, especially to restore the idea of the citizen-soldier as it had been during the Second World War, to increase the manpower range of the army, and to cancel the idea of an all volunteer force.
  • In his opinion, the changes after the Second World War led to the removal of the American people from the conduct of war. This central claim is well based and is carefully presented.
  • The importance of this book is shown by the fact that Routledge has issued a second edition. In addition, even though the book presents a specific thesis that is merged within the fascinating historiographical debate over the American way of war, it also provides an in-depth discussion of U.S. military history of the past sixty years.
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  • This is mandatory reading for all those engaged in U.S. military history, and above all should be included in the reading list of the American officer ranks, as well as the decision makers and policy shapers among the various political and military echelons.
manhefnawi

Vienna's Chamber of Wonders | History Today - 0 views

  • The Habsburgs, a family of aristocrats originating in modern Switzerland, ruled the Holy Roman Empire and then the Austrian Empire for over 600 years
  • The first true collector among the Habsburgs was Ferdinand I (1503-64)
  • Rudolf II (1552-1612), the grandson of Ferdinand I, made the Kunstkammer internationally famous
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  • After Rudolf’s death his brothers invoked Majoratssiftung (primogeniture) to stop the collection being divided up again, but before it could all be transported to Vienna much was destroyed in the wake of the Thirty Years War. First the Bavarian and Saxon armies and then Swedish soldiers destroyed or plundered all that had been left in Prague, which is how so much of it passed into the possession of Queen Christina of Sweden
  • It was Franz Joseph II (r.1848-1916), one of the least intellectually curious monarchs in European history, who created what we now think of as the Kunstkammer
Javier E

How YouTube Radicalized Brazil - The New York Times - 0 views

  • “YouTube became the social media platform of the Brazilian right,”
  • Members of the nation’s newly empowered far right — from grass-roots organizers to federal lawmakers — say their movement would not have risen so far, so fast, without YouTube’s recommendation engine.
  • New research has found they may be correct. YouTube’s search and recommendation system appears to have systematically diverted users to far-right and conspiracy channels in Brazil.
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  • A New York Times investigation in Brazil found that, time and again, videos promoted by the site have upended central elements of daily life
  • YouTube’s recommendation system is engineered to maximize watchtime, among other factors, the company says, but not to favor any political ideology.
  • Some parents look to “Dr. YouTube” for health advice but get dangerous misinformation instead, hampering the nation’s efforts to fight diseases like Zika. Viral videos have incited death threats against public health advocates.
  • And in politics, a wave of right-wing YouTube stars ran for office alongside Mr. Bolsonaro, some winning by historic margins. Most still use the platform, governing the world’s fourth-largest democracy through internet-honed trolling and provocation
  • Teachers describe classrooms made unruly by students who quote from YouTube conspiracy videos or who, encouraged by right-wing YouTube stars, secretly record their instructors
  • “Before that, I didn’t have an ideological political background,” Mr. Martins said. YouTube’s auto-playing recommendations, he declared, were “my political education.”
  • As the system suggests more provocative videos to keep users watching, it can direct them toward extreme content they might otherwise never find. And it is designed to lead users to new topics to pique new interest
  • The system now drives 70 percent of total time on the platfor
  • Zeynep Tufekci, a social media scholar, has called it “one of the most powerful radicalizing instruments of the 21st century.”
  • Danah Boyd, founder of the think tank Data & Society, attributed the disruption in Brazil to YouTube’s unrelenting push for viewer engagement, and the revenues it generates.
  • Maurício Martins, the local vice president of Mr. Bolsonaro’s party in Niterói, credited “most” of the party’s recruitment to YouTube — including his own.
  • But the emotions that draw people in — like fear, doubt and anger — are often central features of conspiracy theories, and in particular, experts say, of right-wing extremism
  • “It was like that with everyone,”
  • Sometimes I’m watching videos about a game, and all of a sudden it’s a Bolsonaro video,”
  • More and more, his fellow students are making extremist claims, often citing as evidence YouTube stars like Mr. Moura, the guitarist-turned-conspiracist.
  • “If social media didn’t exist, I wouldn’t be here,” he said. “Jair Bolsonaro wouldn’t be president.”
  • In the months after YouTube changed its algorithm, positive mentions of Mr. Bolsonaro ballooned. So did mentions of conspiracy theories that he had floated. This began as polls still showed him to be deeply unpopular, suggesting that the platform was doing more than merely reflecting political trends.
  • Jonas Kaiser and Yasodara Córdova, with Adrian Rauchfleisch of National Taiwan University, programmed a Brazil-based server to enter a popular channel or search term, then open YouTube’s top recommendations, then follow the recommendations on each of those, and so on.
  • By repeating this thousands of times, the researchers tracked how the platform moved users from one video to the next. They found that after users watched a video about politics or even entertainment, YouTube’s recommendations often favored right-wing, conspiracy-filled channels like Mr. Moura’s
  • Not long after YouTube installed its new recommendation engine, Dr. Santana’s patients began telling him that they’d seen videos blaming Zika on vaccines — and, later, on larvicides. Many refused both.
  • The algorithm had united once-marginal channels — and then built an audience for them
  • One of those channels belonged to Mr. Bolsonaro, who had long used the platform to post hoaxes and conspiracies
  • The conspiracies were not limited to politics. Many Brazilians searching YouTube for health care information found videos that terrified them: some said Zika was being spread by vaccines, or by the insecticides meant to curb the spread of the mosquito-borne disease that has ravaged northeastern Brazi
  • The videos appeared to rise on the platform in much the same way as extremist political content: by making alarming claims and promising forbidden truths that kept users glued to their screens.
  • Doctors, social workers and former government officials said the videos had created the foundation of a public health crisis as frightened patients refused vaccines and even anti-Zika insecticides.
  • Crucially, users who watched one far-right channel would often be shown many more.
  • Medical providers, she said, were competing “every single day” against “Dr. Google and Dr. YouTube” — and they were losing
  • Brazil’s medical community had reason to feel outmatched. The Harvard researchers found that YouTube’s systems frequently directed users who searched for information on Zika, or even those who watched a reputable video on health issues, toward conspiracy channels
  • As the far right rose, many of its leading voices had learned to weaponize the conspiracy videos, offering their vast audiences a target: people to blame
  • Eventually, the YouTube conspiracists turned their spotlight on Debora Diniz, a women’s rights activist whose abortion advocacy had long made her a target of the far right
  • Bernardo Küster, a YouTube star whose homemade rants had won him 750,000 subscribers and an endorsement from Mr. Bolsonaro, accused her of involvement in the supposed Zika plots.
  • As far-right and conspiracy channels began citing one another, YouTube’s recommendation system learned to string their videos together
  • However implausible any individual rumor might be on its own, joined together, they created the impression that dozens of disparate sources were revealing the same terrifying truth.
  • When the university where Ms. Diniz taught received a warning that a gunman would shoot her and her students, and the police said they could no longer guarantee her safety, she left Brazil.
  • “The YouTube system of recommending the next video and the next video,” she said, had created “an ecosystem of hate.
  • “‘I heard here that she’s an enemy of Brazil. I hear in the next one that feminists are changing family values. And the next one I hear that they receive money from abroad” she said. “That loop is what leads someone to say ‘I will do what has to be done.’
  • In Brazil, this is a growing online practice known as “linchamento” — lynching. Mr. Bolsonaro was an early pioneer, spreading videos in 2012 that falsely accused left-wing academics of plotting to force schools to distribute “gay kits” to convert children to homosexuality.
  • Mr. Jordy, his tattooed Niterói protégé, was untroubled to learn that his own YouTube campaign, accusing teachers of spreading communism, had turned their lives upside down.One of those teachers, Valeria Borges, said she and her colleagues had been overwhelmed with messages of hate, creating a climate of fear.
  • Mr. Jordy, far from disputing this, said it had been his goal. “I wanted her to feel fear,” he said
  • The group’s co-founder, a man-bunned former rock guitarist name Pedro D’Eyrot, said “we have something here that we call the dictatorship of the like.”
  • Reality, he said, is shaped by whatever message goes most viral.
  • Even as he spoke, a two-hour YouTube video was captivating the nation. Titled “1964” for the year of Brazil’s military coup, it argued that the takeover had been necessary to save Brazil from communism.Mr. Dominguez, the teenager learning to play guitar, said the video persuaded him that his teachers had fabricated the horrors of military rule.
Javier E

Nudging Towards Theocracy: Adrian Vermeule's War on Liberalism | Dissent Magazine - 0 views

  • If power is to be delivered to the technocrats, it has to be taken away from someone else. For Vermeule, that someone is the judiciary.
  • Judges, in his view, are ill-equipped to adjudicate on the administrative and regulatory questions that, in modern states, so often come across their desks. Judges have no business, Vermeule thinks, meddling with technical or regulatory matters, and thus they seldom do. So whatever fantasy we might spin about living in a republic of laws, in reality we are living in a republic of administrators.
  • The abnegation of the law opens the door for the executive branch to assert its proper role. This has been the grand theme of Vermeule’s collaborations with Sunstein and Posner. His writings with Sunstein have focused on the need for government agencies to have wide leeway to intervene in and regulate the social order, without serious oversight from the legislature or the Constitution.
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  • a provocative 2009 paper titled “Conspiracy Theories.” As always, they begin with a genuine problem: in this case, the spread of harmful untruths like birtherism or trutherism. Their basic idea is that government agencies should be allowed to pursue a project of “cognitive infiltration,” anonymously mucking about in conspiracy circles in order to sow doubt and confusion
  • Who, in the end, has the capacity to employ the awesome powers of the modern state?
  • Schmitt showed, they believe, that the executive branch is the proper locus of sovereignty and the one that is most legitimately linked with the people. It is also the only one with the capacity and speed to act in times of emergency.
  • Vermeule and Posner published two books, Terror in the Balance (2007) and Executive Unbound (2009), that brought Schmitt’s insights into the context of contemporary America and its global War on Terror. The books mount a robust defense of executive leeway, including the right to use “enhanced interrogation”—or, in layman’s terms, torture.
  • it is hard not to place him into a recognizable genealogy of liberal Protestants, ensconced in the mainstream intellectual culture of their day, who found their way to Rome. Jacques Maritain belongs in this camp, as do G.K. Chesterton and Alasdair MacIntyre. Like Vermeule, they brought the zeal of the convert with them, and were often more radical than cradle Catholics
  • one can find quite similar trajectories: deep engagement in mainstream, non-Catholic schools, which brought them to unresolvable contradictions. The Church offered them answers to questions they already had.
  • His scholarship with Sunstein and Posner labored mightily to persuade us that shreds of paper, be they constitutions or laws, were irrational guides to social betterment. And yet what was to take their place?
  • How can the state make decisions about ethical matters, which it must do, and why ought those decisions be viewed as legitimate? What, in the end, do citizens share with one another? These are first-order questions
  • Liberal individualism had always relied upon, and was even a relic of, constitutional legalism. The whole idea had been that law could structure social relations, allowing different cultures and religions to live in relative harmony. By depriving the law of this sort of social function, the law and economics circle opened up a vast new set of questions about how the social order might cohere.
  • Vermeule’s co-authors looked to the individual and her preferences, as stewarded by a free market and enlightened administrative agencies
  • Vermeule, however, came to see liberalism as purely destructive: as a set of tools and procedures whose primary purpose was to reshape social reality in its own image, steamrolling the virtues of the people in the name of individualism and science
  • he has begun to entertain dark visions about how the administrative state might coerce the unruly people toward virtue. He positively cites Joseph de Maistre, a Catholic critic of the French Revolution and fellow defender of torture. Vermeule dreams of a world in which we will “sear the liberal faith with hot irons” in order “to defeat and capture the hearts and minds of liberal agents.” A less honest thinker would be sure to remind readers that this is all meant metaphorically. Vermeule does no such thing and goes out of his way to assert that “coercion” ought to be on the table. There is only one way to read this: he is arguing that actual violence could legitimately be used to convert hearts and minds.
  • Vermeule’s theory, in Law’s Abnegation and elsewhere, has been that the modern state is not actually governed by law or courts but by administrative agencies like the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Education. And his proposal in his more radical writings is that those agencies ought to be staffed by integralists who would bend the powers of the state in his desired direction.
  • “We have learned from behavioral economics,” he reminds us, that administrative agents can “nudge whole populations in desirable directions.” The theory that the state might “nudge” citizens toward more optimal outcomes, as defined by technocrats, is the famous theory developed by Sunstein
  • Vermeule is saying, if we are going to grant the administrative state the right to mold citizen behavior, why stop there? We might be nudged, he thinks, with hot irons; we might be nudged right back to the Inquisition.
  • He is not exactly a “populist” and is more committed to the reign of the Church than he is to that of the Republican Party. And yet, given his apologetics for the Eastern European regimes that are currently committed to gutting judiciaries and human rights protections, there is no doubt which side he will be on if or when the true moment of crisis arrives in our imperiled republic
  • Vermeule’s story shows us just how easily technocracy, by evacuating the moral center of our politics, can tip toward a moralizing authoritarianism that promises to restore one—how easily, in other words, Bloomberg might tip into Bonaparte.
carolinehayter

If China needs to boost its population why not scrap birth quotas entirely? The reason ... - 0 views

  • In a bid to arrest a demographic crisis, China this week announced it will allow couples to have three children -- but some critics questioned why the government kept a limit on parents at all?
  • The answer might lie in Beijing's attitudes towards its ethnic minorities, particularly those in Xinjiang.
  • Experts said Beijing is reluctant to remove all quotas on the number of children per family for several reasons. But one major factor is that ending the policy would make it much more difficult to justify Beijing's attempts to limit the population in Xinjiang and other regions with large minority groups, which tend to have more children.
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  • "If there was no policy across the whole country, it would be difficult to enforce a separate one for poor people and Muslims."
  • China's birth rate has been falling rapidly since the introduction of the one-child policy more than 40 years ago, which limited couples to one baby in order to alleviate poverty and stem a population boom.
  • During the one-child policy, ethnic minorities, including Xinjiang's Uyghur population, were allowed to have up to three children, which authorities said was in deference of the group's cultural traditions of large families.
  • Faced with a demographic crisis, the Chinese government relaxed the policy in 2016 to allow for two children
  • n 2020, the birth rate fell by almost 15% year on year.
  • Between 1991 and 2017, Xinjiang had a substantially higher birth-rate ratio when compared to the rest of the country, according to a report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
  • While the policy successfully reined in birth rates as China developed, in more recent years officials have become concerned the country won't have enough young workers to keep powering its economic growth.
  • But when the Chinese government began its crackdown in Xinjiang in 2017, which allegedly involved sending millions of Uyghurs to a vast complex of detention centers, there was a simultaneous tightening of family planning policies.Between 2017 and 2018, birth rates in Xinjiang dropped by a third, from 15.8 per 1,000 people to 10.7 per 1,000 people.
  • At a time when the Chinese government was desperately trying to raise birth rates, sterilizations in the region surged to 243 per 100,000 people in 2018, according to official government documents referenced in a report by Xinjiang researcher Adrian Zenz. That is far higher than the rate of 33 per 100,000 people for the rest of the country.
  • And while the use of IUD birth control devices dropped in China between 2016 and 2018, Zenz quoted documents showing in Xinjiang it rose to 963 per 100,000 people.
  • "If you lifted the birth restrictions universally, they'd lose their justification for tightening birth control policies against specific sectors of Chinese society that they dislike," said Carl Minzner, professor of law at Fordham University.
  • Experts said Beijing would be reluctant to find new roles for the tens of thousands of people employed by the government to oversee the country's massive family planning policy.
  • At the same time, removing the limits would abolish one of the many ways in the Chinese government can monitor its population, Byler said, forcing Beijing to find another reason to carry out intimate domestic surveillance.
Javier E

The new tech worldview | The Economist - 0 views

  • Sam Altman is almost supine
  • the 37-year-old entrepreneur looks about as laid-back as someone with a galloping mind ever could. Yet the ceo of OpenAi, a startup reportedly valued at nearly $20bn whose mission is to make artificial intelligence a force for good, is not one for light conversation
  • Joe Lonsdale, 40, is nothing like Mr Altman. He’s sitting in the heart of Silicon Valley, dressed in linen with his hair slicked back. The tech investor and entrepreneur, who has helped create four unicorns plus Palantir, a data-analytics firm worth around $15bn that works with soldiers and spooks
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  • a “builder class”—a brains trust of youngish idealists, which includes Patrick Collison, co-founder of Stripe, a payments firm valued at $74bn, and other (mostly white and male) techies, who are posing questions that go far beyond the usual interests of Silicon Valley’s titans. They include the future of man and machine, the constraints on economic growth, and the nature of government.
  • They share other similarities. Business provided them with their clout, but doesn’t seem to satisfy their ambition
  • The number of techno-billionaires in America (Mr Collison included) has more than doubled in a decade.
  • ome of them, like the Medicis in medieval Florence, are keen to use their money to bankroll the intellectual ferment
  • The other is Paul Graham, co-founder of Y Combinator, a startup accelerator, whose essays on everything from cities to politics are considered required reading on tech campuses.
  • Mr Altman puts it more optimistically: “The iPhone and cloud computing enabled a Cambrian explosion of new technology. Some things went right and some went wrong. But one thing that went weirdly right is a lot of people got rich and said ‘OK, now what?’”
  • A belief that with money and brains they can reboot social progress is the essence of this new mindset, making it resolutely upbeat
  • The question is: are the rest of them further evidence of the tech industry’s hubristic decadence? Or do they reflect the start of a welcome capacity for renewal?
  • Two well-known entrepreneurs from that era provided the intellectual seed capital for some of today’s techno nerds.
  • Mr Thiel, a would-be libertarian philosopher and investor
  • This cohort of eggheads starts from common ground: frustration with what they see as sluggish progress in the world around them.
  • Yet the impact could ultimately be positive. Frustrations with a sluggish society have encouraged them to put their money and brains to work on problems from science funding and the redistribution of wealth to entirely new universities. Their exaltation of science may encourage a greater focus on hard tech
  • the rationalist movement has hit the mainstream. The result is a fascination with big ideas that its advocates believe goes beyond simply rose-tinted tech utopianism
  • A burgeoning example of this is “progress studies”, a movement that Mr Collison and Tyler Cowen, an economist and seer of the tech set, advocated for in an article in the Atlantic in 2019
  • Progress, they think, is a combination of economic, technological and cultural advancement—and deserves its own field of study
  • There are other examples of this expansive worldview. In an essay in 2021 Mr Altman set out a vision that he called “Moore’s Law for Everything”, based on similar logic to the semiconductor revolution. In it, he predicted that smart machines, building ever smarter replacements, would in the coming decades outcompete humans for work. This would create phenomenal wealth for some, obliterate wages for others, and require a vast overhaul of taxation and redistribution
  • His two bets, on OpenAI and nuclear fusion, have become fashionable of late—the former’s chatbot, ChatGPT, is all the rage. He has invested $375m in Helion, a company that aims to build a fusion reactor.
  • Mr Lonsdale, who shares a libertarian streak with Mr Thiel, has focused attention on trying to fix the shortcomings of society and government. In an essay this year called “In Defence of Us”, he argues against “historical nihilism”, or an excessive focus on the failures of the West.
  • With a soft spot for Roman philosophy, he has created the Cicero Institute in Austin that aims to inject free-market principles such as competition and transparency into public policy.
  • He is also bringing the startup culture to academia, backing a new place of learning called the University of Austin, which emphasises free speech.
  • All three have business ties to their mentors. As a teen, Mr Altman was part of the first cohort of founders in Mr Graham’s Y Combinator, which went on to back successes such as Airbnb and Dropbox. In 2014 he replaced him as its president, and for a while counted Mr Thiel as a partner (Mr Altman keeps an original manuscript of Mr Thiel’s book “Zero to One” in his library). Mr Thiel was also an early backer of Stripe, founded by Mr Collison and his brother, John. Mr Graham saw promise in Patrick Collison while the latter was still at school. He was soon invited to join Y Combinator. Mr Graham remains a fan: “If you dropped Patrick on a desert island, he would figure out how to reproduce the Industrial Revolution,”
  • While at university, Mr Lonsdale edited the Stanford Review, a contrarian publication co-founded by Mr Thiel. He went on to work for his mentor and the two men eventually helped found Palantir. He still calls Mr Thiel “a genius”—though he claims these days to be less “cynical” than his guru.
  • “The tech industry has always told these grand stories about itself,” says Adrian Daub of Stanford University and author of the book, “What Tech Calls Thinking”. Mr Daub sees it as a way of convincing recruits and investors to bet on their risky projects. “It’s incredibly convenient for their business models.”
  • In the 2000s Mr Thiel supported the emergence of a small community of online bloggers, self-named the “rationalists”, who were focused on removing cognitive biases from thinking (Mr Thiel has since distanced himself). That intellectual heritage dates even further back, to “cypherpunks”, who noodled about cryptography, as well as “extropians”, who believed in improving the human condition through life extensions
  • Silicon Valley has shown an uncanny ability to reinvent itself in the past.
Javier E

The Worst Cat Memes You've Ever Seen - The Atlantic - 0 views

  • Taken seriously, the content of these posts is deeply offensive and dehumanizing. But the people sharing them get to hide behind a thin veil of irony: They’re just some funny cats. If you’re offended, that’s your problem
  • Trump is well versed in this tactic—he routinely attempts to walk right up to the edge of plausible deniability. Consider, for example, the time he floated the idea of executing one of his top generals
  • this behavior has been called doing it “for the lulz.” As Adrian Chen chronicled in The Nation in 2014, lulz—a perversion of lol—justifies heinous behavior online. The term came out of the bowels of 4chan in the mid-aughts and typically means maniacally laughing at a victim. It has often been associated with jokes about topics such as the Holocaust, suicide, terrorism, and rape
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  • The lulz have always been a tool to obfuscate that an individual was being racist, sexist, or generally hateful
  • The endgame of prior for-the-lulz moments provides clues as to where the MAGA cat memes are headed. The casual misogyny that the trolls of 4chan espoused eventually culminated in cyberstalking and online harassment of women that was sometimes so pernicious, it drove them away from the internet altogether
Javier E

Opinion | Manliness, Cat Ladies, Fertility Panic and the 2024 Election - The New York T... - 0 views

  • post-liberalism. And I think that’s a very important term here. It’s also a loosely defined one. And that comes from people like law professor Adrian Vermeule and Patrick Deneen, who is a political theorist at Notre Dame. And they basically take an argument or vision of the world that challenges liberalism’s emphasis on the individual. Instead of saying the state is meant to be an engine for individual self-fulfillment or to allow people to live life as best they want it, they argue that there’s a shared telos, a purpose, a common good to politics. And for them, it’s primarily defined by Catholic doctrine, and the purpose of politics should be moving us toward that goal. And part of that envisions the nation almost as an organic whole rather than a series of discrete individuals making choices. So it’s the question of what is good for the body politic as a unit, and that includes perpetuity, survival, children — hence the natalism that’s so important in Vance’s thought.
  • You’ve made this point about the differences between what you call sort of the neopatriarchy right and the Barstool conservatism right. And the Barstool conservatism right has been a little less excited about some of what it is hearing from Vance. Can you walk through the difference there?
  • The neopatriarchal right, the one that Vance has really aligned itself with, is a group that says a major focus of the state should be on fostering traditional morality and family formation. They don’t explicitly say women shouldn’t be working most of the time — though sometimes they do — but it basically means an emphasis on traditional loosely defined family structure. So you got to have kids, you got to get married, you shouldn’t be having sex out of marriage, birth control is probably bad. You can see some of this in the book by the head of the Heritage Foundation, which JD Vance wrote the foreword to. The publications have been delayed, but some of the excerpts have leaked, and he makes exactly this kind of argument about birth control specifically and other family planning choices.
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  • So that’s one version of conservatism when it comes to views of the family, but another one, which honestly I think fits Donald Trump a little bit better, is this Barstool conservative. It’s a term that’s named after Barstool Sports, the popular sports website. The term was coined by Matthew Walther, a conservative columnist. And Walther’s argument is that these kinds of conservatives aren’t social conservatives like he is. They are people who really are frustrated with the left’s control of culture in the same way that the neopatriarchal right is, but for completely different reasons. They’re angry that they can’t say sexist stuff in public. They’re angry that sexual harassment has become something whose prohibitions are strictly enforced and they think prevent, you know, flirting in the workplace or something like that. They like seeing cheerleaders at football halftime shows.
  • And these dudes — I use that term very explicitly because it really speaks to the self-identity, right? These dudes are very, very different from the people who are telling you, don’t have sex before marriage, have a family as soon as you can. And while those distinctions are papered over when they’re fighting and at loggerheads against the left in a kind of alliance, they really disagree fundamentally on certain key issues.
  • Emba: One of the things that is unspoken in this clip, but seems very important, is the idea that citizens have to create the citizens to replace them in whatever country they’re in, which sort of negates the idea that immigration could be a possible way to help expand a society or prop up a civilization. This idea that, in fact, immigration is a bad thing and we should be wary of it, is a huge part of the Republican Party’s platform.
  • Right now, we’re seeing men only earn about 74 bachelor’s degrees for every 100 that women earn. Wages for men, especially working-class men, have basically stagnated since the 1970s or even declined — wages for men everywhere except the very top of the economic ladder. And so I think that men now in competition with women generally are feeling a little bit of anxiety — perhaps more than a little bit, I would say — and uncertainty about where they fit in America, both in a social sense and in the economy. That stress was already on the ground and underlying our political landscape.
  • And then, especially around the #MeToo movement in 2018, when the terrible behavior of certain men became really noticeable and women felt compelled to speak out about their own experiences, there was a general aura that masculinity was a bad thing. And a lot of men, I think, felt attacked. They felt that women were not just succeeding but actually holding them back and discriminating against them. In real life, I think this was not necessarily the case. I think that men and women clearly need each other to survive. But the discourse — especially the popular discourse on TV, on podcasts, did seem, I think, offensive to a large group of men and made them resentful.
  • Beauchamp: The other thing I want to add is that trans issues play a really important gluing role in the conservative coalition. We’ve been talking a lot about the distinction between Barstool conservatives and neopatriarchal conservatives. One way that you get people who have such different views on gender and social roles to align is by creating a shared enemy. And trans people are, for different reasons, disfavored by both groups. These two factions, they can both agree that liberals should not be allowed to be deciding what gender means or changing the way the bathrooms work or letting men into women’s sports in their view.
  • Emba: I think you’re actually observing something really real, and I would agree with you there. First of all, we have to think of the material conditions of the last couple of decades. We’ve seen a shift in the economy away from traditional and perhaps masculine-favoring manufacturing jobs and labor jobs to social skills jobs that have tended to favor or at least allow women to enter the marketplace. Post the 1970s, women who were previously barred or kept out of schools and employment entered the work force and entered the educational market and have really succeeded and, in many cases, are outpacing men.
  • Emba: In the past, Republicans have put themselves forward as the party of masculinity. The Democrats, the liberals are sort of the female party. But Tim Walz versus that vision of masculinity is turning that vision on its head. In the same way that Republicans seem to have gone from the party of freedom to the anti-freedom party, they have gone from the party of real masculinity, of men who shoot guns and work in the yard to, I don’t know, World Wrestling Federation performers?
  • So often when you see conservatives talking about a lack of family formation, they’re talking about a specific kind of family that aligns with their ideals. Which is why, even though there’s a lot of talk about how Americans aren’t having enough children, how there aren’t enough babies, how we’re below replacement rate, politicians like JD Vance have still voted against policies that would allow Americans to access I.V.F. and fertility treatments. There is the right kind of family that’s supposed to be reproducing, and that’s the family that they’re worried about.
  • Beauchamp: Apocalypses, imagined or real, tell you a lot about a political movement. And one thing I think that’s really interesting is the shift in the conservative vision of a future apocalypse from being the debt and the deficit, which used to be really the centerpiece of conservative fears about the future. And that’s declined in prominence in conservative movement rhetoric, with a lot of the family formation stuff and declining birthrates becoming a much more central theme.
  • Beauchamp: If you listen to Harris’s speeches — or Tim Walz’s, for that matter — there’s one word that they use over and over again, and that word is freedom. And there’s good reason for that. Freedom is one of those contested American values that used to be the centerpiece of Republican rhetoric
  • if you can convince voters that Republicans are anti-freedom — and Dobbs was really the opening here, Dobbs and election denial, right? They’re going after your freedom to have the kind of family you want and your freedom to vote
  • Those two things end up becoming really, really powerful in making Democrats seem like the live-and-let-live party, the one that wants to embody the American ethos of freedom.
  • Harris is not just saying, vote for me because my policies will give you a better world. What she’s saying is, vote for me because I’m the one who stands up for this essential American and crucially liberal value of freedom
  • If JD Vance wants to be the candidate of post-liberals, Harris is saying, great, I’m going to be the candidate of liberals. I’m going to be the candidate of liberalism. I’m for freedom. And what are you for? You’re for weird attacks on childless cat ladies and vague ideas about a structured society that you don’t even really want to own, because they’re unpopular. And it’s put her on immensely effective rhetorical ground.
  • The Great Replacement Theory is something that the right has mentioned often and that Tucker Carlson mainstreamed on his show — that Democrats and liberals are somehow going to bring in immigrants to replace American citizens who aren’t having enough children, to fill up America by themselves basically, and that this is a bad thing.
  • Democrats seem to have gone or are trying to go from a party of feminized soy boys — as they used to be insulted by Republicans — to, yes, the party of Tim Walz, a dad who wears a camouflage hat. The memes circulating of him online are of a guy from the Midwest who’s straight-talking, loves eating meat and will help you fix your car when it’s on the side of the road. And this is a vision of masculinity that is still very stereotypically masculine. He’s a football coach. He was in the military. But also positive. One might call it a tonic masculinity. He’s male, but he’s helpful. He supports women, but he says he’s not trying to be in their business and legislate how they should use their uteri.
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