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“[N]aturally, the language of these ideas should be acceptable for all the participants in this process – both the P5+1 group and Iran,” Lavrov said. The crucial details provided by Lavrov on the timing of the amended draft shed new light on Secretary of State John Kerry’s claim in a press conference in Abu Dhabi on Monday of unity among the six powers on the that draft. “We were unified on Saturday when we presented a proposal to the Iranians.” Kerry said, adding that “everybody agreed it was a fair proposal.” Kerry gave no indication of when on Saturday that proposal had been approved by the other five powers, nor did he acknowledge explicitly that it was a draft that departed from the earlier draft agreed upon with Iran. Lavrov’s remarks make it clear that the other members of the group had little or no time to study or discuss the changes before deciding whether to go along with it.

Although the nature of the changes in the amended draft remain a secret, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has charged that they were quite far-reaching and that they affected far more of the draft agreement that had been worked out between the United States and Iran than had been acknowledged by any of the participants. In tweets on Tuesday, Zarif, responding to Kerry’s remarks in Abu Dhabi, wrote, “Mr. Secretary, was it Iran that gutted over half of US draft Thursday night?” Zarif’s comments indicated that changes of wording had nullified the previous understanding that had been reached between the United States and Iran on multiple issues.

Zarif’s tweet, combined with remarks by President Hassan Rouhani to the national assembly Sunday warning that Iran’s rights to enrichment are “red lines” that could not be crossed, suggests further that the language of the original draft agreement dealing with the “end game” of the negotiating process was also changed on Saturday. Kerry himself alluded to the issue in his remarks in Abu Dhabi, using the curious formulation that no nation has an “existing right to enrich.” One of the language changes in the agreement evidently related to that issue, and it was aimed at satisfying a demand of Israeli origin at the expense of Iran’s support for the draft. Now the Obama administration will face a decision whether to press Iran to go along with those changes or to go back to the original compromise when political directors of the six powers and Iran reconvene Nov. 20. That choice will provide the key indicator of how strongly committed Obama is to reaching an agreement with Iran.

There is however what U.S. officials believe is a contradiction in the July draft, which would effectively ask American troops to provide training and confront al-Qaeda from the confines of bases. While it says operations against al-Qaeda may be necessary, it also says US troops will not be allowed to make arrests or enter Afghan homes. Advertise | AdChoices “No detention or arrest shall be carried out by the United States forces. The United States forces shall not search any homes or other real estate properties,” it says.“[The contradiction] was a matter of serious consternation at the highest levels” of the Obama administration over the weekend, according to one senior defense official. “It is the one remaining issue that could ultimately kill the deal." However, US officials believe that in a more recent draft, which was circulated among key Pentagon officials and US lawmakers on Monday, the US has won its position on this point.The document doesn’t specifically say how many U.S. and NATO troops would remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014. Afghan officials tell NBC News they hope it will be 10 to 15 thousand. U.S. officials tell NBC News the number is closer to seven to eight thousand, with an additional contribution from NATO. Factoring in troop rotations, home leave, and breaks between deployments, the service of tens of thousands of American troops would be required to maintain a force of seven to eight thousand for a decade or longer. The anticipated costs would likely run into the billions quickly.

Afghan officials tell NBC NEWS the agreement is critical to Afghanistan’s future stability. Without ongoing military assistance, training and funding, those officials say the government could collapse and Afghanistan would enter a civil war. If the agreement passes, the draft says Washington would commit to a long -term, indefinite military involvement in this land-locked Asian nation.A spokesperson for the White House National Security Council did not comment on the draft version of the agreement, but said that "the President is still reviewing options from his national security team and has not made a decision about a possible U.S. presence after 2014."The agreement circulating this week is unlikely to be the last. It first must pass through the Loya Jirga, then go onto parliament for final approval. “We’re looking at 60-days or more” before the US and Afghanistan sign any agreement, defense officials said. Here are highlights of the July draft of the bi-lateral agreement:

Three points deserve special mention: 1) A caveat: “revise” not “repeal” Senators who spoke during the Committee’s meeting in favor of the amendment to sunset the 2001 AUMF did not describe the provision as an opportunity to repeal the AUMF but to “refine,” “reevaluate,” or reconsider it three years from now. 2. A missed opportunity for transparency? The ISIL AUMF includes a robust set of transparency and reporting requirements. This is good news. But, while we are in the business of applying such reporting requirements to the fight with ISIL, what’s the possible justification for not applying them to the fight with Al-Qaeda as well? As Jack Goldsmith, Steve Vladeck and I wrote in our Op-Ed (emphasis added):

Although Congress will likely not vote on today’s initiative before the end of the current term, there is no mistaking today’s historically significant moment with respect to both the limit on the 2001 AUMF and the authority to use force against ISIL more broadly. Today’s approval of the draft ISIL AUMF places an important marker for discussions in the 114th Congress.

The Archive appealed the lower court's decision, and with representation from the distinguished firm of Skadden Arps Meagher Slate & Flom, brought the case to the D.C. Circuit, with oral argument in December 2013. The National Coalition for History, including the American Historical Association and other historical and archival professional organizations, joined the case with an amicus curiae brief authored by the Jones Day law firm arguing for release of the volume. Titled "CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs Operation," Volume V apparently contains Pfeiffer's aggressive defense of the CIA against a hard-hitting 1961 internal review, written by the agency's own Inspector General, which held the CIA singularly responsible for the poor assumptions, faulty planning and incompetence that led to the quick defeat of the paramilitary exile brigade by Fidel Castro's military at the Bahia de Cochinos between April 17 and April 20, 1961. The Archive obtained under FOIA and published the IG Report in 1998. The CIA has admitted in court papers that the Pfeiffer study contains "a polemic of recriminations against CIA officers who later criticized the operation," as well as against other Kennedy administration officials who Pfeiffer contended were responsible for this foreign policy disaster. In the dissenting opinion from the D.C. Circuit's 2-1 decision yesterday, Judge Judith Rogers (appointed by Bill Clinton) identified multiple contradictions in the CIA's legal arguments. Judge Rogers pointed out that the CIA had failed to justify why release of Volume V would "lead to public confusion" when CIA had already released Volumes I-IV. She noted that neither the CIA nor the majority court opinion had explained "why release of the draft of Volume V 'would expose an agency's decision making process,'" and discourage future internal deliberations within the CIA's historical office any more than release of the previous four volumes had done.

Prior to yesterday's decision, the Obama administration had bragged that reducing the government's invocation of the b-5 exemption was proof of the impact of the President's Day One commitment to a "presumption of disclosure." Instead, the bureaucracy has actually increased in the last two years its use of the b-5 exemption, which current White House counselor John Podesta once characterized as the "withhold if you want to" exemption. The majority opinion also left two openings for transparency advocates. It invites Congress to set a time limit for applying the b-5 exemption, as Congress has done in the Presidential Records Act. Second, it concludes that any "factual material" contained in the draft should be reachable through Freedom of Information requests.

Earlier on Wednesday, the European Parliament accepted, with a large majority, a decision expressing support "in principle" of the recognition of a Palestinian state, along with furthering negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Some 498 parliamentarians voted in favor of the motion, 88 voted against it, and 111 abstained. On Tuesday, the U.S. clarified that it would be willing to support a United Nations Security Council proposal on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, as long as it contains "no unilateral measures" that would predetermine the outcome of diplomatic negotiations. State Department Spokesman Jen Psaki said that if the wording of the resolution included terms of reference for negotiations on the core issues, the United States would accept it, and not view it as a unilateral move.

When efforts to resolve issues have failed to find remedy in their own country, the IACHR can be appealed to. All 35 member states of the OAS are under the jurisdiction of the IACHR, headquartered in Washington. No country can be a part of the OAS process without ratifying the OAS Charter. “All 35 member countries have signed the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948,” said Maria Isabel Rivera, director of Press and Publications for the IACHR. “This means the Commission analyzes all cases and petitions and monitors human rights situations in those countries under the light of the rights recognized in the Declaration.” Countries that have not ratified the convention include the Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Cuba, Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the U.S. Thus, cases originating in these countries cannot be brought to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, but they can be brought to IACHR in a petition of injustice.

“There are regional particulates that are unique and not defined in the U.N. Declaration [UNDRIP],” Crippa said. He used the example of people in the Americas living in voluntary isolation, emphasizing, “We need to protect these peoples from internal armed conflicts, such as in Colombia, where they’re caught in the middle of military, paramilitary and guerrilla forces. It’s a situation of a government of a country trying to control land of indigenous peoples without respect to their rights.” Indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation are groups or individuals who remain untouched by non-indigenous populations. They do not maintain contact with non-indigenous populations, may reject any type of contact, or may have chosen to return to their traditional culture and break relations with non-native societies in favor of maintaining their own ways of life. A provision to protect indigenous communities living in isolation has been approved in the OAS draft declaration, which has no corresponding provision in UNDRIP.

The study also found that Brazil is the country with the greatest diversity of indigenous peoples in isolation, followed by Peru and Bolivia. The current version of the OAS declaration includes Article XXVI, agreed by consensus in 2005, specifically for indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation to have the right to remain in that condition and to live freely and in accordance with their cultures. “In most cases the key recommendation is to prevent contact either by state agencies, officials, non-government organizations or companies wanting to exploit resources of their lands,” Crippa said. Their ancestors lived on the land long before the current states even existed. Vulnerable and at risk of disappearing entirely, they cannot advocate for their own rights. The study cites the National Environment Commission of Peru’s findings that from 1950 to 1957 a total of 11 indigenous groups disappeared completely from the Amazon, and of those remaining, 18 are in grave danger of disappearing, as they each have fewer than 225 members.

The OAS draft declaration recommends protections including legislation that specifically addresses indigenous rights to land, culture and self-determination, and training programs for state employees, who may encounter issues that affect communities living in voluntary isolation. It further recommends studies for projects which take into account people living in isolation nearby, and sanctions for those violating natural resources protections. It also calls for limiting commercial tourism in the territories of people living in voluntary isolation and urges companies, organizations and governments to work in coordination with indigenous groups which aim to protect indigenous rights toward free and prior consent. “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, express, and freely develop their cultural identity in all respects, free from any external attempt at assimilation,” the draft also states. “The States shall not carry out, adopt, support, or favor any policy to assimilate the indigenous peoples or to destroy their cultures.”

Automatic new sanctions if no agreement or further delay: Like the earlier version, this text stipulates that new sanctions would automatically be imposed, escalating over a period of months, in the event that  the Presidents fails to send to Congress the details of a comprehensive deal reached with Iran and the required “verification assessment” by July 5. This appears to apply even in the case of an additional extension or the sides agreeing to a period to iron out the details of implementation of an agreement.  It also stipulates that in the event that the President fails to send to Congress the details of a comprehensive deal reached with Iran and the required “verification assessment” by July 5, any sanctions previously waived by the President under the JPOA will automatically snap back on.

Laying out far-reaching parameters for a deal: Like in the previous version, the Sense of Congress included in the bill is, by definition, non-binding. It nonetheless sends a strong statement of Congressional intent. And this Sense of Congress, like the previous version, sends a statement of hardline red lines in order for any deal to be acceptable to Congress (and the lengthy review period imposed by this bill clearly implies that Congress will be reviewing any agreement to determine if it meets its standards – and implies that if it does not meet its standards, there will be concrete consequences). Promising that sanctions will continue, regardless of a deal. While, like in the previous version, the Sense of Congress is by definition non-binding, it nonetheless sends a strong statement of Congressional intent. And this Sense of Congress once again makes clear that even if there is a deal that verifiably addresses U.S. concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, Congress will seek to continue to impose far-reaching sanctions against Iran for other reasons.

Planting the seeds for a deal to far apart:  The key provisions of this updated version of the bill, even amended, are a clear poison pill for any agreement.  In effect, this bill undermines negotiations and weakens U.S. negotiators. Rather than offering more sanctions relief to Iran in exchange for a deal, it prohibits it, and establishes a 4-month period during which the President is explicitly deprived of any authority to deliver anything to Iran beyond what was already delivered during negotiations. Assuming Iran would agree to a deal under such circumstances – which is doubtful – this bill sets into motion a dynamic in which Iranian opponents of a diplomacy will have an easy time arguing against the deal, and in which mischief-makers in Congress will have ample time to push ahead with new legislation rejecting a deal or putting new conditions on its implementation and limitations on sanctions relief. And given the Sense of Congress in this bill – which makes the case for continued Iran sanctions even after a nuclear deal, it is not a stretch to imagine that members of Congress would adopt such an approach during this 4 month waiting period.

Al-Khadoumi points out that Israel’s Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, in 2013, stated that “Israel and the Golan are part and parcel” and that the “international community” should settle the question about sovereignty over the Golan within the framework of an Israel – Palestinian agreement. Besides open announcements about plans to permanently annex the Syrian Golan, Israel has been supporting Jabhat al-Nusrah and other al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood(FSA and co.) brigades via the Golan since 2012. In 2013 Israel’s covert support of the insurgents was leaked to the press by an Austrian UNDOF officer. By February 2014 the administration of Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu launched a PR campaign to sell the support of the Islamist mercenary brigades under “humanitarian cover”. (see video)

By October 2014 Israel’s direct cooperation and State sponsorship of Jabhat al-Nusrah, the so-called Free Syrian Army and other mercenary brigades resulted in the withdrawal of UNDOF troops from a 12 – 16 km wide corridor in the buffer zone. (see UNDOF map above) The withdrawal has since then facilitated the direct interaction between Israeli military and intelligence and the foreign-backed mercenaries, using the Golan Heights as well as the Israeli occupied, Lebanese Sheba Farms area as launching pads for transgressions against Syria and Lebanon. Absent a U-turn in U.S. policy with regard to Israel and Syria, notes Al-Khadoumi, it is highly implausible that the re-drafted Security Council resolution will pass, or that it won’t be vetoed by the United States.

The March 13, 2003, cable was sent by CIA field officers in response to a request for more information on a single-source intelligence report of a meeting in a Prague park between Atta and al Ani. The cable warned that U.S. government officials shouldn’t cite the unverified report.Even so, Cheney continued to give the report credibility in media interviews, telling CNN in June 2004 that the truth of the report hadn’t been resolved.“Those statements were simply not true,” Levin said in the draft. “The vice president was recklessly disregarding the truth, and he did so in a way calculated to maintain support for the administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq.”During his February 2013 hearing to be confirmed as CIA director, Brennan was urged by Levin to ask the Czech government if it would object to the release of the cable. “Absolutely, Senator, I will,” Brennan replied.

After receiving no response from Brennan, Levin earlier this year blocked the nomination of Caroline Krass to be the CIA general counsel. He agreed to lift his hold on Krass after receiving a March 13 letter from Brennan that summarized the cable, saying that it cast “serious doubt” that the alleged meeting occurred.Brennan added, “Investigative records subsequently placed Atta in the United States just before and after the date on which the single-source report said the meeting was to have occurred,” according to a copy of the letter obtained by McClatchy.Brennan declassified a single line from the cable that said, “There is not one USG (U.S. government counterterrorism) or FBI expert that . . . has said they have evidence or ‘know’ that (Atta) was indeed (in Prague). In fact, the analysis has been quite the opposite.”

In the draft of his remarks, Levin asserted that there was other “critically relevant information” in the cable that had been “denied to the public in order to protect those in the Bush White House who are responsible” for “playing games with intelligence.”“I believe decision-makers should have to face the full, unadulterated, unredacted truth about their decisions,” said Levin. “The American people should know the full story . . . as a warning to future leaders against the misuse of intelligence and the abuse of power.”

It is noteworthy that the Minsk Accords on September 5, 2014, which resulted in the volatile but nonetheless a ceasefire agreement and a return to dialog were reached by sidelining the United States and the United Kingdom.

Meanwhile, the situation on the ground in southeastern Ukraine remains critical. The pocket around some 7,000 regular Ukrainian troops plus about 1,000 militia, including foreign mercenaries in the Debaltsevo region has been closed by militia from the Lughansk and Donetsk People’s Republics. An interim ceasefire agreement that would have allowed the evacuation of civilians has not been upheld, with both sides blaming the other. The evacuation had to be abandoned.

Under pressure from Congress, and in the wake of revelations that agency management influenced the IG’s final report, Obama appointed Linick as the State Department’s permanent IG in June 2013, less than a month after CBS broke the news about the IG cover-up. Congress confirmed him three months later. Linick launched a new investigation, and in October 2014 the IG confirmed that at least three DSS investigations were blocked by top State Department officials, including the probe involving the ambassador. While the new IG’s report was critical of management’s efforts to block the DSS investigations, it was silent on whether its own office bowed to the pressure.

The proposed constitutional change was met by substantial public criticism – until the “Kurdistan Freedom Hawks” distracted from the discourse by exploding two bombs in Istanbul. Instead of discussions about and protests against what is widely perceived as the attempt to implement a semi-dictatorial presidential system, the AKP, the MHP and associated organizations are now calling for mass rallies against terror (Kurds), and national unity.