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Ed Webb

Salafist Security Patrols Divide Tunisians - Tunisia Live : Tunisia Live - 0 views

www.tunisia-live.net/...urity-patrols-divide-tunisians

Tunisia Islamists Salafists ennahda security policing

shared by Ed Webb on 14 Feb 13 - No Cached
  • The activation of such Salafist neighborhood patrols after Belaid’s assassination has sparked debate among Tunisians. Due to a perceived lack of security, patrols sprang up in areas such as Tunis’ suburbs, Sousse, Hammamet, Sfax, and Bizerte. Some media reports have claimed these groups conducted their patrols in coordination with Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution
  • Salah Edhaoui, a deputy chief of police in the Omrane Supérieure suburb of Tunis, called such efforts “parallel security” and claimed that they tarnished the image of official security institutions in Tunisia. “If such behavior is repeated, people will think that Salafist groups will take the place of policemen, which is harmful to the public image of security institutions as well as to the image of the state’s institutions,”
  • Minister of Interior Ali Laarayedh denied the existence of a coordinated Salafist security system and said an investigation into the patrols would be opened
Ed Webb

Ahram Online - Egypt faces stark choice between less security or brutal police on anniv... - 0 views

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Egypt rights torture police policing

shared by Ed Webb on 06 Jun 11 - No Cached
  • Some also say that police are back to forcefully collecting bribes. For example, a Cairo-based food shop owner, who prefers to remain anonymous, describes their situation. “Before the revolution the police working at the station and undercover agents used to take bribes in the form of free breakfasts. When I refused they used to detain my employees on their way home, claiming it was for investigation purposes, as allowed under the emergency law. The detention can go on for up to several days. Right after the revolution they stopped asking for such bribes - but now such demands are back.”
  • One of the main demands of the revolution was to lift the state of emergency, but such a demand, four months after the start of the revolution, has yet to be granted by the current interim government.
  • they do not seem to be taking serious steps to change the policy orientation. For example; no one is working on cases of torture and police violations before 25 January, the violations which took place during the 18-day uprising are the only ones discussed, while the previous 30 years are ignored. Violations are also still ongoing
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  • State officials claim that by restructuring State Security, now renamed the National Security Agency, some changes have been achieved. The Ministry of Interior declared that those transferred from State Security to the new agency werenot only chosen just for their efficiency, but also because they were cleared of any minor or major human rights violations during their work under the previous regime. Younger officers were selected and those involved in torture were offered early retirement packages, according to a National Security officer.
  • the Italian government offered to sign a debt-for-development agreement with Egypt, specifically offering police training in exchange for reduction of debt. However, Italy’s police is reputed to be among the most brutal in Europe
  • Ed Webb on 06 Jun 11
     
    Plus ca change...
Ed Webb

Electing a New Libya - carnegieendowment.org - Readability - 0 views

www.readability.com/...bc2wuxxb

Libya elections analysis

shared by Ed Webb on 04 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • there remain questions about the government’s capability to provide security at polling stations. It has “deputized” a number of militias in major cities as part of its security plan. And there have been some very vocal calls for an election boycott in the east by Islamist and pro-federalism leaders, as well as attacks on election offices. The government reportedly has a plan to “freeze” the voting at polling places where there is violence or disruption, which could result in a de-facto invalidation of the results
  • The postponement of a few weeks was simply a technical delay. Libya’s transitional authorities were behind schedule in registering voters and in other preparations for the election. According to the accounts of the United Nations and several NGO observers, the delay was fully justified and not nefarious in any way.
  • for most of the main parties, the experience of campaigning and articulating a party platform is completely new. For many, the metric of voter support is how many posters are produced or media ads are running on television.  
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  • the ideological spectrum even between Islamists and nationalist parties is quite narrow—the nationalists make frequent references to Islam as a basis for law and governance and the Islamists trumpet their nationalist credentials. There are cases where election posters from a major Islamist party show women candidates unveiled—an attempt to soften their image and appeal to women voters. All of this bodes well for consensus building and national unity once the parliament is formed.
  • local agendas will likely win the day
  • Libyans will be electing a 200-person parliament to replace the NTC, and the new assembly will need to choose its president and appoint a prime minister within its first month in operation. The next real order of business is to form a body to write Libya’s new constitution. A draft must be presented in 120 days and then needs to be approved in a national referendum.
  • the problems are confined and the state is not about to implode
  • glaring shortfalls in the transition are the lack of development in the security sector and the continued activity of powerful militias
  • The government is working with what it has and treading very carefully. The government knows it must demobilize and integrate these militias, so there are a number of plans to register fighters and provide them with attractive options like starting a small business, continuing their education, or joining the police or military. Whether these plans can be implemented remains to be seen. Maintaining internal stability is going to be a long-term challenge
  • A Salafi group known as Ansar al-Sharia has established itself in Derna and Benghazi and recently sent armed men into Benghazi’s main square to demand the imposition of sharia. Its leader declared the elections un-Islamic. There have also been attacks on the American and British consulates and the International Committee for the Red Cross.
  • On one level, Libya is transitioning effectively just by virtue of holding elections. On another, oil production is exceeding expectations by already surpassing pre-war levels, providing much-needed funds to help stabilize the economy and state
  • People do not want the breakup of the state, but don’t want a return to the completely centralized control associated with the Qaddafi era either
  • In parts of Libya, we are seeing the perfect storm of weak state control, traditional areas of smuggling and criminality, proliferation of arms, tribal discontent, ethnic unrest, and Islamist groups moving in to take advantage
gabrielle verdier

FT.com / Comment / Opinion - Too much aid will hobble Arab spring - 0 views

www.ft.com/...47-11e0-9668-00144feab49a.html

Revolution2.0 IMF

shared by gabrielle verdier on 09 Jun 11 - No Cached
  • Those calling for new support seem to forget that the deposed regimes already received plenty of international aid finance. Under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, they presided over elaborate privatisation and reform programmes, which benefited those close to power but did little to help the wider population. In truth the regimes tended to use this support to strengthen their rule, building state security apparatuses and creating kleptocratic governments accountable only to their foreign bankrollers.
  • Generous aid programmes mean leaders do not need to please their citizens, or gain their trust to secure power; they can instead use donor money to build a security state and buy off their opposition.
Ed Webb

Special Report: In Egypt's military, a march for change | Reuters - 1 views

www.reuters.com/...ypt-army-idUSBRE8390IV20120410

Egypt military

shared by Ed Webb on 10 Apr 12 - Cached
  • As in the country, so in the barracks. Over the past six months, more than a dozen serving or recently retired mid- and lower-ranking officers have said they and their colleagues see Egypt's revolution as their own chance to win better treatment, salaries, and improved conditions and training. They are tired, they said, of a few very top officers becoming rich while the vast majority of officers and ordinary soldiers struggle.
  • "Military ranks struggle like the rest of Egyptians because, like Egyptian society, the wealth of the military is concentrated at the top and does not trickle down. You have to reach a specific rank before wealth is unlocked," one major said.
  • say they will hold off on pushing their demands further until the ruling military council hands over power to an elected civilian government
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  • Numbering at least 468,000 men - officials refuse to give the exact number saying it could hurt national security - Egypt's combined army, air force, air defense command, navy and paramilitaries make up the largest military force in the Arab world. More than half of those in uniform are conscripts.
  • One of the keys to the military's power is its grip on business, which was strengthened after Egypt's 1979 peace deal with Israel. Under that accord, the military had to shrink its forces. But instead of sacking hundreds of thousands of men, commanders opened factories to employ them. Those plants now produce everything from components for ammunition to pots and pans, fire extinguishers, and cutlery. The military also runs banks, tourism operations, farms, water treatment plants, a petrol station chain, construction firms, and import companies.Businesses owned solely by the military are exempt from tax, and often built on the backs of poorly paid conscripts, who make between $17 and $28 a month, although they are fed by the army and receive basic medical help. "A conscript goes into the army less for training, and more for working in one of the military factories or business schemes,"
  • Many soldiers feel the U.S. money benefits American arms manufacturers and forces Egypt to buy outdated weaponry. Egypt, they say, needs to be able to make its own money to advance.
  • the armed forces have de facto control over all unused land in Egypt, or about 87 percent of the country
  • the military establishment is likely to retain significant powers, no matter who wins the two-round presidential election
  • "The armed forces will not allow any interference into its business projects. This is a matter of national security," said Nasr.
  • "Previously the military budget was subject to specific laws and was not in any constitution," said General Mamdouh Shahine, who is responsible for legal affairs on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has run Egypt since Mubarak's ouster. "But now we want to bring it under the new constitution to ensure stability. By adding budgetary clauses to the constitution, I am simply asserting a reality that has existed for a long time. What is the problem with that?"
  • The spark for the soldiers' rebellion in Alexandria was a brutal episode in Cairo. On October 9 last year, a group of Coptic Christians converged on Cairo's television station to protest at the burning of a church. In a neighborhood called Maspero, the protesters clashed with soldiers; about 25 civilians were killed.The army says soldiers were also killed in the violence. The lieutenant colonel with direct knowledge of the rebellion at the Air Defence Institute said one officer and 22 soldiers died. Those who survived were seriously injured and some were disabled, according to a source at the military judiciary. Among other things Air Defence Institute officers demanded was financial compensation for the families of those dead.
  • There are also problems with training, which four senior officers said was evident in the poor handling of tanks and armored personnel carriers on the streets during last year's protests. At Maspero, inexperienced soldiers in charge of armored carriers injured protesters inadvertently, one recently retired general responsible for devising training systems for the military said.
  • "stay away from politics or organized religion, don't outshine your commander, don't think about improving the system."
  • While most soldiers and officers are religious, the military does not allow religious organizations to set up within its ranks.
  • "You must remember that at the end of the day, the army is patriotic," said the colonel. "Many of the rank and file refuse to rebel because they feel the country depends on them and they are the last institution standing. They want change but they would rather wait until a civilian government is formed."
Ed Webb

The Islamic Monthly - Winter/Spring 2012 : International: Ghostwriter for the Arab Leader - 0 views

onlinedigeditions.com/display_article.php

Bahrain autocracy censorship bureaucracy authoritarianism psychology

shared by Ed Webb on 26 Apr 12 - Cached
  • Its nerves showed in July 2010, when King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa split his Ministry of Culture and Information into two unequal parts. The incumbent minister, an Al Khalifa woman, kept responsibility for culture and tourism. The more telling and urgent action concerned the information portfolio. In a public statement, King Hamad declared that Bahrain had become the target of "planned media provocations, particularly from Iran, to which the Bahraini media has not been able to respond as it must." He then decreed the creation of an Information Affairs Authority (IAA) to meet the Kingdom's "immense" political challenges. The man the king picked to lead the new authority is Sheikh Fawaz bin Mohammed Al Khalifa. As IAA chief, Sheikh Fawaz enjoys ministerial rank and is effectively Bahrain's Minister of Information, although only unofficial media use that Orwellian title.
  • Sheikh Fawaz is courteous, unquestionably loyal, and, at base, unimaginative. He is also relentlessly competitive
  • Tone-Lōc's Funky Cold Medina was a favorite
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  • Politics wasn't a favored subject of discussion for the sheikh. The Gulf War's scripted violence had left a strong impression: When prompted, he often reduced political matters to military or special forces' work. He revered the British royal family and the SAS, Britain's commando elite, and was surprised to learn that I had not voted for George H.W. Bush, the liberator of Kuwait. I soon learned that he admired winners in general. An avid sports fan, he supported Manchester United and the Dallas Cowboys, then the reliable champions of British and American football. For the first time in our acquaintance, this love of winners made his unfocused mind appear predictable.
  • Few Bahrainis acknowledged the large U.S. naval base that remains today
  • He seemed to be blandly incurious and without serious prejudices. He certainly did not read or write for pleasure. In fact, my ability to make sense of ordinary maps surprised him, as if a mark of special training
  • While government hours are 7 to 2, a concession to the sweltering climate, I soon learned to arrive by 10, preceding by a half-hour the sheikh and his retinue
  • I visited the new University of Bahrain and naively asked around for the political science department. The country's public university didn't teach the troublesome social sciences
  • The sheikh once saw the four-wheel-drive Range Rover he had provided for my personal use covered in mud, the result of a winter downpour that flooded the old part of Manama, which lacked street drains. He winced as if he had been pinched. He politely asked my plans to have the car washed, and I shilly-shallied an answer. The capacious Rover was soon quietly replaced by a small Mercedes 190 with mechanical problems. The exchange worked to my disadvantage in more ways than one, for the Rover's license plates indicated it belonged to the sheikh's father, Bahrain's security chief. The Rover thus conferred comic book superpowers that induced Pavlovian salutes from traffic cops and building guards – such a machine rightly should not have been dragged through the mud. In contrast, a Pakistani mechanic once patched the undistinguished Mercedes with cardboard wrapped in twine.
  • The monarchy is not wholly bereft of tolerance; it just occurs near the apex, among the family's scattered layer of advisers and aides, many of whom are foreign born. The Al Khalifa are ambivalent about otherwise touchy matters if they judge someone useful to their purposes. Issues such as religion, my shopkeeper-ish Indian ethnicity or my habit of calling the sheikh by name without prefixing his inherited title – unthinkable for a Bahraini commoner – never came up. I wasn't unique: The sheikh's banker, the man who handed me cash each month, belonged to the same Iraqi-Jewish émigré family as Bahrain's current female ambassador to the U.S., also a Jew.
  • Of course, ownership of the many reefs and islands between the two states had implications for oil and gas exploration. Yet the sheikh always spoke to me as if only family honor mattered. This normally unexcitable man clearly disliked Qatar's Al Thani rulers. He viewed the boundary disputes as a contest between entitled Al Khalifa patricians and Al Thani nouveau riche – possessors of the world's largest natural gas field, rulers of the country with the world's highest per capita GDP, and, one might add, imminent founders of the upstart Al-Jazeera TV network. Propelled by rivalry, Sheikh Fawaz simply wanted to beat them this time.
  • I also kept mum about the surprisingly incautious lawyers I had met who spoke bitterly about the regime's poor human rights record and discrimination against Shiites. I found these middle-aged men in their cheap, gray suits in almost every coffeehouse or bar I frequented. None appeared bent on importing Iran's revolution. They seemed defeated and physically worn, even underweight, but determined to share with a foreigner their stories of regime prejudice and abuse
  • Modern Bahrain works on the bases of stark social segregation, selective memory and diversion. I caught glimpses of the thousands of dark-skinned Asian laborers only as they fixed roads in the debilitating heat, or sat in the cheapest curry shops and all-male hookah stands where air conditioning was absent and Indian films played nightly on color TVs. Local lore had it that weather forecasters lied about the temperature to avoid work stoppages. The island's wealthiest foreigners were diverted in ways that assumed – often accurately – an inebriate's view of the good life. Although the teetotaler Sheikh Fawaz showed no interest in nightlife, Manama groaned under the weight of barhoppable hotels and nightclubs. Many clubs featured teams of comely Filipinas belting out pop songs. A large bar in the downtown area catered to U.S. sailors, complete with country-themed karaoke, line dancing and Budweiser beer.
  • Later that night, Sheikh H. and I talked politics again. Tired, he quietly noted that he hadn't been surprised to hear that the crown prince wasn't liked in the cafes. He said this accorded with his own sense of the future ruler's unpopularity. He added that others in the ruling family had serious doubts about the man, too. They worried that the crown prince was infatuated with the tiny military forces he commanded and wasn't savvy enough to handle the complexities of being emir. But, Sheikh H. admitted, nothing could be done about it. Looking back, Crown Prince Hamad may have felt little need for the savvy of an emir. He succeeded his father in 1999, and, in 2002, elevated his own title from "His Highness the Emir" to the historically unprecedented "His Majesty the King of Bahrain." Today, he shakes that vainglorious title over a resentful patrimony less than one-third the size of Rhode Island.
  • discrimination and chronic inequality explain the Kingdom's centrifugal politics better than old doctrinal differences. Nonetheless, the strategy of minority rulers cultivating the support of other minorities is a tested one (witness Syria). The Al Khalifa also have a long history of reliance on authoritative foreigners, stretching over a century from Bahrain's days as a British protectorate past independence in 1971. Indeed, Bahrain is now a U.S. protectorate, as the quietly expanding presence of the 5th Fleet confirms. An American arms dealer dubbed "The Merchant of Death" was a recurring figure throughout my stay in Manama.
  • Sociologists say that pre-modern bureaucracies value personal relations over professional merit. Sheikh Fawaz unwittingly supported this notion when he asked me to attend meetings with foreign investment companies seeking to do business with the national Pension Fund. Initially, I took notes while two chatty Merrill Lynch representatives pitched portfolio options. The reps struggled to discern my relationship with the sheikh they wanted to impress. The scene was repeated with other would-be fund partners, some of whom affected a false camaraderie that left Sheikh Fawaz unmoved. After a while, he asked if I would write a report on the Pension Fund's performance. The idea was laughable – I knew nothing about investment. But I didn't say no. Staring at the fund's data, I parroted the language of "small caps" versus "big caps" and other terms found in the introductory investment texts Sheikh Fawaz supplied, and wrote his report, inserting a couple of charts for gravitas.
  • the sheikh asked if I would consider writing a doctoral thesis for him at Cambridge or another elite English university. I quickly said no; ethical considerations aside, I knew he was unlikely to do it anyway (a correct assumption, it turned out)
  • He has severely curtailed foreign and local media since becoming information minister in 2010. In the months preceding the Arab Spring, the anti-censorship group Reporters Without Borders dropped Bahrain's rank from 119th to 144th in the world. As regime apologist, the sheikh still speaks in the same, mildly narcotized cadence that suggests aristocratic ennui more than stupidity. He effusively praises the largely foreign security forces responsible for the killings, torture and detentions, while claiming that outsiders want to destabilize the country. Even so, the minister now insists, the affairs of the Kingdom are "back to normal."
  • A relieved Sheikh Fawaz – now with 14,000-plus followers on Twitter – ecstatically praised the current crown prince "for his great exertions to return the Grand Prix race to Bahrain." Echoes of the sports-obsessed young heir pinged through my head
  • He was a rigid and competitive yet unsinister man 20 years ago. What would he have become given a different pedigree? Dictatorships, like Sheikh Fawaz today, work to obscure those choices
  • Ed Webb on 26 Apr 12
     
    Great insight into Bahrain ruling family
Ed Webb

Yemen turns a page - 0 views

executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php

Yemen revolutions

shared by Ed Webb on 09 Dec 11 - No Cached
  • After the Yemeni Parliament began the year by passing new legislation allowing Saleh to run for the presidency ad infinitum, Saleh announced his three famous “No’s” a month later: no presidency forever, no running for elections again and no inherited presidency, meaning that his son, who was being groomed for succession, and who is the leader of the Republican Guard, will not succeed his father.   Saleh’s concessions failed to appease those itching for immediate change, however, and February 3 witnessed the first massive demonstrations. Taking place in more than 17 governates, the protests organized by the JMP called for political and economic reforms and a fair distribution of wealth. Up until this point, demands for Saleh to step down had not been made. The JMP called an end to the demonstrations but groups of young people remained in Sanaa’s squares demanding Saleh’s departure. These unknown youth were the catalyst of Yemen’s continuous uprisings for the next nine months. 
  • March 18, when the security forces’ snipers opened fire on protesters, killing more than 50 and injuring hundreds
  • due to an international cardiopulmonary resuscitation, especially at the hand of Saudi Arabia, eight months passed without a transition of power
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  • the humanitarian situation became catastrophic. Violence broke out in many governates, including clashes between government forces and tribal leaders in the capital and escalating violence between government forces and extremists in the Abyan governate. With the situation deteriorating drastically, the international community slowly ratcheted up pressure
  • on November 23, given one final ultimatum by the Security Council, Saleh signed the plan whereby he will remain honorary president but will delegate his powers to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. Under the plan, the latter will work to form a new government with the opposition, with elections intended within three months
  • in Yemeni politics, signatures are much easier to put on paper than they are to abide by
  • the fall of a dictator is only the start of a revolution
Ed Webb

Boston Review - Emon, Lust, and Macklin: We Are All Khaled Said - 0 views

www.bostonreview.net/..._facebook_egypt_revolution.php

Egypt revolution facebook

shared by Ed Webb on 03 Nov 11 - No Cached
  • We secured ourselves and our connections, but I can tell you in many cases we didn’t for different reasons: slow connections, the need to update from a public device, etc. Luckily, the state security were not that smart, because I know ways in which they could have pinpointed our location and identity, but they didn't. Even the arrest of Wael Ghonim, as far as I know, was not related to his Khaled Said activity; it was something that was discovered during their interrogation of him on a different matter.
  • During the revolution I was the only person using their real account to administer the page, so I was terrified and took extra measures
  • Facebook in Egypt is very limited in its outreach. You can only reach certain areas (mostly neighborhoods in Cairo and Alexandria) and a certain segment (the middle class youths). We had only around 400,000 members on the page, mostly from Giza and the surrounding region, and mostly in their twenties and 30s. This is a very homogeneous group, but, clearly, given some conditions, they can start something significant.
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  • Blocking websites like Facebook and Twitter would have angered the business masters in whose lap [Hosni Mubarak’'s son] Gamal Mubarak was sitting. It was an unholy coalition between the sponsors of the corrupt regime and the popular social-networking Web sites.
  • youths in Egypt, pre-revolution, lived two lives, one online and one off-line. The off-line life is very limited in access to information, freedom of speech and mobilization, and even in access to each other. For decades, it was illegal for five people to gather for any reason (per emergency law), although it was tolerated except when it was politically motivated. Online political activists used terms like “group,” “room,” and “comment” as if they had physical meanings. The Internet offered an open environment that politicized the youths, allowed them to raise awareness on possibilities of shaping their future, diversified their perspectives, anonymized their identities, gave them the taste of free speech, and pushed them to see through the regime propaganda and despise it.
  • Since the Egyptian government had made the brick-and-mortar world so unfriendly to free expression and the Internet was so readily available to just tweet, update Facebook, or send a quick blog post, it became the space to express your thoughts or post a news item. As the people posted live, people would react live and a conversation developed. I believe 2010 was a tipping point for this interaction; we went from conversation to a public debate, and just not with activists but with a larger, less engaged tech-savvy population. Administrators were very deliberate in cultivating a relationship with this population.
  • none of the administrators in Egypt, for obvious reasons, could use his real Facebook identity to administer the page, and that was a violation of Facebook terms and conditions. Nadine, given her relatively safer location, was the firewall whenever Facebook realized the fake identities we used and deleted them. She would give us back access.
  • the most important factor in triggering the Egyptian revolution was the effect of Tunisia’s revolution, which did not start on Facebook. Neither did any of the other Arab revolutions. If it weren’t for Facebook, the Egyptian revolution would have started anyway. The effect of a Facebook call to a timed revolution with a large outreach (that activated an organized political activist community that’s been in the making for decades) is making the revolution shorter, more organized, with fewer casualties and more theatrical. These are important effects, especially to reduce casualties. But the multitude of factors involved with the startup, the process, and the success of the Egyptian revolution makes the Facebook effect a minor one
  • the angle that I hear most on Arab revolutions in Western media is the social media/Facebook/Internet one, rather than the more important, stronger and more direct effect of the injustice perpetuated by the dictators sponsored by Western regimes.
  • We have to remember that 850 people died. Not just Facebook profiles but flesh and blood people
Ed Webb

Boston Review - Madawi Al-Rasheed: No Saudi Spring - 0 views

www.bostonreview.net/...d_arab_spring_saudi_arabia.php

KSA Saudi revolutions protests analysis opinion

shared by Ed Webb on 06 Mar 12 - No Cached
  • Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Saudi Arabia has no civil society of any significance. As a result, online calls to protest—beloved of so many “cyber-utopians”—had no place to take root.
  • The protests reflected a growing sense of disappointment with King Abdullah, who has failed to implement a single political demand from previous petitions. However, in spite of their disappointment, reformers from a wide range of political ideologies—Islamists, nationalists, leftists, and liberals—are being cautious because the future could be worse. Many intellectuals and professionals are haunted by the prospect of losing their positions when Crown Prince Nayif becomes king. Abdullah has developed a quasi-liberal constituency and cultivated its interest in the state, business, and media. Reformers nonetheless loyal to Abdullah fear that Nayif’s iron fist will come down on them: functionaries of the ancien régime to be replaced.
  • Another group, the National Coalition and Free Youth Movement, formed on Facebook and Twitter in spite of having no offline organizational presence. Their Web pages would disappear amid government censorship only to reappear at different addresses. Many pages gathered thousands of supporters, but it is difficult to claim that all were authentic. Cyber-warfare pitted activists and non-ideological young men and women against regime security, complicating the headcount.
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  • There are essentially no non-state institutions in the country. Saudi Arabia has not had trade unions since the 1950s, when the government banned them in the oil-rich province where the then-American oil company ARAMCO was based. Likewise, there are no legal political parties, youth associations, women’s organizations, or independent human rights organizations.
  • By intervening, the Saudis hoped not only to protect their Bahraini ally, but to split their internal opposition using sectarian politics. As the protests grew and the GCC deliberated, the Saudi official press peddled the regime’s line: an Iranian-Shia conspiracy was targeting the Sunni heartland. The champions of Sunni Islam would save the Gulf from the Iranian-Shia takeover. The Saudi regime proved not only to its subjects, but also to Western governments, a determination to crush protest and expel Iranian and Shia influence from the peninsula. The message to President Obama was to think twice before supporting democracy and human rights in the Arabian Peninsula. The message to Saudis was that critics would be tarred as traitors to the nation and enemies of the faith.
  • All local newspapers reported on it favorably.
  • Many in the younger generation are critical of the regime’s repressive gender policies, but they support its opposition to the Shia as alien, heretical, and loyal to Iran.
  • the “liberal press”—also officially controlled—published articles denouncing sectarianism. Liberal authors attacked sectarian preachers of hate and instead celebrated national unity, wataniyya. Not that these liberal authors favored political protest or close ties with the Shia. Rather, they offered Saudis an alternative discourse that still served the regime’s interests. With society divided between supposedly liberal intellectuals and hateful preachers, the regime confirms in the minds of people that it alone can broker between the fiercely opposed groups.
  • Protesters avoid arrest by supporting the king and demanding that bureaucrats respect his royal decrees. Anger is therefore channelled toward low-level civil servants without challenging the regime directly or insisting on royal intervention. As long as protests do not question the policies of senior members of the royal family, they are tolerated, perhaps to some extent welcomed as a means to vent public anger.
  • The press has dubbed the wave of small-scale demonstrations “protest fever.” Importantly, women are uniting in pursuit of their interests and rights, suggesting that this is the beginning of a civil rights movement. Saudi women have agitated before—in 1990 some were arrested for violating a driving ban—but the 2011 protests are different. At local and regional levels, women’s demands are more fundamental than before. They want employment, the right to vote in municipal elections, and freedom of speech.
  • When protesters agitate for the end of the regime, they are shown no mercy. As of this writing, seven demonstrators have been shot and killed by Saudi security forces. In the virtual world, government agents continue to use propaganda, counterarguments, and rumors against calls for protest.
  • should pressure start coming from the West, the Saudi regime knows how to exploit its allies’ weak spots: fear of terrorism and an insatiable appetite for oil and military contracts.
  • Digital activism will continue to provide an outlet to a population denied basic freedom. But with popular unrest largely under wraps and the West silent, the regime faces no threat in the short term.
  • The economic and social deprivation, political oppression, and corruption that triggered revolutions elsewhere are all present in Saudi Arabia, but these alone are not sufficient to precipitate an uprising. Saudi Arabia does not have trade unions—the majority of its working population is foreign, which has stunted the growth of organized labor—a women’s movement, or an active student population, three factors that helped to make protests in Tunis and Cairo successful. Elsewhere in the Arab world, in the absence of these important factors, revolt stumbled, turned violent, and could not progress without serious foreign intervention. Libya is a case in point.
  • where the state is the only institution that matters, effectively bringing people together offline may be impossible
mehrreporter

West's policies on Iran and Syria are a - 0 views

www.yjc.ir/...gerous-gamble-saudi-ambassador

iran syria saudi ambassador US

shared by mehrreporter on 18 Dec 13 - No Cached
  • mehrreporter on 18 Dec 13
     
    The West's policies on Iran and Syria are a "dangerous gamble" and Saudi Arabia is prepared to act on its own to safeguard security in the region, a top Saudi diplomat said Tuesday.
حسام الحملاوي

الجيش والأمن التونسي يقتربان من (تفكيك ما تبقى) من الحرس الشخصي للرئيس المخلو... - 0 views

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Tunisia Dictatorship Uprising protests Revolution Military Police

shared by حسام الحملاوي on 16 Jan 11 - Cached
  • حسام الحملاوي on 16 Jan 11
     
    The army is in conflict with the remnants of Ben Ali's security apparatus, more or less like what happened in Romania.
Ed Webb

‏كلنا واحد's Photos - وثائق كلنا واحد‏ | Facebook - 0 views

www.facebook.com/photo.php

Egypt #jan25 protests policing

shared by Ed Webb on 30 Jan 11 - No Cached
  • Ed Webb on 30 Jan 11
     
    Instructions to security forces about how to handle demonstrations.
gabrielle verdier

Violence and censorship fuel Tunisia tensions - Africa - Al Jazeera English - 0 views

english.aljazeera.net/...20115718233603222.html

Revolution2.0 Counter-Revolution

shared by gabrielle verdier on 07 May 11 - No Cached
  • gabrielle verdier on 07 May 11
     
    "called on the transitional government to rein in the security forces."
Ed Webb

Death fears as Bahrain set to host F1 race - 0 views

www.smh.com.au/...st-f1-race-20120414-1x02r.html

Bahrain F1 torture rights

shared by Ed Webb on 19 Apr 12 - Cached
  • Bernie Ecclestone, 81, the formula one supremo, speaking at the Chinese Grand Prix in Shanghai, said of Bahrain: ''I know people who live there and it's all very quiet and peaceful.''
  • Pictures emerged of Ecclestone's image being burned in Bahrain posted on a Facebook page called ''Pearl Family Circle - Martyrs' Square''.
  • concerns for the health of imprisoned activist Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, now 65 days into a hunger strike, being held in a military hospital.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • ''We are very concerned for our safety. The FIA have got security companies and bullet-proof cars for their drivers and F1 teams,'' Dr Ala'a Shehabi, a British-born Bahraini academic and activist, said. ''Who's going to be protecting the Bahrainis who are going to be locked up in their villages, and prevented from protesting, given that they are going to be extremely angry and provoked by the F1? ''There's going to be popping champagne corks, live concerts and parties … which is a huge provocation to the families of victims who have been killed, and those of hundreds of political prisoners. ''And I'm even more surprised at Ecclestone's remark because I've spoken to him. He knows about my own personal case, and how my husband was tortured, ambushed, kidnapped, subjected to a military trial and in jail for 10 months.''
Ed Webb

BBC News - Scores injured and arrested in fresh Egypt clashes - 0 views

www.bbc.co.uk/...world-middle-east-17959144

Egypt SCAF violence military protests

shared by Ed Webb on 05 May 12 - No Cached
  • Later the health ministry said one soldier had been killed and about 300 people wounded. It says about 130 are being treated in hospital. The army says proceedings against those arrested have already started in military courts.
  • At one point, soldiers broadcast a message on loud-hailers saying the defence ministry would only be stormed over their dead bodies, and that reinforcements were on the way. A senior general later appeared on television to announce a night-time curfew around the defence ministry.
  • State television blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for the trouble, despite the fact that the Islamist movement has been urging its supporters to stay away.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Clashes also happened between protesters and security forces in Egypt's second city of Alexandria
Ed Webb

The Islamic Monthly - Religion and the Arab Spring: Between opposition, equivocation an... - 0 views

theislamicmonthly.com/...uivocation_and_liberation.html

religion Islam opinion revolution revolutions arabspring

shared by Ed Webb on 12 Mar 12 - No Cached
  • 18 tumultuous days of nonstop media coverage
  • Reflecting on Bouazizi's death on his popular TV show, al-Shari'a wa-l-Hayat, Qaradawi affirmed that suicide was generally a major sin (kabira), but blamed the Tunisian state for Bouazizi's sin and prayed that God would absolve him of any blame for that sin. Qaradawi's sympathy for Bouazizi's otherwise sinful act was a reflection of Qaradawi's more general approach to the problem of religion and politics: that justice is a central demand of the Shari'a and that interpretations of the Shari'a that strengthen oppressors and tyrants cannot be deemed to be legitimate parts of the Shari'a.
  • Qaradawi's reputation for moral courage in the face of Arab dictators, however, suffered a significant blow as a result of his refusal to condemn the actions of the Bahraini and Saudi governments in violently suppressing the peaceful protests in Manama's Pearl Square. His attempts to distinguish the Bahraini protests on the ground that they were sectarian in character rather than national hardly seemed at the time plausible; in light of subsequent events, they are even less so.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • Gomaa's fatwas were consistent with historical Sunni views that regard revolution with scepticism, if not outright terror, at the prospect of public disorder. The mufti's stance of neutrality, meanwhile, alienated significant segments of the Egyptian population who expected him to take a much stronger stance against the unlawful conduct of the regime and its security forces
  • The various responses by religious leaders to the events of the Arab Spring suggest three distinct issues facing the role of religion and politics (particularly, the possibility of a more democratic politics) in the Arab World. First, the lack of institutional independence from strong regimes continues to undermine scholars' legitimacy. It is hard to believe, for example, that Qaradawi's stance regarding Bahrain was not influenced by the Gulf Cooperation Council's anti-Iran policies. This failure to be consistent, meanwhile, undermines his status as a moral voice in these times of uncertainty. Second, among traditional scholars, there remains a profound failure to understand the nature of the modern state and how it differs from the personal rule that characterized pre-modern states. Third, traditionalist scholars continue to view politics as something exogenous to the religious life, as if it were something that can safely be ignored without doing any damage to one's life as a Muslim.
  • the desire by virtually all political parties to use the religious establishment to further their political programs contradicts the desire to have an independent religious establishment that could be faithful to its own mission
  • To the extent that traditional scholars still cling to a conception of political rule that identifies legitimacy in the personal attributes of the ruler, they anachronistically promote the idea that good politics is the function of the virtuous ruler, rather than the modern notion that virtuous rule is the product of the right institutions.
  • the Arab Spring rejected the notion that one can live a virtuous private life untouched by an unjust and corrupt political sphere
  • If one accepts the proposition that the character of a regime profoundly affects everything produced within its domain, then it is no surprise that the authoritarianism of the last 50 years in the Arab World produced sterile and decadent religious as well as secular thought
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