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The administrative courts or the Supreme Constitutional Court might indeed refuse to honor Morsi’s addendum. But unless there is strong opposition from a powerful political force (and the most likely opponent, the SCAF itself, seems to be going along with the president instead), a court taking such a move would be bold indeed.

The same co-governance is in place, but with the president as the more powerful actor. Indeed, by cancelling the June 2012 constitutional addendum Morsi has now legally reinserted himself as chairman of the SCAF itself

Morsi’s selection of a Mahmud Makki, a prominent judge, as vice president—after selecting Mahmud’s older brother Ahmad as minister of justice—may be an attempt to outmaneuver judicial opposition. The Makki brothers were both prominent members of the 2005 judicial reform movement and thus have some credibility in circles opposed to the old regime. Both were also rumored to have mild Islamist inclinations, though such rumors are hard to evaluate since judges rarely disclose their partisan feelings even when they have them. But the placement of prominent judges in such positions—and the brief floating of a suggestion that the new justice minister draft a new judicial law to be issued by presidential decree (not waiting for the new parliament)—may be a way of signaling to the judiciary that accommodation rather than a full frontal assault may be a better strategy for those anxious about the presidency and the Islamist rise. Whether a presidency at least momentarily free of strong checks on its authority will set its sights on restructuring the judiciary is not yet clear—but judges will definitely be scouring presidential statements and decisions for indications of Morsi’s intentions

18 tumultuous days of nonstop media coverage

Reflecting on Bouazizi's death on his popular TV show, al-Shari'a wa-l-Hayat, Qaradawi affirmed that suicide was generally a major sin (kabira), but blamed the Tunisian state for Bouazizi's sin and prayed that God would absolve him of any blame for that sin. Qaradawi's sympathy for Bouazizi's otherwise sinful act was a reflection of Qaradawi's more general approach to the problem of religion and politics: that justice is a central demand of the Shari'a and that interpretations of the Shari'a that strengthen oppressors and tyrants cannot be deemed to be legitimate parts of the Shari'a.

Qaradawi's reputation for moral courage in the face of Arab dictators, however, suffered a significant blow as a result of his refusal to condemn the actions of the Bahraini and Saudi governments in violently suppressing the peaceful protests in Manama's Pearl Square. His attempts to distinguish the Bahraini protests on the ground that they were sectarian in character rather than national hardly seemed at the time plausible; in light of subsequent events, they are even less so.

Mohamed Bennour, spokesperson of the center-left party Ettakatol, declared that the gathering was a way of misleading the public. “People who attended the event are using Bourguiba’s name to impose their ideas. These people do not care about Bourguiba – where were they when Bourguiba was imprisoned by Ben Ali for 13 years? They were supporting Ben Ali’s decision,” he said.

Samir Ben Amor, a member of the center-left Congress for the Republic party, also saw in the meeting an attempt to move Tunisia back towards the undemocratic ways of Ben Ali’s RCD party. “The meeting conveys that these people want to steal the Tunisian revolution and its aims. It is inappropriate for some opposition figures to refuse to join the coalition government, yet accept to ally with RCD’s legacy parties. It is a failed attempt to bring back the RCD using a different name. It is a shame that they are using Bourguiba’s name to achieve this purpose,” he announced.

Abed Hamid Jelassi, a member of Ennahda’s executive office, stated his belief that the gathering was a way of hijacking the Tunisian revolution, but that he thinks Tunisians are too clever to fall for the trap. “Obviously these people want the return of RCD, they are using the fear that people have against religious extremists to serve their own interests,” he said.

Supporters of Mr Shafiq, who had been holding a rally in the capital's northern suburb of Nasser City, were stunned by the result. There was screaming and crying and people were seen holding their heads in despair.

Security had been tight for the announcement, with tanks and troops deployed around the election commission's headquarters

Hours after the result, Mr Mursi resigned from his positions within the Muslim Brotherhood including his role as chairman of its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) as he had pledged to do in the event of his victory

Morsi’s victory does not mean that democracy has triumphed in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood has already denounced the constitutional declaration, but the SCAF is unlikely to give in on that point after conceding Morsi’s triumph.

the secular parties that claimed that their past performance in the elections was poor because they did not have adequate time to organize do not appear to be making the massive effort to build their parties that they need in order to be successful the next time around

Behind Sabbahi, Abdel Moniem Abouel Fotouh, a moderate Islamist independent candidate followed with 387,497, or 22 percent, of the votes, while former foreign minister Amr Moussa won 291,000 votes in third place, followed by Mohamed Morsy, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate with 269,455. Ahmed Shafiq, former prime minister under Mubarak, who is leading the poll nationally, only won 212,275 votes in Egypt’s second largest city.

It was clear by now that people had lost trust and hope in both the ultraconservative Salafi Nour Party, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party

“Now, the split within the Salafis has been apparent these days, there are some who want to leave the political scene and go back to preaching and their religious roots, which was their main concern before,”

In a statement on their Facebook page that has some 255,000 followers, Ultras Ahlawy said last week that it would defy the spectator ban in the match against Ismaily  to deliver a message to “all remnants of the ousted regime” that they would not obey their “manipulated regime.” In their statement, the ultras said: “The issue is bigger than football. We want to settle the score with remnants of the former regime, under the leadership of Samir Zaher, and their oppression of Egyptian youth.” UWK issued a similar statement saying that “we suffered a lot from injustice and repression in the past, but we stood up to that with pride. We fought with all our might to maintain our principles and freedom. We thought justice and freedom would come after our revolution. We will continue in our defense of freedom even with our blood. Our war with the EFA will continue until we win and see the corrupt people in prison.”

As the frontline in the ‘Battle of the Dakhliya (interior ministry)’ or alternatively dubbed the Battle of Mohammed Mahmoud – the epicenter of the confrontation just off Tahrir Square -- moved at times closer to and then further away from the ministry, Chinese-made motorcycles carried the wounded to safety. Shamarikh, the controversial, colored fireworks employed by the ultras during soccer matches lit up the sky at night replacing street lights that had been turned off. Theirs was as much a battle for karama or dignity as it was part of the fight to hold the military to its pledge to lead the country to democracy. Their dignity is vested in their ability to stand up to the dakhliya, the knowledge that they no longer can be abused by security forces without recourse and the fact that they no longer have to pay off each and every policemen to stay out of trouble.

A la télévision, rien de neuf. Aucune nouvelle chaîne n'a été lancée depuis la chute de l'ancien régime

Dans les kiosques, deux ou trois nouveaux titres seulement

A Radio Sfax ou Radio Monastir, deux stations publiques régionales, l'information vit encore sous l'ère Ben Ali