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Ed Webb

Can Essebsi's 'Call for Tunisia' Movement Unite the Opposition? - By Erik Churchill | T... - 0 views

  • The Call for Tunisia features a broad spectrum of former regime officials together with secular liberals. The former regime officials, or RCDists (from the Constitutional Democratic Rally), were excluded from running in the last elections and see in the new initiative a chance to revive their political prospects. (There was no such cleansing of the actual government administrations -- only positions in the Constituent Assembly). These officials and their supporters oftentimes criticize the current government as incompetent and unable to manage the complexity of government. They try to deflect criticisms of the rampant corruption and stasi-like police state of the past, by pointing to the (very real) progress achieved under Bourguiba and Ben Ali. They cite statistics on women's rights, improvements in education, and infrastructure development, and they compare Tunisia with its neighbors in the Maghreb and throughout Africa. Their motives are clear -- keep the good and throw out the bad of the former regime.
  • challenge will be to integrate their liberal values into what is at heart a conservative party
  • While Ennahda supporters talk about the extremism of Bourguiba/Ben Ali regarding Islamic practices (including banning the veil and a very liberal interpretation of Ramadan -- not to mention the systematic torture and imprisonment of Islamists themselves), many Tunisians felt comfortable being Muslim under the former regime. It is fair to say that many (though certainly not all) Tunisians did not feel that their religion was under assault under the previous secular regime
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  • Essebsi's movement has scared both liberal secularists and Ennahda supporters alike.  A return of the crooked, corrupt, and cruel former regime is everything that they fought against -- not just in the past 2 years, but in the last 30 years. While Ennahda will point to the abuses against Islam, and secular liberals will point to the harassment of human rights activists and infringements on freedom of expression, both will point to the ultimate failure of the Bourguiba/Ben Ali experiment to bring real progress to many parts of Tunisia. While visitors to Tunisia's coastal areas can see the development and progress of the last 50 years, it takes only a few minutes to get to villages that remain poor, backwards, and lacking in any opportunities to progress. They will point to the promises of Ben Ali to provide education and work, even while the educational system declined and job opportunities dried up. They will point to the fact that closer relations with the west only brought tighter visa restrictions and low-wage jobs.
  • Some have pointed to Mustapha Nabli, who has links to the former regime, but spent the last 12 years at the World Bank prior to coming back after the revolution to lead the Tunisian Central Bank. He is well respected in international circles and has already engaged in fierce debate with the coalition government over the central bank's independence, and as a result has received open calls for his sacking by President Marzouki himself. Others have cited Taieb Baccouche, a former labor and human rights leader, who most recently served with Essebsi as Minister of Education in the transition government. He has been making the rounds in Tunisian media on behalf of the Call.
  • the CPR and Ennahda have proposed legislation that would limit RCD participation in any future government. While political activists in Tunisia have long regretted the relative immunity granted to the former regime officials, many Tunisians continue to place the blame firmly on Ben Ali and his family. Essebsi has capitalized on this sentiment by stating that these proposals are anti-democratic and would only further polarize a society that needs unity. Nevertheless, with control over the government and the assembly, the coalition could tighten the rules to make it difficult for the Call to field candidates
  • The work for Essebsi's movement will be able to convince Tunisians that they can keep the gains of Tunisia's independence leaders while upholding the values of the revolution. For Tunisia's secular left, the Call represents an opportunity to join a party that may have real traction with ordinary Tunisians, but also signifies a capitulation for what many have worked so hard to change. Like in Egypt, the rise of two conservative parties (the Islamists and the Call) is a disappointment to those who fought for human rights and civil liberties. At the same time, in this conservative society it is hardly surprising that the debate is characterized by what kind of conservatism Tunisians will choose between
Ed Webb

Yemen turns a page - 0 views

  • After the Yemeni Parliament began the year by passing new legislation allowing Saleh to run for the presidency ad infinitum, Saleh announced his three famous “No’s” a month later: no presidency forever, no running for elections again and no inherited presidency, meaning that his son, who was being groomed for succession, and who is the leader of the Republican Guard, will not succeed his father.   Saleh’s concessions failed to appease those itching for immediate change, however, and February 3 witnessed the first massive demonstrations. Taking place in more than 17 governates, the protests organized by the JMP called for political and economic reforms and a fair distribution of wealth. Up until this point, demands for Saleh to step down had not been made. The JMP called an end to the demonstrations but groups of young people remained in Sanaa’s squares demanding Saleh’s departure. These unknown youth were the catalyst of Yemen’s continuous uprisings for the next nine months. 
  • March 18, when the security forces’ snipers opened fire on protesters, killing more than 50 and injuring hundreds
  • due to an international cardiopulmonary resuscitation, especially at the hand of Saudi Arabia, eight months passed without a transition of power
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  • the humanitarian situation became catastrophic. Violence broke out in many governates, including clashes between government forces and tribal leaders in the capital and escalating violence between government forces and extremists in the Abyan governate. With the situation deteriorating drastically, the international community slowly ratcheted up pressure
  • on November 23, given one final ultimatum by the Security Council, Saleh signed the plan whereby he will remain honorary president but will delegate his powers to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. Under the plan, the latter will work to form a new government with the opposition, with elections intended within three months
  • in Yemeni politics, signatures are much easier to put on paper than they are to abide by
  • the fall of a dictator is only the start of a revolution
Ed Webb

In Libya, the U.N. and EU Are Leaving Migrants to Die as Civil War Rages - 0 views

  • a seemingly endless series of scandals across a network of detention centers ostensibly run by the Libyan Department for Combating Illegal Migration, which is associated with the U.N.-backed, Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). In reality, many of the detention centers are controlled by militias.
  • Tens of thousands of refugees and migrants have been locked up indefinitely in Libyan detention centers over the past two and a half years, after they were intercepted by the Libyan coast guard trying to reach Italy across the Mediterranean Sea. Since 2017, the Libyan coast guard has been supported with equipment and training worth tens of millions of dollars by the European Union. This money comes from the Trust Fund for Africa—a multibillion-dollar fund created at the height of the so-called migration crisis, with the aim of preventing migration to Europe by increasing border controls and funding projects in 26 African countries
  • EU’s deal with Libya—a country without a stable government where conflict is raging—has been repeatedly condemned by human rights organizations. They say the EU is supporting the coast guard with the aim of circumventing the international law principle of non-refoulement, which would prohibit European ships from returning asylum-seekers and refugees to a country where they could face persecution
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  • In January, dozens of migrants and refugees were sold directly to human traffickers from the Souq al-Khamis detention center in Khoms, soon after they were delivered there by the Libyan coast guard.
  • Since the latest conflict began in Tripoli in April, after eastern Gen. Khalifa Haftar ordered his self-styled Libyan National Army to advance on the capital, refugees and migrants say their lives have become even worse. Detainees in five detention centers told Foreign Policy they have been forced to assist GNA-associated militias by loading or moving weapons, cleaning military bases on the front lines, and even—in a few cases—fighting with guns.
  • In July, at least 53 detainees were killed in the Tajoura detention center, in eastern Tripoli, when a bomb dropped by Haftar’s forces directly hit the hall they were locked in, close to a weapons store. Survivors accused the GNA government of using them as “human shields.”
  • while UNHCR and IOM do some important work, they are actively involved in whitewashing the devastating and horrific impacts of hardening European Union policy aimed at keeping refugees and migrants out of Europe. “They are constantly watering down the problems that are happening in the detention centers,” said one aid official. “They are encouraging the situation to continue. … They are paid by the EU to do [the EU’s] fucking job.”
  • it was clear the U.N. is “totally overwhelmed” with the situation, yet it has management who are always “on the defensive.” 
  • While the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights have been pointedly critical, UNHCR and IOM regularly thank the EU for funding through their social media accounts, without mentioning that the EU plays a central role in sending refugees and migrants to detention centers in the first place
  • According to Crisp, the problems include: “dependence on EU funding and inability to change EU policy; a government that is supported by both the UN and EU; weak government institutions that are closely linked to militias; desperate refugees who don’t understand why UNHCR can’t do more for them; irregular and limited access to the refugees; concerns over staff safety and security,”
  • When asked about the European Union’s role in facilitating the exploitation, torture, and abuse of thousands of refugees and migrants in Libya, EU spokespeople regularly point to the presence of the U.N. in detention centers, saying the EU is trying to improve conditions through these means and would like the centers closed.
  • “In almost every country where there is an emergency there are always complaints, there are always issues and critics, but what we see in Libya is a complete mess,”
  • While UNHCR has helped 1,540 refugees leave Libya in 2019, this is only a small percentage of those stuck in a cycle between detention centers, smugglers, and the Libyan coast guard, some of whom have waited years to be considered for evacuation. In May alone, nearly as many refugees (1,224) were returned from the Mediterranean Sea and locked up in detention
  • the bombing survivor said he has lost hope in UNHCR and is ready to return to smugglers. “I will try the sea again and again. I’ve got nothing to lose,” he said, adding, “I want the world to know how people are suffering in Libya, because many people die and lose their minds here.”
Ed Webb

Electing a New Libya - carnegieendowment.org - Readability - 0 views

  • there remain questions about the government’s capability to provide security at polling stations. It has “deputized” a number of militias in major cities as part of its security plan. And there have been some very vocal calls for an election boycott in the east by Islamist and pro-federalism leaders, as well as attacks on election offices. The government reportedly has a plan to “freeze” the voting at polling places where there is violence or disruption, which could result in a de-facto invalidation of the results
  • The postponement of a few weeks was simply a technical delay. Libya’s transitional authorities were behind schedule in registering voters and in other preparations for the election. According to the accounts of the United Nations and several NGO observers, the delay was fully justified and not nefarious in any way.
  • for most of the main parties, the experience of campaigning and articulating a party platform is completely new. For many, the metric of voter support is how many posters are produced or media ads are running on television.  
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  • the ideological spectrum even between Islamists and nationalist parties is quite narrow—the nationalists make frequent references to Islam as a basis for law and governance and the Islamists trumpet their nationalist credentials. There are cases where election posters from a major Islamist party show women candidates unveiled—an attempt to soften their image and appeal to women voters. All of this bodes well for consensus building and national unity once the parliament is formed.
  • local agendas will likely win the day
  • Libyans will be electing a 200-person parliament to replace the NTC, and the new assembly will need to choose its president and appoint a prime minister within its first month in operation. The next real order of business is to form a body to write Libya’s new constitution. A draft must be presented in 120 days and then needs to be approved in a national referendum.
  • the problems are confined and the state is not about to implode
  • glaring shortfalls in the transition are the lack of development in the security sector and the continued activity of powerful militias
  • The government is working with what it has and treading very carefully. The government knows it must demobilize and integrate these militias, so there are a number of plans to register fighters and provide them with attractive options like starting a small business, continuing their education, or joining the police or military. Whether these plans can be implemented remains to be seen. Maintaining internal stability is going to be a long-term challenge
  • A Salafi group known as Ansar al-Sharia has established itself in Derna and Benghazi and recently sent armed men into Benghazi’s main square to demand the imposition of sharia. Its leader declared the elections un-Islamic. There have also been attacks on the American and British consulates and the International Committee for the Red Cross.
  • On one level, Libya is transitioning effectively just by virtue of holding elections. On another, oil production is exceeding expectations by already surpassing pre-war levels, providing much-needed funds to help stabilize the economy and state
  • People do not want the breakup of the state, but don’t want a return to the completely centralized control associated with the Qaddafi era either
  • In parts of Libya, we are seeing the perfect storm of weak state control, traditional areas of smuggling and criminality, proliferation of arms, tribal discontent, ethnic unrest, and Islamist groups moving in to take advantage
Ed Webb

Youth Movements Criticize Government Performance : Tunisia Live - News, Economy, Cultur... - 0 views

  • “I can’t really tell if the Tunisian youth are satisfied or not. However, I can tell you about the youth around me. They are trying to be as involved as possible. Tunisian youth are active with many associations like I Watch, and JVT (Tunisian NGOs). All these are young people who are trying to sensitize other people to our political situation,”
  • Houssem Eddine Trabelsi, the coordinator of Ekbes, told Tunisia Live, “This was a way of protesting the government’s performance. We are young members of  Ennahdha with different opinions and positions than those of the government.” Trabelsi said that he and the campaign members have been connecting with ministers and plan to hold more events, as well as conduct their own investigations into how the government can do better.
  • Farah Labidi, a Constituent Assembly representative and member of Ennahdha said that the criticism of Ekbes was good for the accountability of leaders. “This is a very healthy initiative as they are asking for daring decisions to fight corruption, and immediate execution of plans. It is a plus for us as they are pointing to our weaknesses. Their criticism is a right.”
Ed Webb

Boston Review - Madawi Al-Rasheed: No Saudi Spring - 0 views

  • Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Saudi Arabia has no civil society of any significance. As a result, online calls to protest—beloved of so many “cyber-utopians”—had no place to take root.
  • The protests reflected a growing sense of disappointment with King Abdullah, who has failed to implement a single political demand from previous petitions. However, in spite of their disappointment, reformers from a wide range of political ideologies—Islamists, nationalists, leftists, and liberals—are being cautious because the future could be worse. Many intellectuals and professionals are haunted by the prospect of losing their positions when Crown Prince Nayif becomes king. Abdullah has developed a quasi-liberal constituency and cultivated its interest in the state, business, and media. Reformers nonetheless loyal to Abdullah fear that Nayif’s iron fist will come down on them: functionaries of the ancien régime to be replaced.
  • Another group, the National Coalition and Free Youth Movement, formed on Facebook and Twitter in spite of having no offline organizational presence. Their Web pages would disappear amid government censorship only to reappear at different addresses. Many pages gathered thousands of supporters, but it is difficult to claim that all were authentic. Cyber-warfare pitted activists and non-ideological young men and women against regime security, complicating the headcount.
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  • There are essentially no non-state institutions in the country. Saudi Arabia has not had trade unions since the 1950s, when the government banned them in the oil-rich province where the then-American oil company ARAMCO was based. Likewise, there are no legal political parties, youth associations, women’s organizations, or independent human rights organizations.
  • By intervening, the Saudis hoped not only to protect their Bahraini ally, but to split their internal opposition using sectarian politics. As the protests grew and the GCC deliberated, the Saudi official press peddled the regime’s line: an Iranian-Shia conspiracy was targeting the Sunni heartland. The champions of Sunni Islam would save the Gulf from the Iranian-Shia takeover. The Saudi regime proved not only to its subjects, but also to Western governments, a determination to crush protest and expel Iranian and Shia influence from the peninsula. The message to President Obama was to think twice before supporting democracy and human rights in the Arabian Peninsula. The message to Saudis was that critics would be tarred as traitors to the nation and enemies of the faith.
  • All local newspapers reported on it favorably.
  • Many in the younger generation are critical of the regime’s repressive gender policies, but they support its opposition to the Shia as alien, heretical, and loyal to Iran.
  • the “liberal press”—also officially controlled—published articles denouncing sectarianism. Liberal authors attacked sectarian preachers of hate and instead celebrated national unity, wataniyya. Not that these liberal authors favored political protest or close ties with the Shia. Rather, they offered Saudis an alternative discourse that still served the regime’s interests. With society divided between supposedly liberal intellectuals and hateful preachers, the regime confirms in the minds of people that it alone can broker between the fiercely opposed groups.
  • Protesters avoid arrest by supporting the king and demanding that bureaucrats respect his royal decrees. Anger is therefore channelled toward low-level civil servants without challenging the regime directly or insisting on royal intervention. As long as protests do not question the policies of senior members of the royal family, they are tolerated, perhaps to some extent welcomed as a means to vent public anger.
  • The press has dubbed the wave of small-scale demonstrations “protest fever.” Importantly, women are uniting in pursuit of their interests and rights, suggesting that this is the beginning of a civil rights movement. Saudi women have agitated before—in 1990 some were arrested for violating a driving ban—but the 2011 protests are different. At local and regional levels, women’s demands are more fundamental than before. They want employment, the right to vote in municipal elections, and freedom of speech.
  • When protesters agitate for the end of the regime, they are shown no mercy. As of this writing, seven demonstrators have been shot and killed by Saudi security forces. In the virtual world, government agents continue to use propaganda, counterarguments, and rumors against calls for protest.
  • should pressure start coming from the West, the Saudi regime knows how to exploit its allies’ weak spots: fear of terrorism and an insatiable appetite for oil and military contracts.
  • Digital activism will continue to provide an outlet to a population denied basic freedom. But with popular unrest largely under wraps and the West silent, the regime faces no threat in the short term.
  • The economic and social deprivation, political oppression, and corruption that triggered revolutions elsewhere are all present in Saudi Arabia, but these alone are not sufficient to precipitate an uprising. Saudi Arabia does not have trade unions—the majority of its working population is foreign, which has stunted the growth of organized labor—a women’s movement, or an active student population, three factors that helped to make protests in Tunis and Cairo successful. Elsewhere in the Arab world, in the absence of these important factors, revolt stumbled, turned violent, and could not progress without serious foreign intervention. Libya is a case in point.
  • where the state is the only institution that matters, effectively bringing people together offline may be impossible
Ed Webb

Tunisia's Governing Coalition Sees Traces of Old Regime in Essebsi Meeting : Tunisia Live - 0 views

  • Mohamed Bennour, spokesperson of the center-left party Ettakatol, declared that the gathering was a way of misleading the public. “People who attended the event are using Bourguiba’s name to impose their ideas. These people do not care about Bourguiba – where were they when Bourguiba was imprisoned by Ben Ali for 13 years? They were supporting Ben Ali’s decision,” he said.
  • Samir Ben Amor, a member of the center-left Congress for the Republic party, also saw in the meeting an attempt to move Tunisia back towards the undemocratic ways of Ben Ali’s RCD party. “The meeting conveys that these people want to steal the Tunisian revolution and its aims. It is inappropriate for some opposition figures to refuse to join the coalition government, yet accept to ally with RCD’s legacy parties. It is a failed attempt to bring back the RCD using a different name. It is a shame that they are using Bourguiba’s name to achieve this purpose,” he announced.
  • Abed Hamid Jelassi, a member of Ennahda’s executive office, stated his belief that the gathering was a way of hijacking the Tunisian revolution, but that he thinks Tunisians are too clever to fall for the trap. “Obviously these people want the return of RCD, they are using the fear that people have against religious extremists to serve their own interests,” he said.
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  • Mouldi Fehem, a member of the PDP, one of the parties present at the event, disagreed with the representatives of the coalition, stating that it was normal for parties who share similar views to gather and express their opinions, especially now with the “advent of religious extremism.” “We are all here because we want to protect people’s freedoms and rights,” he said. When asked about attendees who shared close ties with the RCD, he replied, “We should not let our desire for revenge take control over us; we should first see who really was accountable for the crimes committed by the former regime.”
  • The transitional justice system is not working well, and unless something is done the previous clan will take over again.
Ed Webb

The politics of bread in Egypt - Opinion - Al Jazeera English - 0 views

  • Food security policy has little room to manoeuvre in Egypt, where the per-person endowment of cropland is one of the smallest in the world. Virtually all 82 million Egyptians, along with almost all agricultural lands, are squeezed into just five per cent of the nation's total land area: A strip running eight to 15 kilometres wide along the Nile River and fanning out through the Delta. It's as if the entire population of the United States and all of our agriculture were clustered within 60 kilometres of the Mississippi.
  • There have long been laws against building on agricultural land in Egypt, but enforcement has always been lax. During the past year, with the government otherwise occupied, there was virtually no enforcement at all. Powerful economic interests have jumped into that vacuum, and land-grabbing and construction on cropland have accelerated. Economically stressed farmers have a hard time resisting offers of big money from aggressive developers.
  • it will not be easy to restructure a system that for decades fit comfortably into a thoroughly corrupt economy. For one thing, it will be necessary to deal with resistance from the food industries, interest groups, tycoons, and politicians who benefit from the current way of doing things.
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  • Having lived through a succession of food-price shocks over the years, including the 30-per cent spike that triggered widespread protest in the spring of 2008, Egyptians simply don't want the government to shift the burden of price increases onto their shoulders. It's not so much the steady march of inflation that worries them as it is the wild week-to-week price swings that often occur.
  • Even if the government promised to raise cash payments annually to keep up with to the cost of living, he said: "I would not trust such a promise."
  • If Egyptians manage to wrest economic and political power from the oligarchs who have held it for so long, they will have a chance to protect their agricultural landscape and ensure a good food supply for everyone.
gabrielle verdier

New date proposed for Tunisia polls: News24: Africa: News - 0 views

  • arrested 1 400 people linked to recent anti-government protests.
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    "arrested 1 400 people linked to recent anti-government protests."
Ed Webb

'Everything is stolen from us': Tunisians fight to preserve cultural heritage | PLACE - 0 views

  • The looting of archaeological sites is a longstanding problem in Tunisia
  • Objects of significant historical and cultural value often end up on the European market and in the homes of Tunisia's rich and powerful
  • instability and chaos of conflict often provides a window for archaeological looting
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  • the authorities are getting more serious about tackling the illicit antiquities trade
  • The western region of Kasserine, where the shrine of Sidi Boughanem is located, is one of the most marginalised parts of the country - with government figures showing about one in four people unemployed, far higher than the 15% unemployment rate for the country as a whole. It is also one of the most archaeologically rich. There are four major sites located in an area of 8,000 square kilometres (3,000 square miles), and the land is peppered with architectural ruins and antique stones.
  • the sheer number of small sites makes it impossible to keep an eye on all of them
  • "There are economic reasons (for looting)," he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation in Tunis. "The blame should not be put on the people who are trying to get by day-to-day, but the persons who are furnishing these collections."
  • Ayoub Sayhi, a 22-year-old amateur filmmaker from Thala, called on the government to do more to care for the country's ancient objects. To Sayhi, the looting of Kasserine's antiquities was just another symptom of what he saw as the state's neglect of the region. "(My film) is to get the government to do something about this region because it is poor even though it is rich in natural resources," he said. "Everything is stolen from us, both in the day and in the night."
Ed Webb

Special Report: In Egypt's military, a march for change | Reuters - 1 views

  • As in the country, so in the barracks. Over the past six months, more than a dozen serving or recently retired mid- and lower-ranking officers have said they and their colleagues see Egypt's revolution as their own chance to win better treatment, salaries, and improved conditions and training. They are tired, they said, of a few very top officers becoming rich while the vast majority of officers and ordinary soldiers struggle.
  • "Military ranks struggle like the rest of Egyptians because, like Egyptian society, the wealth of the military is concentrated at the top and does not trickle down. You have to reach a specific rank before wealth is unlocked," one major said.
  • say they will hold off on pushing their demands further until the ruling military council hands over power to an elected civilian government
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  • Numbering at least 468,000 men - officials refuse to give the exact number saying it could hurt national security - Egypt's combined army, air force, air defense command, navy and paramilitaries make up the largest military force in the Arab world. More than half of those in uniform are conscripts.
  • One of the keys to the military's power is its grip on business, which was strengthened after Egypt's 1979 peace deal with Israel. Under that accord, the military had to shrink its forces. But instead of sacking hundreds of thousands of men, commanders opened factories to employ them. Those plants now produce everything from components for ammunition to pots and pans, fire extinguishers, and cutlery. The military also runs banks, tourism operations, farms, water treatment plants, a petrol station chain, construction firms, and import companies.Businesses owned solely by the military are exempt from tax, and often built on the backs of poorly paid conscripts, who make between $17 and $28 a month, although they are fed by the army and receive basic medical help. "A conscript goes into the army less for training, and more for working in one of the military factories or business schemes,"
  • the military establishment is likely to retain significant powers, no matter who wins the two-round presidential election
  • the armed forces have de facto control over all unused land in Egypt, or about 87 percent of the country
  • Many soldiers feel the U.S. money benefits American arms manufacturers and forces Egypt to buy outdated weaponry. Egypt, they say, needs to be able to make its own money to advance.
  • "The armed forces will not allow any interference into its business projects. This is a matter of national security," said Nasr.
  • "Previously the military budget was subject to specific laws and was not in any constitution," said General Mamdouh Shahine, who is responsible for legal affairs on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has run Egypt since Mubarak's ouster. "But now we want to bring it under the new constitution to ensure stability. By adding budgetary clauses to the constitution, I am simply asserting a reality that has existed for a long time. What is the problem with that?"
  • The spark for the soldiers' rebellion in Alexandria was a brutal episode in Cairo. On October 9 last year, a group of Coptic Christians converged on Cairo's television station to protest at the burning of a church. In a neighborhood called Maspero, the protesters clashed with soldiers; about 25 civilians were killed.The army says soldiers were also killed in the violence. The lieutenant colonel with direct knowledge of the rebellion at the Air Defence Institute said one officer and 22 soldiers died. Those who survived were seriously injured and some were disabled, according to a source at the military judiciary. Among other things Air Defence Institute officers demanded was financial compensation for the families of those dead.
  • There are also problems with training, which four senior officers said was evident in the poor handling of tanks and armored personnel carriers on the streets during last year's protests. At Maspero, inexperienced soldiers in charge of armored carriers injured protesters inadvertently, one recently retired general responsible for devising training systems for the military said.
  • "stay away from politics or organized religion, don't outshine your commander, don't think about improving the system."
  • While most soldiers and officers are religious, the military does not allow religious organizations to set up within its ranks.
  • "You must remember that at the end of the day, the army is patriotic," said the colonel. "Many of the rank and file refuse to rebel because they feel the country depends on them and they are the last institution standing. They want change but they would rather wait until a civilian government is formed."
Ed Webb

Partisan Rifts Deepen Over Appointment of Future Tunisian President : Tunisia Live - 0 views

  • Ennahdha members have consistently argued for a parliamentary system of governance, where the president would be appointed by the Constituent Assembly and would have limited powers. Conversely, CPR supports a semi-presidential system, where a president would be chosen through a general election.
  • Ladhari clarified that defining Tunisia’s future political system as either parliamentary or presidential is not within the purview of his committee, which is limited to determining how the president will be elected.  However, this technicality means little on a practical level, given that the issue of presidential vs. parliamentary governance is at the core of the division within the committee
  • Samia Abbou, a representative of CPR, stated that Ennahdha representatives chose to vote for their proposal on a day when most of the committee members were not present, including the president of the committee, Amor Chtioui
Ed Webb

Habib Kheder Estimates Completion of Constitution in February : Tunisia Live - News, Ec... - 0 views

  • members left the Assembly last week for their first break since they began writing in February. Just before their departure, the publication of the first full draft of the constitution demonstrated marked progress, but the contents of the draft have caused controversy throughout the country. The draft revealed that divisive issues, such as the status of women, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and the parliamentary structure of the government, are still far from settled inside and outside of the NCA. The Assembly will reconvene in early September to negotiate these divisions, but the timeframe for the ratification of the constitution remains unclear.
Ed Webb

Cairo's new Cabinet proves how little has really changed - The National - 0 views

  • blame falls first and foremost to the military's handling of the post-Mubarak period, the greed and other failings of his Muslim Brothers and other political parties, and the inability of revolutionaries to turn their symbolic capital into a political vision. The present situation is also a reminder of how "sticky" bad old habits of governance in Egypt are, and the extent to which the question of why the country was so badly run for so many years extended far beyond the dull rule of Hosni Mubarak.
  • the Brotherhood and the generals do have some power, but far more significant is their lack of power and legitimacy in imposing themselves against each another, and upon society
  • the Brotherhood and the generals do have some power, but far more significant is their lack of power and legitimacy in imposing themselves against each another, and upon society
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  • The Muslim Brotherhood has made inroads into some ministries (not for the first time: in the 1960s, some members had been allowed, as individuals, ministerial positions). It should be of little surprise that these include the ministries of housing and education - institutions whose role is to provide services, something in which the Brotherhood has some experience.
    • Ed Webb
       
      Education is not simply a service. It is a privileged site of ideological elaboration and indoctrination, alongside Information, and always a prime target for religious parties.
  • the beginning of a shake-up of the manner in which politics have been codified for the past 60 years, with myriad actors trying to adapt to this change - and salvage what they can from the old power structure at the same time
  • blame falls first and foremost to the military's handling of the post-Mubarak period, the greed and other failings of his Muslim Brothers and other political parties, and the inability of revolutionaries to turn their symbolic capital into a political vision. The present situation is also a reminder of how "sticky" bad old habits of governance in Egypt are, and the extent to which the question of why the country was so badly run for so many years extended far beyond the dull rule of Hosni Mubarak.
  • a Brother now heads the information ministry, a costly behemoth whose reform is one of the biggest headaches of post-Mubarak Egypt. That the media is on a warpath against the Brotherhood has been a refrain of its members; perhaps they hope to better control it. But the loyalties of Egypt's state media are divided; its multiple organs now have different masters. And, for the printed press in particular, the new minister will have to face the politically influential Journalists' Syndicate
  • There will not be a political Islamist in control of either endowments or state mosques
  • In a sense we've now seen a return of real politics, unmediated by the micromanagement of security officials
mehrreporter

The Arab world is going through a difficult time: Sharjah Ruler - 0 views

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    The Arab world is going through a difficult time and the media profession in such a critical phase can be just as dangerous as a doctor quivering holding a blade in surgery, said His Highness Dr Shaikh Sultan Bin Mohammad Al Qasimi, in his keynote address at the International Government Communication Forum 2014 (IGCF 2014) yesterday.
حسام الحملاوي

Anti-government protests in Jordan continue - Monsters and Critics - 0 views

  • They praised the Tunisian uprising that forced President Zine Al Abidine ben Ali to flee the country last week.
Ed Webb

Watching Egypt (but not on Al Jazeera) | Marc Lynch - 0 views

  • One key factor was missing, though, at least early on. Al Jazeera has played a vital, instrumental role in framing this popular narrative by its intense, innovative coverage of Tunisia and its explicit broadening of that experience to the region. Its coverage today has been frankly baffling, though. During the key period when the protests were picking up steam, Al Jazeera aired a documentary cultural program on a very nice seeming Egyptian novelist and musical groups, and then to sports. Now (10:30am EST) it is finally covering the protests in depth, but its early lack of coverage may hurt its credibility. I can't remember another case of Al Jazeera simply punting on a major story in a political space which it has owned.
  • More broadly, it's astonishing how much is now in motion in Arab politics after such a long period of seeming stagnation. There's a vivid sense of an era coming to a close and an uncertain new vista opening. Even if Al Jazeera's release of the so-called "Palestine Papers" doesn't bring down Abu Mazen's negotiating team or the PA it feels like the autopsy of a long-dead peace process. Hezbollah's Parliamentary maneuver to bring down the Hariri government and replace him with veteran politician and businessman Najib Miqati, a response to the Special Tribunal's reported indictments which has sparked violent protests by Hariri backers, may mean an end to the era of U.S. alliance with a March 14-led Lebanon. It's hard to know where to focus --- but in fact I continue to see these seemingly unrelated events as part of a broader story of the crumbling of an Arab status quo which has long seemed unsustainable.
  • 3pm:  Al-Jazeera's lack of coverage of the protests has become a major story.   It doesn't seem to have gotten any better since this morning --- since getting back on line I've seen an episode of a talk show, more Palestine Papers, and only short snippets of breaking news on Egypt.  Al-Arabiya apparently hasn't done any better.  My Twitter feed and email are full of comments like "AJ Arabic is covering childrens gymnastics programs in Indonesia right now. Good call." (@mwhanna1) and "Exposed. Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya's failure in covering #Jan25" (@SultanAlQassemi).   Egyptian activists are complaining bitterly, and most seem to think that Mubarak cut a deal with the Qatari and Saudi governments. 
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