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the leaders of Tahrir want to institutionalise the incredible creativity of the revolution, from musical performances and film to artwork, poetry and story-telling. These activities have sustained protesters during the darkest days of violence and have helped to attract hundreds of thousands of "ordinary Egyptians" to the Meidan during each of the occupations since January. This would constitute a permanent counterpoint to the state media and other mechanisms that the government and elite have at their disposal, through which they try to convince Egyptians that the Tahriris are little more than "thugs" who don't have their interests at heart.

one of the major problems of Tahrir today (similar to the situation during the last major occupation, in July, and different from the January-February protests), is that it has clearly been infiltrated by the security services with provocateurs. Their job is to keep the Meidan constantly on edge, and in so doing, keep the pressure on, drive people away, and encourage the degradation of life in Tahrir to the point that it either dissolves on its own, or an be "cleaned out", Zuccotti Park-style.

"People have to learn for themselves," one explained to me this morning. "And they will. In the meantime, we will produce another proposal and figure out how more forcefully to deal with the infiltrators. I know who they are, after ten months of doing this, I can smell them." I have no doubt he can, but the real question is whether Egyptians more broadly can not merely smell, but root out, the precise infiltration of their embryonic democracy by the forces of crony capitalism and corruption that have for so long dominated the country. "Power is attractive and parliament comes with a lot of money," one long-time activist put it to me in justifying the anger at the betrayal of the principles and of the revolution's martyrs by the emerging political elite.

for the first time Egyptian elections are characterized by one of the most important features of democracy: uncertainty

The absence of a pre-determined majority for the NDP is forcing all parties to shift their agendas away from simply opposing Mubarak policies to addressing voters concerns. It is also forcing all contenders and political forces, including the new post-January parties and "icons" to shift their attention away from television shows which have been their main venue and focus since the revolution, to building local constituencies and to adjusting their programs accordingly.

It is also allowing citizens to reclaim politics in a way that was shortly lived during the uprising, but soon gave away to an elitist monopoly of politics within a narrow public sphere of experts and ‘professional activists' debating on TV and in closed forums.

Observers have often summarized the situation in Tunisia, and the Arab world in general, as a conflict between Islamists and secularists. While the framework of an Islamist–secularist divide is not completely inaccurate, it frequently ignores more nuanced analysis and perpetuates the orientalist premise that Middle East politics should be explained by historical religious norms. In Tunisia, political Islam was marginal until the fall of dictatorship in January 2011.

The main demands of the sporadic protest movements before 2011 were not ideological, but called for more political liberties or an improved socioeconomic situation, as in the 2008 Gafsa uprising

a growing sense among disenchanted voters, youth in particular, that their standards of living would not improve no matter which party they voted for.

This was the worst possible outcome of the elections: it is the prelude to the direct confrontation between the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood that Mubarak warned about and used to justify—and win tacit international acceptance for—his authoritarian policies.

On one side of the battle will be the military, state institutions including the courts that are still controlled by Mubarak-era personnel, the business community, other people who thrived under the old regime, and ordinary Egyptians who want order restored. On the other side will be the Muslim Brothers, most Islamists, and the Egyptians who rose up in January 2011 and do not want to see the regime they thought they had defeated make a comeback.

in the middle will stand over 50 percent of Egyptians who did not vote for either Morsi or Shafiq, but for three candidates that represent, in their own very different fashion, an alternative

Friday, January 14, 2011

Maybe Ben Ali will continue urging his security forces to redouble their efforts, but cooler heads in the police and army ought to be telling him (if they are not doing so already) that there is now only one action that can quell the riots: the departure of Ben Ali himself.

without extreme vigilance on the part of the Tunisian public, the country might find itself, a few months from now, with another RCD president and a parliament still dominated by Ben Ali's party. Tunisians are going to have to remain very watchful, and keep up the pressure for change.

Some also say that police are back to forcefully collecting bribes. For example, a Cairo-based food shop owner, who prefers to remain anonymous, describes their situation. “Before the revolution the police working at the station and undercover agents used to take bribes in the form of free breakfasts. When I refused they used to detain my employees on their way home, claiming it was for investigation purposes, as allowed under the emergency law. The detention can go on for up to several days. Right after the revolution they stopped asking for such bribes - but now such demands are back.”

One of the main demands of the revolution was to lift the state of emergency, but such a demand, four months after the start of the revolution, has yet to be granted by the current interim government.

they do not seem to be taking serious steps to change the policy orientation. For example; no one is working on cases of torture and police violations before 25 January, the violations which took place during the 18-day uprising are the only ones discussed, while the previous 30 years are ignored. Violations are also still ongoing