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The Sentencing Commission has only issued "advisory policy statements" applicable to revocations of probation and supervised release instead of mandatory guidelines. U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pts. A1, A3(a); see also United States v. George, 184 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Because the Commission has not yet issued guidelines relating to revocation of supervised release or changed its view that the Chapter 7 policy statements are merely advisory, we see no reason to reduce the flexibility of district courts in sentencing supervised release violators."). We have held that a district court, when revoking supervised release, has discretion to go outside the suggested sentencing range of the policy statements up to the statutory maximum listed in 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e)(3). See George, 184 F.3d at 1122-23 (finding no error where the district court considered the 7to 13-month range in the policy statements of Chapter 7, rejected it, and sentenced the defendant to 23 months imprisonment). The policy statement range for Musa's violation of the conditions of his supervised release is three to nine months, see U.S.S.G. S7B1.4, but the statutory maximum, as previously noted, is three years, see 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e)(3).

udge Kaplan commented that at-will employees who have been discharged from working for the State government use mandamus, since there is no appeal authorized for an at-will employee who has been wrongfully discharged. Mr. Sykes pointed out this would come under regular mandamus, which is applicable when there is no record. When an agency makes a final decision affecting the rights of parties, an appeal is effected by administrative mandamus if there is no statutory right of appeal.

Mr. Gohn noted that he did not believe that under administrative or regular mandamus, there would be the necessity to file the entire file. Ms. Baron may have been looking at the certiorari rule, which does not apply.

In their suit, Appellants alleged that Scheer violated their rights to procedural due process by refusing to allow them to participate in his telephone conversation with the City Solicitor. They alleged that he violated their rights to substantive due process by pursuing the investigation without probable cause, misrepresenting facts to Solicitor Maser, inducing CHOP to falsify records, and attempting to suborn perjury by Dr. Henretig.2

. Plaintiffs also contend on appeal that the District Court erred by making credibility judgments in its summary judgment ruling. Specifically, they argue that the District Court should not have determined that the actions of Scheer were reasonable or made in good faith. We reject this argument summarily. As discussed above, plaintiffs proffered no evidence of acts by Scheer that rose to a level of arbitrariness that shocks the conscience and therefore failed to state the kind of deprivation that might rise to the level of a constitutional violation. in the District Court's construction of Scheer's behavior in this case

Court Opinions US Supreme Court US Tax Court Board of Patent Appeals State Laws Alabama Arizona California Florida Georgia Illinois Indiana Massachusetts Michigan Nevada New Jersey New York North Carolina Oregon Pennsylvania Texas Virginia Washington US Code Copyrights Crimes Labor Patents Shipping US Constitution Preamble Art. I - Legislative Art. II - Executive Art. III - Judicial Art. IV - States' Relations Art. V - Mode of Amendment Art. VI - Prior Debts Art VII - Ratification California Evidence Code Section 669 Legal Research Home > California Lawyer > Evidence Code > California Evidence Code Section 669 Sponsored Links google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad); google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad); (a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if: (1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted. (b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that: (1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law; or (2) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation was a child and exercised the degree of care ordinarily exercised by persons of his maturity, intelligence, and capacity under similar circumstances, but the presumption may not be rebutted by such proof if the violation occurred in the course of an activity normally engaged in only by adults and requiring adult qualifications. Section: Previous  660  662  663  664  665  666  667  668  669  669.1  669.5  670  Next Last modified: January 12, 2009 google_protectAndRun("ads_core.google_render_ad", google_handleError, google_render_ad);border: medium none ; margin: 0pt; paddin