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Nye Frank

we asked for a safe way to report Building A Financial Abuse Case for the Criminal Just... - 0 views

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safe way for victims to report criminal

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Identify other sources of information Health care professionals Paramedics and EMTs Family and friends Who did victim tell first Importance of asking about and documenting the victim's demeanor and reason for making contact Not for police action but for safety, health needs, seek help
  • Crawford v. Washington  Critical importance of witnesses to whom victim and suspect have spoken Identify non governmental witnesses to statements Document spontaneous statements and demeanor Calls for help and medical care
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
Nye Frank

Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

conspiracy

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...getcase.pl

1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Winter, Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a j... - 0 views

www.constitution.org/...winter_standing.htm

standing selfgovernance

shared by Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09 - Cached
  • The democracy conundrum The most appealing justification of standing law is that, in preserving the separation of powers, it protects the majoritarian political process from undue intrusion by the unelected judiciary. But not all issues are amenable to the political process. All too often, the inevitable consequence of a decision denying standing is "that the most injurious and widespread Governmental actions c[an] be questioned by nobody." n60 In those cases, standing law undermines the notion of accountability that supports a constitutional system premised on the rule of law. In Sections VI C and D, I propose a means of recapturing these values.
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    The traditional answer places heavy emphasis on the function of the common law writ system to do the work now done by the concept of standing. n27 According to this analysis, the concept of standing could only arise after the breakdown of the writ system and of common law pleading. Standing then developed as an elaboration of the essence of the private causes of action previously embodied in the writs. n28 As such, the modern concept of standing, with its focus on injury-in-fact, is thought to be only the preservation of the private rights model n29 of adjudication known to the Framers.
  • ...5 more comments...
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    Thus, a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act n49 is a justiciable controversy even without the usual showing that the person has suffered any "palpable injury." n50
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
  • Nye Frank on 31 Jul 09
     
    On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding was precisely the same as that sought by Mr. Lyons on the merits of his case. n19On one level, Lyons represents a jurisprudential dispute between the majority and the dissent over the relative efficacy of retrospective damage remedies and prospective injunctive relief to deter constitutional violations. On another level, this case concerns a related dispute about the role of federal courts in our system. But there was an underlying reality: Human lives were at stake. Mr. Lyons obtained a preliminary injunction against the chokehold practice; both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court issued a stay of that order while the appeal was pending. Six additional people were choked to death by Los Angeles police while the courts determined that no one had standing to stop the practice. n18 Yet, two years later when the Court considered the same substantive constitutional theory in a related factual context, it held that it was unconstitutional for the police to use deadly force against nondangerous suspects. This holding w
Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

www.docstoc.com/...-NYU-School-of-Law---Pildusdoc

mandamus judicial discretion

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
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questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

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victim statement of fact for summary judgement

shared by Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09
     
    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
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Nye Frank Racing off Road racing race-dezert dusty times Riverside county Rod Pacheco Mike Rushton Elder Victims Corruption

shared by Nye Frank on 07 Mar 09 - No Cached
  • Nye Frank on 07 Mar 09
     
    My Recent Bookmarks Friends' Recent Bookmarks Unread Bookmarks Bookmarks shared with me Recent Bookmarks X My Recent Bookmarks more » homicide case, administrative, exceptional Tags: homicide , case , closed , administrative , closure , exceptional about 3 hours ago Yahoo! News Search Results for supreme court cases elder victims of crime california legal assistance civil cases Tags: supreme , court about 3 hours ago Search Results - National Criminal Justice Reference Service Tags: Riverside , County , Corruption , publications , elder , abuse , court , system about 3 hours ago Topic - National Criminal Justice Reference Service Tags: crime , reference , service , victims , elders about 3 hours ago related:/interstitial?url=http://www.foruminfotech.net/legalaid/your_invitation.html - Google Search Tags: self , litigation , courts , elders , pro , se , legal , clinic , how , to about 3 hours ago Friends' Recent Bookmarks more » Find your friends to share great findings and see what you have in common. Bookmarks shared with me more » Yon don't have shared bookmarks from your friends See My Friends » Friends Activities NO friends with recent activities. Invite Friends Now Recent Visitors to My Profile No recent visitors yet 4 unread bookmarks Bookmarks specially shared with me My Diigo Tools My Account Nye Frank View My Profile Edit my profile Edit my picture Invite Your Friends Adding friends will enable you to have more meaningful knowledge sharing and interaction. Invite friends » Download Toolbar Download New Diigo Toolbar Sponsored links
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how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor - Google Search - 0 views

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conspiracy

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Results 1 - 10 of about 140,000 for how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor . ( 0.38 seconds) Did you mean: how to provide specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor Search Results Conspiracy (crime) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Conspiracy law usually does not require proof of the specific intent by the ... based on the fact that the prosecutor would be unable to prove beyond a ... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Conspiracy _(crime) - 54k - Cached - Similar pages - 1. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda-genocide-conspiracy ... defendant's co-conspirators acted with specific intent would "tend to prove" that the. 40. See Prosecutor v. Bagasora et al., Case Nos. ICTR-98-41-AR93, ... papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID951847_code366348.pdf?abstractid=951847&rulid=263109&mirid=4 - Similar pages - by A Decision E Law: Conspiracy to Commit Genocide: Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda ... [48] In order to prove the existence of a conspiracy, ..... that an accused might have the specific intent required to commit genocide and also to act ... The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecutor relied on the same intent of the two ... www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v8n1/obote-odora81.html - 1k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML Where the prosecutor did not charge conspiracy as an offense, but introduced evidence of a conspiracy to prove liability, the court had a sua sponte duty to ... an agreement between two or more people with the specific intent to agree ... www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/archive/B199059.PDF - Similar pages - [PDF] [J-28-99] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENN
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Untitled - 0 views

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appeal motion rule

shared by Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09
     
    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
  • Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09
     
    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
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Department of Justice, State of Oregon - Links - 0 views

www.doj.state.or.us/links.shtml

legal links courts leg senate org law

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Legal | Consumer | Child Support (DCS) | Other Government Legal Oregon Courts Oregon Revised Statutes Links Oregon Constitution Links Oregon Administrative Rules Oregon State Bar Association United States Courts Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals United States Supreme Court Consumer American Association of Retired Persons Better Business Bureau Construction Contractors Board Federal Communication Commission Federal Trade Commission Food & Drug Administration Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Child Support DCS Links Other Government United States Department of Justice United States Senate United States House of Representatives Oregon Legislature Oregon Governor State of Oregon |Back to Top
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Legal | Consumer | Child Support (DCS) | Other Government Legal Oregon Courts Oregon Revised Statutes Links Oregon Constitution Links Oregon Administrative Rules Oregon State Bar Association United States Courts Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals United States Supreme Court Consumer American Association of Retired Persons Better Business Bureau Construction Contractors Board Federal Communication Commission Federal Trade Commission Food & Drug Administration Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Child Support DCS Links Other Government United States Department of Justice United States Senate United States House of Representatives Oregon Legislature Oregon Governor State of Oregon |Back to Top
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California Elder Abuse Act, Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA): S... - 0 views

www.preventelderabuse.com/alifornia-elder-abuse-act.html

elder abuse act legislative

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Jul 09
     
    California's Elder Abuse Act California's Elder Abuse Act has been in existence in its current state since 1991 and is officially known as the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (hereinafter "EADACPA" or simply, the "Elder Abuse Act"). The Elder Abuse Act, found at Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq., sets forth a very detailed body of law that has since been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as providing for a distinct and recognized cause of action - that being a statutory cause of action for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq. When properly proven, a claim for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect provides for certain enhanced remedies that are unwise unavailable under other common law causes of action. The Elder Abuse Act was created out of concern that the elderly members of our society are not receiving the care and attention they deserved - and are in fact being abused and neglected. In enacting the Elder Abuse Act, the California Legislature expressly recognized that elders (defined as a person greater than the age of 65) and dependent adults (generally defined as persons between the ages of 18 and 64 who confined to live in 24-hour medical facilities and/or who are not able to care for themselves due to medical disorders) are particularly subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and that the state has a distinct responsibility to protect these persons. In its preamble, the Elder Abuse Act expressly states that the Legislature "desires to direct special attention to the needs and problems of elderly persons, recognizing that these persons constitute a significant and identifiable segment of the population and that they are more subject to risks of abuse, neglect, and abandonment." (See, Welfare & Institutions Code §15600). The statute further states that most elders and dependent adults who are at the greatest risk of abuse or neglect by their caretakers suffer "physical impairment
  • Nye Frank on 23 Jul 09
     
    California's Elder Abuse Act California's Elder Abuse Act has been in existence in its current state since 1991 and is officially known as the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (hereinafter "EADACPA" or simply, the "Elder Abuse Act"). The Elder Abuse Act, found at Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq., sets forth a very detailed body of law that has since been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as providing for a distinct and recognized cause of action - that being a statutory cause of action for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq. When properly proven, a claim for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect provides for certain enhanced remedies that are unwise unavailable under other common law causes of action. The Elder Abuse Act was created out of concern that the elderly members of our society are not receiving the care and attention they deserved - and are in fact being abused and neglected. In enacting the Elder Abuse Act, the California Legislature expressly recognized that elders (defined as a person greater than the age of 65) and dependent adults (generally defined as persons between the ages of 18 and 64 who confined to live in 24-hour medical facilities and/or who are not able to care for themselves due to medical disorders) are particularly subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and that the state has a distinct responsibility to protect these persons. In its preamble, the Elder Abuse Act expressly states that the Legislature "desires to direct special attention to the needs and problems of elderly persons, recognizing that these persons constitute a significant and identifiable segment of the population and that they are more subject to risks of abuse, neglect, and abandonment." (See, Welfare & Institutions Code §15600). The statute further states that most elders and dependent adults who are at the greatest risk of abuse or neglect by their caretakers suffer "physical impairment
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conspiracy, immunity court - 0 views

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court conspiracy

shared by Nye Frank on 07 Mar 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 07 Mar 09
     
    Results 1 - 10 for official immunity for conspiracy with Safesearch on. (0.16 seconds) Ads by Google Officiel at Amazon Great Deals On Magazines. Save Up To $10 Today! Amazon.com/magazines Immunity Symptoms, Causes, Treatments of Immunity www.Healthline.com Custom Search official immunity - definition of official immunity by the Free ... Meaning of official immunity. Pronunciation of official immunity. Translations of official immunity. ... Official Handbook of the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy ... www.thefreedictionary.com/official+immunity Official Government Conspiracy Theory - What does OGCT stand for ... Definition of Official Government Conspiracy Theory in the list of acronyms and abbreviations provided by the ... official immunity · official information ... acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/Official+Government+Conspiracy+Theory Does hospital's sovereign immunity cover its CEO? | North America ... ... defamation, conspiracy, and statutory violations that allegedly damages his ... Jacobson was entitled to official immunity as to all claims against him, ... www.allbusiness.com/human-resources/employee-development-leadership/855264-1.html 729 F.2d 1128 participated in the Defendants' conspiracy by accepting those bribes. .... Marino, 613 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.1980) (official immunity applies to civil damage and ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/729/729.F2d.1128.83-1819.html FindLaw | Cases and Codes Mowbray alleges a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate her civil rights, ... Police officers are entitled to official immunity from suits arising out of ... caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=5th&navby=case&no=0040504cv0 274 F.3d 269 Hesskew and Robertson cannot be liable under § 1983 for conspiracy to .... Police officers are entitled to official immunity from suits arising out of ... bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/274/274.F3d.269.00-41229.00-40504.html THE SUPREME COURT: OFFICI
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538 F2d 10 Torres v. Sachs S Velez | Open Jurist - 0 views

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rico act case nye

shared by Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
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spoilage autopsy coroner corruption

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, the California Supreme Court did away with the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence: ...we hold that there is no tort remedy for the intentional spoliation of evidence by a party to the cause of action to which the spoliated evidence is relevant, in cases which, as here, the spoliation victim knows or should have known of the alleged spoliation before the trial or other decision on the merits of the underlying action.... [18 Cal.4th 1, 17-18; fn. omitted.]
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Diigo & Google - 0 views

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due process

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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IMBLER V. PACHTMAN, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) -- US Supreme Court Cases from Justia & Oyez - 0 views

supreme.justia.com/...case.html

immunity 1983 cases

shared by Nye Frank on 18 Sep 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 18 Sep 09
     
    1983
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    1983
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    1983
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    1983
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    1983
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    1983
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    1983
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    1983
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    1983
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laws for state liability in mandated duties - Google Search - 0 views

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mandates

shared by Nye Frank on 16 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 16 Apr 09
     
    The Changing Role of the Courts in Elder Abuse Cases These cases addressed a wide array of issues: immunity from liability for people .... The fraud units are mandated by the federal government and authorized to ... The growth of elder law as a practice specialty has fueled much of the ... Recommended Guidelines for State Courts Handling Cases Involving Elder Abuse. ... www.utahbar.org/sites/noecomm/html/the_changing_role_of_the_court.html - 35k - Cached - Similar pages Manual Call Of Duty 4 Pc - Manual Call Of Duty 4 Pc Apr 8, 2009 ... maryland state law jury duty masint analyst duties marriage duty ... massachusetts private duty elderly ... mandatory duty public entity liability for marine corp embassy duty ... maryland sheriff's duties marine locator non active duty ... Homicide? A muscle in Carol's arm twitched involuntarily ... technologise.com/search.php?q=manual-call-of- duty -4-pc - Similar pages The StandDown Texas Project: Law of Parties/Felony Murder Rule All of these issues give better cause to eliminate state executions, ... auxiliary sheriff's deputy, a fire marshal or an assistant fire marshal with ..... due process protections mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 decision, ...... state's law of parties, a conspirator liability statute that posits that if ... standdown.typepad.com/weblog/ law _of_partiesfelony_murder_rule/ - 179k - Cached - Similar pages North Country Gazette » Death In Pinellas County-Excited Delirium ... The medical examiner's office ruled Tipton's death a homicide, ... In such as state of "excited delirium", experts say that physical restraint by ... Last week in Ohio, retired visiting judge Ted Schneiderman who is long past the mandated ... sheriff's officers from any liability in McCullaugh's death and to cause ...
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It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the impo... - 0 views

www.fbi.gov/...apr976.htm

tort constitution lawsuits

shared by Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Assuming internal police guidelines are relevant...they are relevant only when one of their purposes is to protect the individual against whom force is used....Both the guidelines at issue here and the context in which they appear in the police manual show they were meant to safeguard the police and other innocent parties, not the suspect....A violation of these guidelines might be deserving of discipline, but it's irrelevant to [plaintiff's] case.16 It is important to note here that the appellate court did not decide that internal police guidelines are relevant in some instances; they only assumed that they might be relevant in the narrow instance described-i.e., when the policy was intended to safeguard the plaintiff.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    Legal Duties It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.4 Thus, while negligence claims against a police officer or the department may be recognized under state law, the Supreme Court has held that simple negligence-or lack of due care-is insufficient to establish the violation of a federal constitutional right. These distinctions between state tort claims and federal constitutional tort claims can have a bearing on the different ways the courts treat allegations of policy violations. The basic formula for any lawsuit is 1) existence of a legal duty owed by one party to another, 2) an alleged breach of that duty, and 3) injury or loss resulting from that breach. Legal duties may arise in a variety of contexts, but most generally are established by custom, statute, or constitutional law. Whatever its source, a legal duty must be owed to the plaintiff by the named defendant in order for a civil suit to be viable. That being the case, a departmental policy must create a legal duty to a potential plaintiff before a violation of that policy can create liability. In reality, whether a policy violation is even relevant to the question of the legal liability of an officer or department depends to a large extent upon the nature of the claim and the forum in which it is brought. For example, policy violations in tort claims brought under state law alleging negligence will generally be treated differently than claims brought under federal law alleging violations of federal constitutional rights. The relevance of departmental policy also can depend upon whether a legal duty, or standard of conduct, is clearly delineated by law, or whether it is determined by reference to custom or practice.
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