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we asked for a safe way to report Building A Financial Abuse Case for the Criminal Just... - 0 views

  • Identify other sources of information Health care professionals Paramedics and EMTs Family and friends Who did victim tell first Importance of asking about and documenting the victim's demeanor and reason for making contact Not for police action but for safety, health needs, seek help
  • Crawford v. Washington  Critical importance of witnesses to whom victim and suspect have spoken Identify non governmental witnesses to statements Document spontaneous statements and demeanor Calls for help and medical care
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
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  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

538 F2d 10 Torres v. Sachs S Velez | Open Jurist - 0 views

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    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
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    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
Nye Frank

federal statutes Honorable Dirk Kempthorne , James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior ... - 0 views

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    Page 1 1 June 19, 2006 Honorable Dirk Kempthorne, James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior Associate Deputy Secretary Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs 1849 C Street NW Department of Interior Washington, D.C. 20240 1849 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20240 George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Philip Hogen, Chairman for Policy and Economic Development Penny Coleman, Director, General Counsel Office of the Assistant Secretary of National Indian Gaming Commission Indian Affairs - Indian Gaming 1441 L Street, NW 1849 C Street NW Suite 9100 Washington, D.C. 20240 Washington, D.C. 20005 Honorable Governor Christine Gregoire Attorney General, Rob McKenna State of Washington State of Washington P.O. Box 40002 1125 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98504-0002 Olympia, WA 98504 RE: EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION (90 DAYS) OF CONSTRUCTION OF PROPOSED NOOKSACK TRIBAL CLASS II CASINO ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, NEAR LYNDEN, WA, PENDING: 1. DUE DILIGENCE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF TRIBAL MANAGEMENT AND INVESTORS; 2. DUE DILIGENCE REGARDING FEDERAL SUPERINTENDENCE, TRUST STATUS OF LAND, REGARDING GAMING ELIGIBILITY; AND 3. UNAMBIGUOUS VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, 1983 AND 1985 (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AFFECTING WHATCOM COUNTY CITIZENS, ADJACENT LANDOWNERS, AND NOOKSACK TRIBAL MEMBERS. Dear Secretary Kempthorne, Governor Gregoire, et al, This letter requests your urgent attention to a project thus far approved by state and federal agencies that combines expansion of tribal governance, Indian gaming and international border vulnerability. The project is scheduled for ceremonial groundbreaking on or about June 18, 2006. As Chair of our national organization, I was invited to inspect the project location, met with several Nooksack tribal members, and community members in Lynden, Washington (Whatcom County). What I have seen and heard, and since researched, is alarming. Background. The project applicant, Nooksack Tribe of Wa
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    Page 1 1 June 19, 2006 Honorable Dirk Kempthorne, James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior Associate Deputy Secretary Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs 1849 C Street NW Department of Interior Washington, D.C. 20240 1849 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20240 George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Philip Hogen, Chairman for Policy and Economic Development Penny Coleman, Director, General Counsel Office of the Assistant Secretary of National Indian Gaming Commission Indian Affairs - Indian Gaming 1441 L Street, NW 1849 C Street NW Suite 9100 Washington, D.C. 20240 Washington, D.C. 20005 Honorable Governor Christine Gregoire Attorney General, Rob McKenna State of Washington State of Washington P.O. Box 40002 1125 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98504-0002 Olympia, WA 98504 RE: EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION (90 DAYS) OF CONSTRUCTION OF PROPOSED NOOKSACK TRIBAL CLASS II CASINO ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, NEAR LYNDEN, WA, PENDING: 1. DUE DILIGENCE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF TRIBAL MANAGEMENT AND INVESTORS; 2. DUE DILIGENCE REGARDING FEDERAL SUPERINTENDENCE, TRUST STATUS OF LAND, REGARDING GAMING ELIGIBILITY; AND 3. UNAMBIGUOUS VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, 1983 AND 1985 (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AFFECTING WHATCOM COUNTY CITIZENS, ADJACENT LANDOWNERS, AND NOOKSACK TRIBAL MEMBERS. Dear Secretary Kempthorne, Governor Gregoire, et al, This letter requests your urgent attention to a project thus far approved by state and federal agencies that combines expansion of tribal governance, Indian gaming and international border vulnerability. The project is scheduled for ceremonial groundbreaking on or about June 18, 2006. As Chair of our national organization, I was invited to inspect the project location, met with several Nooksack tribal members, and community members in Lynden, Washington (Whatcom County). What I have seen and heard, and since researched, is alarming. Background. The project applicant, Nooksack Tribe of Wa
Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • Plaintiffs Teri and Thomas Lewis, Philip Lewis's parents, filed suit in Sacramento County Superior Court against Sacramento County, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, and Officer Smith. The Lewises allege a deprivation of their son's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and wrongful death under California state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment on various grounds
  • The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the S 1983 claims. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Smith as to the state causes of action. The court denied summary judgment as to the pendent state law causes of action against the County and the Sheriff's department, dismissing those claims without prejudice. The district court's decisions are summarized below.
  • We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. We do not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • First, the district court assumed, without deciding, that Officer Smith had violated Lewis's constitutional rights. The court then addressed Smith's claim to qualified immunity. The court stated that plaintiffs had not presented, and it could not find, any "state or federal opinion published before May, 1990, when the alleged misconduct took place, that supports plaintiffs' view that they have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right in the context of high speed police pursuits." The court therefore found that the law regarding Lewis's Fourteenth Amendment right to life and personal security was not clearly established and granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Smith on qualified immunity grounds.
  • Because the court dismissed all federal claims, it declined to decide whether the county and the sheriff's department were also immune under California law. The court then dismissed without prejudice the state claims against the county and sheriff's department to allow plaintiffs to file those claims in state court.
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected right. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989))
  •  
    LakinChapman, LLC Nationwide www.lakinlaw.com/PracticeAreas/Nursing-Home-Neglect.asp Pioneers in nursing home abuse law 866-839-2021 Statutory Protection of Older Persons Today, all states have laws concerning the abuse, neglect or exploitation of older people, but these states may follow different approaches. In most states, there is a system of adult protective services for investigating and remedying reported abuses. Moreover, some states have laws giving victims of abuse, neglect or exploitation a civil cause of action. Finally, in most states, the abuse or neglect of older people is also a crime. Adult Protective Services Typically, before any civil or criminal action is commenced against a nursing home, a report will have been made to your state's adult protective services agency, or other system in place for the reporting and investigation of allegations of the abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly. All states have a system for reporting allegations of abuse, neglect and exploitation of the elderly, for investigating the allegations and, if the allegations are founded, for providing services to the older person to remedy the problems and prevent their recurrence. In fact, most states have mandatory reporting requirements with respect to such allegations. If an agency concludes that an allegation is founded, it will respond by offering the older person appropriate services, such as medical assistance, counseling, special transportation, assistance with money management, or placement in a different residential setting. Civil Actions Based on Statutes Some state legislatures have created causes of action involving the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of older people, which allow victims to bring civil actions against the perpetrators and/or their employees. These causes of action may authorize damages awards to victims, but may also authorize the issuance of injunctions and restraining or protective orders, for immediate relief from ongoing abuse
Nye Frank

Links - September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 - 0 views

  • Links for state bar associations for some key victim states are listed below. State Bar of California Connecticut Bar Association District of Columbia Bar Maryland State Bar Association Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers,Office of the Bar Counsel New Jersey State Bar Association New York State Bar Association Pennsylvania Bar Association Virginia State Bar
  •  
    There is much litigation over the question whether a particular wrong allegedly perpetrated by a defendant upon a plaintiff is the type of conduct that the civil rights act was designed to remedy. Many claimed infractions of the law do not give rise to a civil rights violation. Suit is allowed only if the defendant deprives a person of his or her rights under the federal laws or the United States Constitution. Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 384 N.W.2d 333 (1986). The civil rights statute does not create any substantive rights. Penterman v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997). The procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment will only be triggered if state action implicates a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property. Board of Regents v. Roth, 498 U.S. 564 (1972)(no constitutional tort was involved in non-renewal of contract of non-tenured teacher). Nothing in the 14th Amendment protects against all government deprivations of life, liberty or property. Only deprivations without due process of law are protected. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, (1984)(shakedown of prison inmate not actionable unless solely for the purpose of harassing or humiliating plaintiff) http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:mOG9ycDK1QwJ:www.pittslaw.com/_pittslaw.09_/Pages/civil_rights_claims.html+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a
Nye Frank

Diigo & Google - 0 views

  •  
    There is much litigation over the question whether a particular wrong allegedly perpetrated by a defendant upon a plaintiff is the type of conduct that the civil rights act was designed to remedy. Many claimed infractions of the law do not give rise to a civil rights violation. Suit is allowed only if the defendant deprives a person of his or her rights under the federal laws or the United States Constitution. Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 384 N.W.2d 333 (1986). The civil rights statute does not create any substantive rights. Penterman v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997). The procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment will only be triggered if state action implicates a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property. Board of Regents v. Roth, 498 U.S. 564 (1972)(no constitutional tort was involved in non-renewal of contract of non-tenured teacher). Nothing in the 14th Amendment protects against all government deprivations of life, liberty or property. Only deprivations without due process of law are protected. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, (1984)(shakedown of prison inmate not actionable unless solely for the purpose of harassing or humiliating plaintiff) http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:mOG9ycDK1QwJ:www.pittslaw.com/_pittslaw.09_/Pages/civil_rights_claims.html+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a
Nye Frank

Diigo & Google - 0 views

  •  
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

  •  
    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
  • ...4 more comments...
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
  •  
    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
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    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
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    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
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    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

conspiracy case 99-6050 -- U.S. v. Rahseparian -- 11/07/2000 - 0 views

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    SEYMOUR , Chief Judge. After a joint jury trial, co-defendants Ardashir (aka Ardie) and Daryoush (aka Steve), along with Jalal (aka Jack) Rahseparian, were convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. All three appealed. Jack's appeal is addressed in the companion opinion, see United States v. Rahseparian, No. 99-6031 (Nov. 7, 2000). Ardie contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Ardie and Steve contend a new trial is necessary due to the prosecutor's comment on their failure to testify in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Steve further claims a new trial is required because of certain incriminating hearsay statements elicited by the prosecutor in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). We affirm. I BACKGROUND Ardie and Steve Rahseparian are the sons of Jack Rahseparian. At the time of the conduct for which they were charged, Steve resided in Altoona, Pennsylvania, Ardie resided in Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Jack resided and worked in Shawnee, Oklahoma. The government contended at trial that Ardie and Steve Rahseparian formed Genesis Marketing, a telemarketing company, through which they and their father conspired to commit and did commit mail fraud from May 1994 to May 1995. The government further successfully argued that Ardie, Steve, and Jack Rahseparian laundered the proceeds from the telemarketing scheme through Jack's business checking accounts. Brad Russell, the company's only employee other than the Rahseparians themselves, testified on behalf of the government. Mr. Russell was a personal friend of Ardie. The two worked out of Ardie's apartment in Fort Smith as the sole telemarketers for Genesis Marketing. Mr. Russell testified that he and Ardie would entice customers over the telephone to buy products, such as water purifiers and "Say No to Drugs" kits, at highly inflated pric
Nye Frank

Civil Rights Claims In Wisconsin | Wisconsin Attorney's | PittsLaw.com - 0 views

  • 120 day notice of claim requirement, qualified immunities for discretionary conduct by governmental employees, and a limitation of damages provision in the amount of $50,000.00 that applies to most state law claims
  • Whether state or federal qualified immunity for discretionary acts might shield a defendant from liability under the civil rights act depends on whether the defendant violates a plaintiff’s clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Allen v. Guerrero, 276 Wis.2d 679, 688 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 2004)(deliberately holding a person in prison beyond a statutorily prescribed release date violates the 8th Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment). The plaintiff must prove unconstitutional conduct and that the applicable constitutional standards were clearly established at the time in question. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)(excessive force during an arrest); Newsome v McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003)(procurement of false testimony); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996)(high speed chase by police).  
  •   The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the $50,000.00 municipal liability cap on damages prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) does not apply in a civil rights lawsuit.  Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983). Wisconsin’s state law that puts a $350,000 cap on damages for loss of society and companionship arising out of the death of an adult family member or a $500,000 cap on damages for loss of society and companionship of a minor is likewise inapplicable in a civil rights case. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984
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    Whether state or federal qualified immunity for discretionary acts might shield a defendant from liability under the civil rights act depends on whether the defendant violates a plaintiff's clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Allen v. Guerrero, 276 Wis.2d 679, 688 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 2004)(deliberately holding a person in prison beyond a statutorily prescribed release date violates the 8th Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment). The plaintiff must prove unconstitutional conduct and that the applicable constitutional standards were clearly established at the time in question. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)(excessive force during an arrest); Newsome v McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003)(procurement of false testimony); Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996)(high speed chase by police). http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:mOG9ycDK1QwJ:www.pittslaw.com/_pittslaw.09_/Pages/civil_rights_claims.html+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a
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27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing ... - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
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    1. pecialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... Latest Major Action: 4/27/2009 Referred to House subcommittee. ... thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 2. View Bill | C-SPAN Congressional Chronicle, Created by Cable ... 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 448 . ... www.c-spanarchives.org/congress/?q=node/77535&id... - Cached - Similar - 3. Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs .... Latest Major Action: 1/27/2009 Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. ... www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 4. CD2 Trent Franks | Arizona Congress Watch H. R. 448, the Elder Abuse Victims Act, passed the House 397 - 25. The bill seeks to protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... www.azcongresswatch.com/?cat=18 - Cached - Similar - 5. [DOC] Intricate File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML The Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009 (H.R.448), sponsored by Representative ... protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities .... The amendment was proposed on April 23, 2009, and considered by the Senate on April 27. ... www.ncea.aoa.gov/NCEAroot/Main_Site/.../May_Newsletter.doc - Simi
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    1. pecialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... Latest Major Action: 4/27/2009 Referred to House subcommittee. ... thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 2. View Bill | C-SPAN Congressional Chronicle, Created by Cable ... 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 448 . ... www.c-spanarchives.org/congress/?q=node/77535&id... - Cached - Similar - 3. Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs .... Latest Major Action: 1/27/2009 Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. ... www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 4. CD2 Trent Franks | Arizona Congress Watch H. R. 448, the Elder Abuse Victims Act, passed the House 397 - 25. The bill seeks to protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... www.azcongresswatch.com/?cat=18 - Cached - Similar - 5. [DOC] Intricate File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML The Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009 (H.R.448), sponsored by Representative ... protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities .... The amendment was proposed on April 23, 2009, and considered by the Senate on April 27. ... www.ncea.aoa.gov/NCEAroot/Main_Site/.../May_Newsletter.doc - S
Nye Frank

California Codes - California Attorney Resources - California Laws - 0 views

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    Court Opinions US Supreme Court US Tax Court Board of Patent Appeals State Laws Alabama Arizona California Florida Georgia Illinois Indiana Massachusetts Michigan Nevada New Jersey New York North Carolina Oregon Pennsylvania Texas Virginia Washington US Code Copyrights Crimes Labor Patents Shipping US Constitution Preamble Art. I - Legislative Art. II - Executive Art. III - Judicial Art. IV - States' Relations Art. V - Mode of Amendment Art. VI - Prior Debts Art VII - Ratification California Codes Legal Research Home > California Lawyer Sponsored Links California Constitution . (Cal. Const.) California Business and Professions Code . (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code) California Civil Code . (Cal. Civ. Code) California Code of Civil Procedure . (Cal. Civ. Proc.) California Commercial Code . (Cal. Com. Code) California Corporations Code . (Cal. Corp. Code) California Education Code . (Cal. Educ. Code) California Elections Code . (Cal. Elec. Code) California Evidence Code . (Cal. Evid. Code) California Family Code . (Cal. Fam. Code) California Financial Code . (Cal. Fin. Code) California Fish and Game Code . (Cal. Fish & Game Code) California Food and Agricultural Code . (Cal. Food & Agric. Code) California Government Code . (Cal. Gov't Code) California Harbors and Navigation Code . (Cal. Harb. & Nav. Code) California Health and Safety Code . (Cal. Health & Safety Code) California Insurance Code . (Cal. Ins. Code) California Labor Code . (Cal. Lab. Code) California Military and Veterans Code . (Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code) California Penal Code . (Cal. Penal Code) California Pr
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27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing ... - 0 views

  •  
    le Advanced Search Preferences Web Hide optionsShow options... Results 1 - 10 of about 161 for 27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and a. (0.55 seconds) Search Results Results include your SearchWiki notes for 27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and a. Share these notes Copy and paste this link into an email or IM: See a preview of the shared page 1. STOP ELDER ABUSE - SUPPORT VICTIMS ACT- HR 448 - The Petition Site To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... www.thepetitionsite.com/.../support-the-elder-abuse-victims-act---hr-448 - Cached - Similar - 2. Stop Elder Abuse - PASS Elder Abuse Victims Act HR 448 - The ... To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid .... 2:27 pm PDT, Jun 26, Susanne Prahl, Wisconsin Elder Abuse must be addressed! ... www.thepetitionsite.com/.../stop-elder-abuse---pass-elder-abuse-victims-act-hr-448 - Cached - Similar - 3. H.R.448: Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009 - U.S.... OpenCongress To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h448/show - Cached - Similar - 4. Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... Latest Major Action: 4/27/2009 Referred to House subcommittee. ... thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin
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    le Advanced Search Preferences Web Hide optionsShow options... Results 1 - 10 of about 161 for 27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and a. (0.55 seconds) Search Results Results include your SearchWiki notes for 27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and a. Share these notes Copy and paste this link into an email or IM: See a preview of the shared page 1. STOP ELDER ABUSE - SUPPORT VICTIMS ACT- HR 448 - The Petition Site To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... www.thepetitionsite.com/.../support-the-elder-abuse-victims-act---hr-448 - Cached - Similar - 2. Stop Elder Abuse - PASS Elder Abuse Victims Act HR 448 - The ... To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid .... 2:27 pm PDT, Jun 26, Susanne Prahl, Wisconsin Elder Abuse must be addressed! ... www.thepetitionsite.com/.../stop-elder-abuse---pass-elder-abuse-victims-act-hr-448 - Cached - Similar - 3. H.R.448: Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009 - U.S.... OpenCongress To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h448/show - Cached - Similar - 4. Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... Latest Major Action: 4/27/2009 Referred to House subcommittee. ... thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin
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Duke Law Journal: Krista M. Enns, Can A California Litigant Prevail In An Action For Le... - 0 views

  • Part IV acknowledges the tension between the difficulty of proving causation in legal malpractice actions and one of the goals of legal malpractice, which is to allow litigants recovery when their attorneys are negligent. The part then considers the "loss of chance" doctrine, which is used in medical malpractice cases, as a possible alternative to the rigorous "but for" causation requirement in legal malpractice. Since a shift away from the "but for" standard is likely to cause more problems than it solves, and because adequate protections already exist for litigants, Part IV argues that the current causation requirements should be maintained for litigants who allege that they suffered an injury during Supreme Court oral argument. [*pg 115]
    • Nye Frank
       
      that lawyers with previous experience before the Court prevail "substantially more often."57 Data from the Solicitor General's office also support this theory http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?48+Duke+L.+J.+111
  • The opportunity to convince [the Justices] of the merits of your position is at its highpoint."47
  • See 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 15, § 29.41, at 772 ("In presenting the underlying appeal in the subsequent legal malpractice action, the parties must specify the issues that should have been urged in the underlying action."). Failure to specify the issues is a failure to prove causation. See id. 146. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 147. See Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975). 148. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 153 (Ct. App. 1968). The attorney's action need not be the sole cause of the client's loss, just a substantial factor. See id. at 153 n.7. 149. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
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      Results 1 - 10 for Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure with Safesearch on. (0.23 seconds) Ads by Google Federal Criminal Rules Federal Criminal Code and Rules 2009 Edition, $75.65 Free shipping. West.Thomson.com Local Court Rules For Lawyers - Find Current Law Requirements For US Courts! www.SmartRules.com/California Los Angeles, CA Federal civil procedure The FRCP and E-Dsicovery Free white paper here! ClearwellSystems.com California Tax Jackson Hewitt File Your Tax Free with E-File Tax Preperation Only As Low as $20 secure.jacksonhewitt.com/loc Los Angeles, CA Compliance with FRCP Legal grade email archiving system from MX Logic helps with compliance www.mxlogic.com Criminal Laws Expert in DUI, Drugs, Theft & More. 13 Yrs Criminal Defense. Call Now. www.SoCalCriminalLawyer.com Los Angeles, CA Buy the Book from Amazon Criminal law and procedure Free Shipping Avail. Aff www.amazon.com Federal Criminal Charges Federal Criminal Defense Firm Call If Feds Are Coming After You. McNabbAssociates.com Instant Criminal Records $18.95 Easy, Accurate, Confidential The Definitive Criminal Database IntegraScan.com California Custom Search Federal RulemakingFederal Rules of Civil Procedure (modified w/hyperlinks & bookmarks)(PDF). Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (modified w/hyperlinks & bookmarks)(PDF) ... www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules4.html LII: Federal Rules of Criminal ProcedureFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure (2009). (incorporating the amendment that took effect Dec. 1, 2008). I. APPLICABILITY. II. PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS ... www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/ The United States House of Representatives Committee On The JudiciaryJurisdiction over measures relating to law, courts and judges, Constitutional amendments, immigration, patents and trademarks, interstate compacts, ... judiciary.house.gov/ Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law SchoolUpdates for Federal Rules: Evidence (Sept. 19, 2008), Civil Procedure, Criminal
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    that lawyers with previous experience before the Court prevail "substantially more often."57 Data from the Solicitor General's office also support this theory http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?48+Duke+L.+J.+111
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Defense attorney claims he has proof of misconduct by Santa Clara County prosecutors - ... - 0 views

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questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

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    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
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SB 1343 Witness testimony: support persons: elder abuse. - Google Search - 0 views

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    Requires each member of the designated agency of the State Bar responsible for evaluation of judicial candidates to complete a minimum of training in fairness and bias.
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    FISCAL COMMITTEE: yes URGENCY CLAUSE: no INTRODUCED: 02/15/2008 LAST AMEND: 08/04/2008 DISPOSITION: Failed - Adjourned LOCATION: Senate Appropriations Committee SUMMARY: Requires that information related to deaths of children and adults with disabilities killed as a result of domestic violence be examined by Child, Domestic Violence, and Elder Death Review Teams. Includes within the authority of an Elder Death Review Team, the review of dependent adult deaths. Relates to reporting of suspected abuse or neglect involving persons with developmental disabilities to local law enforcement. Requires the Office of Emergency Services to convene a working group on such crimes. STATUS: 08/07/2008 In SENATE Committee on APPROPRIATIONS: Not heard. PRIVATE FILE: CVUC POSITION: SUPPORT
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