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中国国家数字地震台网的精细分析结果和美国地质调查局的监测结果都显示，汶川地震震源深度10公里，属浅层地震，具有巨大的破坏性。

Dr. Yu started his remarks by underlining how Hu Jintao, only a year after he was made vice-president, made his national debut in 1999 following the Belgrade bombing—at the height of anti-American protests—and urged for calm and reason from the angry mobs when then-President Jiang Zemin was at the height of his power. Hu’s show of grace, which stood in strong contrast to the often crass measures descriptive of Jiang’s leadership, has led some notable China watchers to predict that Hu is a visionary leader. However, Dr. Yu argues that Hu is not visionary, and the hysteria against the Dalai Lama is an example of Hu’s pedantry of the traditional Chinese political psyche.

Central bank purchases of traditional reserve assets still dwarf sovereign wealth fund purchases of riskier assets -- as well as central bank purchases of equities. But over time, it is reasonable to expect that many over-reserved sovereigns will diversify their portfolios. The recent decision to increase the share of the CIC's initial $205-210 billion in capital that it can invest abroad and SAFE's increased willingness to purchase equities as well as bonds are examples.

A far more challenging issue is how the huge increase in financial assets managed by potentially non-economic agents will affect the efficiency of the global capital market and the allocation of risk and resources. ….

And then there is China. China enormous foreign asset growth in the first quarter implies that it might be able to add more to its reserves and sovereign fund in 2008 than all the oil-exporters combined even if oil stays at its current levels.

It is commonly argued that growing economic ties tend to create common interests that will reduce tension between nations (see FT's Alphaville). The enormous amount China has lent to the US -- a total that the US data (which tends to underestimate Chinese holdings) now puts above $1 trillion -- will, according to this view, prevent other sources of conflict from getting out of hand. Alas, relations between creditors and debtors are rarely quite so free of tension. Creditors want to get paid back in full. Debtors would rather pay back at little as possible. Mei Xinyu, a senior researcher under the Chinese commerce ministry writing in a personal capacity for the Shanghai Daily, argues that China needs to put pressure on the US at the Strategic Economic Dialogue to do more defend the dollar. With the dollar at 1.60 against the euro, it isn't hard to see why. Mei goes on to argue that if the US doesn't do more to defend the dollar, it is effectively defaulting on China.

Mei's complaint, in other words, should be directed in part at China's own policy makers. When they bought long-term US dollar-denominated debt they took the risk that the dollar would depreciate over time. They effectively gave the US the option to pay China back in depreciated dollars. What's more, they didn't charge a premium for the option. That was China's own choice. China wanted to keep the RMB down even if that meant over-paying for US assets.

China, for complicated reasons, has decided to lend to the US in US dollars and to lend to Europe in euros and pounds. China's European lending - incidentally -- could prove to be as risky as lending to the US in dollars; SAFE and the CIC are really over paying for euros.

As the world’s attention turns to Buddhist protests against Chinese rule and cultural domination in Tibet, another neighbor of China is protesting in a less peaceful manner. In Mongolia, anti-Chinese sentiment has taken a nasty turn. The neo-Nazi group Blue Mongolia, for example, shaves the heads of women caught sleeping with Chinese men. “It is for their own good,” says Gansuren Damdinsuren, a Blue Mongolia board member.  “A small nation can only survive by keeping its blood pure.”

To the point that we have accepted this fact and feel it’s a logical thing to do for everyone and our nation. What’s happening even is that people are self-censoring and self-policing on media and speech without government.

熊培云认为，在一个不尽如人意的社会里，并不需要暴力、流血的“先破坏后建设”，而最为可取（也是唯一可取）的就是对局部的改良，是以开放来促进改革，宏观的不好的东西可以化为具体的细微举措来促进其发展，与外界文明的交流和对其营养的吸收也会发展本国的社会与政治。今日之中国，需要一步一步地、一点一滴地、渐进地进步。

具体到个人，就要求每个人对其所参与的社会不能丧失信心，个人要做的是：在不自由的世界里一点点地争取自由，在不宽容的社会里先让自己拥有宽容之心，在集体绝望的处境中先进行自救——就像他时常引用胡适引自易卜生的那句：“有时候我觉得这个世界就好像大海上翻船，最要紧的是救出我自己。”个体的幸福不可能指望全由社会给予，而更多的需要自救，像是所有被投入集中营的人们不能指望辛格勒这样的天使的救助；而更需要像《美丽人生》的主人公圭多一样，在绝望的环境中和儿子做“游戏”。

上面的英文写道“A Tib-etan monk was dragged away by the police in Katmandu, Nepal, on Monday during a rally at United Nations offices”。“在尼泊尔加德满都，一位在联合国门前示威的藏喇嘛正在被拖走”。 这个错误被发现后，纽约时报又换了一张照片。 事件讨论现场。 讽刺的是，当人们（包括本人）斗牛士一样，兴奋地批评西方媒体新闻误导的时候，连那个地名的汉字和英文都不敢直接写，只能写成“西囧藏”。

With large numbers of Chinese officials handling foreign affairs and nationality issues, there is no way that China could not understand what the Dalai Lama says. It is the Dalai Lama and his government in exile, who do not understand China. Just last week, before the latest demonstrations began, China accused the Dalai Lama of working to sabotage the Beijing Olympics. The reaction was exactly what China wanted: the Dalai Lama declared his firm support for China’s Olympics.

In India, the Dalai Lama's stated uncertainty about selecting his successor, combined with the fractures that lie under the surface of the exiled community, may make it likely that at his passing he will leave a resident Tibetan refugee community adrift. For all of his missteps in dealing with China, the Dalai Lama's achievement in securing the cohesion and stability of the exiled community is considerable. And he is the most universally recognisable symbol of Tibet. Given what has just transpired in Tibet, China feels that the elimination of that symbol can come none too soon.

This lack of freedom stunts any real debate on the future of China. Thinking is still circumscribed. There are areas that are still taboo or where intellectuals can only hint at what they mean. In three vital spheres, this is deeply damaging to China’s national interest. The first is foreign policy. China has evolved in less than a generation into a world power, one now placed alongside America in a newly minted category of G2. But the country is uncertain how to exercise this power. And as long as the party restricts the debate to a known ideological framework, it cannot mobilise China’s vast intellectual capabilities to address this. The second area, intellectual property, is equally damaged. As long as there is no real freedom to question the foundations of society, China will not produce innovators. It will be able to copy and develop, but not to outstrip competitors and set the framework for the world. And the third area is the legitimate assertion of religious and regional identities alongside Chinese citizenship.