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anonymous

Rand and Empirical Responsibility 14 - 0 views

aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/...pirical-responsibility-14.html

objectivism criticalthinking

shared by anonymous on 24 Feb 11 - Cached
  • If Rand's statement was meant as a definition, she is guilty of equivocation; for she does not always stick to that particular usage.
  • Whether such esteem is based on a reliance of one's power to think is an assertion about matters of fact that requires evidence.
  • “Only a rationally selfish man, a man of self-esteem, is capable of love.”
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • This statement packs three assertions, any one of which could easily be dismissed on empirical grounds. It assumes that, in order to be capable of love, one must be (1) rational, (2) selfish and (3) a man of self-esteem. Does Rand provide any evidence of these assertions? No. Indeed, they are hardly plausible. If Rand's view was true, we would have to conclude that most people are incapable of love. Would any sane person actually believe such a thing?
  • “Humility is not a recognition of one’s failings, but a rejection of morality.”
  • Rand's tendency to redefine terms, not merely for herself, but for others, constitutes an egregious intellectual vice. She is, in effect, putting words in other people mouths and then condemning them on that basis.
  • anonymous on 24 Feb 11
     
    ""Self-esteem is reliance on one's power to think." It's not clear whether this is meant as a definition or as a statement of fact. Objectivists often confuse the one with the other. A definition merely defines how a term is used. One may define one's terms as one pleases, but once a definition is granted, one needs to stay consistent to the usuage. If Rand's statement was meant as a definition, she is guilty of equivocation; for she does not always stick to that particular usage."
anonymous

The Significance of Libya's Gulf of Sidra Energy Assets | STRATFOR - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...ibyas-gulf-sidra-energy-assets

stratfor geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 23 Feb 11 - Cached
  • The directors of several oil companies in the Gulf of Sidra region of eastern Libya announced they were splitting from embattled leader Moammar Gadhafi and had “pledged loyalty to the people,” Zawya Dow Jones reported Feb. 23.
  • Currently, the fluid situation in eastern Libya makes it difficult to draw boundaries between cities controlled by pro- and anti-Gadhafi forces. While there appears to be an east-to-west domino effect, protests are still contained in individual cities, and their success in recruiting the support of local tribes, military forces or business leaders is different from city to city. Geographic limitations will further constrain the ability of protesters in these cities to coalesce for a push westward.
  • It is still very early in the conflict, and there is no indication that anti-Gadhafi forces are consolidating in eastern Libya, but control of the Gulf of Sidra could provide crucial strategic depth to a region of Libya that is breaking away from Tripoli’s control.
  • anonymous on 23 Feb 11
     
    "The heads of several oil companies in eastern Libya's Gulf of Sidra region announced Feb. 23 they had "pledged loyalty to the people" and were splitting from Moammar Gadhafi's regime. The Gulf of Sidra is critical to Libya's energy exports and its major ports handle approximately 77 percent of Libya's oil exports. It is still very early in the conflict, but if eastern forces gain control over this region, it could provide crucial strategic depth in their fight against Tripoli."
anonymous

Revolution and the Muslim World - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...21-revolution-and-muslim-world

stratfor geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 23 Feb 11 - Cached
  • There have been moments in history where revolution spread in a region or around the world as if it were a wildfire.
  • Each had a basic theme.
  • But in the end, the reasons behind them could reasonably be condensed into a sentence or two.
  • ...28 more annotations...
  • The key is that in each country where they took place, there were significant differences in the details — but they shared core principles at a time when other countries were open to those principles, at least to some extent.
  • The Muslim countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have been the prime focus of these risings, and in particular North Africa where Egypt, Tunisia and now Libya have had profound crises.
  • The key principle that appears to be driving the risings is a feeling that the regimes, or a group of individuals within the regimes, has deprived the public of political and, more important, economic rights — in short, that they enriched themselves beyond what good taste permitted.
  • Why has it come together now?
  • One reason is that there was a tremendous amount of regime change in the region from the 1950s through the early 1970s, as the Muslim countries created regimes to replace foreign imperial powers and were buffeted by the Cold War.
  • More than anything, if we want to define this wave of unrest, particularly in North Africa, it is a rising against regimes — and particularly individuals — who have been in place for extraordinarily long periods of time.
  • In this case, the question of greatest importance is not why these revolutions are taking place, but who will take advantage of them.
  • In this case, whatever the cause of the risings, there is no question that radical Islamists will attempt to take advantage and control of them. Why wouldn’t they? It is a rational and logical course for them.
  • Whether they will be able to do so is a more complex and important question, but that they would want to and are trying to do so is obvious.
  • But while there is no question that Islamists would like to take control of the revolution, that does not mean that they will, nor does it mean that these revolutions will be successful. Recall that 1848 and 1968 were failures and those who tried to take advantage of them had no vehicle to ride. Also recall that taking control of a revolution is no easy thing. But as we saw in Russia in 1917, it is not necessarily the more popular group that wins, but the best organized. And you frequently don’t find out who is best organized until afterwards.
  • Democratic revolutions have two phases.
  • The first is the establishment of democracy. The second is the election of governments.
  • So there are three crosscurrents here.
  • The first is the reaction against corrupt regimes. The second is the election itself. And the third? The United States needs to remember, as it applauds the rise of democracy, that the elected government may not be what one expected.
  • pictures of peaceful demonstrators are not nearly as significant as the media will have you believe, but pictures of demonstrators continuing to hold their ground after being fired on is very significant.
  • This leads to the key event in the revolution. The revolutionaries cannot defeat armed men. But if those armed men, in whole or part, come over to the revolutionary side, victory is possible. And this is the key event.
  • In Libya, the military has split wide open.
  • If the split in the military is roughly equal and deep, this could lead to civil war.
  • Far more common is for the military to split. If the split creates an overwhelming anti-regime force, this leads to the revolution’s success.
  • It is this act, the military and police coming over to the side of the demonstrators, that makes or breaks a revolution.
  • Therefore, looking at the students on TV tells you little. Watching the soldiers tells you much more.
  • The danger is not radical Islam, but chaos, followed either by civil war, the military taking control simply to stabilize the situation or the emergence of a radical Islamic party to take control — simply because they are the only ones in the crowd with a plan and an organization. That’s how minorities take control of revolutions.
  • Only in the case of Eastern Europe do we see broad revolutionary success, but that was against an empire in collapse, so few lessons can be drawn from that for the Muslim world.
  • democracy and pro-Western political culture do not mean the same thing.
  • There are three possibilities.
  • One is that this is like 1848, a broad rising that will fail for lack of organization and coherence, but that will resonate for decades.
  • The second is 1968, a revolution that overthrew no regime even temporarily and left some cultural remnants of minimal historical importance.
  • The third is 1989, a revolution that overthrew the political order in an entire region, and created a new order in its place.
  • anonymous on 23 Feb 11
     
    "The Muslim world, from North Africa to Iran, has experienced a wave of instability in the last few weeks. No regimes have been overthrown yet, although as of this writing, Libya was teetering on the brink."
anonymous

Libya: Signs of an Army-led Ouster in the Works | STRATFOR - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...ya-signs-army-led-ouster-works

stratfor geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 23 Feb 11 - Cached
  • Based on allegations that Gadhafi ordered the Libyan air forces to bomb civilian opposition targets, many high-level Libyan defectors, including Libyan Ambassador to the United States Ali Suleiman Aujali, have been calling on the UNSC to declare a no-fly zone over Libya and for the United States to enforce the zone.
  • Ultimately, without a strong regime at the helm, the loyalties of Libya’s army officers are more likely to fall to their respective tribes. At that point, the potential for civil war increases considerably.
  • the Libyan situation cannot be viewed as a replication of the crisis management employed by the military in Egypt.
  • anonymous on 23 Feb 11
     
    "STRATFOR has picked up on a number of signs that an army-led faction in Libya is attempting to oust Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi and install a new Revolutionary Command Council made up of public and military figures to administer the country. Unlike the situation in Egypt, a military intervention in Libya has a much lower chance of success."
anonymous

Unrest in the Middle East: A Special Report - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...est-middle-east-special-report

stratfor geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 17 Feb 11 - Cached
  • High youth unemployment, a lack of political representation, repressive police states, a lack of housing and rising commodity prices are among the more common complaints voiced by protesters across the region.
  • Regime responses to those complaints also have been relatively consistent, including subsidy handouts; changes to the government, in many cases cosmetic; promises of job growth, electoral reform, and a repeal of emergency rule
  • states also has unique circumstances
  • ...18 more annotations...
  • In the past several days Egypt has not witnessed a popular revolution but a carefully managed succession by the military.
  • It must be recognized that the succession crisis in Egypt was playing out between the country’s military elite and Mubarak well before protests began in Egypt on Jan. 25.
  • The demonstrators, encouraged by both internal and external pro-democracy groups, were in fact a critical tool the military used to maneuver Mubarak out while preserving the regime.
  • Though Tunisia had some domestic pro-democracy groups before unrest began in December 2010, Tunisia saw one of the region’s more organic uprisings.
  • The ouster of Ben Ali and his family and a reshuffling of the government for now have calmed most of the unrest. A sense of normalcy is gradually returning as Tunisians look ahead to as-yet unscheduled elections due sometime in 2011.
  • In all likelihood, Tunisia will end up with another government dominated by many of the former Ben Ali elites, albeit with a democratic face.
  • While the civil unrest will continue to capture the cameras’ attention, the real struggle in Algeria is not playing out in the streets. A power struggle has long been under way between the country’s increasingly embattled president, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, and the head of the Military Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DRS), Gen. Mohamed “Toufik” Mediene.
  • Not by coincidence, one of the main organizers of the demonstrations, Saeed Saidi (a Berber) is known to be on excellent terms with Mediene, also a Berber. The call for Berber rights — Berbers make up roughly one-third of the Algerian population — has been one of the leading drivers of the demonstrations thus far.
  • Now, however, a recently-created Facebook group known as “Moroccans for Change” has called for a nationwide protest Feb. 20, something the government of King Mohammed VI has responded to by meeting with opposition parties and promising to speed up the pace of economic, social and political reforms.
  • In one of its main demands, the opposition has called for a new constitution that would strip power from the monarchy and from the network of state and business elites known as the Makhzen.
  • In sum, the planned demonstrations in Morocco are illustrations of opportunism as opposed to a serious potential popular uprising — much less regime change.
  • King Abdullah II acted quickly to pre-empt major civil unrest in the country by handing out millions of dollars in subsidies and by forming a new government.
  • Bahrain was the first among Persian Gulf countries to witness significant demonstrations, and protesters clashed with riot police early on. After two days of demonstrations led by Shiite opposition groups, a heavy crackdown was launched on Pearl Square in the heart of Manama late Feb. 16 on mostly Shiite protesters who were camping overnight.
  • The ruling Sunni family may be a minority in the Shiite-majority country, but some 54 percent of the population is made up of foreign guest workers, who are notably not taking part in the demonstrations.
  • Poor socio-economic conditions, high youth unemployment (around 26 percent) and disillusionment with the regime are all notable factors in the development of Iran’s opposition movement, but as STRATFOR stressed in 2009, the primarily youth-driven, middle- and upper-class opposition in Tehran is not representative of the wider population, a significant portion of which is supportive of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
  • The civil unrest in Libya is unlikely to pose a meaningful threat to the regime, but it could impact the country’s ongoing power-struggle between Gadhafi’s two sons.
  • In attempt to take the steam out of the political opposition, Saleh has announced that he will not run for re-election in 2013, and that he would do away with pending amendments that would have abolished presidential term limits.
  • Soon after the unrest in Egypt broke out, Syrian opposition youth activists (most of whom are based outside the country) attempted to organize their own “Day of Rage” via social media to challenge the al Assad regime.
  • anonymous on 17 Feb 11
     
    "Footage of self-immolations in Algeria, clashes between police and protesters in Yemen and Bahrain, government reshufflings in Jordan and fledgling street demonstrations in Iran could lead to the impression of a domino effect under way in the Middle East in which aging autocrats are on the verge of being uprooted by Tunisia-inspired revolutionary fervor. A careful review of unrest in the Middle East and North Africa , however, exposes a very different picture. "
anonymous

Rand and Empirical Responsibility 13 - 0 views

aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/...pirical-responsibility-13.html

objectivism criticalthinking

shared by anonymous on 15 Feb 11 - Cached
  • How, for example, does she know that intellectual appeasement is merely an attempt to apologize for being concerned about intellectual matters? Where would she get such a notion? Where on earth does she come up with the idea that intellectual appeasement involves an "escape from loneliness"? What evidence does she have that such is the case?
  • “Tribalism is … a logical consequence of modern philosophy.” This is a specific application of Rand's theory of history. The trouble with such statements is that, because they are so broad and sweeping, they can neither be corroborated or refuted by empirical evidence.
  • it is far more plausible to suppose that tribalism is a hard-wired feature of human nature, prominent in many human beings, and only weaker or non-existent within the exceptional few.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Philosophy, as Nietzsche noticed more than hundred years ago and which cognitive science and experimental psychology continues to corroborate, often degenerates into a mere rationalization of the the desires, sentiments, and interests that afflict various strains of human nature.
  • anonymous on 15 Feb 11
     
    "Rand, despite her cluelessness about human nature, nevertheless couldn't help tossing off wildly speculative remarks about the more obscure motivations of the human animal."
anonymous

Egypt: The Distance Between Enthusiasm and Reality - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...between-enthusiasm-and-reality

egypt geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 14 Feb 11 - Cached
  • What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power. This isn’t incompatible with democratic reform. Organizing elections, political parties and candidates is not something that can be done quickly. If the military is sincere in its intentions, it will have to do these things. The problem is that if the military is insincere it will do exactly the same things. Six months is a long time, passions can subside and promises can be forgotten.
  • Power rests with the regime, not with the crowds. In our view, the crowds never had nearly as much power as many have claimed.
  • In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is odd to consider this a revolution.
  • ...11 more annotations...
  • The crowd in Cairo, as telegenic as it was, was the backdrop to the drama, not the main feature.
  • Mubarak’s decision to name his son represented a direct challenge to the Egyptian regime. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command, which had been the real power in the regime.
  • The demonstrators never called for the downfall of the regime. They demanded that Mubarak step aside. This was the same demand that was being made by many if not most officers in the military months before the crowds gathered in the streets.
  • What happened was not a revolution. The demonstrators never brought down Mubarak, let alone the regime. What happened was a military coup that used the cover of protests to force Mubarak out of office in order to preserve the regime. When it became clear Feb. 10 that Mubarak would not voluntarily step down, the military staged what amounted to a coup to force his resignation. Once he was forced out of office, the military took over the existing regime by creating a military council and taking control of critical ministries. The regime was always centered on the military. What happened on Feb. 11 was that the military took direct control.
  • We now face the question of whether the coup will turn into a revolution. The demonstrators demanded — and the military has agreed to hold — genuinely democratic elections and to stop repression. It is not clear that the new leaders mean what they have said or were simply saying it to get the crowds to go home.
  • First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society.
  • Second, the military is deeply enmeshed in running the country.
  • The largest number of protesters arrived in Tahrir Square after the Internet was completely shut down.
  • For all the chatter about the Egyptian people demanding democracy, the fact is that hardly anyone participated in the demonstrations, relative to the number of Egyptians there are, and no one really knows how the Egyptian people would vote on this issue.
  • The Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy as the man they forced out of office. They have promised democracy, but it is not clear that they mean it. If they mean it, it is not clear how they would do it, certainly not in a timeframe of a few months. Indeed, this means that the crowds may re-emerge demanding more rapid democratization, depending on who organized the crowds in the first place and what their intentions are now.
  • The week began with an old soldier running Egypt. It ended with different old soldiers running Egypt with even more formal power than Mubarak had. This has caused worldwide shock and awe. We were killjoys in 2009, when we said the Iranians revolution wasn’t going anywhere. We do not want to be killjoys now, since everyone is so excited and happy. But we should point out that, in spite of the crowds, nothing much has really happened yet in Egypt. It doesn’t mean that it won’t, but it hasn’t yet.
  • anonymous on 14 Feb 11
     
    "On Feb. 11, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned. A military council was named to govern in his place. On Feb. 11-12, the crowds that had gathered in Tahrir Square celebrated Mubarak's fall and the triumph of democracy in Egypt. On Feb. 13, the military council abolished the constitution and dissolved parliament, promising a new constitution to be ratified by a referendum and stating that the military would rule for six months, or until the military decides it's ready to hold parliamentary and presidential elections."
anonymous

The Strategy Behind the Military's Fourth Communique - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...nd-militarys-fourth-communique

geopolitics egypt

shared by anonymous on 13 Feb 11 - Cached
  • In other words, the military — and only the military — will be the one to prioritize the state’s agenda, which is likely to differ greatly from the order of priorities outlined by the opposition. The military council then vaguely expresses its “commitment” to the provisions of its previous statements (to meet the demands of the people) and then orders Egyptian citizens to return to work (and thus clear the streets).
  • the council is “committing the Egyptian Arab Republic to all regional and international obligations and treaties.” The military is specifically reassuring Israel and the United States that the 1978 peace accord will remain intact.
  • The military is being strategically vague in its promises to the people, yet direct in clearly articulating its demands to the people. The opposition’s reaction is thus critical to watch in the days ahead. If political forces begin to criticize the military for backtracking on promises and attempt to continue street demonstrations until their demands are met, they will not be met with the same tolerance the military exhibited while Muabrak was clinging onto power.
  • anonymous on 13 Feb 11
     
    "Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, now the caretakers of the state, issued its fourth communique Feb. 12. The language of the statement is deliberately vague enough to keep the opposition guessing, but, in line with STRATFOR's prediction, the military's interest in preserving the regime is overriding the opposition's demands for dismantling the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), revising the Constitution and, most importantly, holding fresh parliamentary elections in a timely manner."
anonymous

The Egyptian Military's Defining Moment - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...tian-militarys-defining-moment

egypt geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 11 Feb 11 - Cached
  • By the time the Egyptian ambassador to the United States cleared up the matter on CNN, the crowd felt betrayed and seemed no longer to care about the significant distinction. They did not want power to be ceded. They wanted Mubarak gone and they wanted the military to take care of the matter.
  • The fact that Mubarak was clinging to the constitution and the crowds were in effect calling for a coup represented a kind of irony, but ultimately not much of one.
  • There is a constitution and Mubarak is the president. If he is simply forced out, the status of the constitution is in doubt and with it, the regime that the military founded under Nasser. Mubarak wanted to serve out his term, but was prepared to cede practical power. That, from their point of view, should have been enough.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • The other argument was that at this point the crowds were not asking for regime change, remaining focused on Mubarak. If the military resisted and the crowds turned on them, they would be calling for regime change and with it, everything would be up in the air. Far better to violate the letter of the constitution and depose Mubarak, then risk destroying it all by protecting Mubarak; far better to capitulate to the crowds than to fire on them.
  • Both sides had the same fear — regime change.
  • The choices involved the fate of the nation and the military and one can imagine the arguments, people changing sides, decisions quickly reversed. The players were as confused as the observers.
  • anonymous on 11 Feb 11
     
    "It was a night of watching. What was being watched was the Egyptian military, faced with a defining moment. President Hosni Mubarak was expected to resign today. People ranging from the head of the CIA to Egyptian government officials to the crowds in the streets clearly expected it to happen. Obviously, word had leaked out from sources close to Mubarak that he had made the decision to go. Yet when he made his speech today, he did not resign. "
anonymous

Mubarak Transfers Some Powers - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...0210-mubarak-refuses-step-down

egypt geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 10 Feb 11 - Cached
  • Mubarak may still be attempting to hang onto power, but that does not mean the military does not have a plan. The military likely has anticipated the opposition’s complete rejection of Mubarak’s minor concessions. Thus, the coming hours will tell whether this is the reaction that the army is waiting for to legitimize their intervention, for if the military does not act, the next likely scenario is for the demonstrations to spiral out of control.
  • anonymous on 10 Feb 11
     
    "Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak delivered a speech the evening of Feb. 10 in which he announced that, while he would not resign, he would transfer some of his powers to Vice President Omar Suleiman. Mubarak also said he would repeal a three-decade-long state of emergency once the current security situation stabilizes. Once again, the embattled Egyptian president insisted on upholding his duty to the constitution in safeguarding the country until he can peacefully transfer the presidency through elections."
anonymous

Mubarak Stepping Down? - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...20110210-mubarak-stepping-down

egypt geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 10 Feb 11 - No Cached
  • Egyptian Prime Minister and former air force chief Ahmed Shafiq announced to BBC Arabic that discussions are under way for Mubarak to step down.
  • Gen. Hassan al-Roueini, the military commander for the Cairo area, reportedly told protesters in Tahrir Square, “All your demands will be met today.”
  • Then, Shafiq reportedly made a statement saying that Mubarak will in fact stay in his post as president and that Mubarak has not made a decision to step down.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • Curiously, no statements from Suleiman have been issued Feb. 10, even though Suleiman assumed de facto leadership of the regime Jan. 29.
  • The details are still extremely murky, but based on the conflicting statements thus far and rumors that have been circulating over the past several days of the army’s distrust of Suleiman as a successor to Mubarak, there appears to be a struggle under way within the regime elite, specifically between serving officers and former officers who have maintained close ties with Mubarak, such as Shafiq and Suleiman. The situation remains in flux, but the army appears ready to intervene in order to usher Mubarak out.
  • anonymous on 10 Feb 11
     
    "Conflicting statements out of Cairo on Feb. 10 suggest that a struggle is under way between the Egyptian military and civilian elite over Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's political exit."
anonymous

U.S. Handling of the Egyptian Crisis - 2 views

www.stratfor.com/...09-us-handling-egyptian-crisis

shared by anonymous on 10 Feb 11 - Cached
  • While behind the scenes, the United States was dealing closely with Egyptian military leaders who were appealing for restraint, in public, Washington was seen by many Arab leaders as dealing recklessly with the crisis.
  • On the one hand, it has a strategic need to keep Egypt’s military-dominated regime in place.
  • moreover it did not want to be caught on the wrong side of a brutal crackdown, and felt the need to maintain its image of supporting democratic popular demands.
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • Washington’s response, while confused at times, certainly has evolved.
  • Washington is becoming more critical of the regime’s failings, more supportive of the grievances of the protesters, and more vocal about the need for reforms in Egypt and even elsewhere in the region.
  • While behind the scenes, the United States was dealing closely with Egyptian military leaders who were appealing for restraint, in public, Washington was seen by many Arab leaders as dealing recklessly with the crisis.
  • On the one hand, it has a strategic need to keep Egypt’s military-dominated regime in place.
  • This U.S. administration in particular has put considerable effort into trying to reshape the U.S. image in the Islamic world.
  • Moreover, Washington was juggling among various relationships it had in Cairo in trying to shape a resolution to the crisis.
  • others with the military were split between the old guard elite and new guard, who spent much of their life training in the United States and had thus built strong relationships with Washington — hence the uncertainty and mixed signals from Washington
  • Washington appears to have caught its breath following the early days of the crisis and is seeking a more coherent policy — one that better balances the promotion of what it labels “universal values” with an understanding of strategic interests in the region.
  • No doubt the United States is fully aware of the danger of weakening the very allies that it is supposed to be buttressing in the contest with Iran, but it also sees that cracks are spreading across the facade of the old regimes, and a push toward a more pluralistic setup, to pacify the most frustrated elements in Arab societies, could be a lever that can ease pressure and avoid a catastrophic collapse.
  • The Arab states may view U.S. policy as detrimental to their interests, but the reality is that – aside from the significant amount of aid the United States provides to the Egyptian military — there are serious limits on the U.S. ability to shape the outcome of the current turmoil.
  • anonymous on 10 Feb 11
     
    "Wednesday saw a rising chorus of criticisms from Arab states over the United States' handling of the Egyptian crisis, specifically its perceived attempts to hasten President Hosni Mubarak's resignation. Reports indicate that Jordanian King Abdullah II, reshuffling his Cabinet amid fears of popular opposition inspired by Egyptian unrest, has called on the United States to promote a smooth transition in Egypt; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have meanwhile criticized the manner in which Washington has dealt with the situation in Egypt and the wider region. U.S. President Barack Obama spoke for a second time in as many weeks with Saudi King Abdullah, presumably about the direction of events and coordinating responses."
anonymous

WikiLeaks cables: Saudi Arabia cannot pump enough oil to keep a lid on prices - 0 views

www.guardian.co.uk/...-reserves-overstated-wikileaks

shared by anonymous on 09 Feb 11 - Cached
  • The cables, released by WikiLeaks, urge Washington to take seriously a warning from a senior Saudi government oil executive that the kingdom's crude oil reserves may have been overstated by as much as 300bn barrels – nearly 40%.
  • According to the cables, which date between 2007-09, Husseini said Saudi Arabia might reach an output of 12m barrels a day in 10 years but before then – possibly as early as 2012 – global oil production would have hit its highest point. This crunch point is known as "peak oil".
  • anonymous on 09 Feb 11
     
    "US diplomat convinced by Saudi expert that reserves of world's biggest oil exporter have been overstated by nearly 40%"
anonymous

Egypt, Israel and a Strategic Reconsideration - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...-and-strategic-reconsideration

geopolitics egypt

shared by anonymous on 08 Feb 11 - No Cached
  • without the foreign military forces along the frontiers, the Palestinians could trouble but not destroy Israel. Israel’s existence was not at stake, nor was it an issue for 33 years.
  • The danger that the Egyptian army posed was that it could close with the Israelis and engage in extended, high-intensity combat that would break the back of Israel Defense Forces by imposing a rate of attrition that Israel could not sustain.
  • It was to the great benefit of Israel that Egyptian forces were generally poorly commanded and trained and that Egyptian war-fighting doctrine, derived from Britain and the Soviet Union, was not suited to the battle problem Israel posed.
  • ...19 more annotations...
  • One of Israel’s fundamental assumptions was that Israeli intelligence would provide ample warning of an attack. And one of the fundamental assumptions of Israeli intelligence was that Egypt could not mount an attack while Israel maintained air superiority. Both assumptions were wrong.
  • Egypt had a greater interest in breaking its dependency on the Soviets than in defeating Israel. It could do the former more readily than the latter.
  • in the years after the treaty achieved two things.
  • First, they ended Egypt’s dependency on the Soviets. Second, they further guaranteed Israel’s security by creating an Egyptian army dependent on a steady flow of spare parts and contractors from the United States. Cut the flow and the Egyptian army would be crippled.
  • What is now regarded as corruption was then regarded as just rewards for bleeding in four wars against the Israelis.
  • But now is 33 years later, and the world has changed.
  • For this younger generation, the idea of Gamal Mubarak being allowed to take over the presidency was the last straw. They wanted the elder Mubarak to leave not only because he had ambitions for his son but also because he didn’t want to leave after more than a quarter century of pressure. Mubarak wanted guarantees that, if he left, his possessions, in addition to his honor, would remain intact. If Gamal could not be president, then no one’s promise had value. So Mubarak locked himself into position.
  • The cameras love demonstrations, but they are frequently not the real story.
  • The demonstrators who wanted democracy are a real faction, but they don’t speak for the shopkeepers and peasants more interested in prosperity than wealth.
  • I have laid out the reasons why the 1978 treaty is in Egypt’s national interest. I have left out two pieces.
  • The first is ideology. The ideological tenor of the Middle East prior to 1978 was secular and socialist. Today it is increasingly Islamist.
  • Second, military technology, skills and terrain have made Egypt a defensive power for the past 33 years. But military technology and skills can change, on both sides.
  • As new generations of officers arise, who have heard of war only from their grandfathers, the fear of war declines and the desire for glory grows.
  • Two things from this should strike the Israelis.
  • The first is how badly they need peace with Egypt.
  • The second lesson is that Israel should do everything possible to make certain that the transfer of power in Egypt is from Mubarak to the next generation of military officers and that these officers maintain their credibility in Egypt.
  • Given the strategic and ideological crosscurrents in Egypt, it is in Israel’s national interest to minimize the intensity of the ideological and make certain that Israel is not perceived as a threat.
  • The future of Gaza or the precise borders of a Palestinian state are trivial compared to preserving the treaty with Egypt.
  • There are those in Israel who would argue that any release in pressure on the Palestinians will be met with rejection. If that is true, then, in my view, that is catastrophic news for Israel. In due course, ideological shifts and recalculations of Israeli intentions will cause a change in Egyptian policy.
  • anonymous on 08 Feb 11
     
    "The events in Egypt have sent shock waves through Israel. The 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel have been the bedrock of Israeli national security. In three of the four wars Israel fought before the accords, a catastrophic outcome for Israel was conceivable. In 1948, 1967 and 1973, credible scenarios existed in which the Israelis were defeated and the state of Israel ceased to exist. In 1973, it appeared for several days that one of those scenarios was unfolding."
anonymous

U.S.-Brazil Tag Team Could Pique Beijing's Ire | STRATFOR - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...-team-could-pique-beijings-ire

geopolitics china brazil

shared by anonymous on 08 Feb 11 - Cached
  • China is using unilateral pro-export policies to flood foreign markets with its goods, undermining competitors, and it is using its massive cash surpluses to lock down foreign resources.
  • Even if Washington were not a military superpower on whose bad side Brazil would not want to be, the United States retains the world’s largest consumer market even with a relatively weak currency, and it imports a mix of Brazilian goods, rather than simply the raw materials.
  • anonymous on 08 Feb 11
     
    Geithner's comments in Sao Paulo gained extra attention because of the thinly veiled criticism of China's undervalued currency contained therein. Geithner said that the surge in capital flows into Brazil was not only the result of Brazil's rapid growth rates but has been intensified by "the policies of other emerging economies that are trying to sustain undervalued currencies, with tightly controlled exchange rate regimes." While Geithner has often pulled punches when speaking about China, and deliberately noted that China is not the only currency manipulator, nevertheless China remains the most conspicuous example of such exchange rate regimes and the obvious target of Geithner's comments. In short, he argued that because of nations like China with closed capital accounts and an exchange rate set by fiat, nations like Brazil are suffering excessive and rapid inflows that monetary policy is insufficient to control.
anonymous

Rand and Empirical Responsibility 12 - 0 views

aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/...pirical-responsibility-12.html

criticalthinking objectivism

shared by anonymous on 03 Feb 11 - Cached
  • Rand was always mistrustful of anything that smacked of "just knowing." She shared the rationalist's contempt for non-explicated knowledge.
  • In the first place, hardly anyone outside of Objectivism regards Rand's view of Kant as fair or accurate.
  • anonymous on 03 Feb 11
     
    ""The process of forming a concept is not complete until its constituent units have been integrated into a single mental unit by means of a specific word." This assertion reflects Rand's bias against tacit knowledge."
anonymous

The Egyptian Transition in a Quandary - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...1-egyptian-transition-quandary

egypt geopolitics

shared by anonymous on 02 Feb 11 - Cached
  • anonymous on 02 Feb 11
     
    "Egypt's beleaguered President Hosni Mubarak in his second address to the nation within four days announced Tuesday that he would not seek re-election in the presidential polls slated for September, but would oversee the transition of power to a more democratic system until then - a move that was immediately rejected by his opponents. Shortly thereafter, U.S. President Barack Obama called for an orderly transition that would include people from across the Egyptian political spectrum. The two leaders had talked earlier in the day."
anonymous

Mideast Turmoil: A Forecast Compilation - 0 views

www.futureatlas.com/...turmoil-a-forecast-compilation

geopolitics egypt

shared by anonymous on 31 Jan 11 - Cached
  • anonymous on 31 Jan 11
     
    "This is a roundup of some of the fast-accumulating forecasts for Egypt and the Middle East, particularly those taking a longer view (including some of my own)."
anonymous

Egypt's Protests and the Significance of Cairo's Stability - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...-significance-cairos-stability

geopolitics egypt

shared by anonymous on 31 Jan 11 - Cached
  • anonymous on 31 Jan 11
     
    "Protests continued in Egypt on Jan. 26, though there were fewer protesters in the streets than on the previous day. Protests alone will not bring down the Mubarak government, but they create a sense of disorder that the military or opposition groups could use to destabilize Cairo. Such destabilization - especially if it results in regime change, and especially as Cairo is preparing for a leadership change but has no set succession plan - would have implications in the Middle East and beyond."
anonymous

The Egypt Crisis in a Global Context: A Special Report - 0 views

www.stratfor.com/...lobal-context-a-special-report

geopolitics egypt

shared by anonymous on 31 Jan 11 - Cached
  • anonymous on 31 Jan 11
     
    "It is not at all clear what will happen in the Egyptian revolution. It is not a surprise that this is happening. Hosni Mubarak has been president for more than a quarter of a century, ever since the assassination of Anwar Sadat. He is old and has been ill. No one expected him to live much longer, and his apparent plan, which was that he would be replaced by his son, Gamal, was not going to happen even though it was a possibility a year ago. There was no one, save his closest business associates, who wanted to see Mubarak's succession plans happen. As his father weakened, Gamal's succession became even less likely. Mubarak's failure to design a credible succession plan guaranteed instability on his death. Since everyone knew that there would be instability on his death, there were obviously those who saw little advantage to acting before he died. Who these people were and what they wanted is the issue."
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