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anonymous

A Note Of Warning And Encouragement For Egyptians, From An Iranian Writer Who Lived Thr... - 0 views

  • But both the leader and his American supporters were caught off-guard by the size of the demonstrations.
  • When the leader tried to use the force of his military to calm the situation, the United States issued ambiguous statements, indicating support for the leader’s desire to establish law and order on the one hand while at the same time insisting that the march of democracy must continue, and that the use of force could not be a solution to the country’s problems.
  • The country I am speaking of is not Egypt in 2011 but Iran in 1979.
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  • For Egyptians, the history of the Iranian Revolution should serve as a warning. In 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini hid his true intentions—namely the creation of a despotic rule of the clerics—behind the mantle of democracy.
  • For over a century, Egypt, like Iran, has been a bellwether state for the entire region. The arrival of freedom to Egypt would therefore put the Iranian mullahs on the defensive.
  •  
    "After days of unrest, after declaring martial law in some of the country's main cities, the authoritarian leader gave a much anticipated television speech. His tone was repentant. He promised change and reform. The people wanted democracy and he promised to bend to their wishes. "
anonymous

Egypt: The Distance Between Enthusiasm and Reality - 0 views

  • What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power. This isn’t incompatible with democratic reform. Organizing elections, political parties and candidates is not something that can be done quickly. If the military is sincere in its intentions, it will have to do these things. The problem is that if the military is insincere it will do exactly the same things. Six months is a long time, passions can subside and promises can be forgotten.
  • Power rests with the regime, not with the crowds. In our view, the crowds never had nearly as much power as many have claimed.
  • In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is odd to consider this a revolution.
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  • The crowd in Cairo, as telegenic as it was, was the backdrop to the drama, not the main feature.
  • Mubarak’s decision to name his son represented a direct challenge to the Egyptian regime. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command, which had been the real power in the regime.
  • The demonstrators never called for the downfall of the regime. They demanded that Mubarak step aside. This was the same demand that was being made by many if not most officers in the military months before the crowds gathered in the streets.
  • What happened was not a revolution. The demonstrators never brought down Mubarak, let alone the regime. What happened was a military coup that used the cover of protests to force Mubarak out of office in order to preserve the regime. When it became clear Feb. 10 that Mubarak would not voluntarily step down, the military staged what amounted to a coup to force his resignation. Once he was forced out of office, the military took over the existing regime by creating a military council and taking control of critical ministries. The regime was always centered on the military. What happened on Feb. 11 was that the military took direct control.
  • We now face the question of whether the coup will turn into a revolution. The demonstrators demanded — and the military has agreed to hold — genuinely democratic elections and to stop repression. It is not clear that the new leaders mean what they have said or were simply saying it to get the crowds to go home.
  • First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society.
  • Second, the military is deeply enmeshed in running the country.
  • The largest number of protesters arrived in Tahrir Square after the Internet was completely shut down.
  • For all the chatter about the Egyptian people demanding democracy, the fact is that hardly anyone participated in the demonstrations, relative to the number of Egyptians there are, and no one really knows how the Egyptian people would vote on this issue.
  • The Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy as the man they forced out of office. They have promised democracy, but it is not clear that they mean it. If they mean it, it is not clear how they would do it, certainly not in a timeframe of a few months. Indeed, this means that the crowds may re-emerge demanding more rapid democratization, depending on who organized the crowds in the first place and what their intentions are now.
  • The week began with an old soldier running Egypt. It ended with different old soldiers running Egypt with even more formal power than Mubarak had. This has caused worldwide shock and awe. We were killjoys in 2009, when we said the Iranians revolution wasn’t going anywhere. We do not want to be killjoys now, since everyone is so excited and happy. But we should point out that, in spite of the crowds, nothing much has really happened yet in Egypt. It doesn’t mean that it won’t, but it hasn’t yet.
  •  
    "On Feb. 11, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned. A military council was named to govern in his place. On Feb. 11-12, the crowds that had gathered in Tahrir Square celebrated Mubarak's fall and the triumph of democracy in Egypt. On Feb. 13, the military council abolished the constitution and dissolved parliament, promising a new constitution to be ratified by a referendum and stating that the military would rule for six months, or until the military decides it's ready to hold parliamentary and presidential elections."
anonymous

Turkey's Moment of Reckoning - 0 views

  • With geopolitical opportunities presenting themselves on all of its borders, Turkey, having been out of the great power game for some 90-odd years, could afford some experimentation. In this geopolitical testing phase, Turkey could spread itself relatively far and wide in trying to reclaim influence, all under the Davutoglu-coined “zero problems with neighbors” strategy.
  • The invisible hand of geopolitics teaches that politicians, regardless of personality, ideology or anything else, will pursue strategic ends without being necessarily aware of their policies’ contributions to (or detractions from) national power. The gentle nudges guiding Turkey for most of the past decade are now transforming into a firm, unyielding push.
  • Whether Ankara is ready or not, the Middle East is accelerating Turkey’s rise.
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  • in Egypt (where the Turks ruled under the Ottoman Empire for 279 years from 1517-1796), there is not much Turkey can do or may even need to do.
  • The shaking out of Iraq’s Sunni-Shia balance (or imbalance, depending on how you view it) is the current pivot to Persian Gulf stability.
  •  
    "In a high-powered visit to Cairo, Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met Thursday with the members of Egypt's ruling Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). In addition to meeting with the military elite, the Turkish leaders are also talking to the opposition forces. On Thursday, Gul and Davutoglu met with Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Badie and over the course of the next three days they are expected to meet with opposition figures Mohamed ElBaradei and Arab League chief Amr Mousa, as well as the Jan. 25 Youth Coalition."
anonymous

Lessons from the long tail of improbable disaster - 2 views

  • The troubles in northern Japan, for example, are beginning to ripple through global supply chains, creating bottlenecks and shortages in dozens of industries. The way globalization increases economic efficiency is by leveraging the advantages of scale and specialization. Yet the bigger and more concentrated production becomes, the more vulnerable it becomes to disruption.
    • anonymous
       
      The principle argument in favor of broadly progressive economic policies. The thinking goes: Capitalism is focused squarely on efficiency, therefore, calamities wreak more havoc on supply chains because there is no 'buffer' to absorb the chain's redirection.
  • Many scholars
    • anonymous
       
      Citation, please? I realize it's a blog, and I'd probably balk if people asked for citations for every one of my (sometimes boneheaded) assertions. However, knowing (just a little) where the criticism is coming from is highly useful.
  • more attention must be paid to the extra risks that come with all the advantages of modern life. There may be a significant cost involved in preventing low-probability disasters, or having sufficient infrastructure to deal with them when they cannot be prevented.
    • anonymous
       
      Add to that the fact that, even with tons of safeguards, disasters will still happen. That's life, once again, not conforming to our numerical expectations. It's impossible to properly *gauge* the value of a safeguard. We can't build something, flood it, build it some other way, flood it again, ad nauseum.
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  • If it seems that the frequency and size of calamities have been picking up in recent years, it’s only because they probably have.
    • anonymous
       
      I call 'observer bias' on this one. While expanding human settlement will, indeed, drive up instances of disasters, my supposition is that our communications technology gives a false impression of increased occurrences.
  • What all of these have in common is that they are all low-probability, high-impact events — the “long-tail” phenomenon, to use the jargon of risk modelers
  • Although we observe that calamities happen, we assume that they won’t happen to us, or they won’t happen again.
    • anonymous
       
      Back in Mpls, I remember reading about people who bought property on 50-year flood plains and then were shocked - shocked - that a flood wiped out their home.
  • Part of the problem is that we don’t know what we don’t know. The other part is that small miscalculations of probabilities can have large effects on outcomes when dealing with long periods of time.
    • anonymous
       
      These are two really great characterizations of the relevant cognitive shortcomings.
  •  
    "What all of these have in common is that they are all low-probability, high-impact events - the "long-tail" phenomenon, to use the jargon of risk modelers, referring to the far ends of the traditional bell curve of probabilities, or "black swans," to use the metaphor popularized by former Wall Street trader Nassim Nicholas Taleb."
anonymous

Rand and Aesthetics 9 - 0 views

  • The problem with this category is (1) the vagueness of its terms, and (2) lack of specific examples.
  • Rand's attempt to use the issue of volition versus determinism to analye literature again demonstrates the futility of viewing literature through this particular prism.
  • Whether their characters are "grand-scale" or not, they are nonetheless drawn in the hope of being compelling and believable manifestations of human nature. And why should any believable representation of human nature be equated with determinism?
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  • Under Rand's conceptual schema, there is (generaly speaking) no way really to distinguish between Romantic and Naturalist literature, beyond recourse to Rand's own statements about a handful of specific authors.
  • In discussing Byronism, Rand is able to provide only one example -- that of Byron himself. She notes that "the chief exponents of this category were poets," yet refuses to name any of these poets other than the aforementioned Byron. This is a typical failing throughout Rand's philosophical writings: a failure to provide specific examples so that her readers could better evaluate her contentions. This failure suggests one of three possibilities:(1) Rand was not familiar enough with those authors to evaluate them (meaning she hadn't read them)(2) Those authors don't fit into her categories, so she ignored them(3) Combination of one and two
  •  
    ""Byronic" Romanticism. With Rand's division of free will into two parts, one pertaining to consciousness and the other to existence, she proceeds to develop a second category of Romanticism:"
anonymous

There was scale and structure before history - 0 views

  • even if genetics is not determinate or even fundamentally specially insightful, it will at least sharpen the discussions, and move scholars away from arguments of rhetorical excess.
  • The “demic diffusion” model to some extent seems to play into this, where simple demographic population growth due to the ability of farmers to extract more calories per unit of land allowed them to “swamp” the hunter-gatherers.
  • the major problem with these models is that they downplay by understandable omission the higher order social complexity of institutions and identities which characterize humans.
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  • The Inca for example did not have full elaborated literacy, and yet had political dominion and cultural hegemony from Ecuador to central Chile.
  • the genetic references are thin and somewhat outdated
  • I think the genetics is now making a stronger case for disruption, confusion, and replacement, than is acknowledged in this article.
  • we must look to punctuation of cultural and demographic change as the norm, rather than the exception. The old diffusion models may be predicated on a level of smoothness and gradualism in historical and social process which are simply not feasible.
  • The long pause of agriculture on the north European plain was partly probably the structural constraint because of the poor fit between southern crops and northern climes. But once a sufficient fit was operative did that naturally result in the rapid sweep of farmers north? Perhaps not.
  •  
    "Until relatively recently the spread of agriculture in Europe, and to some extent the whole world, was pigeon-holed into two maximalist models: cultural or demographic diffusionist. Neither of these models were maximalist in that they denied the impact of culture or demographics in totality, but they tended to be rhetorically brandished in a manner where it was clear which dynamic was the dominant mode of explaining the nature of cultural and genetic variation and their origins."
anonymous

Portfolio: Obstacles to a China-Russia Energy Deal - 0 views

  • Russia’s the largest exporter of raw commodities in the world. China’s the largest importer of raw commodities in the world. It seems that it should already be a very robust trading relationship between the two, but there’s not. Until now, most of the public and even private debate between the two, the negotiations of a natural gas deal, have focused on price.
  • The Chinese want to pay no more than about $100, $150 per thousand cubic meters, which they say is the domestic price of natural gas in their country, and they’re right. The Russians say they will accept nothing less than the European price, which is $350-$400 per thousand cubic meters, which is what they say they charge all their other customers, which is also right.
  • It’s not that price isn’t an issue but the real problem is not the price of natural gas but the price of the project.
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  • Russia and China, while they seem to be right next to each other on a map, are very large places. Their population centers are wildly divergent, several thousand kilometers apart, and the natural gas in Russia for the most part is nowhere near the population centers in China.
  • This is a huge project. Conservatively, very conservatively, this is $100 billion infrastructure project. More realistically it’s more like $300 billion and that doesn’t even include the cost of building a natural gas grid in China in order to take advantage of the gas. Even now the Chinese do not have a unified system like most states.
  • And so the future of energy cooperation between the two countries will undoubtedly grow but $2-$300 billion infrastructure tag? That’s pretty doubtful. And timing is a big issue here too. The Russians have been working for the last 35 years to build one of these megaprojects starting in the Yamal Peninsula going down the Europe. That project is now finally nearing operational status but it took 35 years and tens of billions of dollars of investment. Even if the Chinese do agree with the Russians on every aspect of what would be the world’s largest infrastructure project ever, it’s not going to come online until 2030.
  •  
    "Vice President of Analysis Peter Zeihan discusses the logistical and geopolitical challenges to Sino-Russian energy integration."
anonymous

Dispatch: Moscow Gets Ahead on Missile Defense - 0 views

  • First, the Shanghai Corporation Organization, the SCO, issued a joint statement during its meeting in Kazakhstan regarding the Western plans for a missile defense system saying that any system that would threaten international security is opposed by the organization. Second, the Czech government also announced today that it would oppose any sort of a U.S. plan that was of minimal nature, essentially pulling Prague out of the U.S. plans for a ballistic missile defense system in central Europe.
  • The negative statement about the ballistic missile defense from the SCO is not surprising. Since it is essentially led by Russia, and Russia has in the past attempted to portray the SCO as some sort of a counter weight to NATO, although it is nothing of the sort at this moment.
  • But what is somewhat interesting about the statement is that it is the first time that Beijing has really publicly weighed in on the issue.
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  • Prague has always had a little more room to maneuver when it came to the BMD system. It is not positioned on the borders with a resurgent Russia nor would any of its buffer states such as Ukraine and Belarus.
  • Unlike Poland and Romania, which had missile components of the new BMD system, Prague was left with an early warning system, which really constituted nothing more than a room full of computers
  • As such the Czech government didn’t really see any reason why to put political capital behind a project that was A, unpopular and B, didn’t really have any large significance. At the end of the day, the BMD system from the perspective of the central Europeans is really about bringing the United States into the region, to offer greater security against Russian resurgence.
  • Moscow will be able to use the SCO statement to show that it’s not just Russia that has problems with the U.S. plans for BMD in Europe but also for another very important security player in the world - China.
  •  
    "Analyst Marko Papic explains two separate statements made Wednesday that give Russia momentum against U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense in Europe."
anonymous

China's Technology Showcases Mask Economic Warning Signs - 0 views

  • Newspapers and defense journals along the Pacific Rim and elsewhere are replete with foreign speculation on the future activities of a more internationally active and aggressive Chinese navy, to say nothing of more sober discussions of the constraints and limitations facing potential Chinese naval ambitions with a single carrier (for now) and no history or culture of carrier operations.
  • The attention on the Varyag is, in many ways, misplaced. China is historically a land power. Its biggest security challenges remain at home, across a vast territory that will continue to require large expenditures for manpower, equipment and transportation. China’s historical flirtation with a navy that travels far beyond its immediate neighborhood has been limited. Even the famous voyages of Zheng He could be called frivolous, rather than a serious attempt to dominate seas around the world or even the region.
  • Unlike neighboring Japan, China’s attempts to build up a navy to counter European influence proved ineffective, and the emergent Japanese navy defeated the Chinese fleet.
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  • China’s extensive geography and high population are its core strength and greatest defense. Even if an invasion from the sea is initially successful, China has the human resources to ultimately either absorb the conqueror (the one land power that was successful in invading China — the Mongols — eventually became subsumed into Chinese culture), or to outlast the invader through a long war of attrition.
  • STRATFOR has said that one of the reasons China appears bent on expanding its naval capabilities relates to its shifting economic structure.
  • China’s economic supply lines now cross the globe.
  • China’s naval expansion, in that case, is not part of a strategy to engage in a naval arms race with the United States or challenge U.S. dominance of the seas. Rather, Beijing intends to build a defensive buffer around China’s maritime periphery.
  • the attention to China’s new aircraft carrier, deep-diving submarine, its space exploration, and similar activities also helps Beijing distract audiences domestic and global from real problems inside the country
  • Overseas, they somehow reinforce the perception of a rising China — and a rising China cannot be on the verge of a major economic and social crisis.
  • Like the Three Gorges Dam, this show of China’s capabilities is impressive for a moment, but it does not really address the country’s core needs.
  • Beijing’s top concern is avoiding an economic and social crisis, and Chinese leaders know that it may be only a matter of time before the Chinese economy faces the same structural limitations that its East Asian counterparts already faced.
  • What happens if China’s economic miracle faces what all economic miracles eventually face — the reality that there is no such thing as unlimited, linear, multidigit growth.
  •  
    "China is once again on the verge of sending its first aircraft carrier to sea. In recent days, the Chinese media has expanded on comments, made during a Defense Ministry press conference, openly confirming that China is refitting the Varyag and preparing to enter the small club of nations with aircraft carriers."
anonymous

U.S., Russia Make New Deals on Supply Routes to Afghanistan - 0 views

  • The ability to move more cargo along these routes will strengthen the United States’ position relative to Pakistan in their upcoming summit.
  • During the past year, Russia has been cooperating more with the United States on security issues in Afghanistan, particularly by expanding the use of supply routes to Afghanistan that go through Central Asia.
  • In 2009, as much as 90 percent of NATO supplies shipped via surface routes to Afghanistan were transported along supply lines through Pakistani territory.
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  • the United States has dramatically increased the volume of supplies moving into Afghanistan via road and rail routes through Central Asia known as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN)
  • As of July, more than 40 percent of surface cargo bound for Afghanistan was transported along these routes. U.S. military officials have said they hope to increase this share to as much as 75 percent by the end of the year.
  • U.S.-Russian cooperation has increased, particularly in the last quarter, on security issues in Afghanistan and the surrounding Central Asian states.
  • before Washington can expand its use of the NDN, the United States and Russia must address several outstanding issues.
  • First, the only cargo currently allowed to move along the NDN is “non-lethal” cargo: food, water, construction materials and the like. Weapons and ammunition are not permitted.
  • What Russia really wants is an agreement on ballistic missile defense in Europe
  • An additional problem is that current Central Asian supply routes to Afghanistan only go one way; the shipment of any supplies out of Afghanistan via the NDN is prohibited.
  • The third issue is that some of the transportation infrastructure along the Central Asian networks is in disrepair and would need upgrades to handle any significant increase in volume.
  • Finally, there is the issue that NATO supply lines have served as major targets for militants.
  • it is likely that Washington and Moscow have already reached an agreement on most of these issues
  •  
    "U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan at the end of July, right before traveling to Pakistan to meet the Pakistani president and participate in a trilateral summit on the Afghan war."
anonymous

The Debt Ceiling Deal: The Case for Caving (Part 3) - 0 views

  • The Tea Party, in this sense, has succeeded by adopting a rational frustration strategy.
  • You can find fault with the Tea Party’s prescription for balancing the budget—most economists do—but if they hadn’t come to Washington last year, Congress would have waited for a real bond crisis, five or 10 years from now, to create its super committee.
  • We will know, at the close of the next round of negotiations, which game the Tea Party has been playing: Balance the Budget or Kill the King.
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  • I appreciate pquincy’s thoughtful comments. With regard to the reference to divorce, it’s also worth noting that – regardless of whether or not there are children involved – almost all divorce cases (along with almost all other civil cases) are resolved through a bargained solution (i.e., a settlement) rather than a trial. But in the vast majority of cases the bargained solution is not achieved until the parties arrive at a critical deadline such as the eve of trial. This is because, prior to the deadline and as suggested by Brams, “each player has an incentive to dissemble” in pursuit of a better outcome for itself. Since each player intuitively understands this, neither views the other player’s assertions about their “bottom line” to be credible, and neither can convince the other of the genuineness of its own position prior to the deadline.
  • Pquincy ‘s suggestion that this problem should eventually become less acute in a repeated game appears to be correct. But in the game of politics, it seems that (as in litigation), a player can be expected to pretend – in the pursuit of self-interest and for as long as it can – that it is less interested in arriving at a bargained solution than it is in pursuing some sort of abstract principle (such as what it would characterize as “justice” or “the public good”).
  • In contrast to some of the other people that have posted comments in response to this article, I don’t think the outcome that was ultimately arrived at in the debt ceiling negotiations can be fairly attributed to Obama’s having played the game poorly. Rather, I think the outcome was attributable to the fact that it was obvious from the outset that Obama’s objective (regardless of whether one wishes to characterize that objective as “preserving the health and safety of our most vulnerable citizens" or “holding on for a few more years to the remnants of a bloated welfare state”) would unquestionably be placed further out of reach if he were to walk away from whatever deal the other side was ultimately willing to grant as of the deadline. He could not credibly pretend otherwise.
  • Although this article muddles a few basic concepts, it serves to illustrate that game theory offers a relatively straightforward explanation for much of the conflict that exists in the world, certainly a much better explanation than is routinely put forth by partisans and commentators. Brams is spot-on. And it's a cop-out to claim that game theory assumes that people are hyper-rational, or that it does not apply when someone is seeking an unreasonable goal. Even if your adversary's goal is, at least in your view, unreasonable or irrational, game theory allows you to understand how you and your adversary can be expected to behave in the pursuit of your respective objectives.
  •  
    Part 3 of the piece.
anonymous

The Debt Ceiling Deal: The Case for Caving (Part 2) - 0 views

  • Game theorists distinguish between “cooperative” and “noncooperative” games.
  • A cooperative game looks to divide a pie in a way that leaves both sides with trust in the process.
  • The object of the game, as each leader described it, was about how best to divide the pain of closing the deficit, in the same way a family sits down to a pile of bills on the kitchen table.
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  • The two parties in Washington pretended to be playing a cooperative game this summer.
  • The President’s bipartisan commission on deficit reduction, set up late last year and chaired by Democrat Erskine Bowles and Republican Alan Simpson, also played a cooperative game.
  • A noncooperative game lacks a higher authority to impose agreements on both sides.
  • In Washington, no politician is bound to reach a compromise to solve any long-term problem. Everyone, however, is playing a game called “election,” and the only possible goal in that game is to win the next one.
  • If you hear someone in Congress say, “Senator X is just playing politics,” a perfectly legitimate response is, “She has to. Those are the rules of the Constitution.”
  • Anyone who promises to fix or change Washington is merely attempting to impose a cooperative game on a town that, by design, can’t play one.
  • A game theorist would say that the President is trying to play a cooperative game in a town that can’t play along with him. The trouble for the White House is that the Republicans aren’t playing a game called “fix the budget deficit.” They’re necessarily playing one called “defeat Barack Obama.” A reasonable offer seldom works in a divorce; there’s no reason to expect it would in Congress.
  • Obama and the House Republicans, says Steven Brams, were playing chicken this summer, a noncooperative, non-zero-sum game in which both players can lose.
  • Brams argues that there’s no value in trying to determine whether anger is real or feigned; it has the same effect either way.
  • frustration can actually turn a noncooperative game cooperative
  •  
    Part two of the article, because there isn't a 'single page' option. Booo.
anonymous

Theory of Knowledge (rationality outreach) - 0 views

  • It's called Theory of Knowledge, and it's offered at 2,307 schools worldwide as part of the IB Diploma Program.
  • For the record, I'm not convinced the IB Diploma Program is a good thing. It doesn't really solve any of the problems with public schools, it shares the frustrating focus on standardized testing and password-guessing instead of real learning, etc. But I think Theory of Knowledge is a huge opportunity to spread the ideas of rationality.
  • There isn't much in the way of standards for a curriculum, and in the entire last semester we covered less content than I learn from any given top-level LessWrong post.
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  • In retrospect, I think the best thing that could have been added would have been a discussion up front about how not to be confused about words. Some combo of the material in Disputing Definitions and Conceptual Analysis and Moral Theory. After that, something to undermine reliance on introspection and intuition more generally, perhaps in the context of presenting basic cognitive biases.
  • There are a lot of ways to make ToK good, and some of them don't look like LessWrong.
  •  
    "The consensus seems to be that a class teaching the basic principles of thinking would be a huge step towards raising the sanity waterline, but that it will never happen. Well, my school has one. It's called Theory of Knowledge, and it's offered at 2,307 schools worldwide as part of the IB Diploma Program."
anonymous

Why Rand Never Lost an Argument - 0 views

  • The written evidence, such as it is, demonstrates no very great arguing skill on Rand's part. Quite the contrary, Rand, when she deigns to offer any sort of arguments at all, produces rather poor ones, afflicted with yawning gaps and blistering equivocations.
  • There are several factors which contribue to explaining this anamoly. Rand depended on at least five such factors to provide the varnish of irrefragibility over her otherwise hollow and empirically impoverished arguments.
  • Inability of individuals to evaluate the quality of arguments made on behalf of conclusions they agree with.Intimidation tacticsSelection of debating opponentsReliance on explicit articulation of viewsAvoidance of empirical tests in favor of verbalism
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  • (1) Cognitive science and experimental psychology have uncovered reams of evidence that people are not very good at evaluating arguments when they agree with the conclusions.
  • Devotees of Ayn Rand sincerely believe that the Objectivist metaphysics, although based on little more than empty tautologies and other such empirically vacuous truisms, represents the very acme of logical soundness.
  • People tend to believe what they want to believe
  • If only bad arguments are available, they will gravitate toward the best of the bad.
  • Most people become attracted to Objectivism when they are young and without experience either of the world or of philosophical arguments
    • anonymous
       
      This was my experience. Though quite intellectual (seeming) from a very young age, the fact of the matter was that binary, reductionist thinking was a very large part of my intellectual adolescence. I moved from fundamentalist Christianity, to strict Libertarianism, to strict Objectivism, before finally understanding it wasn't the *second* part of those labels that was the real problem - it was the first: fundaminalist... strict... strict...
  • Rand's Objectivist philosophy provides an intriguing set of rationalizations defending an extreme form of secular individualism and egoism coupled with common sense view of reality.
  • (2) For Rand, intimidation became central to maintaining her intellectual dominance over disciples.
  • I learned ... that it didn't pay to be confrontational with [Rand]. If I saw or suspected some inconsistency, I would point it out in calm and even tones, as if it were "no big deal." That way, she would often accept the correction and go on. To expose the inconsistency bluntly and nakedly would only infuriate her
    • anonymous
       
      This has been validated by other writings. Those of poorer stills with verbalization would be absolutely savaged by her.
  • Many of my patients used to tell me that they were terrified to ask questions because of the way Miss Rand might respond to them.
  • I remember many occasions when Rand pounced, assuming that a question was motivated by hostility to her or her ideas, or that the questioner was intellectually dishonest or irrational, or had evil motives, or was her "enemy."
  • A young man asked if her brief characterization of Immanuel Kant's philosophy was accurate, and she exploded that she had not come here to be insulted. I was surprised at the heated tone of her response because he was not antagonistic to her and he had, as I watched him, no glimmer of malice or "gotcha" in his eyes.
  • Rand's anger helped shield her from effective criticism. It encouraged her disciples to be extra cautious when asking questions, which led to many important doctrines in Objectivism remaining unchallenged.
  • Individuals tend to be rather poor at evaluating and criticizing their own beliefs. For this reason, criticism from others is essential for any philosophy that presumes to be rational.
  • Indeed, criticism from others is central to rationality.
  • Rand's refusal to allow herself to be effectively challenged renders her system irrational and dogmatic.
  • (3) Rand not only refused to engage in formal debates with other philosophers and intellectuals, she refused to have anything to do with the two groups which could have challenged her most effectively, namely, conservatives and liberatarians.
  • Her disdain for libertarians is both notorious and perplexing. The reasons for her disdain (which include such trivial reasons as her dislike for the word libertarian) strike one as contrived and superficial, as if they were mere rationalizations.
  • It is not difficult to understand the attraction Ayn Rand has for the uninstructed. She appears, I suppose, to be the spokesman for freedom, for self-esteem, and other equally noble ideals. However, patient examination reveals her pronouncements to be but a shroud beneath which lies the corpse of illogic.
    • anonymous
       
      And this is from a member of a movement that's been broadly sympathetic to the spirit, if not the letter, of Objectivism.
  • Rand's hostility (and the subsequent Objectivism policy to avoid libertarians because, as Peikoff once put it, Libertarians are worse than communists) gave her a pretext for avoiding the very group which could offer the most well-informed criticism of her Objectivist philosophy
  • Rand kept her distance from them, as she kept her distance from conservative intellectuals. By doing so, Rand was able to protect herself from just the sort of intellectuals who could have conquered her in debate.
  • Rand never lost an argument, not because she was a great debator, but because she never took on any challenging opponents.
  • (4) Many people do not know how to verbalize their basic beliefs.
  • Regardless of how poor Rand's actual arguments might be, the very fact that she could articulate her beliefs would give her a decisive advantage.
  • (5) In the absence of effective, empirical criticism, debates are determined by factors that have little, if anything to do with the truth.
  • Debates conducted without reference to effective empirical criticism become exercises in verbal facility, where the most aggressive, articulate, personable, and/or witty debator inevitably wins.
  •  
    "Sam Anderson, in a review of Anne Heller's biography of Rand, notes: "Eyewitnesses say that [Rand] never lost an argument." Given the poor quality of many of Rand's actual arguments, as one finds them embalmed in her writings, this is a bit of anamoly." You think? :) Another great ARCHN on July 19, 2011
anonymous

China, Infrastructure, Economic Development and Oligarchy - 0 views

  • For all China’s economic might, it’s worth remembering that it remains a) quite poor in per-capita terms and b) governed by an opaque, corrupt, oligarchic, anti-democratic single party apparatus that, for all the  dazzle of its economic accomplishments in recent decades, continues to immiserate large swathes of its population through internal migration controls, currency manipulation and, you know, large-scale denial of basic human rights.
  • I think it’s a bit too easy to let the U.S. off the hook, both in terms of the economics and the politics.
  • There really is a serious infrastructure problem in the United States, though, and not all of it can be explained by the fact that our infrastructure is old. Part of it can, to be sure. One of the advantages of developing late and/or having your entire continent reduced to rubble after the initial round of industrialization has run its course is that you’re allowed/forced to build new stuff rather than trying to upgrade/repurpose old stuff.
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  • we have an oligarchy here too. One that’s answerable to the larger populace through an electoral system that provides, at best, tenuous democratic accountability and uneven rule of law. And that’s fine as far as it goes. Most societies are more or less oligarchic.
  • It’s not like the wealth doesn’t exist. It’s simply so concentrated among such a small group of people who have become so good at exploiting a political system rife with veto points, useless anti-democratic institutions and geographically-dispersed power centers that it can’t be tapped. It’s not simply a matter of “reaching consensus.”
  •  
    "Last week James Joyner had at post up over at OTB breaking down some of the unwarranted CCP-oriented Sinophilia that occasionally overtakes otherwise sensible people." By Matt Eckel at Foreign Policy Watch on July 18, 2011.
anonymous

Immaculate Intervention: The Wars of Humanitarianism - 0 views

  • Since World War II, a new class of war has emerged that we might call humanitarian wars — wars in which the combatants claim to be fighting neither for their national interest nor to impose any ideology, but rather to prevent inordinate human suffering.
  • In humanitarian wars, the intervention is designed both to be neutral and to protect potential victims on one side.
  • That no one intervened to prevent or stop these atrocities was seen as a moral failure. According to this ideology, the international community has an obligation to prevent such slaughter.
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  • In international wars, where the aggressor is trying to both kill large numbers of civilians and destroy the enemy’s right to national self-determination, this does not pose a significant intellectual problem.
  • In internal unrest and civil war, however, the challenge of the intervention is to protect human rights without undermining national sovereignty or the right of national self-determination.
  • I call humanitarian wars immaculate intervention, because most advocates want to see the outcome limited to preventing war crimes, not extended to include regime change or the imposition of alien values.
  • They want a war of immaculate intentions surgically limited to a singular end without other consequences. And this is where the doctrine of humanitarian war unravels.
  • What we are seeing in Libya is a classic slow escalation motivated by two factors.
  • The first is the hope that the leader of the country responsible for the bloodshed will capitulate.
  • The second is a genuine reluctance of intervening nations to spend excessive wealth or blood on a project they view in effect as charitable.
  • The expectation of capitulation in the case of Libya is made unlikely by another aspect of humanitarian war fighting, namely the International Criminal Court (ICC).
  • While a logical extension of humanitarian warfare — having intervened against atrocities, the perpetrators ought to be brought to justice — the effect is a prolongation of the war. The example of Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, who ended the Kosovo War with what he thought was a promise that he would not be prosecuted, undoubtedly is on Gadhafi’s mind.
  • But the war is also prolonged by the unwillingness of the intervening forces to inflict civilian casualties.
  • The application of minimal and insufficient force, combined with the unwillingness of people like Gadhafi and his equally guilty supporters to face The Hague, creates the framework for a long and inconclusive war in which the intervention in favor of humanitarian considerations turns into an intervention in a civil war on the side that opposes the regime.
  • It should be remembered that many of Libya’s opposition leaders are former senior officials of the Gadhafi government. They did not survive as long as they did in that regime without having themselves committed crimes, and without being prepared to commit more.
  • At some point, the interveners have the choice of walking away and leaving chaos, as the United States did in Somalia, or staying for a long time and fighting, as they did in Iraq.
  • Regardless of the United States’ other motivations in both conflicts, it would seem that those who favor humanitarian intervention would have favored the Iraq war. That they generally opposed the Iraq war from the beginning requires a return to the concept of immaculate intervention.
    • anonymous
       
      For those generally anti-war, this is a less-than-delightful realization, but (I think) jibes with reality more. However, former President Bush and his advisers established justification (WMD's) that affected both intentions and expectations from people on all sides of the debate. Notwithstanding the good intentions of those who advocate humanitarian wars, the effect can never be what is desired.
  • Hussein was a war criminal and a danger to his people. However, the American justification for intervention was not immaculate.
  • That it also had a humanitarian outcome — the destruction of the Hussein regime — made the American intervention inappropriate in the view of those who favor immaculate interventions for two reasons.
  • First, the humanitarian outcome was intended as part of a broader war.
  • Second, regardless of the fact that humanitarian interventions almost always result in regime change, the explicit intention to usurp Iraq’s national self-determination openly undermined in principle what the humanitarian interveners wanted to undermine only in practice.
  • for the humanitarian warrior, there are other political considerations.
  • In the case of the French, the contrast between their absolute opposition to Iraq and their aggressive desire to intervene in Libya needs to be explained. I suspect it will not be.
  • Perhaps it was about oil in this case, but Gadhafi was happily shipping oil to Europe, so intervening to ensure that it continues makes no sense.
  • Sometimes the lack of a persuasive reason for a war generates theories to fill the vacuum. In all humanitarian wars, there is a belief that the war could not be about humanitarian matters.
  • Therein lays the dilemma of humanitarian wars. They have a tendency to go far beyond the original intent behind them, as the interveners, trapped in the logic of humanitarian war, are drawn further in. Over time, the ideological zeal frays and the lack of national interest saps the intervener’s will.
  • My unease with humanitarian intervention is not that I don’t think the intent is good and the end moral. It is that the intent frequently gets lost and the moral end is not achieved. Ideology, like passion, fades. But interest has a certain enduring quality.
  • A doctrine of humanitarian warfare that demands an immaculate intervention will fail because the desire to do good is an insufficient basis for war.
  • In the end, the ultimate dishonesties of humanitarian war are the claims that “this won’t hurt much” and “it will be over fast.”
  • If you must go in, go in heavy, go in hard and get out fast. Humanitarian warfare says that you go in light, you go in soft and you stay there long.
  •  
    "There are wars in pursuit of interest. In these wars, nations pursue economic or strategic ends to protect the nation or expand its power. There are also wars of ideology, designed to spread some idea of "the good," whether this good is religious or secular. The two obviously can be intertwined, such that a war designed to spread an ideology also strengthens the interests of the nation spreading the ideology."
anonymous

The Science of Why We Don't Believe Science - 0 views

  • In the annals of denial, it doesn't get much more extreme than the Seekers. They lost their jobs, the press mocked them, and there were efforts to keep them away from impressionable young minds. But while Martin's space cult might lie at on the far end of the spectrum of human self-delusion, there's plenty to go around. And since Festinger's day, an array of new discoveries in psychology and neuroscience has further demonstrated how our preexisting beliefs, far more than any new facts, can skew our thoughts and even color what we consider our most dispassionate and logical conclusions. This tendency toward so-called "motivated reasoning [3]" helps explain why we find groups so polarized over matters where the evidence is so unequivocal: climate change, vaccines, "death panels," the birthplace and religion of the president [4] (PDF), and much else. It would seem that expecting people to be convinced by the facts flies in the face of, you know, the facts.
  • The theory of motivated reasoning builds on a key insight of modern neuroscience [5] (PDF): Reasoning is actually suffused with emotion (or what researchers often call "affect"). Not only are the two inseparable, but our positive or negative feelings about people, things, and ideas arise much more rapidly than our conscious thoughts, in a matter of milliseconds—fast enough to detect with an EEG device, but long before we're aware of it. That shouldn't be surprising: Evolution required us to react very quickly to stimuli in our environment. It's a "basic human survival skill," explains political scientist Arthur Lupia [6] of the University of Michigan. We push threatening information away; we pull friendly information close. We apply fight-or-flight reflexes not only to predators, but to data itself.
  • a subconscious negative response to the new information—and that response, in turn, guides the type of memories and associations formed in the conscious mind. "They retrieve thoughts that are consistent with their previous beliefs," says Taber, "and that will lead them to build an argument and challenge what they're hearing."
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  • But reasoning comes later, works slower—and even then, it doesn't take place in an emotional vacuum.
  • In other words, when we think we're reasoning, we may instead be rationalizing.
  • That's not to suggest that we aren't also motivated to perceive the world accurately—we are. Or that we never change our minds—we do. It's just that we have other important goals besides accuracy—including identity affirmation and protecting one's sense of self—and often those make us highly resistant to changing our beliefs when the facts say we should.
  • Ironically, in part because researchers employ so much nuance and strive to disclose all remaining sources of uncertainty, scientific evidence is highly susceptible to selective reading and misinterpretation.
  • people's deep-seated views about morality, and about the way society should be ordered, strongly predict whom they consider to be a legitimate scientific expert in the first place—and thus where they consider "scientific consensus" to lie on contested issues.
  • In Kahan's research [13] (PDF), individuals are classified, based on their cultural values, as either "individualists" or "communitarians," and as either "hierarchical" or "egalitarian" in outlook.
  • The results were stark: When the scientist's position stated that global warming is real and human-caused, for instance, only 23 percent of hierarchical individualists agreed the person was a "trustworthy and knowledgeable expert." Yet 88 percent of egalitarian communitarians accepted the same scientist's expertise.
  • people rejected the validity of a scientific source because its conclusion contradicted their deeply held views—and thus the relative risks inherent in each scenario.
  • head-on attempts to persuade can sometimes trigger a backfire effect, where people not only fail to change their minds when confronted with the facts—they may hold their wrong views more tenaciously than ever.
  • A key question—and one that's difficult to answer—is how "irrational" all this is. On the one hand, it doesn't make sense to discard an entire belief system, built up over a lifetime, because of some new snippet of information. "It is quite possible to say, 'I reached this pro-capital-punishment decision based on real information that I arrived at over my life,'" explains Stanford social psychologist Jon Krosnick [21]. Indeed, there's a sense in which science denial could be considered keenly "rational." In certain conservative communities, explains Yale's Kahan, "People who say, 'I think there's something to climate change,' that's going to mark them out as a certain kind of person, and their life is going to go less well."
  • people gravitate toward information that confirms what they believe, and they select sources that deliver it. Same as it ever was, right? Maybe, but the problem is arguably growing more acute, given the way we now consume information
  • a higher education correlated with an increased likelihood of denying the science on the issue.
  • one insidious aspect of motivated reasoning is that political sophisticates are prone to be more biased than those who know less about the issues.
  • It all raises the question: Do left and right differ in any meaningful way when it comes to biases in processing information, or are we all equally susceptible?
  • Some researchers have suggested that there are psychological differences between the left and the right that might impact responses to new information—that conservatives are more rigid and authoritarian, and liberals more tolerant of ambiguity. Psychologist John Jost of New York University has further argued that conservatives are "system justifiers": They engage in motivated reasoning to defend the status quo.
  • What can be done to counteract human nature itself?
  • Given the power of our prior beliefs to skew how we respond to new information, one thing is becoming clear: If you want someone to accept new evidence, make sure to present it to them in a context that doesn't trigger a defensive, emotional reaction.
  • Kahan infers that the effect occurred because the science had been written into an alternative narrative that appealed to their pro-industry worldview.
  • You can follow the logic to its conclusion: Conservatives are more likely to embrace climate science if it comes to them via a business or religious leader, who can set the issue in the context of different values than those from which environmentalists or scientists often argue. Doing so is, effectively, to signal a détente in what Kahan has called a "culture war of fact." In other words, paradoxically, you don't lead with the facts in order to convince. You lead with the values—so as to give the facts a fighting chance.
  •  
    In the annals of denial, it doesn't get much more extreme than the Seekers. They lost their jobs, the press mocked them, and there were efforts to keep them away from impressionable young minds. But while Martin's space cult might lie at on the far end of the spectrum of human self-delusion, there's plenty to go around. And since Festinger's day, an array of new discoveries in psychology and neuroscience has further demonstrated how our preexisting beliefs, far more than any new facts, can skew our thoughts and even color what we consider our most dispassionate and logical conclusions. This tendency toward so-called "motivated reasoning [3]" helps explain why we find groups so polarized over matters where the evidence is so unequivocal: climate change, vaccines, "death panels," the birthplace and religion of the president [4] (PDF), and much else. It would seem that expecting people to be convinced by the facts flies in the face of, you know, the facts.
anonymous

Europe's Libyan Dilemma Deepens - 0 views

  • U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing military intervention specifically prohibits ground-troop involvement for occupation, but by definition leaves open the possibility of ground forces being used for some undefined purpose.
  • the situation on the ground has continuously overtaken official statements and apparently firm policy stances.
  • First, the Libyan intervention has no clear leader.
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  • Second, the intervening countries clearly have regime change in mind as the ultimate goal, but have thus far limited their operations purely to the enforcement of the no-fly zone and the targeting of Gadhafi loyalist forces from the air.
  • The failure to evict Gadhafi from power and standing by while Misrata gets pounded presents a political problem, especially after so much political capital was spent in Paris and London on getting the intervention approved in the first place, specifically for the purpose of preventing civilian casualties. Yet again Europeans will look impotent and incompetent in foreign affairs, just as the Yugoslav imbroglio illustrated in the 1990s.
  •  
    "Italian Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa said on Wednesday that Western forces might need to increase their involvement in Libya. La Russa added that Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi would only leave power if forcibly removed, and that Rome would consider sending 10 military instructors to help train rebels. The pledge from La Russa comes after the United Kingdom announced it was sending 20 military advisers and France stated that it would also send military liaison officers."
anonymous

Egypt's Changing Foreign Policy Attitudes - 0 views

  • the question is why is Egypt making such a radical change in policy?
  • The common element in these developments is that they are against what Israel has to come to expect of Egypt.
  • On the domestic front, SCAF is well aware of the popular sentiment toward the Palestinians and Israel and is therefore adjusting its behavior accordingly.
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  • The new military rulers also wish to see their country regain its status as the pre-eminent player in the Arab world. From their perspective, this can be achieved by engaging in radical moves vis-a-vis the Palestinians, Israel and Iran.
  • It is unlikely, however, that Egypt is about to truly reverse its position toward Israel. The Egyptians do not wish to create problems with the Israelis.
  •  
    "Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi said in an interview with Al Jazeera on Thursday that Cairo was working to permanently open the Rafah border crossing with the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Al-Arabi told the Qatari-owned channel that within seven to 10 days, measures would be adopted to assuage the "blockade and suffering of the Palestinian nation." The Egyptian foreign minister added, "It is the responsibility of each country in the world not to take part in what is called the humiliating siege. In my view, this (siege) was a disgraceful thing to happen.""
anonymous

Eurozone Crisis: Not a Greek Drama - 0 views

  • Lost in the coverage is the fact that Greece constitutes 2.5 percent of Eurozone GDP and Eurozone member states’ direct exposure to Greece is manageable.
  • After a year and a half of watching the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis unfold, we should put one notion to rest: no one event, crisis or decision will cause the Eurozone to collapse. Such a complex system of financial and monetary relationships will not unravel in a day, a month or a year.
  • Eurozone member states have proven highly flexible in their handling of the crisis.
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  • Skeptics contend that because the Eurozone was primarily a political creation, its economic logic is fundamentally flawed. A singular economic or political shock — such as the collapse of the Greek government — could therefore unravel the entire bloc by exposing a slew of economic problems.
  • Precisely because the Eurozone is a political creation, however, fundamental changes in the geopolitics of Europe are required to undermine it. Furthermore, the greater the imminent financial crisis, the greater the likelihood that Eurozone member states will find flexible means to resolve it. This resourcefulness has been evidenced throughout the crisis.
  • Therefore if all else fails, the ECB will print money.
  • The idea that the ECB would participate in its own dissolution because it is committed to its independence, or to maintaining 2 percent inflation, is a theoretical assumption that takes little account of the ECB’s behavior over the last 24 months.
  • This analysis leads us to two conclusions.
  • First, the Eurozone is not going to collapse in the middle of the sovereign debt crisis.
  • Second, fundamental political changes underway in Europe — such as the weakening of the NATO alliance, the regionalization of security alliances, and especially the developing Russian-German relationship — are far more important to the future of the Eurozone than a Greek confidence vote.
  • Because the Eurozone is fundamentally a political project, the weakening of the political bonds that tie Eurozone member states into a currency union are what will ultimately lead to its dissolution or modification.
  • Monumental shifts are underway in Europe. We have no reason to believe that Greece is at the center of them. What is most interesting is that the focus, both in terms of risks and solutions, continues to be on both short-term effects and singular events. This myopia is in part because Eurozone member states, in particular Germany, have not offered a long-term solution or plan.
  • The question that needs to be asked is: what do Europeans, and specifically the Germans, plan to do with Europe’s security and political architecture in the long term? The answer to that question cannot be found in the financial databases of Eurostat or the Bank of International Settlement, nor especially in the coverage of 24-hour investor-news stations.
  •  
    "It has been 2,000 years since Athenian legislators last received the kind of global attention fixed upon them Tuesday. News coverage of the Greek parliament's June 21 confidence vote captivated the global financial sector. The vote was carried live on most global 24-hour investment-news stations and links to live online feeds of the Greek vote were posted across the world wide web. The vote passed, giving Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou the political authority to try to pass further austerity measures mandated by the Eurozone in another vote on June 28."
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