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Mckenzie Hudson

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Chechnya Global Issues IRE

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  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations.
  • ...17 more annotations...
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations.
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these deva
  • flicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have
  • 178 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 178–201. Copyright © 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The Wars in Chechnya and Their Effects on Neighboring Regions Olga I. Vendina, Vitaliy S. Belozerov, and Andrew Gustafson1 Abstract: A team of Russia- and U.S.-based geographers presents and discusses the eco- nomic and demographic consequences of the conflicts in Chechnya on that republic, on the neighboring ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, as well as on the adjoining region of Stavropol’ with a majority of Russian inhabitants. Formal economic indicators, which gener- ally exhibit negative trends since 1991, are contrasted with the large, diverse shadow econ- omy that tends to absorb federal development funding diverted from the formal sector to the benefit of local elites. The authors explore the extent to which economic activity once based in Chechnya is dispersed to contiguous regions, discuss changes in the ethnic composition of the republics (“de-Russification”), and consider whether Chechnya and the adjoining repub- lics will ever regain the close economic, political, and social ties with Russia that prevailed during the Soviet period. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O18, R12. 3 figures, 1 table, 73 references. Key words: North Caucasus, Chechnya, Russia, terrorism, Kabardino-Balkaria, jihadists, Dagestan, Ingushetia, shariat, corruption, Stavropol’ Kray, clans, shadow economy, Russo-Chechen wars, money laundering. he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced mi
  • for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensio
  • Chechnya has not been continually at war since it declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991
  • he conflicts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the
  • cts that have plagued Chechnya since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been responsible for a very high cost in human lives, with as many as 75,000 civilians and 14,000 military killed, according to estimates by the Memorial human rights organiza- tion (Abdullayev, 2005). Most attention has been focused on the military campaigns and the impacts of rampant violence, but very little attention has been paid to the non-military dimensions of these devastating wars, both within Chechnya and beyond. Violence can be found in every region of the North Caucasus and the entire region is marked by the historical legacy of forced migrations. Chechnya occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxical position in a distinctly unstable region. Most of the Republic’s conventional ties with the outside world have been severed. Until recently, the region has been a “no-go” zone for the world’s press. Human rights groups and humanitarian organizations have long been forced out of the region. Economic and trans- portation networks once focused on the republic have been relocated over the past decade and a half to avoid crossing Chechen territory. Yet, while persistent brutal violence has con- 1Respectively, Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy pereulok 29, 119017 Moscow, Russia (dnkoiv@comtv.ru); Vice-Rector and Professor of Geography, Stavropol’ State University, Ulitsa Pushkina 1, 355009 Stavropol’, Russia (vbelozerov@hotmail.com); and Graduate Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Campus Box 260, Boulder, CO 80309 (gustafaf@colorado.edu). Detailed comments on the paper were received from John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. The survey data reported in the paper were collected with the support of the National Science Foundation (grant 0433927) and the fieldwork in the North Caucasus was supported by the Committee for Exploration and Research of the National Geographic Society (John O’Loughlin, PI on both grants).
  • t of the RSFSR, declared a state of emergency in Chechnya in November 1991, dispatching troop
  • hat ensued was a disastrous 21-month campaign that culminated in the encirclement of several thousand Russian troops inside the capital, Grozny, by Chechen rebel forces in August 1996. That same month, a peace deal was brokered at Khasavyurt (Dagestan), which called for the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Chechnya by the end of the year and stipulated that the final status of the republic would be resolved by 2001 (Sakwa, 2005, p. 296). The period from 1996 until the resumption of hostilities in 1999 was one of de facto independence
  • presented above should permit the reader to conclude that the effects of the war in Chechnya on the North Caucasus have been uneven and diverse. Much has been written about the spread of Islamic extremism, interethnic strife, separatist movements, rampant criminality, and other negative aspects of the conflict that supposedly demonstrate the host of social, cultural, and economic cleavages that plague the region. In reality, however, it is possible to identify specific economic processes occurring in a large number of sectors at a variety of scal
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 30 Oct 11
       
      1996...1999... de facto indepenence
  • A rash of bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow and other Russian cities in August–September 1999 helped precipitate the second Chechen war. Although doubts remain about the official blame and convictions of Chechen terrorists for the bombings, they, together with raids into Dagestan (see below), provided an opportunity for the recently appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, to launch a new military campaign against the res- tive region. In August 1999, Basayev and the rebel commander Ibn al-K
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 30 Oct 11
       
      uses "chechyan terrorist bombings as an excuse to invade chechnya
Caroline Yevak

Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya: The Role of Memorial... - 0 views

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chechen wars conflict russia

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  • The collapse of Communism in Eurasia has led to many events that few analysts in the West could have predicted during the Cold War. One of the most improbable of these events was the stunning military victory of the tiny autonomous republic of Chechnya in the 1994-1996 war for independence against the Russian Federation.
  • While the Chechens can officially claim to be victors in the first Russo-Chechen war of the 1990s, there was in actuality no winner in this bloody conflict. Scores of Chechen villages were destroyed, the Chechen capital of Grozny was bombed to rubble in the heaviest bombardment in Europe since the bombing of Dresden, tens of thousands of Chechens and Russians living in Chechnya lost their lives, hundreds of thousands more were made refugees, and the economy of the independent statelet of Ichkeria, as Chechnya is now known, lies in utter ruin.
  • Rather than accepting autonomy within the Russian Federation, as the Republic of Tatarstan has, for example, the Chechen people rallied behind such leaders as Dzhokhar Dudaev, Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basaev, and chose to fight the might of transcontinental Russia in a bitter struggle for total freedom. The heavy cost of this independence for the Chechen people has been incalculable in socioeconomic terms.
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • If the destruction from the first post-Soviet invasion was not sufficient, the majority of the tiny Chechen RepubliCs infrastructure which was rebuilt after 1996 was totally obliterated by Russian bombing raids and artillery bombardments in late 1999 and early 2000 that surpassed even those of the previous war in their intensity.
  • the Russian government seems determined to avenge its defeat in the previous Chechen War
  • the second Chechen War has all the logic of an American invasion of Vietnam to avenge its defeat at the hands of the Viet Cong.
  • While much has been written on the Russian government's reasons for launching the second post-Soviet Chechen War
  • ndeed, historically, no ethnic group on the north Caucasus flank has had as violent a history of conflict with the Russians as the Chechens.
    • Caroline Yevak
      Caroline Yevak on 31 Oct 11
       
      Russians determined to beat Chechnya, but they lose
    • Caroline Yevak
      Caroline Yevak on 31 Oct 11
       
      Chechnya and Russia have a history of conflict-- 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars. Wars hurt both economies 
    • Caroline Yevak
      Caroline Yevak on 31 Oct 11
       
      ethnic & religious conflict (roots of conflict)
Caroline Yevak

THE CHECHEN WARS: WILL RUSSIA GO THE WAY OF THE SOVIET UNION? - ProQuest Research Libra... - 0 views

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wars russia chechen chechnya

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  • At the time of writing of this review of Matthew Evangelista's clearly written book on the wars between Russia and Chechnya, there are reports of several people being killed in an explosion on a commuter train in south Russia, close to Chechnya.
  • The Russian authorities immediately blamed "Chechen terrorists.
    • Caroline Yevak
      Caroline Yevak on 31 Oct 11
       
      history of conflict
  • ...17 more annotations...
  • If this incident is connected with the war in Chechnya
  • civilian targets
  • The Russian authorities and many commentators explain that the two invasions of Chechnya in the 1990s were primarily necessary to prevent the Russian Federation from unravelling like the Soviet Union did.
  • in late 1996, the social, economic, political and security situation in this small and relatively resource-poor part of the world deteriorated.
  • "No War, No Peace."
  • The rise of the incidence of kidnappings for cash and extremist Islamist infiltrations did not help. Money allocated by Moscow for reconstruction was channelled into corrupt hands. A power struggle developed in Chechnya.
  • rovides many good reasons why the Russians should intensify their efforts to find a non-violent solution to the situation. There are some provoking sections on the question of whether war crimes are being committed, and how Russia may be exposing itself to increasing attention on this issue.
  • In August 1999, armed forces (apparently acting in the cause of Wahabiism, an extremist Islamic movement) based in Chechnya attacked targets in Dagestan, Chechnya's eastern neighbour. Putin was appointed prime minister by Yeltsin days after this event. Four months later, Yeltsin resigned.
  • Blaming Chechens,
    • Caroline Yevak
      Caroline Yevak on 31 Oct 11
       
      Russia blames Chechnya
    • Caroline Yevak
      Caroline Yevak on 31 Oct 11
       
      wealth
    • Caroline Yevak
      Caroline Yevak on 31 Oct 11
       
      elite leaders not controlling conflict
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in December 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites.
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in December 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites.
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in December 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites.
  • The power struggles and significant degrees uf chaos and confusion in both Chechnya and Russia in the early 1990s are described, and one is left with the impression that one of the key reasons for the descent into violence in Decembe
  • 1994 was the lack of competence of the leading actors in both the Chechen and Russian political and security elites
alessandro Lannes

Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia/Drogas, ... - 2 views

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drugs violence colombia

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    • alessandro Lannes
      alessandro Lannes on 16 Sep 11
       
      Alessandro Lannes
  • Some authors have argued that high violence was the result of Escobar's excessive political ambition (Camacho and López 2001), which made traffickers unnecessarily visible
  • Colombian traffickers faced in penetrating and making stable connections with the political establishment, the event does not by itself explain the highly violent methods of Escobar's organization, which preceded his brief transit through Congress and persisted well after it. The relative centralization and coherence of Escobar's organization were also crucial factors that help explain its employment of highly organized and brutally violent methods.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • Pablo Escobar was arrested for the first time for drug trafficking. By 1978 Carlos Lehder had consolidated a network of cocaine trafficking both with us and Colombian citizens, and by the early 1980s two organizations, based in the cities of Medellin and Cali, controlled most cocaine exports (Camacho and López 2001). Since the early 1980s the Medellin traffickers began to employ increasingly violent methods. This violence was the result of three interrelated factors: (1) the inability of Medellin traffickers to successfully penetrate the political establishment, (2) the government's decision to confront traffickers by approving an extradition treaty with the United States, and (3) the relative centralization and internal coherence of Medellin traffickers under the leadership of Pablo Escobar.
  • Escobar was elected to represent Medellin in the Lower Chamber of Congress. Escobar's election generated a strong negative reaction among a wide range of political elites, who opposed the public presence of a trafficker in Congress and successfully pushed for Escobar's loss of political immunity and expulsion from Congress in 1983 (Camacho and López 2001). These events motivated Escobar to react violently against political "oligarchs", who in turn publicly declared war on traffickers by approving an extradition treaty with the us that included narcotics offences. As a reaction to this policy, traffickers led by Escobar created the group "Los Extraditables," responsible for initiating the period of "narco-terrorism" by engaging in strategic violence against the state, targeting high level politicians and carrying out terrorist attacks against the civilian population in an effort to push the government to refrain from making extradition effective
  • sign of Escobar's war against the state was the assassination of the Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in 1984, and, as of 1990, the violence of Medellin traffickers had claimed the lives of some 500 police officers in Medellin, hundreds of civilians in terrorist attacks in Bogota and Medellin, and prominent politicians, including presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galá
    • alessandro Lannes
      alessandro Lannes on 17 Sep 11
       
      Pablo Escobar was desperate to get into Congress, when he was kicked out he took drastic measures to get revenge on the people responsible
William Fromm

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  • Causes of Displacement Young people's vulnerability to abuses is the motivating factor for fleeing in many cases. The UNHCHR reports that threats by guerrillas and paramilitaries are the primary reasons for families to seek refuge elsewhere. According to CODHES, in 1998, 36 percent of families fled with their children because of direct threats; 25 percent because of fear; 22 percent because of massacres and killings; 8 percent because of battles; 4 percent because of "disappearances"; 3 percent because of armed attacks; and 2 percent because of torture. According to the ICG, armed conflict accounted for 66 percent of displacement cases in Putumayo in 2002. Families regularly cited fear of forced recruitment of children into armed forces as a reason for fleeing from their homes. For example, 60 families fled from their homes in the municipality of Cunday, in Tolima department in August 2002, following the announcement of a recruitment order by the FARC-EP for everyone over the age of 12, according to the UNHCHR (E/CN.4/2003/13, Annex). In 2002, fighting for territorial control between guerrillas and paramilitaries in western Urabá forced a group of 64 civilians, including 36 children, to flee to the Punusa area of the Darién jungle in Panama, near the Colombian border (UNHCR). World Vision Colombia reports in Victimas Civiles en Medio del Conflicto Armado, 2002, that paramilitary forces committed six massacres during the last quarter of 2002 that provoked displacements of at least 170 people each in Antioquia, Chocó and Córdoba departments. The report also cites 11 massacres by unidentified forces committed during the same period that also forced residents to flee. No specific locations or dates of these events are provided.
  • William Fromm on 15 Sep 11
     
    Helpful Website on Colombian history with drug trafficking and the reactions of its citizens.
Cole Blum

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  • the Russian Federation. For that purpose it was even willing to fight a full- scale war, the first round of which (1994-96) it won, at least militarily.
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 25 Oct 11
       
      WIlling to fight a full scale war to maintain the illusion of independene
  • All this has called for both a radical re-moulding of Chechen national identi- ty and a thorough revision of its collective past. The Chechen authorities, the national movement, and in fact all the Chechen intelligentsia – that is, both professional historians and (even more so) many other persons with higher edu- cation – have been involved in this revision of their national past and rewriting of their history on both the academic and popular levels. It all began in 1989, when Gorbachev’s glasnost reached the periphery, and has been steadily growing in momentum ever since. The main milestones in its development have been 1) in 1990, the appointment of a Chechen as republican secretary of the party for the first time since the second world war;5 2) what man
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 25 Oct 11
       
      all good stuff
  • e new Chechen historical narrative is still strongly linked to Soviet narratives, ways of arguing and moulds of thinking. It tries to prove, for example, that its national heroes were ‘progressive’ and ‘popular’, not ‘reactionary’. It tends, like its progenitor, to be openly political, to make value judgements and moralize and to overlook facts inconsistent with its thesis. Moreover, even emo- tionally it is still very much connected to the ex-USSR, and tries, for example, to prove the Chechens’ loyalty and heroism in the ‘Great Patriotic War’, as the Sec- ond World War is still called in the ex-USSR
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 25 Oct 11
       
      attempt to portray themselves as progressive not reactionary and its loyalty to wwII though trying to de sovietize
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • The Chechens (or the Vainakhs) are an ancient civilized nation. They are descendants of the Hurrians, the founders of the ancient Kingdoms of Mittani and Urartu15 and are, therefore, one of the civilizations of the ancient Near East. Since antiquity they were in contact with, and influ- enced, the peoples of the steppes.16 The Soviet narrative is, thus, reversed: the Chechens are the Russians’ elders in age and civilization and, by impli- cation, are also the ones who indirectly civilized them. (2) The Vainakhs have inhabited their present territory continuously since at least the 4th century BC.17 The northern districts, now populated by Rus- sians, had also been settled by the Chechens until Russian colonization dislodged them. This argument aims to counter the Soviet thesis that the Chechens migrated from the mountains into the lowlands only in the 17th and 18th centuries,18 and the possible political implications of this. (3) They have formed states and polities over the ages. A Vainakh state – Durzuketi – existed in the Northern Caucasus in the 4th and 3rd centuries BC and one of its princesses was the first queen of Georgia.19 Other states of which they were part included Serir (5th-9th centuries AD), Alaniya (10th-11th centuries) and Simsim (16t
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 25 Oct 11
       
      ways they are re-writing history
  • Although Russian ‘robbery raids’ against peaceful Cheche
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 25 Oct 11
       
      important wording- peacful chechnya- Chechnya says armed conflict 94-96 started three hundred years b4 at first gazavat
  • beginning with Moscow’s attempt to depose the newly elected president Jokhar Dudaev by paratroopers in November 1991, and escalating into a full-scale invasion in December 199
    • Cole Blum
      Cole Blum on 28 Oct 11
       
      This is a good article about how nationalism, while it should be a good thing, can turn into something very harmful.
    • Cole Blum
      Cole Blum on 28 Oct 11
       
      This is interesting how you can easily get people very excited and get them ready to fight just by getting them loyal to something, as shown in this example. Nationalism is a humongous example of this.
    • Cole Blum
      Cole Blum on 29 Oct 11
       
      This is actually Mckenzies article.
William Fromm

UN raises Colombia's internally displaced figure to 3.6M - Colombia news | Colombia Rep... - 1 views

colombiareports.com/...y-displaced-figure-to-36m.html

shared by William Fromm on 16 Sep 11 - No Cached
  • The U.N.'s refugee agency (UNHCR) has increased the figure of officially recognized internally displaced people in Colombia from 3.4 to 3.67 million, maintaining its undesired position as the first in the world, Caracol Radio reported Monday. UNHCR explains that in 2010 there were 57 "massive displacements," up from 42 the year before, while indigenous communities and Afro-Colombians continue to be the most prominently victimized by forced displacements, who tend to be concentrated in the areas that have witnessed intensified conflict in recent years such as the Pacific coastal regions. The latest U.N. report claimed that ethnic groups have been further affected by the development of illegal mining as a source of finance for illegal armed groups in the country, while inter-city displacement continues to rise, particularly in the Antioquian capital of Medellin. The U.N. agency noted concern for the situation of young people affected by the country's ongoing armed conflict and the emergence of criminal organizations following the 2006 demobilization process that have largely continued the narco-trafficking work of the paramilitaries. The figure of 3.6 million internally displaced people contrasts strikingly with that of Colombian non-governmental organization CODHES, which released a report earlier this year citing 5.2 million displaced Colombians, over 11% of the population, evidently using different criteria with which to classify what constitutes a "forcibly displaced" person. The government's figure by the close of 2010 rested closer to that of the U.N. with around 3.6 million people. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), however, indicates that "the rates of under-registration are substantially high."
  • "The national-survey by the Civil Society Follow-up Commission showed that 65,7% of IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] are registered," the IDMC explains, while the remaining 34.3% are not. The Colombian government puts the percentage of unregistered IDPs at 21%. The IDMC notes that many people remain outside of the government's official registry "as IDPs did not come forward out of fear or ignorance of procedures, and because many who requested it were denied registration."
  • William Fromm on 16 Sep 11
     
    Colombian Internally displaced figures have been increasing instead of decreasing.
Stuart Algood

CSA - 0 views

md1.csa.com/...viewrecord.php

shared by Stuart Algood on 29 Oct 11 - No Cached
  • ts in the war, namely the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs, are the focus of the study. The level o
  • influence
  • influence
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • bstraction at which these rival ethnic groups were sensitive to demographic trends, and therefore the level at which that rivalry played out, was the local municipality, the opstina where competition over jobs and political power was manifest. It is at this level that basic tenets of ethnic competition theory are considered to have been at work. An index of ethnic competition is introduced to measure competition in terms of the relative balance of ethnic populations. This index is complemented by analysis of the trend of relative ethnic population numbers over the two decades prior to the war. Data from the Yugoslavian census show how the demographic position of the Bosnian Serbs declined dramatically in over 90% of the opstinas throughout the country. These population trends are translated into an index of demographic disadvantage.
  • ds, and therefore the level at which that rivalry played out, was the local municipality, the opstina where competition over jobs and political power was manifest. It is at this level that basic tenets of ethnic competition theory are considered to have been at work. An index of ethnic competition is introduced to measure competition in terms of the relative balance of ethnic populations. This index is complemented by analysis of the trend of relative ethnic population numbers over the two decades prior to the war. Data from the Yugoslavian census show how the demographic position of the Bosnian Serbs declined dramatically in over 90% of the opstinas throughout t
    • Stuart Algood
      Stuart Algood on 29 Oct 11
       
      This is helpful to answering why genocide took place in curtain areas of Bosnia.
Shana Thomas

About Georgia : History : Georgia under the Soviet Union (1921-1990) - 0 views

www.aboutgeorgia.ge/...index.html

georgia

shared by Shana Thomas on 30 Oct 11 - No Cached
  • the powers, struggling for the independence, finally divided into two camps. The most popular in the public was the political block "The Round Table". The famous leader of this block was the former dissident, philologist, Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1938-1993). Exactly his personal popularity conditioned the victory (62% votes) of "The Round Table" after October 28, 1990 elections (the first many-partied elections in Georgia since 1921). Thus, it was a peaceful end of the Communist governance in Georgia. Z. Gamsakhurdia soon became the president of the country, and during the period of his reign, the inner political situation in the Republic aggravated. Because of the inflexible, ambitious policy of Gamsakhurdia, the relations between the governing "The Round Table" and the rest opposite part, became bitter. The condition in Autonomies was strained too, especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic phraseology disturbed the ethnic minorities. If in 1981 the partial compromise with Abkhazia was managed, the conflict with Ossetia became the armed opposition. The reason of this was the abolishment of Autonomous Region of Ossetia by the Parliament of Georgia. This solution was provoked by Ossetians, declaring the Autonomous Region as the Sovereign Republic. It must also be notified that in Georgia of this period, one of the reasons of existing ethnical conflicts (and also the split in Georgian national movement), except the local radical actions, was, as it seemed, the hidden activity of SSC of the Union, which used the tried imperial methods - "separate and dominate".
  • Shana Thomas on 30 Oct 11
     
    the fall of soviet union
William Fromm

Expert Witness Details Secrets of a Drug Cartel - New York Times - 1 views

www.nytimes.com/...-secrets-of-a-drug-cartel.html

medellin

shared by William Fromm on 15 Sep 11 - No Cached
  • Testifying for the prosecution in a Federal drug conspiracy and money laundering trial, Mr. Mermelstein said that from 1981 to 1985 he was one of the cartel's main representatives in the United States. He said that for four years he supervised the distribution of 56 tons of cocaine brought into the country and that he was responsible for transferring about $300 million from drug sales back to Colombia.
  • More Like ThisJackson Heights Streets Familiar to Drug CartelsCOLOMBIANS SEIZE DRUG RING SUSPECT AND 134 AIRCRAFTBanking's Technology Helps Drug Dealers Export Cash . . .Find More StoriesFederal LawDrug CartelMedellin CartelExpert Witness
    • Katy Field
      Katy Field on 15 Sep 11
       
      Sticky note on Bill's Stuff
  • ...2 more annotations...
    • William Fromm
      William Fromm on 15 Sep 11
       
      Finally gives a testimony about the drug cartels, and it turns out to be the most extensive and most informative about the drug cartels.
  • testimony came at the trial of Carlos Eduardo Restrepo, who is accused of laundering more than $10 million for the Medellin cartel through a currency-exchange company in Greenwich that was an undercover ''sting'' operation set up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Money laundering, under a 1986 Federal law, is the concealment and illegal transfer of money obtained through unlawful acts.The United States Attorney in Connecticut, Stanley A. Twardy Jr., said in an interview that Mr. Restrepo is the first person to be tried under the Federal law. Mr. Restrepo, who is 38 and who has described himself as a businessman, has pleaded not guilty.
  • William Fromm on 15 Sep 11
     
    This New York Times article shows how an eyewitness might have been treated under the colombian government, and how it later on seeked safety in the U.S. Federal Witness Protection Program.
Caroline Yevak

NO MAN'S LAND: The Mystery of Mexico's Drug Wars - ProQuest Research Library - ProQuest - 0 views

search.proquest.com/...2

Mexico's Drug War

shared by Caroline Yevak on 13 Sep 11 - No Cached
  • "It's looking more and more like Colombia looked twenty years ago," she said, "where the narco-traffickers control certain parts of the country."
  • Mexico doesn't even have a viable proclaimed guerrilla force aiming to topple the government. Instead, Mexico has labyrinthine drug gangs murderously fighting it out against each other-while they extort, intimidate, massacre, and conduct firefights with the government.
  • There is no law there," he warned. "They are the law."
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • By "they," he meant an irregular army of drug traffickers, who had created a no-man's-land in a grim little slice of Mexico.
  • Mexico's low-intensity "narco-war" has cast a daunting shadow over many of its backcountry areas, some of them wedged disconcertingly against the 2,000-mile-long border with the United States. The border's southern side is dotted with mysterious conflict zones, emitting rumors of burned houses, fleeing residents, and shadowy pseudo-armies of drug traffickers clashing by night.
  • Beltrán Leyva Cartel, El Gilo, the Zetas, El Chapo and his Sinaloa Cartel, the New Federation . . . This one little postage stamp of desert soil sounds like a package tour of "Narco-Mexico."
    • Caroline Yevak
      Caroline Yevak on 13 Sep 11
       
      Beltrán-Leyva Cartel is one of the biggest in Mexico
  • There, a rival of the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, reportedly runs two large militia camps in the mountains, each with about three hundred men. The Sinaloa Cartel's own force there, orbiting the same general area, is said to number four hundred, in fifty-man squads.
  • Over on the other side of the country, the greener side by the Gulf of Mexico, south of Texas, three of the cartel gunmen arrested in the August massacre were reportedly aged fourteen, seventeen, and eighteen.
  • Such is the typical age spread for an expedition like this: a not-so-clandestine grupo de limpieza, a "cleanup squad" sent by one drug cartel to quash another.
  • Interestingly, no Mexican police or army troops spotted the cleanup caravan that brought Ramón Mesa, though it frightened various small towns en route. The forty-five hundred Mexican Army troops deployed across the country in the drug war have struck some heavy blows against the cartels, and the troops are often more professional than some outsiders might imagine, but mysteries still abide.
Neha Kukreja

Colombia's Child Drug Assassins - 2 views

pangaea.org/...colokid.htm

shared by Neha Kukreja on 11 Sep 11 - No Cached
  • but also in the society that continues to produce them. Before juvenile violence became so widespread, many dramatic changes had occurred in Colombia. First of all, there are historical factors. The gangs emerged in areas characterized by massive rural migration. By and large, the state had completely forgotten these areas by the 1970s. Residents were condemned to the world of "informality"--a world in which the rights and obligations of citizenship were lacking. The sons of these migrants from the Colombian countryside grew up on the edge of legality. They were treated as second-class citizens, to be dealt with only by the police.
    • Neha Kukreja
      Neha Kukreja on 11 Sep 11
       
      Mhmm.... "the state forgot about them." No wonder the youth have gotten involved in Colombia's drug trafficking activities. 
  • The killing of high officials highlights the role of the young paid assassins. Most are just like Chucho--from poor neighborhoods, abandoned by their fathers, school dropouts, and unemployed. Young boys with similar social profiles have assassinated newspaper editors, leftist politicians and state functionarie
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 12 Sep 11
       
      The inablities of the Colombian Government has allowed Drug Cartels to enforce their own brand of Justice with Sicarios, with almost no fear of consequences
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 12 Sep 11
       
      This is Neha's article by the way... just says i shared it for some reason.
  • In a poll conducted last year in the schools of the Northeastern District, students were asked whom they considered the most important person in the country. Pablo Escobar was named by 21 percent of those surveyed; 19.6 percent chose President César Gaviria; and 12.6 percent named the goalkeeper of the national soccer team, René Higuita.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • efficacy.
    • Neha Kukreja
      Neha Kukreja on 16 Sep 11
       
      Look Mrs. Field.... It's yo favorite word!!!!
  • In 1990, after the assassination of Liberal presidential candidate Luís Carlos Galán, the government launched a frontal attack on the Medellín cartel. The security forces began by attacking the youth gangs considered to be the reserve army of the narcotraffickers. This offensive took place without the least respect for human rights. It used the same logic as the counterinsurgency war: classifying entire communities as enemies of society. To be an adolescent in a poor neighborhood meant to be classified as a sicario.
Ellen Mischinski

Balkan holocausts?: Serbian and ... - David Bruce MacDonald - Google Books - 0 views

books.google.com/books

Yugoslavia Serbia Croatia Bosnia Propaganda

shared by Ellen Mischinski on 21 Oct 11 - No Cached
    • Ellen Mischinski
      Ellen Mischinski on 21 Oct 11
       
      Croatian propagandists focused most of their attacks on Serbia, which was in the process of invading and occupying one quarter of their new independent country
    • Ellen Mischinski
      Ellen Mischinski on 21 Oct 11
       
      ther important myths include the Antemurale Christianitatis, the belief that Croatia represented the easternmost outpost of European civilization. Across the divide were the Serbs, often presented as being on a lower level of civilization, with an 'Asiatic' mentality, and distinct racial and psychological features, as well as different linguistic and cultural forms of identity. Such forms of differentiation would buttress Croatian arguments that, at all levels, Serbs were more backward, barbarous, and warlike.
    • Ellen Mischinski
      Ellen Mischinski on 26 Oct 11
       
      An interesting aspect of Croatian propaganda was how the focus of attack shifted after 1991. Before Serbia became a threat to Croatian autonomy, Croatian nationalists had little interest in Serbian leaders or Serbian history. Their only true enemies were the Communists, who were solidly in control of the SFRY....A long tradition of attacking Communism and Tito as the worst possible enemies of Croatia changed after 1991, when the Serbs, not the Communists generally, became the new source of evil...myths of Croatian history before WWII is the historical evolution of Serbian hatred against the Croats. What begins as a general condemnation of eastern barbarity, due to the Great Schism, becomes more politicised in the 19th century. p125
  • ...1 more annotation...
    • Ellen Mischinski
      Ellen Mischinski on 29 Oct 11
       
      mostly spread propaganda through internet
    • Ellen Mischinski
      Ellen Mischinski on 29 Oct 11
       
      p.125
Ellen Mischinski

Ingrid Betancourt: The Story that was Not - 1 views

find.galegroup.com/...retrieve.do

colombia FARC kidnapping Ingrid Betancourt

shared by Ellen Mischinski on 15 Sep 11 - No Cached
  • She was the presidential candidate of the Green Oxygen Party - a group that she had created after leaving the Liberal Party in 1998
  • San Vicente de Caguan was also one of the most dangerous areas in Colombia, as it was considered one of the strongholds of the guerrillas protected, forming part of the demilitarized zone of the army.
  • political kidnapping for extortion that are used purely as a means of financing at this stage of the life of the guerrillas
  • ...7 more annotations...
    • Ellen Mischinski
      Ellen Mischinski on 15 Sep 11
       
      FARC=anti-government. Betancourt=government.
    • Ellen Mischinski
      Ellen Mischinski on 15 Sep 11
       
      Money=objective. 
  • But although the government warned repeatedly that there was fighting in Saint Vincent and the strong presence of guerrillas, Betancourt departed the area, but by land, since not been allowed to travel on a military helicopter that was moving place. Along the way, his convoy was stopped by two army checkpoints and warned that there were guerrillas later everywhere. Betancourt ordered his driver to continue driving, but at the last checkpoint bodyguards (the army) said you could not accompany more. She, however, continued the journey to San Vicente and was kidnapped by the FARC, along with Clara Rojas, the number two of his party.
  • It is in this context that the kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt in 2002 moved to Colombia's internal conflict at a global level
  • On the one hand, if there had been no such kidnapping would not have much interest in what happened and is currently in Colombia.
  • the balance of kidnapping has more positives than negatives in terms of Realpolitik, because it weakened the position of the FARC to the world.
    • Ellen Mischinski
      Ellen Mischinski on 16 Sep 11
       
      found by Ellen
Austin Buben

Judging History: The Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the F... - 0 views

search.proquest.com/...5

arkan tigers

shared by Austin Buben on 30 Oct 11 - No Cached
  • The Judgment then turns to Bosnia and deals with the rise of ethnically-constituted parties in 1990 and the efforts of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) to achieve a Greater Serbia by annexing parts of Bosnia and Croatia where there were Serb populations.97 There is a thorough discussion of how the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which up to that point had been multi-ethnic, became 90 percent Serb. In 1991 it had become an army without a state to defend, and thus turned into an instrument of a militaristic Serb nationalism.98 War raged between the newly independent Croatia and Serb forces in late 1991, and this greatly increased tensions in Bosnia. The JNA withdrew from Croatia in early 1992 and brought 100,000 troops, airplanes, helicopters, and heavy weapons into Bosnia which further exacerbated anxiety and hostility among the population.99
  • "Arkan's Tigers.
  • "Arkan"
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • The Judgment dedicates a great deal of space to the propaganda campaign in Bosnia. By the spring of 1992, all of the media in Bosnia was Serb controlled, and was pounding out the same unrelenting message that Serbs were about to be overwhelmed by Ustasha Croats and fundamentalist Muslims, and had no choice but to join with the JNA in an all-out war to save the Serbs from genocide. Broadcasts from Belgrade featured Serb politicians such as Zeljko
  • Raznatovic who declared that the Second World War was not over and "news" reports with fictitious stories about a Croat doctor sterilizing Serb women and castrating Serb boys.100The SDS in Bosnia capitalized on the fear created by such propaganda, and began proclaiming Serb Autonomous Regions as part of creating a Greater Serbia. Crisis staffs set up in these regions carried out local government and military functions. Combining elements of the JNA, paramilitary organizations, and police units, the SDS established physical control over these areas. Since the JNA had expelled non-Serbs and was short of manpower, it relied increasingly on paramilitaries such as
  • 101 Even though the JNA was withdrawn from Bosnia in May 1992, apparently in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 752 calling for an end to outside interference,102 the Bosnian Serb army (VRS) inherited personnel and weapons from the JNA and could still count on air support from the JNA.103 Both of the last two points were essential for connecting the actions of Dusko Tadic, one small cog in the Bosnian Serb security apparatus, to the wider policies of ethnic cleansing.
    • Austin Buben
      Austin Buben on 30 Oct 11
       
      Interesting how Arkan is Aelijko Raznatovic's middle name. Also, how the serbs took over the media in bosnia and spread their propaganda.
Daniel Holtzschue

Colombian Criminal Justice in Crisis: Fear and Distrust - ProQuest Research Library - P... - 1 views

search.proquest.com/...2

shared by Daniel Holtzschue on 12 Sep 11 - No Cached
  • Colombian criminal jurisdiction not only-and not mainly-as an inefficient and corrupt system but rather as a system driven by fear and distrust.
  • fear also affects the performance of justice by inhibiting and discouraging judges from administering justice
  • These effects of fear relate closely both to a more or less generalized distrust of the Colombia juridical system and state justice and, alternatively, to the prevalence of private justice.
    • Daniel Holtzschue
      Daniel Holtzschue on 12 Sep 11
       
      The main reason why people take matters into their own hands
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • This is so because, on the one hand, high levels of fear and distrust inhibit the state's capability to provide justice to its citizens. On the other hand, private justice appears as a somehow logical response to the failure of the Colombian state to provide justice. In reality, private justice becomes the main source to further violence and increase people's distrust in the administration of justice
    • Daniel Holtzschue
      Daniel Holtzschue on 16 Sep 11
       
      never-ending cycle
  • The state's failure to provide justice to its citizens and the lack of a reliable criminal jurisdiction are frequent descriptions of the exercise of justice in contemporary Colombia.
    • Daniel Holtzschue
      Daniel Holtzschue on 16 Sep 11
       
      This sums up the entire judiciary problem in Colombia
  • the generalized use of violence has become a powerful way of subverting criminal jurisdiction.
  • Intimidation through violence ensures that the "request" or impositions of these groups are effectively and rapidly carried out. The constant competition within and among these groups and the increasing inability of the state to control them has meant that "private justice" is now available as any other market commodity, and can be bought by most ordinary people, not just those who are involved in armed conflict or drug trafficking
    • Daniel Holtzschue
      Daniel Holtzschue on 17 Sep 11
       
      Daniel Holtzschue
Mckenzie Hudson

Violence, Organized Crime And The Criminal Justice System In Colombia - Research and Re... - 1 views

www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst

shared by Mckenzie Hudson on 11 Sep 11 - No Cached
  • One of the concerns of the economic theory of crime has been the effect of the justice system on criminal activities
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 11 Sep 11
       
      The justice system in Colombia, through corruption, police ignorance and a lack of manpower, might as well not be there. In fact, it facilitiates more violence when drug dealers can pay off the police to become personal Sicarios
  • At the national level, statistics show a negative relationship between violence, using as an indicator the homicide rate, the presence of armed groups, and various performance indicators for the criminal justice system. In the last two decades, the Colombian homicide rate has more than quadrupled. In a parallel fashion, the influence of the principle armed organizations - the guerrilla, the drag mafia (or narco-traffickers), and paramilitary groups - has increased [Thoumi 1994]. During the same period, the capacity of the justice system to investigate homicides has been considerably reduced. The proportion of homicide cases that reach the courts, which in the 1960s was above 35 percent, today is less than 6 percent. In 1975, for every 100 homicides, more than 60 suspects were captured; in 1994, this figure had been reduced to 20. Conviction rates, which in the 1960s reached 11 percent of the total number of homicides committed, have dropped to barely 4 percent today [Ruhio 1996a].
  • . It is also possible to argue that one of the factors that contributed to the paralysis of the criminal justice system in Colombia was precisely this violence and in particular that exercised by private protection services and extra-judicial prosecution.
    • Mckenzie Hudson
      Mckenzie Hudson on 11 Sep 11
       
      Early drug war and "private army" violence may have contributed to the modern inefficiency of the Colombian Justice System.
Austin Buben

Timeline: America's War on Drugs : NPR - 0 views

www.npr.org/...story.php

colombia drug trafficking Drug Mexico medellin War america drugs

shared by Austin Buben on 19 Sep 11 - Cached
  • October 1986: Reagan signs the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which appropriates $1.7 billion to fight the drug war. The bill also creates mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses, which are increasingly criticized for promoting significant racial disparities in the prison population because of the differences in sentencing for crack and powder cocaine. Possession of crack, which is cheaper, results in a harsher sentence; the majority of crack users are lower income.
  • Mid-1980s: Because of the South Florida Drug Task Force's work, cocaine trafficking slowly changes transport routes. The Mexican border becomes the major point of entry for cocaine headed into the United States. Crack, a cheap, addictive and potent form of cocaine, is first developed in the early '80s; it becomes popular in the New York region, devastating inner-city neighborhoods.
  • Nixon creates the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to coordinate the efforts of all other agencies.
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • In the United States, Vice-President George H.W. Bush combines agents from multiple agencies and military branches to form the South Florida Drug Task Force, Miami being the main entry point at the time.
  • January 2006: Authorities announce the discovery of the longest cross-border tunnel in U.S. history, the work of what they call a well-organized and well-financed drug-smuggling group. The half-mile long tunnel links a warehouse in Tijuana, where about two tons of marijuana were seized, to a warehouse in the United States, where 200 pounds of the drug were found.
  • November 1993: President Clinton signs the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which increases the amount of trade and traffic across the U.S.-Mexican border. This makes it more difficult for U.S. Customs to find narcotics moving across the border.
    • Austin Buben
      Austin Buben on 19 Sep 11
       
      This is a giant summary and the history of the DEA and War on Drugs.
    • Austin Buben
      Austin Buben on 19 Sep 11
       
      Austin Found This First
Cole Blum

Georgia Genocide | Russian claims appear inflated - Los Angeles Times - 1 views

articles.latimes.com/...fg-breakaway18

shared by Cole Blum on 30 Oct 11 - No Cached
  • Tskhinvali, the capital of Georgia's breakaway republic of South Ossetia, sustained heavy damage in a five-day barrage of rockets and missiles as Russian troops and their local allies battled Georgian forces, and dozens of deaths have been documented.
  • Georgia launched a military operation in South Ossetia, to bring the pro-Russian rebel region under the control of the central government.
  • Kremlin has come out heavily in support of independence for Georgia's breakaway republics, a move that would redraw the borders of the post-Soviet Caucasus region.
  • ...2 more annotations...
    • Cole Blum
      Cole Blum on 30 Oct 11
       
      It is strange for me to hear about thousands of corpses and all of the casualties in the genocide in Georgia. I have heard of the genocide in Yugoslavia, but I have never heard of the genocide in Georgia. This leads me to believe that genocide is so common in the world today that even extreme cases sometimes go a tad under the radar.
    • Cole Blum
      Cole Blum on 30 Oct 11
       
      This quote really stood out to me when I read this article because it shows the selfishness of countries around the world. Everyone looks out for themselves, and this genocide is a perfect example of how people will turn on their own alies just because they are only looking out for themselves. This is probably why a lot of genocide occurs.
  • Shana Thomas on 30 Oct 11
     
    details about genocide; conspiracy theories.  look up Kremlin*
  • Cole Blum on 30 Oct 11
     
    Shana actually shared this.
Austin Buben

DEA Briefs & Background, Drugs and Drug Abuse, Drug Descriptions, Drug Trafficking in t... - 0 views

www.justice.gov/...drug_trafficking.html

united states trafficking DEA drugs colombia

shared by Austin Buben on 18 Sep 11 - No Cached
    • Austin Buben
      Austin Buben on 18 Sep 11
       
      Austin Buben found this first
  • The illegal drug market in the United States is one of the most profitable in the world. As such, it attracts the most ruthless, sophisticated, and aggressive drug traffickers.
  • according to the U.S. Customs Service, 60 million people enter the United States on more than 675,000 commercial and private flights. Another 6 million come by sea and 370 million by land. In addition, 116 million vehicles cross the land borders with Canada and Mexico. More than 90,000 merchant and passenger ships dock at U.S. ports. These ships carry more than 9 million shipping containers and 400 million tons of cargo. Another 157,000 smaller vessels visit our many coastal towns. Amid this voluminous trade, drug traffickers conceal cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA, and methamphetamine shipments for distribution in U.S. neighborhoods.
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • Criminal groups operating from South America smuggle cocaine and heroin into the United States via a variety of routes, including land routes through Mexico, maritime routes along Mexico's east and west coasts, sea routes through the Caribbean, and international air corridors
  • The U.S./Mexico border is the primary point of entry for cocaine shipments being smuggled into the United States. According to a recent interagency intelligence assessment, approximately 65 percent of the cocaine smuggled into the United States crosses the Southwest border.
  • These organizations use a sophisticated infrastructure to move cocaine by land, sea, and air into the United States.
  • Each cell performs a specific function within the organization, e.g., transportation, local distribution, or money movement. Key managers in Colombia continue to oversee the overall operation.
  • Over the past decade, the Colombia-based drug groups have allowed Mexico-based trafficking organizations to play an increasing role in the U.S. cocaine trade.
  • Throughout most of the 1980s, the criminals in Colombia used the drug smugglers in Mexico to transport cocaine shipments across the Southwest border into the United States. After successfully smuggling the drugs across the border, the Mexican transporters transferred the drugs back to the Colombian groups operating in the United States.
  • Colombian drug trafficking organizations increasingly rely upon the eastern Pacific Ocean as a trafficking route to move cocaine to the United States. Law enforcement and intelligence community sources estimate 65 percent of the cocaine shipped to the United States moves through the Central America-Mexico corridor, primarily by vessels operating in the eastern Pacific. Colombian traffickers utilize fishing vessels to transport bulk shipments of cocaine from Colombia to the west coast of Mexico and, to a lesser extent, the Yucatan Peninsula. The cocaine is off-loaded to go-fast vessels for the final shipment to the Mexican coast. The loads are subsequently broken down into smaller quantities to be moved across the Southwest border.
  • However, cocaine continues to be transported through the Caribbean; Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti are the predominant transshipment points for Colombian cocaine transiting the Caribbean. Because of lawlessness and deteriorating economic conditions, Haiti is a growing transshipment point for Colombian cocaine destined for eastern U.S. markets. Haitian drug traffickers, utilizing maritime shipments to transport cocaine to South Florida, are becoming a major threat. Law enforcement reporting indicates that Jamaica is an increasingly significant transshipment point for cocaine destined for the United States since it is located midway between South America and the United States. Cocaine is primarily smuggled into Jamaica by maritime methods, and the cocaine transshipped through Jamaica often is destined for the Canadian, European, and U.S. markets. Cocaine destined for the United States is usually smuggled from Jamaica to the Bahamas aboard go-fast boats. The cocaine is subsequently smuggled to the Florida coast using go-fast boats, pleasure craft, and fishing vessels.
    • Austin Buben
      Austin Buben on 19 Sep 11
       
      A lot of various different facts potentially useful in my presentation.
  • Cocaine is readily available in nearly all major cities in the United States. Organized crime groups operating in Colombia control the worldwide supply of cocaine.
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