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If you are planning on conducting any research in the Washington D.C. area, this is one guide you'll need.The Jewish Genealogy Society of Greater Washington has published the newly updated and expanded fourth edition of "Capital Collections: Resources for Jewish Genealogical Research in the Washington, DC Area". Resources, phone numbers, Web sites and security information have been updated. New sites have been added, along with a public transportation section and a DC Metro map. HINT: Do not bring any sort of drink down to the Metro platforms; you risk a fine. On my last trip, a friendly passerby advised me to ditch the iced tea before taking the escalator. At the bottom was an official waiting for unsuspecting travelers. I don't know if this tip, common knowledge for residents, is in the book, but it would help visitors.The 103-page guide includes the following sections and resources: Getting around the DC Metro Area; National Archives and Records Administration; NARA Archives II at College Park, Maryland; The Library of Congress; The US Holocaust Memorial Museum; National Museum of American Jewish Military History; Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) Library; Family History Centers; National Library of Medicine; House of the Temple Library and Museum; Washington, DC (includes DC city archives & courts); Maryland (inclding special sections on Baltimore and Anapolis); Virginia (including Northern VA and Richmond); Synagogues in the Washington area; Cemeteries in the Washington area and the Synagogues & Burial Societies using them; Cemeteries in the Baltimore area and the Synagogues & Burial Societies using them.This book is a must for individual genealogists and genealogy society libraries. Single copies are $18 + $5 S&H, though Jewish genealogical libraries may purchase them for $12. To order, send checks to the Jewish Genealogy Society of Greater Washington, Inc., P.O. Box 31122, Bethesda MD 20824, Att: Capital CollectionsLabels: Books, Washington DC

The Under Secretary's rebuttal of the IG's report is withering. It takes the IG's report apart, brick by brick, and shows it to be false in every material respect. Much of the Under Secretary's response is devoted to bureaucratic matters; e.g., the Inspector General was simply wrong in asserting that the work in question was carried out by the Under Secretary for Policy's office. On the merits, the Under Secretary points out that the IG has no expertise to determine that the effort to re-evaluate the intelligence gathered by the CIA and other agencies was "improper," even though it was both legal and directed by the Secretary of Defense: The work found "inappropriate" was an exercise in alternative thinking that the second most senior civilian in this Department directed his subordinates to prepare and brief to the most senior official of this Department. The latter, after receiving the draft briefing, directed that it be shared with the [Director of Central Intelligence]. When the Deputy National Security Advisor requested the briefing, the Deputy Secretary's office directed that it be given to him. These are the activities that the Draft Report characterizes as "inappropriate," because it considers them to be "production" and "dissemination" of an "alternative intelligence assessment" contradicting assessments of the "chartered-intelligence community." If the OIG actually believes that it was inappropriate for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to have some non-[intelligence community] staff members do a critical assessment of some [intelligence community] work on a subject of major significance for national security, inappropriate for the Secretary of Defense to share the OSD work with the [Director of Central Intelligence], and inappropriate for the Deputy Secretary to share the work with the Deputy National Security Advisor when requested by the latter, the OIG should say so directly instead of finding fault with subordinate OSD offices and staff members who did as they were instructed to do.

For some time, there have been claims of Iran's direct involvement in attacks against Iraqi and U.S. troops, but without the presentation of sufficient actual evidence to persuade Congress or the American public at large. Congress - Members of both parties and key staff - have been very reluctant to trust any such claims ever since the Iraqi WMD intelligence debacle. That might change after today, when U.S. officials on the ground in Iraq - not just at the CIA or the Pentagon in Washington - revealed reliable evidence of Iran's direct involvement, from the highest levels in the government, in the attacks.