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one likely scenario ([1], [2]) involves derivatives constructed from the riskier components of some European corporate bonds.

Whale’s notional exposure in one index was speculated to have been $100 billion

total notional exposure of all of JP Morgan’s trades has been estimated to be $79 trillion.

JP Morgan “was just engaging in financial tricks of little or no social value”.

Is JP Morgan “too big to fail”? I think so

recent paper by Stanford Professor Darrell Duffie highlights an unresolved weakness in the U.S. financial system

Each day something like $100 billion in such short-term lending is intermediated by two clearing banks

Duffie believes the system is inherently unstable, as dealer banks depend crucially on the ability and willingness of the clearing banks to provide short-term financing each new day

Here is Duffie’s recommendation for how to make the tri-party clearing system more stable: Given the systemic importance of tri-party clearing agents, and given their high fixed costs and additional economies of scale, tri-party repo clearing services for U.S. dealers and cash investors should probably operate through a dedicated regulated utility. Although this would likely increase operating costs for market participants, it would enable investment in more advanced clearing technology and financial expertise, allowing greater resilience of the tri-party repo market in the face of financial shocks such as the default of a major dealer. The moral hazard associated with lending of last resort to a dedicated utility is much reduced relative to the case of a financial institution with a wide scope of risk-taking activities.

this week’s news should remind us that more needs to be done to ensure financial stability and that the incentives of private participants align with the public’s best interests

It probably won’t last; I expect Wall Street to be back to its usual arrogance within weeks if not days.

As far as we can tell, it used the market for derivatives — complex financial instruments — to make a huge bet on the safety of corporate debt, something like the bets that the insurer A.I.G. made on housing debt a few years ago.

This system gave us half a century of relative financial stability. Eventually, however, the lessons of history were forgotten.

No loopholes, no exemptions, no exceptions, no compromise, no ambiguous language. Until Congress reinstates it, moral hazard governs and the losers will be the Americans taxpayers. History will keep repeating itself unless politics and money are taken out of the equation.