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Carsten Ullrich

EUR-Lex - COM:2017:795:FIN - EN - EUR-Lex - 0 views

  • . In e-commerce in particular, market surveillance authorities have great difficulty tracing non-compliant products imported into the Union and identifying the responsible entity within their jurisdiction.
  • In its 2017 work programme 4 , the Commission announced an initiative to strengthen product compliance and enforcement Union harmonisation legislation on products, as part of the 'Goods Package'. The initiative is to address the increasing amount of non-compliant products on the Union market while offering incentives to boost regulatory compliance and ensuring fair and equal treatment that will benefit of businesses and citizens.
  • The development of e-commerce is also due to a great extent to the proliferation of information society service providers, normally through platforms and for remuneration, which offer intermediary services by storing third party content, but without exercising any control over such content, thus not acting on behalf of an economic operator. Removal of content regarding non-compliant products or where it is not feasible blocking access to non-compliant products offered through their services should be without prejudice to the rules laid down in Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 55 . In particular, no general obligation should be imposed on service providers to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor should a general obligation be imposed upon them to actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. Furthermore, hosting service providers should not be held liable as long as they do not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and are not aware of the facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent.
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  • Those powers should be sufficiently robust to tackle the enforcement challenges of Union harmonisation legislation, along with the challenges of e-commerce and the digital environment and to prevent economic operators from exploiting gaps in the enforcement system by relocating to Member States whose market surveillance authorities are not equipped to tackle unlawful practices. In particular, the powers should ensure that information and evidence can be exchanged between competent authorities so that enforcement can be undertaken equally in all Member States.
  • Compliance rates by Member State/sectors and for e-commerce and imports (improvements in availability and quality of information in Member State enforcement strategies, progress in reduction of compliance gaps)
  • (3) low deterrence of the current enforcement tools, notably with respect to imports from third countries and e-commerce
  • (4) important information gaps (i.e. lack of awareness of rules by businesses and little transparency as regards product compliance)
Carsten Ullrich

Council of Europe - ETS No. 185 - Convention on Cybercrime - 0 views

  • Recognising the need for co-operation between States and private industry
  • need to protect legitimate interests
  • roper balance between the interests of law enforcement and respect for fundamental human rights
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  • right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, and the rights concerning the respect for privacy;
  • United Nations, the OECD
  • European Union and the G8
  • establish as criminal offences under its domestic law,
  • producing child pornography
  •   offering or making available child pornography
  • distributing or transmitting
  • procuring
  • possessing
  • expeditious preservation of traffic data is available
  • expeditious disclosure to the Party’s competent authority,
Carsten Ullrich

The IPKat: France: costs of blocking injunctions to be borne by internet intermediaries - 0 views

  • Why? Because (a) everybody has to chip in the fight against piracy - that includes ISPs and IBPs - and (b) because ISPs and IBPs make profit from letting users access infringing sites, and can afford to cover such costs whereas right holders may not. As such, bearing the full costs of injunctions is no 'unbearable sacrifice' in the meaning of the CJEU's Telekabel jurisprudence. 
  • The unions had asked the ISP/IBPs to block and de-list four websites providing access to protected material via streaming and/or downloading: www.allostreaming.com, www.allowshowtv.com, www.allomovies.com and www.alloshare.com.
  • The claimants also applied for the costs of the injunctions to be covered by ISP/IBPs in their entirety because they were not in the position to sustain these measures financially.
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  • The Appeal Court based its decision on the fact that right holders' unions and societies were financially unable to cover the costs of injunctions, whilst ISP/IBPs were.
  • he appeal decision went further by stressing that their order was also justified by fact that the defendants generated profits from internet users accessing the infringing websites. As a result, the Court breached ISP/IBPs' freedom to conduct business (as protected by Articles 16 and 52(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).
  • Nevertheless, the Supreme Court insisted that the judiciary had jurisdiction to require of ISP/IBPs to perform any necessary measures against copyright infringement on the internet, thanks to the 2000 Directive on electronic commerce and the 2001 InfoSoc Directive (tranposed into national law under Article 6-1-8 of the 2004 'LCEN' Act). The Court held that the dispositions provided a lawful basis to have the costs of injunctions charged against ISP/IBPs. This is because as "technical intermediaries" ISP/IBPs are  "best placed to bring such infringing activities to an end", the Court say, quoting the words of the InfoSoc Directive (Recital 59) directly. 
  • . First, it confirmed that neither ISPs nor IBPs were liable for secondary infringement so long as they had no knowledge of the infringing activities or that they acted sufficiently promptly to put an end to the known illegal acts upon notification by right holders. Second, the Supreme Court reasserted that ISP/IBPs were under no statutory obligation to undertake surveillance work of internet users.
  • The Supreme Court judges see nothing under EU law that would prevent national courts from attributing all costs to intermediaries.
  • "despite their non-liability, access and hosting providers are legally bound to contribute to the fight against illicit material and, more specifically, against the infringement of authors' and neighboring rights" ; "...[O]n the basis of the pure point of law, the decision of the Court of Appeal was legally justified". 
  • on the other hand, that neither ISPs nor IBPs demonstrated that the performance of the measures would represent an unbearable sacrifice, or that their costs would endanger their economic viability
  • It is very interesting to see French Courts give so much weight to the financial situation of the parties and the (alleged or potential) revenues generated by ISP/IBPs from infringing websites, in their application of liability rules. Indeed, the latter are usually framed as pure questions of law, disconnected from economic realities.
  • We will have to wait to see whether the position of the French court catches on in other jurisdictions, or not.
Carsten Ullrich

EUR-Lex - 52003DC0702 - EN - EUR-Lex - 0 views

  • Article 15 prevents Member States from imposing on internet intermediaries, with respect to activities covered by Articles 12-14, a general obligation to monitor the information which they transmit or store or a general obligation to actively seek out facts or circumstances indicating illegal activities. This is important, as general monitoring of millions of sites and web pages would, in practical terms, be impossible and would result in disproportionate burdens on intermediaries and higher costs of access to basic services for users. [73] However, Article 15 does not prevent public authorities in the Member States from imposing a monitoring obliga tion in a specific, clearly defined individual case.[73] In this context, it is important to note that the reports and studies on the effectiveness of blocking and filtering applications appear to indicate that there is not yet any technology which could not be circumvented and provide full effectiveness in blocking or filtering illegal and harmful information whilst at the same time avoiding blocking entirely legal information resulting in violations of freedom of speech.
    • Carsten Ullrich
       
      justifications mainly relate to economic viability and overblocking, but not surveillance
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    justification for Article 15
Carsten Ullrich

Upload filters, copyright and magic pixie dust - Copybuzz - 0 views

  • At the heart of the initiative is a plan for online platforms to “increase the proactive prevention, detection and removal of illegal content inciting hatred, violence and terrorism online.” Significantly, the ideas are presented as “guidelines and principles”. That’s because they are entirely voluntary. Except that the Commission makes it quite clear that if this totally voluntary system is not implemented by companies like Facebook and Google, it will bring in new laws to make them do it on a not-so-voluntary basis. The Commission is quite eager to see swift results from these voluntary efforts, as legislative proposals could already be on the table by May 2018.
  • But the worst idea, and one that appears multiple times in the latest plans, is the routine and pervasive use of upload filters.
  • In doing so, they have caused notable collateral damage, especially to fundamental rights.
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  • The European Commission is well aware that Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive explicitly prohibits Member States from imposing “a general obligation on providers … to monitor the information which they transmit or store, [or] a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.
  • does indeed involve a “general obligation” on those companies to filter all uploads for a vast range of “illegal content”
  • That lack of good faith makes the Commission’s stubborn insistence on a non-existent technical solution to a non-existent problem even more frustrating. If it had the courage to admit the truth about the unproblematic nature of unauthorised sharing of copyright materials, it wouldn’t need to come up with unhelpful approaches like upload filters that are certain to cause immense harm to both the online world and to the EU’s Digital Single Market.
Carsten Ullrich

CopyCamp Conference Discusses Fallacies Of EU Copyright Reform Amid Ideas For Copy Chan... - 0 views

  • Beyond the potential negative economic aspects, several speakers at the Copycamp conference rang the alarm bells over the potential fallout of round-the-clock obligatory monitoring and filtering of user content on the net. Diego Naranjo from the European Digital Rights initiative (EDRi) reported: “I heard one of the EU member state representatives say, ‘Why do we use this (filtering system) only for copyright?’,” he said. The idea of bringing down the unauthorised publication of copyrighted material by algorithm was “a very powerful tool in the hands of government,” he warned.
  • In contrast to the dark picture presented by many activists on copyright, multi-purpose filtering machines and the end of ownership in the time of the internet of things, chances for reform are presented for various areas of rights protection.
  • EU copyright reform itself is a chance, argued Raegan MacDonalds from the Mozilla Foundation, calling it “the opportunity of a generation to bring copyright in line with the digital age, and we want to do that.” Yet the task, like in earlier copyright legislative processes, is to once more expose what she described as later dismantled myths of big rights holders, that any attempt to harmonise exceptions would kill their industry.
Carsten Ullrich

American Internet, American Platforms, American Values - Centre for International Gover... - 0 views

  • Non-Americans should not be satisfied with this state of affairs, which basically amounts to Americans fighting with other Americans about how to run the world.
    • Carsten Ullrich
       
      !!!
  • that is, the idea that people should have a say in the rules that govern their activities. The Manila Principles, moreover, place an inordinate emphasis on domestic courts to regulate platforms, even though, as my co-author Keller notes, courts lack the expertise and policy-making capacity to do so.
  • What all of these proposals have in common, beyond adopting the American free-speech debate as their starting point, is that they treat these large platforms as an unalterable fact of life. They consider the main question to be not whether these platforms should be making decisions for billions of non-Americans, but how they should make these decisions.
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  • he democratic right for non-Americans to determine the rules under which we should live is not even considered. Instead, attempts by democratic governments to impose legitimate democratic regulation on these companies, many of which have assumed the status of essential infrastructure, is derided as creeping authoritarianism or as a threat to the free and open internet.
  • At the very least, thinking of internet governance in these terms should make us more sympathetic to attempts by the Australian, Canadian, German and United Kingdom governments to legislate in this area, rather than be dismissive of the legitimacy of (democratic) governance on its face. If we value democratic oversight, state regulation is almost the only game in town, an approach that can be complemented with international treaty-making among democratic states so as to create agreed-upon minimum standards for regulating cross-border platform activities.
  • o address the first question, in a sense, the global American platforms are free riders on the notion that the internet as a network should be global in reach. Here, a useful analogy is the global financial system. Although we have a global financial system, it is characterized by domestic regulation and, in many countries
  • many of the social harms perpetuated by platforms are the likely result of their business models, which incentivize extremist speech and pervasive surveillance
  • Speech regulation without addressing these root causes is unlikely to be successful. If tools such as internet search functions truly have become essential to knowledge discovery and exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, countries should have the ability to determine for themselves what form they should take. To be blunt, public ownership should be on the table, even if it isn’t, currently, in the United States.
  • Google’s threat (which mirrored Facebook’s) to cut off its search service to Australia was likely due as much, if not more, to Australia’s plan to exercise oversight over its proprietary algorithm than it was about Australia’s plan to force Google to give a cut of its revenues to various Australian media outlets. The harshness of this threat highlights exactly how hard it will be for non-US countries to exert any meaningful control over the services currently monopolized by these US companies.
  • Already, the United States, as the home of these companies, is working to solidify the market and social dominance of its platforms.
  • As already mentioned, the CUSMA contains provisions protecting free cross-border data flows that, while justified in terms of encouraging trade, serve to preserve the dominance of the US platforms in Canada and Mexico. To this, we can add its successful inclusion of CDA Section 230 language in the agreement, effectively pre-empting Canadian and Mexican debates over what values we wish to apply to platform governance.
  • he first step to coming up with a sound policy involves understanding the policy terrain. In internet governance, and particularly in platform governance, this involves understanding the extent to which the dominant debates and landscape reflect particular US interests and values
  • hese interests and values do not necessarily reflect those of people living in other countries. Both Canadians and Americans believe in free speech and market competition. However, our interpretations of the limits of each differ. This reality — the acknowledgement of legitimate differences and the necessity of democratic accountability — should be our starting point in discussions of internet governance, not the desire to preserve a global internet and platform ecosystem that is much less global, and much more American, than it appears.
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