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Very Interesting article. Here I am reminded of Jean Baudrilliard and "Simulacra & Simulation". In it, he talks about how the media shapes the way viewers understand. Effectively he suggests war as it shown on television, was a manufactured by media represention. "The media and the official news service are only there to maintain the illusion of an actuality… of the objectivity of the facts. All events are to be read backward." (Baudrillard, 1994, p.38) Like most things, with recent events in Egypt, it is the media represented accounts, which have become the "real". The idea the Twitter and Facebook can mobilise a revolution is a powerful symbol. "What is perhaps the most telling here is that, as Bikyamasr points out, "millions of the Egyptians that went to the streets probably don't own a computer, and definitely were not checking Twitter or Facebook for where the next gathering was taking place." The article suggests that, by the time the internet was cut off, the protests were already in full swing. Perhaps the Egyptian Government fell for the media reports of the power of Social Media. "It was through word of mouth, not online calls for activism that brought the Egyptian government to its knees". It is important to point out that word-of-mouth is a powerful tool for communication, whether it is through hand-written messages, text or social media, word-of-mouth messages are more likely to be trusted and acted upon by recipients (see Kozinets et.al, 2010) as well as fostering a connection and sense of community between the sender and receiver. References Baudrilliard, J. (1994) Simulation and Simulacra. University of Michigan Press. Translated from the French by Sheila Faria Glaser. Kozinets. R., de Valck, K., Wojnicki, A. & Wilner, S. (2010, March). "Networked Narratives: Understanding Word-of-Mouth Marketing in Online Communities" in Journal of Marketing. 74(2). pp.71-89. Retrieved via American Marketing Association/Atypon.com, 13 April 2011. http://ww

Mayton seeks to address what he views as the Western Media attributing the Egyptian political revolution to the presence of activists online. He underlines that with only a quarter of the population having access to social networks and media online, the idea that a "Revolution 2.0" occurred is seriously flawed. While acknowledging the useful presence of collaboration online, Mayton attributes the success of this political change to a word-of mouth and paper handout campaign, combined with a motivated and committed Egyptian people, preferring to credit the Internet with bringing the issue to the forefront of international politics. However Wael Ghonim a leader of the ground movement that would ultimately topple Mubarak, contradicts the ideas presented in this article. Instead he accredits social networks and in particular facebook (ref) as being the catalyst behind the revolution. While Ghonim acknowledges that any political protest requires bodies on the ground, he attributes the internet and collaboration that occurred on facebook with empowering Egyptian individuals. Furthermore the ability of these networks to spread information at a vast rate, combined with the ability to go undetected were attributed to the success of the initial protest which began in April 2008. This protest organized solely online was the trigger cause for the unrest and the political change that would unfold. Mayton highlights that the common misconception that every Egyptian has direct access to the internet is perhaps symbolism for an Egyptian society that still remains stratified. While this paper underlines the idea that attributing the success of this political collaboration to the internet overlooks the ground work and alternative methods employed to help further this revolution, there can be little doubt that in this course of history social networks did provide empowerment for some of the Egyptian people and played a significant role in this advancing this political colla

To most Australians, the conflict in Egypt was not an Internet revolution until their newspapers, bulletin websites and television told them as such. Spurred on by Google Middle East and North Africa Marketing Director Wael Ghomin's announcement that the Egyptian protesters had "the internet to thank for their victory" (Luna, 2011), headlines across the globe were swept up by the 'Revolution 2.0' media darling. It may be a journalist's job to disseminate current affairs- constructing language and presenting palatable news to their public- however the truth and integrity of the Egyptian Uprising reports suffered at the hands of the outspoken. Jordanian expert on branding Ahmad Humeid recognises these synoptic "slogans" (Pickerill, 2011) such as 'Revolution 2.0' as "extremely important for Western media audiences... [to] take an event and package it in a certain light" (Humeid, 2011). Joseph Mayton's commentary works to detangle the internet's 'exaggerated' role in Egypt. He presents the facts: 25 per cent of Egyptians have no access to a computer, let alone a wifi connected iPhone in their back pocket. The 'Online Revolution' label directly discounts the internet "have-nots" who "struggled for the same cause under the same umbrella". Finally, activists continued to mobilise, even during the four days the Government shut down the Internet service (Mayton, 2011). Yes, there was a significant initial online role in the January protests, but this article encourages that we cannot lump strong-willed street activism in its hundreds of thousands as an Internet uprising. Mayton reminds us the well-worn lesson: we should not accept anything at face value. Ignorance is bred through the blind digestion of 'fact'; we can only come closest to the truth by negotiating as many disparate viewpoints as possible. References: Mayton, J. (2011) Egypt did not have an Internet Revolution. Published on BIKYAMASR, Feb

Contrasting the prominent role the internet played with political revolutions in both the Arab and Western worlds (Dutta, 2008) the striking notion is how significant the Internet and subsequent social medias are in empowering ordinary citisens. For the first time in history the minorities of society have a place to establish equal-footing, share information and as Conley (2011) notes destabilize the old guard and oppressing political regimes. As we see internet inspired revolutions spreading across the globe the idea championed by Ghonim that "the best way to liberate a society is to give them the Internet (Smith 2011)" is becoming increasingly relevant. There's also an underlying theme throughout this news report that this political collaboration was strengthened by the inept tactics adopted by the Mubarak government. As well as the significant costs to the Egyptian economy and businesses through unplugging the Internet, it only served to advance the cause of the protesters elevating personal political stories to a global audience and invoking internet users and organizations from around the world to partake and assist in this online collaboration. A pressing issue for me is the evolution of this collaboration, the grassroots movement can be traced back to 2008 (Egypt's opposition pushes demands as protests continue, 2011) and since then the underground and organized techniques employed by the protesters online, were crucial in not only this political movement going undetected by an oppressive regime but also the successful outcome of this collaboration. While briefly touching on the potential negative aspects of the greater utilization of social media, this source clearly demonstrates how the internet and particularly social networks have assisted in the liberation of the Egyptian society. Although it remains to be seen whether similar internet revolutions will occur, evidenced here is a political collaboration build online and as Cowie (2011) docume

In a media environment where opinion tends to incline toward black or white extremes, MSNBC's technology blogger Wilson Rothman clearly and diplomatically maps out Egypt's January conflict. Performing a simple online search of 'Egypt revolution' will deliver thousands of arguments for two sides of the coin: those reinforcing a dedicated belief that social media conceived and sustained the revolution, and those (such as Mayton, 2011) who consider this estimation a gross discredit to the majority of activists with no online access. Most refreshingly, Rothman refuses to bow to broad and antagonistic statements- preferring instead to present the chain of events and their professional commentary- providing his reader with the means to determine their own position. In light of Wikileaks tracing the seeds of activism from 2008, Facebook and Twitter was used to mobilise numbers for the January 25 demonstration. This is the function for which many consider the Government 'turned off' Internet in Egypt for, however Philip Howard regards the ability to document (photograph and video) and post online the violent police response as a far greater threat and 'kill-switch justification' for the Government. During this time, the leaked media (i.e. SpeakToTweet) were "rendered more uplifting and powerful by their illicit nature" (Rothman, 2011). Journalist John Guardiano has gone as far to say that "Mubarak resigned really because of the pressure imposed on him by CNN, Fox, MSNBC, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Twitter, Facebook and the Internet" completely disregarding the Tahrir Square protesters and igniting the online comment "You bring your hyper partisan lens to bear on events you know little about" (Guardiano, 2011). Rothman's article reminds us that although Egypt's Revolution was 'Internet-fuelled' and gave individuals the capacity to "tell the story...and making sure someone is there to hear the story" (Rothman, 2011), it is

At first glance, Michael Rosenberg's paper is merely another insect in the swarm of academic opinion following Egypt's January revolution. But it is not. Published in September of 2010, Rosenberg unknowingly produced a fascinating body of work. Written mere months before Egypt's first political upheaval in 30 years; the research paper gives an honest and unaffected assessment of the influence of communication technologies in a country which was gearing up to undergo a groundbreaking Internet-charged revolution. The Guardian analyst Hossam el-Hamalawy asserts that, rather than coming from the blue on January 25, the Egyptian revolution is "a result of a process that has been brewing over the past decade- a chain reaction to the autumn 2000 protests" (el-Hamalawy, 2011). He believes that the 'key to it all' was the visual transmission of the protest to such a wide audience. A consideration with which Rosenberg would certainly agree. Perhaps many Australians saw the speed and mass delivery of the Egyptian revolution as a surprise on the front page of their morning newspaper; however Rosenberg's assessment of Egypt's history and present "environment of repression and alienation" shows us that the "aura of impending revolution" was long-standing. The 'snow-balling' social movements are due to the "ride and proliferation of information and communication technologies" (Rosenberg, 2010) such as the immergence of the Egyptian Movement for Change. In her book, R. Kelly Garrett analyses the role of information communication technologies in protest, concluding that they are "changing the ways in which activists communicate, collaborate and demonstrate" (Garratt, 2006). Rosenberg applies this technological shift to his incredibly accurate prediction that (with the exponential increase of internet users since 2000), "Things are finally looking up for the Egyptian people...the spirit of the masses finally has the power and the op

Highlighted throughout this wire piece is the principal idea that the collaboration of online political supporters of the Obama campaign did not happen randomly, rather as Benko (2008) notes there was a "clear vision" behind the strategies used to empower, encourage and promote this activism. While this article takes a more statistical approach the vast success that the campaign had in translating online collaboration into an offline political movement is demonstrated as over 150,000 campaign related events were organized through online communities, and in the last week of the campaign online volunteers were asked to make over a million phone calls encouraging others to vote. A key strength of this source is the lack of political ideology or motive present. As a news piece it offers factual and well supported observations and comparisons as to how this online collaboration evolved. This is documented when noting the crucial role that this organized campaign played in generating financial muscle for the candidate, Obama himself noting "that it was the working men and women" who helped to obtain over $600 million most of which was donated online. The Obama campaign employed the right people in Rospars, Hughes an Goldstein (2009) to exploit the potential Youth, grassroots and hard - to-reach voters with an online political strategy they helped to not only involve them in this revolutionary online collaboration but to also give them a feeling of political empowerment. This reliable source is therefore key in documenting how the Obama campaign skillfully executed an online strategy to maximize group collaboration. Offering not only a balanced and factual observation as to how the internet empowered and mobilized the ordinary citizen thus revolutionizing the political scene of the western world, but also crucially that with this campaign there was a clear bridge that activism online can result in political involvement and ultimately change offline. Refer

It is important to remember that, although Obama cleverly attached the Internet to his campaign, a combination of factors contributed to his 52 per cent (Stirland, 2008) majority: A compelling and humanising personal narrative, stellar oratory skills, and that "the moment was perfect for his message of 'change'" (Norquay, 2007). Obama's candidacy was a consciously planned and executed national movement that "lent itself to mass mobilisation among that very portion of the population that is the most new media friendly and tech-savvy, the younger demographic" (Norquay, 2007). The youth not only engaged in the web pages and online action groups produced by the Obama campaign, they took it upon themselves to create their own media content; such as the 'Yes We Can' (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjXyqcx-mYY, 2008) celebrity-driven music video which reached Youtube notoriety, or the portrait graphic a supporter produced later going on to be assimilated into the official promotion. This content-creation parallels my topic on Middle East revolutions, through activist's construction of uniform slogans, signs and imagery (McHugh, 2011). This article concludes with the prediction that Obama's "rise to the presidency will be studied for years to come as the textbook example of a new kind of electioneering driven by people and technology" (Stirland, 2008), and- to a less successful extent- this was realised in the Kevin07 campaign, in which "Kevin Rudd launched his campaign to online publicity buzz- turning to blogging, Youtube and Facebook" (Best, 2007). The Obama Campaign speaks volumes on trends towards the democratic possibilities of technology; but dystopian thought suggests that "people go online to find out more about a subject, not to be politically transformed" (Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2002). Even though a 2000 ULCA study (Kahn & Keller, 2004) showed only 29.7% of users felt the internet led to people having greater pow

Throughout this paper Lutz seeks to highlight how the Obama campaign employed a well organized and strategically sound operation in order to assist and promote the largest online collaboration in the American electoral history. While noting the idea that any political revolution will require "boots on the ground (Lutz, 2009)", this paper assess the business-like approach that the Obama campaign employed in order to facilitate this political collaboration. The key notion of this paper is that the strategy adopted was not unknown, rather it advanced techniques previously employed by McCain (BBC news, 2001) and Dean (Wolf, 2004) and this combined with an extraordinarily disciplined and organized approach is what helped to expand this "grassroots revolution" online. There is also a clear link between the organization of this aspect of the campaign and methods employed by large scale corporations. This is related in the employment of the Houdini database used to track people to the polls and help to strategically assess campaign decisions to gather every vote needed to win. Again this business-like organization which would subsequently lead to such a mass political collaboration is further underlined by Lutz as he notes the campaign "went where the people were" - specifically selecting the most significant platforms to advance this message while also making use of mobile devices, source materials and relevant tools in order to re-enforce a political message and give a voter a feeling of empowerment. Finally this paper also highlights a key transition from online political collaboration to offline political collaboration, noting that the volunteers who held house parties and channeled support on the ground were integral to the success of the campaign. It is therefore evident from this paper that while a physical presence is required to instigate political collaboration, a strong and organized presence online can go a long way to laying the foundati

The role any Government should play in regulating the Internet is certainly an intriguing argument. Having analyzed the liberating power of the Internet with particular regards to assisting revolutionary political collaborations in the western world (Fraser, 2008), it has become apparent that any attempt to restrict access to content or the internet itself only seeks to further the cause of these being oppressed. This is demonstrated throughout this paper with the uprising in Egypt and the documentation that the "internet shutdown only sought to incite the protesters more." Perhaps the most pressing issue presented from this paper is not only Mubarak's ability to shutdown the internet, but that similar scenarios have arisen across the Arab world and the political justification for large-scale shutdowns of the world wide web have all been fundamentally flawed. Moreover the desperate attempts from political factions to prevent online access, and the steps and methods employed to ensure a shutdown demonstrates just how significant the Internet has become from a governments perspective in empowering both the opposition and the individual leading to potential online collaboration in an attempt to cause political revolution. While there is perhaps too much focus on the technical aspects required to implement a shutdown throughout this article, the poor lack of justification for attempting to potentially kill the Internet within the western world is certainly pressing. While political collaboration online did not reach the same aggressive scale in relation to the situation in Egypt, the justification for a potential kill switch being solely based on a fear of online pandemics is certainly flawed and as Chen (2011) notes human presence will "most likely be a hindrance" in the face of a cyber emergency. Whether online terrorism will become a prominent threat in the 21st century remains to be seen but the justification for killing the internet in order to ha

It seems rare that such a thorough and enlightening review would be found tucked away in the inside page of a global internetworking magazine. Thomas Chen has produced an excellent overview of the Mubarak Government's rationale in shutting down internet and mobile operators, as well as a world-wide evaluation of the relationship between the Government, private ownership sectors and the Internet. Weeks earlier Tunisia endured Internet control on a lesser scale, with the closure of news sites and political blogs, arresting news bloggers and were even "suspected of injecting hidden Javascript on certain Facebook pages to steal login passwords" (Chen, 2011). Chen tackles the difficult question 'What is the proper role of Government?' with the ease you would expect of a technology magazine's editor, questioning whether the Government is entitled to centralised control (quarantine) as though an online threat were a human pandemic such as SARS or swine flu. Mubarak's 'flicking of the switch' during the January uprising has ignited alarm over free speech in the United States. In 2010 a bill was introduced which suggested giving the President the ability to cut off "the nation's connection to the rest of the Internet during a time of crisis" (Lawson, 2011). At the time Senator Lieberman clarified that this so-called 'kill-switch' was for the safety of the American people, to disconnect them from international traffic 'in case of war' (Lawson, 2011). The idea that this switch is not only technologically possible but also a future prospect caused great concern. At the end of the day, did the 'kill-switch' work? The short answer is obviously "no", as the revolution continued during the blockage, Internet was returned after four days, and the Government fell after 17. However the long answer is far more complex. The existence of the 'kill-switch' technology reminds us that Government control and censorship of the Interne

This paper does a great job in critically analysing how Flash Mobs, a new socio-cultural phenomenon, are in fact final products born from a complex human collaboration and use of the technological revolution that is the Internet. It clearly explains their specificity as being totally socially mediated on, by and through online digital tools (blogs, social media, forums, instant messaging) that are used as collaborative spaces to virtually organise and create a real-life upcoming interaction between people (Nicholson, 2005). What's more, the paper brings some ideas about how the Internet can also be used to "hijack" and reverse the original essence of Flash Mob philosophy, thereby turning its main assets - instantaneity, virtual proximity, massive audience reach, networks, costless operation - into potential factors for bringing chaos, as when Philadelphia experienced a very violent wave of riots (Wagner & Buzi, 2010), or when a political protest flash mob was organised in Belarus in 2006 (Peterson, 2009). Garland demonstrates the importance of cooperation and participation between network users for Flash Mobs and cites Rheingold's thesis, with which I strongly agree, that states that they are "a type of social engagement that may be created and organised by interacting with the technology of shared networks or the technologies that allow the shared networks to interact [within an event program]" (2002). Yet, this reading highlights the differences between Flash Mobs and Smart Mobs even though both can be considered as the technology itself and the use of that technology (Rheingold, 2002). In the end, The History of Flash Mobs raises larger concepts from which this phenomenon grew out of, such as communication, social or cultural studies, thus emphasising the importance of Internet as a new way for human beings to interact and collaborate in real life. REFERENCES Buzi, J. & Wagner, A. (2010) Flash Mobs: A New Social Phenomenon Philadelphia N

REFERENCES (continue): Buzi, J. & Wagner, A. (2010) Flash Mobs: A New Social Phenomenon Philadelphia Neighbors. sct.temple.edu. Accessible from http://sct.temple.edu/blogs/murl/2010/03/30/flash-mobs-a-new-socialphenomenon/ (accessed on 11th April, 2011) Nicholson, J. A. (2005) 'Flash! Mobs in the Age of Mobile Connectivity' The Fibreculture Journal, Iss.6 December. Accessible from http://six.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-030-flash-mobs-in-the-age-of-mobile-connectivity/print/ (accessed on 11th April, 2011) Peterson, N. (2009) Flash Mobs - The New Political Dissent. Accessible from http://www.neilpeterson.com/index.php/2009/11/flash-mobs-the-new-political-dissent (accessed on 12th April, 2011) Rheingold, H. (2002) Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution. New-York: Basic Books.

Howard Rheingold is one, if not the most, interesting writer and theorist about collaboration and the use of new participatory media literacy in the framework of Flash Mobs. Cited in almost all the papers, studies and blog posts I have read, he certainly represents a respected thinker and is a reliable author of a number of books on this topic, including Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution (2002) and The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (2000), which establish and explain the relationship between social, cultural and new digital communication mediums. In this video in particular, Rheingold talks about the relationships between communication, Medias (as communication mediums) and collective actions. He argues that our communication means, the way we use them, how they are developed and the ways in which we organise socially have been co-evolving since the beginning of human interaction (2005). He also states that this mutual evolution has conveyed new social interactions, and one perfect example to illustrate this theory is certainly the Flash Mob phenomenon. It is just a new way to interact, made possible by online collaboration of humans expressing their natural need to socialise. This reference in my bookmark list represents a valuable piece of information as it describes the historic bond between communication, collaboration and our social development. Indeed, Rheingold emphasises the fact that collaboration, as a vital question of survival, has naturally emerged between humans. REFERENCES Rheingold, H. (2000). The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. MIT Press. And (2002) Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution. New-York: Basic Books. And (2005) Howard Rheingold on Collaboration [video streaming], accessible from http://www.ted.com/talks/howard_rheingold_on_collaboration.html (accessed on 10th April, 2011)

Clay Shirky is a guru of Internet technologies and online collaborative effort studies. This document, which contains two videos from his presentation at Harvard University, provides in-depth explanations on some chapters from his book Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations (2008). This material is a very valuable reference on Flash Mob studies and more generally for online collaboration. Indeed, Shirky underlines how online collaborative tools are used by people to gather and coordinate without needing traditional organizational and social structures like institutions in our "real life" (Forte, 2010). The idea conveyed in both videos is that Internet, as a space of multi-level freedom, is an extension of the innate human ability to form groups, whatever the reasons. He adds that the orientation of these groups also depends on the political environment. He contextualizes the Flash Mob phenomenon in the age of digital communications and argues that Internet allows us to see the largest ever increase in our potential ability for expression. This expression turns into social interactions such as Flash Mobs. Furthermore, Shirky investigates new forms of political protest supported by Internet and hence, he uses it as a very efficient example to illustrate the shift from online to offline social coordination. He focuses on the role of emails and Flash Mobs as characteristics of political protests in the age of "easy and rapid group forming", which is a specificity of networks (Forte, 2010). REFERENCES Forte, M. (2010). "Clay Shirky: 15 Points on the Web Revolution in Social Collaboration and Political Communication", Political Activism and the Web. Accessible from http://webography.wordpress.com/2010/01/20/clay-shirky-15-points-on-the-web-revolution-in-social-collaboration-and-political-communication (accessed on 11th April, 2011) Shirky, C. (2008). Talks on "Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Orga

REFERENCES (continue): Shirky, C. (2008). Talks on "Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations". Accessible from http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/berkmanat10/2008/02/shirky (accessed on 11th April 2011)

The "Old Spice Guy" Campaign has proven to be a game-changer, not only for Old Spice but for social media marketing. Ehrlich points out (2010), such campaigns seek to involve the audience in an immersive experience, essentially making viewers part of the campaign. Since the original campaign advertisement was launched, the campaign reached 40 million views in a week for a total 1.4 billion campaign impressions across all media, including thousands of parody mashups. The campaign has since gone on to increase sales of Old Spice by 107% and even won the Cannes Film Lions Grand Prix in 2010 (the advertising industry's equivalent of winning an Oscar for best film). Arguably, the most interesting and memorable feature of the campaign has been the interactive "Old Spice Responses". Responses was a series of 186 custom-made videos made for fans and celebrities selected from comments from Social Media Sites like Twitter, Facebook and Reddit (Ehrlich, 2010; see also Grant, 2010). These videos posted on YouTube became the basis for a viral campaign that achieved 6,000,000 responses in 24 hours. The true genius behind Wieden & Kennedy's simple idea, as Ehrlich points out (2010), is that it is viewers themselves who are maintaining the campaign's momentum as "viewers to go viral". This marks an important shift as "brands don't make viral videos, users make videos viral." That's exactly what Old Spice achieved." (Ehrlich, 2010). References: Grant, R. (2010, 10 August). 'Wieden+Kennedy's Old Spice Case Study' in We are Social [video] Retrieve 12 April 2010 via http://wearesocial.net/blog/2010/08/wieden-kennedys-spice-case-study/ Williams, M. (2010, 26 June). "Old Spice scoops Cannes Film Lions Grand Prix" Retrived 12 April, 2010 via http://www.campaignlive.co.uk/news/1012646/Old-Spice-scoops-Cannes-Film-Lions-Grand-Prix/

My topic is more specifically related to videoconferencing, through the use of software programs such as Skype. But I found this article (and this marketing campaign) interesting as they were combining video technology with a marketing campaign, which was the first marketing campaign of its kind (Taylor, 2010). Video has many advantages including those discussed by Isaacs and Tang (1994), which are connecting people who are geographically dispersed, building motivation, providing visual cues and body language indicators. I think Old Spice incorporated these four benefits of video and utilised them effectively into their campaign. They could have made the responses in text only versions, but this would not have been as impactful or effective. They relied on visual cues and body language indicators to assist in delivering their message. Due this marketing campaign being innovative it helped to motivate consumers who were geographically dispersed into spreading these videos throughout their social networks. However as discussed by Masum, Brooks and Spence (2005), without the use of a high speed Internet connection this campaign would not have been as successful. A high speed Internet connection would need to be in place to upload the video content to its users and also share the content throughout the network. If it was still common for users to have dial up speed Internet connections, they would not have found this campaign as motivating as they would have had to wait for it to download and users may have become uninterested quite quickly. References: Isaacs, E., Tang, J. (1994). What video can and can't do for collaboration: A case study. Multimedia Systems, Vol. 2, Issue 2, pages 63 -73. Masum, H., Brooks, M. and Spence, J. Music Grid: A case study in video collaboration. First Monday. Retrieved on 16 April 2011 from http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/1238/1158

Thanks Mandy, you make an interesting point about the importance of Broadband Internet in the growth and popularity of video as a means of communication. It is sometimes easy to overlook or even overestimate the role of tools and affordances in analysing collaborative projects and events. Rosanna's article "Egypt did not have an Internet Revolution" suggests the role of social media was greatly exaggerated by the media and, in fact, the most important collaborative tool in the recent Egypt uprising was, in fact, face-to-face communication and word-of-mouth.

Although often overlooking the role of politicians in organizing online political collaboration, Sanson documents the crucial role that facebook played in galvanizing and motivating the millennial generation of voters to participate and engage in political debate throughout the 2008 election. There is an underlying theme throughout this paper that it was a case of peer -to-peer relationships that caused this revolutionary collaboration of young voters. Further highlighted is the ease with regards to facebook being an organizing tool, with social actions within the site being reflective of a ground based campaign and helping to form a new kind of politics(Sanson, 2008). Sanson ponders why it is that the youth vote has suddenly became more engaged in the political spectrum, considering factors outside of the political world; noting that both circumstance(BBC News,2008 ) and the timing of incidents over the last decade may well have instigated this youth movement. Yet it is crucially noted that the internet and particularly Facebook became a catalyst for this millennial collaboration, based not solely on political presence online but also the wealth of information and the free-flowing style of messages combined with the vast number of users(Facebook, 2011) and the ultimate chain reaction of a peer-to-peer connection. Noted throughout is the fact that this social network was used for more than just organization and a spear head of this political collaboration - highlighted is how it was used for financial muscle, as well as a tool for micro-targeting and the education of a younger generation on both the candidates and the political process. Throughout this academic paper a thorough explanation is offered as to the triggers of this millennial political collaboration which has led to a new dialogue being opened between the politicians and the voters, there can be no question that Facebook has revolutionized the way that political collaborations are conducte

The Internet has presented a medium for people to carry out 'liberal individualist' transactions with government agencies. In 2001, Microsoft announced that the internet will empower citizens "to set their own political agendas, establish government priorities and help implement policies" (Katz & Rice, 2002) and, as Angela Sanson's chapter explains, the 2007/8 United States elections rang this prediction true. Campaign finance was "just one of the many ways Obama's IT and social networking approaches revolutionised citizen participation" (Norquay, 2007): Evidence of internet incensed political dialogue, such as discussion forums, sites indicating support/non-support for parties and leadership (for example, President Obama's 1.7 million friends at the time), videos, art and news combine to create an increasingly potent role for the internet user. Obama endeavoured to "define his campaign by 'conversations' with the American people" (Westling, 2007), and in doing so, formed genuine connections which later translated into votes. As Westling recognises, Facebook is an ultimate campaign tool as it combines the "best features of local bulletin-boards, newspaper, and town hall meetings and places them in one location that is available at any time in practically any location" (2007). Many scholars have likened the transformative role of the Internet in political propaganda to that of television in the 1966 U.S. Election. The impact of the internet, however, far surpasses television because of the vast potential for individual empowerment. Instead of simply voting for themselves, citizens had the opportunity to actively contribute to political change in their peers. From the public's perspective, Facebook "gives amateur activists an easy way to connect with other citizens around the globe and helps them push their collective concerns to the top of political agendas" (Sanson, 2008). This same online influence was successfully em

The success of the Obama campaign in integrating technology to assist with groundwork organization is highlighted as the key reason throughout this paper for Obama's electoral success. Stirland documents the case of one individual who exploited the democrats large scale voter database to collaborate with others in organizing gatherings, phone banks and the canvassing of peers in attempt to fast track this political revolution. Building on the minor successes of Politicians who had gone before him (Ragan, 2008) Obama implemented a "sophisticated and Organized(Stirland, 2008)" online infrastructure in an attempt to channel enthusiasm and inspire supporters to collaborate in the get-out and vote campaign. This paper seeks to eliminate the idea that this collaboration was random, rather it points to the time and effort the campaign invested in ensuring that not only were it volunteers well trained and organized with regards to both online and offline activities, but that through the use of this political database they knew exactly which areas to target and which issues to raise. Moreover throughout this paper is the persistent argument that the foundations of this political movement began with volunteers connecting online, and it was this collaboration online combined with the presence of a real belief in a cause and candidate that would ultimately lead to such a successful ground movement. Although this paper often overlooks the relevance of both the tools and political operatives who assisted this collaboration, it makes sure to highlight the extent to which the campaign significantly exceeded anything on offer from its rival noting the lack of conviction that even rival supporters had in its ability to compete with Obama's online support. Thus in integrating technology into a grassroots movement individuals were able to harbor and execute an organized and strategically sound collaboration and ultimately bring about real political change. Re

As Virag Molnar (2010) emphasises, researchers who have studied the Flash Mob phenomenon (and its derivatives like subway parties), have only focused on the role of digital communication technologies such as blogs, social networking websites or mobile phones, in the organisation and collaborative processes. Yet, in her paper, she remarkably examines how Flash Mobs, as new types of collective actions, provide insights into the "intersection and interaction between new communications media and changing uses of physical urban space" (2010). Using the example of Flash Mobs, she states that communication technologies (mobile phones and Internet in particular), have become powerful design tools used for encouraging new forms of sociability and collaboration, emphasising that they are at the very core of these new kinds of organisation models. Following Rheingold's concept of Smart Mobs (2002), Molnar draws the differences between Flash Mob actions happening in Western Europe or in the U.S, with contrasting Flash Mob events in Eastern Europe or Asia. She highlights that cultural factors will influence sociability as the essence of Flash Mobs and describes their instrumental use to express political, marketing or entertainment purposes. Nonetheless, it is clear from her explanations that whatever the aim of the Flash Mob is, the online collaboration step to make it happen remains as an essential aspect of offline mobilisation and acts as a springboard towards it (Picataggio, 2007). REFERENCES Picataggio, S. (2007). "Use of Social Media and the Internet", on Flash Mob: 101. Accessible from http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/projects/fall07/Picataggio/index.html (accessed on April 12th, 2011) Rheingold, H. (2002) Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution. New-York: Basic Books.

In this article, West argues that the field of education is falling behind and missing out the opportunities that online collaboration can bring to students. He states that "with the ease that misguided youth can organize themselves into a mob; professionals can organize themselves into supportive learning communities." (2010). In particular West discusses Twitter, the use of certain hash tags relevant to his field in music education. West also discusses groups available on Facebook, and how Skype has been used to bring a field expert into the classroom and have a composer watch and ensemble from the other side of the world in order to provide commentary and feedback. West mentions that prior to social networking and other online tools, the only real way to collaborate with those in your field of interest or profession was to attend conferences or conventions held for that specific purpose. But now with the availability of online collaboration tools and the wide spread accessibility, there is a "new universe" (2010) of collaboration and information. West employs that the classroom no longer need to be 4 walls, 1 teacher and 20 odd students, and that the classroom has "at it's disposal a rapidly growing cornucopia of tools, information and services online…" that could bring so much more to students and educators alike. References: West, T. (2010). The Antithesis of Flash Mobs - How Professional Learning Communities Are Changing Education. Retrieved from http://www.thomasjwestmusic.com/apps/blog/show/3327014-the-antithesis-of-flash-mobs-how-professional-learning-communities-are-changing-education

The interesting part of this post that relates to my topic is when West describes Flash Mobs as a springboard for violent events in Philadelphia. According to several papers I have read regarding Flash Mob studies, West is obviously right when he talks about the "ease with which youth can organise themselves into a mob" (Rheingold, 2002). He is also right when he states that they have demonstrated the power of online collaboration because Flash Mobs Mobs simply emerge when communication and computing technologies amplify human talents for cooperation. They are products created from humans' interactions on and with digital mobile communication devices (Nicholson, 2005). But he is wrong, I believe, when he talks about Flash Mobs in general as being an abuse of social networks. Flash Mobs are just one of the many possibilities of how Internet can be used to transform virtual online collaboration between a large number of people into real, concrete offline happenings. Clay Shirky though does a great job of describing the position of Internet in our always changing social interactions and organisation (2008). He notably argues that how tools get used depends on the political environment, and if the Philadelphia riots were actually adopting the same organisational process as Flash Mobs, they did not have anything to do with Flash Mobs (Callari, 2010). As one of the first mob organisers, Bill Wasik, says: "the mobs started as a playful social experiment" (Ubrina, 2010). If Flash Mobs can be used as protest tools, especially in low freedom environments, they were themselves peaceful - almost artistic - interventions. One example used by Howard Rheingold, and which he called a "Smart Mob", is the Ice Cream Flash Mob in Belarus where people ate ice cream to protest against the authoritarian government (Rheingold, 2002). Mobs should be distinguished in nature and by definition, from riots, even though these had been partly organised through Internet.