Before encountering this article, I considered flash mobs to be a fun, street-art experience which illustrated the potential of the Internet and text-messaging to accumulate large numbers of strangers into a unison performance. The tongue-in-cheek mass snowball fight in Washington and kitsch Glee advertising came directly to mind- but certainly not aggressive packs of teenagers assaulting pedestrians and vandalising property (Urbina, 2010).

Although Temple University psychologist Frank Farley believed these dangerous mobs were little more than a "youth fad with a short life" (templecuttingedge, 2010), it is interesting to consider the way the mind changes when part of a 'pack mentality'. "When large numbers congregate with no clear agenda, and bad behaviour is initiated by some, 'social facilitation and 'emotional contagion' helps spread the bad behaviour", Farley assesses. Similar cases are seen in violent gangs, in which the extreme action of one individual quickly escalates into acceptable behaviour of the entire group.

In 2009, a Moldovan anti-Communist flash mob organiser Natalie Morar was officially charged with "calls for organising and staging mass disturbances" in an attempt to overthrow Government with a 'Twitter Revolution' (Hodge, 2009). In many ways, a flash mob's online organisation, collaboration and physical assembly of a mass of individuals is akin to the way in which Egyptian revolutionaries garnered the initial numbers for the January 25 uprising. The Western world threw their support behind the public movement to overthrow Mubarak- many saw the revolution as the uprising public as 'David' overpowering the 'Goliath' of political oppression- a rhetoric which culminating in U.S President Obama calling for an 'orderly transition' for Egypt (Lendman, 2011).

Urbina highlights an opposing voice in the recent applause (in the wake of the Egyptian revolution) for online and mobile connectivity. It is essential to recognise that these are merely communication tools; for example, a kitchen knife is only dangerous when put in the wrong hands.


References:

Hodge, N. (2009) Activist Charged for Inciting 'Twitter Revolution'. Retrieved 22.4.11 from http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/04/activist-charge/

Lendman, S. (2011). Egypt's Revolution: Obama Backing Regime Change? Retrieved 20.4.11 from http://sabbah.biz/mt/archives/2011/02/01/egypts-revolution-obama-backing-regime-change/

Templecuttingedge, (2010). Flashmobs: The Good and The Bad. Retrieved 20.4.11 from http://templecuttingedge.wordpress.com/2010/04/02/flash-mobs-the-good-and-the-bad/

Urbina, I. (2010) Mobs are Born as Word Grows by Text Message. Retrieved 22.4.11 from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/us/25mobs.html?_r=1

In a media environment where opinion tends to incline toward black or white extremes, MSNBC's technology blogger Wilson Rothman clearly and diplomatically maps out Egypt's January conflict. Performing a simple online search of 'Egypt revolution' will deliver thousands of arguments for two sides of the coin: those reinforcing a dedicated belief that social media conceived and sustained the revolution, and those (such as Mayton, 2011) who consider this estimation a gross discredit to the majority of activists with no online access. Most refreshingly, Rothman refuses to bow to broad and antagonistic statements- preferring instead to present the chain of events and their professional commentary- providing his reader with the means to determine their own position. In light of Wikileaks tracing the seeds of activism from 2008, Facebook and Twitter was used to mobilise numbers for the January 25 demonstration. This is the function for which many consider the Government 'turned off' Internet in Egypt for, however Philip Howard regards the ability to document (photograph and video) and post online the violent police response as a far greater threat and 'kill-switch justification' for the Government. During this time, the leaked media (i.e. SpeakToTweet) were "rendered more uplifting and powerful by their illicit nature" (Rothman, 2011). Journalist John Guardiano has gone as far to say that "Mubarak resigned really because of the pressure imposed on him by CNN, Fox, MSNBC, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Twitter, Facebook and the Internet" completely disregarding the Tahrir Square protesters and igniting the online comment "You bring your hyper partisan lens to bear on events you know little about" (Guardiano, 2011). Rothman's article reminds us that although Egypt's Revolution was 'Internet-fuelled' and gave individuals the capacity to "tell the story...and making sure someone is there to hear the story" (Rothman, 2011), it is

It seems rare that such a thorough and enlightening review would be found tucked away in the inside page of a global internetworking magazine. Thomas Chen has produced an excellent overview of the Mubarak Government's rationale in shutting down internet and mobile operators, as well as a world-wide evaluation of the relationship between the Government, private ownership sectors and the Internet. Weeks earlier Tunisia endured Internet control on a lesser scale, with the closure of news sites and political blogs, arresting news bloggers and were even "suspected of injecting hidden Javascript on certain Facebook pages to steal login passwords" (Chen, 2011). Chen tackles the difficult question 'What is the proper role of Government?' with the ease you would expect of a technology magazine's editor, questioning whether the Government is entitled to centralised control (quarantine) as though an online threat were a human pandemic such as SARS or swine flu. Mubarak's 'flicking of the switch' during the January uprising has ignited alarm over free speech in the United States. In 2010 a bill was introduced which suggested giving the President the ability to cut off "the nation's connection to the rest of the Internet during a time of crisis" (Lawson, 2011). At the time Senator Lieberman clarified that this so-called 'kill-switch' was for the safety of the American people, to disconnect them from international traffic 'in case of war' (Lawson, 2011). The idea that this switch is not only technologically possible but also a future prospect caused great concern. At the end of the day, did the 'kill-switch' work? The short answer is obviously "no", as the revolution continued during the blockage, Internet was returned after four days, and the Government fell after 17. However the long answer is far more complex. The existence of the 'kill-switch' technology reminds us that Government control and censorship of the Interne

At first glance, Michael Rosenberg's paper is merely another insect in the swarm of academic opinion following Egypt's January revolution. But it is not. Published in September of 2010, Rosenberg unknowingly produced a fascinating body of work. Written mere months before Egypt's first political upheaval in 30 years; the research paper gives an honest and unaffected assessment of the influence of communication technologies in a country which was gearing up to undergo a groundbreaking Internet-charged revolution. The Guardian analyst Hossam el-Hamalawy asserts that, rather than coming from the blue on January 25, the Egyptian revolution is "a result of a process that has been brewing over the past decade- a chain reaction to the autumn 2000 protests" (el-Hamalawy, 2011). He believes that the 'key to it all' was the visual transmission of the protest to such a wide audience. A consideration with which Rosenberg would certainly agree. Perhaps many Australians saw the speed and mass delivery of the Egyptian revolution as a surprise on the front page of their morning newspaper; however Rosenberg's assessment of Egypt's history and present "environment of repression and alienation" shows us that the "aura of impending revolution" was long-standing. The 'snow-balling' social movements are due to the "ride and proliferation of information and communication technologies" (Rosenberg, 2010) such as the immergence of the Egyptian Movement for Change. In her book, R. Kelly Garrett analyses the role of information communication technologies in protest, concluding that they are "changing the ways in which activists communicate, collaborate and demonstrate" (Garratt, 2006). Rosenberg applies this technological shift to his incredibly accurate prediction that (with the exponential increase of internet users since 2000), "Things are finally looking up for the Egyptian people...the spirit of the masses finally has the power and the op

To most Australians, the conflict in Egypt was not an Internet revolution until their newspapers, bulletin websites and television told them as such. Spurred on by Google Middle East and North Africa Marketing Director Wael Ghomin's announcement that the Egyptian protesters had "the internet to thank for their victory" (Luna, 2011), headlines across the globe were swept up by the 'Revolution 2.0' media darling. It may be a journalist's job to disseminate current affairs- constructing language and presenting palatable news to their public- however the truth and integrity of the Egyptian Uprising reports suffered at the hands of the outspoken. Jordanian expert on branding Ahmad Humeid recognises these synoptic "slogans" (Pickerill, 2011) such as 'Revolution 2.0' as "extremely important for Western media audiences... [to] take an event and package it in a certain light" (Humeid, 2011). Joseph Mayton's commentary works to detangle the internet's 'exaggerated' role in Egypt. He presents the facts: 25 per cent of Egyptians have no access to a computer, let alone a wifi connected iPhone in their back pocket. The 'Online Revolution' label directly discounts the internet "have-nots" who "struggled for the same cause under the same umbrella". Finally, activists continued to mobilise, even during the four days the Government shut down the Internet service (Mayton, 2011). Yes, there was a significant initial online role in the January protests, but this article encourages that we cannot lump strong-willed street activism in its hundreds of thousands as an Internet uprising. Mayton reminds us the well-worn lesson: we should not accept anything at face value. Ignorance is bred through the blind digestion of 'fact'; we can only come closest to the truth by negotiating as many disparate viewpoints as possible. References: Mayton, J. (2011) Egypt did not have an Internet Revolution. Published on BIKYAMASR, Feb