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Highlighted throughout this wire piece is the principal idea that the collaboration of online political supporters of the Obama campaign did not happen randomly, rather as Benko (2008) notes there was a "clear vision" behind the strategies used to empower, encourage and promote this activism. While this article takes a more statistical approach the vast success that the campaign had in translating online collaboration into an offline political movement is demonstrated as over 150,000 campaign related events were organized through online communities, and in the last week of the campaign online volunteers were asked to make over a million phone calls encouraging others to vote. A key strength of this source is the lack of political ideology or motive present. As a news piece it offers factual and well supported observations and comparisons as to how this online collaboration evolved. This is documented when noting the crucial role that this organized campaign played in generating financial muscle for the candidate, Obama himself noting "that it was the working men and women" who helped to obtain over $600 million most of which was donated online. The Obama campaign employed the right people in Rospars, Hughes an Goldstein (2009) to exploit the potential Youth, grassroots and hard - to-reach voters with an online political strategy they helped to not only involve them in this revolutionary online collaboration but to also give them a feeling of political empowerment. This reliable source is therefore key in documenting how the Obama campaign skillfully executed an online strategy to maximize group collaboration. Offering not only a balanced and factual observation as to how the internet empowered and mobilized the ordinary citizen thus revolutionizing the political scene of the western world, but also crucially that with this campaign there was a clear bridge that activism online can result in political involvement and ultimately change offline. Refer

It is important to remember that, although Obama cleverly attached the Internet to his campaign, a combination of factors contributed to his 52 per cent (Stirland, 2008) majority: A compelling and humanising personal narrative, stellar oratory skills, and that "the moment was perfect for his message of 'change'" (Norquay, 2007). Obama's candidacy was a consciously planned and executed national movement that "lent itself to mass mobilisation among that very portion of the population that is the most new media friendly and tech-savvy, the younger demographic" (Norquay, 2007). The youth not only engaged in the web pages and online action groups produced by the Obama campaign, they took it upon themselves to create their own media content; such as the 'Yes We Can' (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjXyqcx-mYY, 2008) celebrity-driven music video which reached Youtube notoriety, or the portrait graphic a supporter produced later going on to be assimilated into the official promotion. This content-creation parallels my topic on Middle East revolutions, through activist's construction of uniform slogans, signs and imagery (McHugh, 2011). This article concludes with the prediction that Obama's "rise to the presidency will be studied for years to come as the textbook example of a new kind of electioneering driven by people and technology" (Stirland, 2008), and- to a less successful extent- this was realised in the Kevin07 campaign, in which "Kevin Rudd launched his campaign to online publicity buzz- turning to blogging, Youtube and Facebook" (Best, 2007). The Obama Campaign speaks volumes on trends towards the democratic possibilities of technology; but dystopian thought suggests that "people go online to find out more about a subject, not to be politically transformed" (Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2002). Even though a 2000 ULCA study (Kahn & Keller, 2004) showed only 29.7% of users felt the internet led to people having greater pow

The success of the Obama campaign in integrating technology to assist with groundwork organization is highlighted as the key reason throughout this paper for Obama's electoral success. Stirland documents the case of one individual who exploited the democrats large scale voter database to collaborate with others in organizing gatherings, phone banks and the canvassing of peers in attempt to fast track this political revolution. Building on the minor successes of Politicians who had gone before him (Ragan, 2008) Obama implemented a "sophisticated and Organized(Stirland, 2008)" online infrastructure in an attempt to channel enthusiasm and inspire supporters to collaborate in the get-out and vote campaign. This paper seeks to eliminate the idea that this collaboration was random, rather it points to the time and effort the campaign invested in ensuring that not only were it volunteers well trained and organized with regards to both online and offline activities, but that through the use of this political database they knew exactly which areas to target and which issues to raise. Moreover throughout this paper is the persistent argument that the foundations of this political movement began with volunteers connecting online, and it was this collaboration online combined with the presence of a real belief in a cause and candidate that would ultimately lead to such a successful ground movement. Although this paper often overlooks the relevance of both the tools and political operatives who assisted this collaboration, it makes sure to highlight the extent to which the campaign significantly exceeded anything on offer from its rival noting the lack of conviction that even rival supporters had in its ability to compete with Obama's online support. Thus in integrating technology into a grassroots movement individuals were able to harbor and execute an organized and strategically sound collaboration and ultimately bring about real political change. Re

Throughout this paper Lutz seeks to highlight how the Obama campaign employed a well organized and strategically sound operation in order to assist and promote the largest online collaboration in the American electoral history. While noting the idea that any political revolution will require "boots on the ground (Lutz, 2009)", this paper assess the business-like approach that the Obama campaign employed in order to facilitate this political collaboration. The key notion of this paper is that the strategy adopted was not unknown, rather it advanced techniques previously employed by McCain (BBC news, 2001) and Dean (Wolf, 2004) and this combined with an extraordinarily disciplined and organized approach is what helped to expand this "grassroots revolution" online. There is also a clear link between the organization of this aspect of the campaign and methods employed by large scale corporations. This is related in the employment of the Houdini database used to track people to the polls and help to strategically assess campaign decisions to gather every vote needed to win. Again this business-like organization which would subsequently lead to such a mass political collaboration is further underlined by Lutz as he notes the campaign "went where the people were" - specifically selecting the most significant platforms to advance this message while also making use of mobile devices, source materials and relevant tools in order to re-enforce a political message and give a voter a feeling of empowerment. Finally this paper also highlights a key transition from online political collaboration to offline political collaboration, noting that the volunteers who held house parties and channeled support on the ground were integral to the success of the campaign. It is therefore evident from this paper that while a physical presence is required to instigate political collaboration, a strong and organized presence online can go a long way to laying the foundati

Although often overlooking the role of politicians in organizing online political collaboration, Sanson documents the crucial role that facebook played in galvanizing and motivating the millennial generation of voters to participate and engage in political debate throughout the 2008 election. There is an underlying theme throughout this paper that it was a case of peer -to-peer relationships that caused this revolutionary collaboration of young voters. Further highlighted is the ease with regards to facebook being an organizing tool, with social actions within the site being reflective of a ground based campaign and helping to form a new kind of politics(Sanson, 2008). Sanson ponders why it is that the youth vote has suddenly became more engaged in the political spectrum, considering factors outside of the political world; noting that both circumstance(BBC News,2008 ) and the timing of incidents over the last decade may well have instigated this youth movement. Yet it is crucially noted that the internet and particularly Facebook became a catalyst for this millennial collaboration, based not solely on political presence online but also the wealth of information and the free-flowing style of messages combined with the vast number of users(Facebook, 2011) and the ultimate chain reaction of a peer-to-peer connection. Noted throughout is the fact that this social network was used for more than just organization and a spear head of this political collaboration - highlighted is how it was used for financial muscle, as well as a tool for micro-targeting and the education of a younger generation on both the candidates and the political process. Throughout this academic paper a thorough explanation is offered as to the triggers of this millennial political collaboration which has led to a new dialogue being opened between the politicians and the voters, there can be no question that Facebook has revolutionized the way that political collaborations are conducte

The Internet has presented a medium for people to carry out 'liberal individualist' transactions with government agencies. In 2001, Microsoft announced that the internet will empower citizens "to set their own political agendas, establish government priorities and help implement policies" (Katz & Rice, 2002) and, as Angela Sanson's chapter explains, the 2007/8 United States elections rang this prediction true. Campaign finance was "just one of the many ways Obama's IT and social networking approaches revolutionised citizen participation" (Norquay, 2007): Evidence of internet incensed political dialogue, such as discussion forums, sites indicating support/non-support for parties and leadership (for example, President Obama's 1.7 million friends at the time), videos, art and news combine to create an increasingly potent role for the internet user. Obama endeavoured to "define his campaign by 'conversations' with the American people" (Westling, 2007), and in doing so, formed genuine connections which later translated into votes. As Westling recognises, Facebook is an ultimate campaign tool as it combines the "best features of local bulletin-boards, newspaper, and town hall meetings and places them in one location that is available at any time in practically any location" (2007). Many scholars have likened the transformative role of the Internet in political propaganda to that of television in the 1966 U.S. Election. The impact of the internet, however, far surpasses television because of the vast potential for individual empowerment. Instead of simply voting for themselves, citizens had the opportunity to actively contribute to political change in their peers. From the public's perspective, Facebook "gives amateur activists an easy way to connect with other citizens around the globe and helps them push their collective concerns to the top of political agendas" (Sanson, 2008). This same online influence was successfully em

The role any Government should play in regulating the Internet is certainly an intriguing argument. Having analyzed the liberating power of the Internet with particular regards to assisting revolutionary political collaborations in the western world (Fraser, 2008), it has become apparent that any attempt to restrict access to content or the internet itself only seeks to further the cause of these being oppressed. This is demonstrated throughout this paper with the uprising in Egypt and the documentation that the "internet shutdown only sought to incite the protesters more." Perhaps the most pressing issue presented from this paper is not only Mubarak's ability to shutdown the internet, but that similar scenarios have arisen across the Arab world and the political justification for large-scale shutdowns of the world wide web have all been fundamentally flawed. Moreover the desperate attempts from political factions to prevent online access, and the steps and methods employed to ensure a shutdown demonstrates just how significant the Internet has become from a governments perspective in empowering both the opposition and the individual leading to potential online collaboration in an attempt to cause political revolution. While there is perhaps too much focus on the technical aspects required to implement a shutdown throughout this article, the poor lack of justification for attempting to potentially kill the Internet within the western world is certainly pressing. While political collaboration online did not reach the same aggressive scale in relation to the situation in Egypt, the justification for a potential kill switch being solely based on a fear of online pandemics is certainly flawed and as Chen (2011) notes human presence will "most likely be a hindrance" in the face of a cyber emergency. Whether online terrorism will become a prominent threat in the 21st century remains to be seen but the justification for killing the internet in order to ha

It seems rare that such a thorough and enlightening review would be found tucked away in the inside page of a global internetworking magazine. Thomas Chen has produced an excellent overview of the Mubarak Government's rationale in shutting down internet and mobile operators, as well as a world-wide evaluation of the relationship between the Government, private ownership sectors and the Internet. Weeks earlier Tunisia endured Internet control on a lesser scale, with the closure of news sites and political blogs, arresting news bloggers and were even "suspected of injecting hidden Javascript on certain Facebook pages to steal login passwords" (Chen, 2011). Chen tackles the difficult question 'What is the proper role of Government?' with the ease you would expect of a technology magazine's editor, questioning whether the Government is entitled to centralised control (quarantine) as though an online threat were a human pandemic such as SARS or swine flu. Mubarak's 'flicking of the switch' during the January uprising has ignited alarm over free speech in the United States. In 2010 a bill was introduced which suggested giving the President the ability to cut off "the nation's connection to the rest of the Internet during a time of crisis" (Lawson, 2011). At the time Senator Lieberman clarified that this so-called 'kill-switch' was for the safety of the American people, to disconnect them from international traffic 'in case of war' (Lawson, 2011). The idea that this switch is not only technologically possible but also a future prospect caused great concern. At the end of the day, did the 'kill-switch' work? The short answer is obviously "no", as the revolution continued during the blockage, Internet was returned after four days, and the Government fell after 17. However the long answer is far more complex. The existence of the 'kill-switch' technology reminds us that Government control and censorship of the Interne

Contrasting the prominent role the internet played with political revolutions in both the Arab and Western worlds (Dutta, 2008) the striking notion is how significant the Internet and subsequent social medias are in empowering ordinary citisens. For the first time in history the minorities of society have a place to establish equal-footing, share information and as Conley (2011) notes destabilize the old guard and oppressing political regimes. As we see internet inspired revolutions spreading across the globe the idea championed by Ghonim that "the best way to liberate a society is to give them the Internet (Smith 2011)" is becoming increasingly relevant. There's also an underlying theme throughout this news report that this political collaboration was strengthened by the inept tactics adopted by the Mubarak government. As well as the significant costs to the Egyptian economy and businesses through unplugging the Internet, it only served to advance the cause of the protesters elevating personal political stories to a global audience and invoking internet users and organizations from around the world to partake and assist in this online collaboration. A pressing issue for me is the evolution of this collaboration, the grassroots movement can be traced back to 2008 (Egypt's opposition pushes demands as protests continue, 2011) and since then the underground and organized techniques employed by the protesters online, were crucial in not only this political movement going undetected by an oppressive regime but also the successful outcome of this collaboration. While briefly touching on the potential negative aspects of the greater utilization of social media, this source clearly demonstrates how the internet and particularly social networks have assisted in the liberation of the Egyptian society. Although it remains to be seen whether similar internet revolutions will occur, evidenced here is a political collaboration build online and as Cowie (2011) docume

In a media environment where opinion tends to incline toward black or white extremes, MSNBC's technology blogger Wilson Rothman clearly and diplomatically maps out Egypt's January conflict. Performing a simple online search of 'Egypt revolution' will deliver thousands of arguments for two sides of the coin: those reinforcing a dedicated belief that social media conceived and sustained the revolution, and those (such as Mayton, 2011) who consider this estimation a gross discredit to the majority of activists with no online access. Most refreshingly, Rothman refuses to bow to broad and antagonistic statements- preferring instead to present the chain of events and their professional commentary- providing his reader with the means to determine their own position. In light of Wikileaks tracing the seeds of activism from 2008, Facebook and Twitter was used to mobilise numbers for the January 25 demonstration. This is the function for which many consider the Government 'turned off' Internet in Egypt for, however Philip Howard regards the ability to document (photograph and video) and post online the violent police response as a far greater threat and 'kill-switch justification' for the Government. During this time, the leaked media (i.e. SpeakToTweet) were "rendered more uplifting and powerful by their illicit nature" (Rothman, 2011). Journalist John Guardiano has gone as far to say that "Mubarak resigned really because of the pressure imposed on him by CNN, Fox, MSNBC, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Twitter, Facebook and the Internet" completely disregarding the Tahrir Square protesters and igniting the online comment "You bring your hyper partisan lens to bear on events you know little about" (Guardiano, 2011). Rothman's article reminds us that although Egypt's Revolution was 'Internet-fuelled' and gave individuals the capacity to "tell the story...and making sure someone is there to hear the story" (Rothman, 2011), it is