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Arabica Robusta

Undermining development? IFIs' role in extractive industries in disarray (Bretton Woods... - 0 views

  • Debt relief worth over $12 billion for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was delayed as the Canadian government sought to apply pressure in a dispute over mining rights.
  • DRC has spent years shelling out tens of millions of dollars in debt 'repayments' while also implementing economic conditions which make its economy more attractive and 'safe' for foreign investors." Civil society groups are calling for audits to establish whether countries' debts are legitimate, or a legacy of irresponsible lending and undemocratic governance, in which case they should be repudiated. Ironically, in June, the World Bank approved a $50 million grant to improve accountability and transparency in DRC's mining sector.
  • Mining tax contradictions In what could be seen as an attack on the policies promoted by the Bank in the 1990s, a May IMF working paper on Malian mining taxation recommended that the government eliminate tax holidays granted to mining companies, which have meant the state “has not been able to collect its full share of revenues.”  These incentives were traced to Bank influence over the country’s mining codes in 2007 research by civil society network the International Federation for Human Rights (see Update 57). 
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    Debt relief worth over $12 billion for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was delayed as the Canadian government sought to apply pressure in a dispute over mining rights.  At June G8 and G20 meetings, the Canadian prime minister raised the issue of Canadian corporation First Quantum Minerals' contract, which was cancelled by the DRC government (see Update 70), while the Canadian World Bank executive director caused a delay to the board vote on debt relief.  The debt relief package was eventually agreed in July, including $1.8 billion owed to the Bank's International Development Association and $491 million to the IMF.  Director of UK NGO the Jubilee Debt Campaign, Nick Dearden, said that, "The experience of DRC goes to show that debt relief schemes are still operating in the interests of the 'creditors'. DRC has spent years shelling out tens of millions of dollars in debt 'repayments' while also implementing economic conditions which make its economy more attractive and 'safe' for foreign investors." Civil society groups are calling for audits to establish whether countries' debts are legitimate, or a legacy of irresponsible lending and undemocratic governance, in which case they should be repudiated. Ironically, in J
Arabica Robusta

Eastern Congo 2: academic-activist partnerships « Find What Works - 0 views

  • The recurring theme in this debate is that the academic community is unhappy with the stances taken by the advocacy community. Although I still defend the Enough Project’s need for a simple narrative, there’s a difference between a simplification of reality and a distortion of it. Here’s a quick test: try to edit your narrative into a more complete picture of the world. If you only have to add elements, then congratulations, your narrative is just a simplification. If you also have to delete elements, then shame on you, your narrative is probably a distortion.
  • Unlike a distortion, a simplification is actually backed by and derived from a more considered analysis. A simplification is tied by a clear (if unstated) chain to a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the problem. Some advocates would claim that it’s okay to use a distorted narrative, as long as it leads to the right policies. This thinking is dangerous because it detaches your policy agenda from reality. You start believing your own distortions and lose any assurance that you really are pursuing the right policies. Even worse, other people start believing your distortions.
  • The academics are unhappy because this distorted narrative can come into conflict with accurate narratives, leading to policy confusion. These kinds of critiques aren’t limited to this particular case. Hype around the issue of child soldiers has also influenced policy and programs, as discussed in a CGD study that Blattman mentioned yesterday. Similarly, the “Save Darfur” movement has been harshly criticized by Mahmood Mamdani in his Saviors and Survivors (2009), which gives an extensive history of how ethnicity, land ownership and outside actors have made the situation in Darfur far more complicated than genocide.* I’m sure there are other examples outside the realm of conflict — maybe something around child labor activism.
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  • First, academics must learn to be okay with simplifications. Relishing the nuances of an issue is a luxury that those outside the Ivory Tower can rarely afford. The political economy of political advocacy won’t allow for it. At the same time, academics must be on guard against distortions. The development blogosphere isn’t the best venue for this, and after the legislation has passed isn’t the best time. Our current debate here provides no form of accountability over the strategic choices made by advocacy groups.
  • If the advocates aren’t reaching out to the academics, the academics should do the outreach themselves. This is where my knowledge of the two communities ends. Are there forums where these conversations happen? I’ve heard too much mocking of international development conferences to think that they provide a good venue. Many think tanks occupy a space between academia and advocacy, but always seem to err in one direction or another. What are the specific mechanisms that can make these partnerships happen in the future?
Arabica Robusta

Congo Siasa: Why legislation on mineral trade is a good thing - 0 views

  • The main criticisms can be boiled down to this:Minerals are not the main issue. Land conflict, communal tensions, state weakness and failed demobilization programs are more important. (Texas in Africa, Pole Institute)By tarring the whole mineral trade with the brush of conflict minerals, we could end up in a boycott of a sector that provides livelihoods to up to a million people in the region. (Resource Consulting Services, Dan Fahey)The way advocates like ENOUGH portray the role of minerals in the conflict is simplistic and often wrong. That kind of advocacy can be dangerous. (All of the above sources)
  • The conflict began more or less in 1996 (although the roots are much deeper) following the collapse of the Zairian state, the arrival of a million Rwandan refugees after the Rwandan genocide, and as local conflicts over land, identity and power got out of control. Minerals did not play a major role in this initial phase.Minerals have, however, taken on a large role in the local economy and the conflict since then. In 2008, at the height of conflict in North Kivu, official statistics record around $30 million in tin, wolframite and coltan exports from the province. The real level of exports were probably at least two to three times as high due to smuggling, and this is without accounting for extralegal gold trade, which the Congolese senate estimated to be around $1,2 billion a year, mostly from the eastern Congo.
  • Of course, the economy is not the only thing driving the conflict; people don't just fight due to greed. Conflict over land tenure has long antagonized local communities, fueled ethnic divisions and driven youths into armed groups. The immigrations of tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi to Masisi in the 1930-1960 period further poisoned these communal relations and led many to claim that the descendants of these communities are not really Congolese.
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  • yet, I do not see how promoting due diligence in the mineral trade will prevent us from addressing these other issues, as well. Instilling accountability in the minerals supply chain can have positive externalities on the Congolese administration in general by helping to promote accountability, strengthen the capacity of the revenue collection agencies and provide an incentive to the government to crack down on the local power barons who benefit from the trade. In order for this to be the case, however, donor efforts need to focus on working with the relevant Congolese state agencies (Ministry of Mines, CEEC, SAESSCAM, Cadastre minier, OFIDA customs agency).Hence, I agree with Pole Institute and Nick Garrett/Harrison Mitchell of RCS that in the end we need to strengthen the state and make the minerals trade more transparent. But I think that a key way of doing this is by implementing audits that will require Congolese traders and the Congolese state to be more transparent in the way they deal with the minerals trade. Without strong incentives, the trade will continue the way it is.
  • We have been trying for years in the United States and Europe to promote greater involvement in the Congolese conflict. Largely in vain. Donors have thrown money at the conflict and deployed a peacekeeping operation there, but for the most part we just don't care enough.
  • I think the reason there has been such a backlash against "conflict minerals" advocacy has been due to the way these voices depict the violence. As I have said before, militias in the Congo do not rape women just because they want to get their hands on minerals. Most minerals in cell phones do not come from the eastern Congo. The war did not begin as a conflict over minerals. And so on. I find a lot of this kind of lobbying distasteful - we do not need to tweak the facts to get attention, it's bad enough already, just present the facts.
  • I think the advocacy groups have really shot themselves in the foot by misrepresenting this issue. So yes, I agree with you there. It will not bring an end to the conflict in the Kivus, but it will make it more attractive for FDLR to go back to Rwanda and for Mai-Mai groups to enter demobilization programs (which also have a ton of problems, as you know). If constructed properly (it currently isnt) to include abusive units within the Congolese army, the regulations could also provide incentives to improve performance and accountability of the Congolese army. Finally, if applied correctly (difficult) they could get rid of some of their more flagrant patronage and collusion between businessmen and soldiers, such as ex-CNDP units and businessmen in Kigali and FARDC units and guys in Kinshasa, Bukavu and Goma.
  • That said, I wondered what your thoughts are on the second criticism you mentioned (DRC minerals being collectively labeled as being tainted, and therefore damaging the DRC's economy)? Cabot does plenty of advertising on the simple platform that it does not deal in coltan from the DRC period, not just 'conflict coltan'. I also noted that the price of tantalum is going up...
  • Conflict mineral advocates see a DIRECT link between the exploitation of minerals and the perpetuation of the conflict. In contrast, we see the mineral sector as ONE important and wealth generating part of the wider economy. At the heart of our scepticism over the focus on the mineral trade is the fact that in the absence of genuine governance and security, any part of the economy - charcoal, cattle or fuel - can be exploited by a rebel group with guns, as you point out.
    • Arabica Robusta
       
      Certainly anything can be exploited.  However, coltan and other minerals are much more attractive to the global market than charcoal.
  • To pick up on the point made about Cabot’s campaigning for conflict-free minerals, it’s not just Cabot, there are a number of Western mining companies involved in this, as pointed out by the researcher Raf Custers in this article: http://www.intal.be/nl/node/9185
  • There is for example also Commerce Resources from Canada, about to develop two major tantalum-exploitation sites in British Columbia and Quebec. The anti-conflict mineral lobbyists they hired have allegedly been working closely with the Enough folks.
  • Advocates like myself, ICG, Global Witness, IPIS, Oxfam and, yes, Enough, have long argued for comprehensive security sector reform and support to the judiciary. ICG and myself (used to be one and the same) have also pushed for a holistic approach to the FDLR that would include more flexibility by the Rwandan government and the UN (although not political negotiations).The problem is that no one ever listened to us. I can't tell you how many briefings I've had with State Dept, FCO, DFID, EU and the AU about these issues. There was not enough of a domestic lobby for them to care. Now, Americans care because there has been intensive lobbying by advocacy groups, who sometimes simplify and bend the truth to pound their message through. I don't like that one bit, and it can lead to bad policy. This legislation is not bad policy, however, if it is applied correctly. I would like to see the US go one step further and push for large support to reforming the Congolese regulatory bodies in the Kivus, much like RCS if I understand correctly, which would make due diligence feasible. Also, if coupled with investigative bodies like the one we pushed for with CIC (http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peace_ssr/congo.html) even the underground gold trade could be better regulated.
  • I doubt Enough does more than talk to those sources in the industry, but if you have doubts then we should emphasize that the bill was also supported by Catholic Relief Services, Amnesty International, Global Witness and Human Rights Watch.
  • Does this mean that the 2006 Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act (http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-2125) sponsored by then Senator Obama and co-sponsored by Hillary Clinton was not substantive or meaningful? Are there no provisions in the 2006 law that can play a constructive role in advancing peace and stability in the region?
Arabica Robusta

ZCommunications | The Vile Scramble For Loot by Robert Miller | ZNet Article - 0 views

  • The offensive failed but Rwanda and Uganda stayed in the Congo to take advantage of the rich resources of the country. They were soon joined by "Burundi, Angola, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, as well as dozens of home grown militia groups and private armies" who wanted a piece of the spoils. "In 2002 and 2003 ... Rwanda and Uganda, after intense international pressure, decided to withdraw from Congo but each, however, leaving behind dozens of armed groups they had created and trained while occupying the Congo".[12] There are now armed groups all over the DRC, many with different loyalties, all fighting mercilessly to get access to the riches under the ground.
  • The only reason these groups are able to survive is because they control the mines. "The Congo possesses over 80 per cent of the world's reserve of coltan.[17]
  • Once mined, the minerals go from the warlords to the comptoirs. These are trading houses, mainly based in Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu respectively. The comptoirs buy minerals from all over North and South Kivu, then sell the minerals onto (mostly) foreign companies. Global Witness reports that "officially register comptoirs are required to obtain a licence [sic] from the Ministry of Mines. Thereafter, they are operating ‘legally', at least from a technical point of view
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  • Anglo American Plc appeared in the UN Group of Experts' list of corporations violating OECD guidelines in the Congo. De Beers, which is part of the Anglo American group, made it onto the same list. AngloGold Ashanti, also part of the group, has been accused of exacerbating the conflict in the Congo as well.[66] A War on Want report on Anglo American reports that "in 2005 De Beers returned to the DRC in an exploration agreement with the country's main diamond mining company Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), itself implicated in a number of human rights abuses."[67] De Beers holds 19.56% of the shares in an umbrella group called SIBEKA, which, in turn, owns 20% of the shares in MIBA.[68] Amnesty International reports that "dozens of illegal miners are shot dead in MIBA's diamond concessions every year" and "according to MIBA officials, around 10 to 15 suspected illegal miners are arrested every day at the polygoneconcession". Amnesty described the detainment centers as "virtually uninhabitable".[69] MIBA is owned and controlled, primarily, by the Congolese government. The Congolese army is both a huge part of the conflict and also involved in the exploitation of minerals.
  • The corporations that are involved in fuelling war and violence in the Congo, such as the ones indicated in this report, have made huge profits off it and will not give up easily. The international trade networks involved in the mineral trade from the DRC are so complex that it becomes extremely difficult to track whether minerals have been sourced from the DRC, and whether they have funded rebel groups and fuelled the conflict. The DRC is so rich in resources that it will be very challenging to give companies incentives to stop exploiting them, and these resources are so beneficial to people in rich countries, such as Britain, that it will be difficult to get a strong movement of ordinary people to seek to rectify the crimes: for example, cassiterite is used to make electronic solders, which alone accounted for over 44% of all refined tin usage in 2007[108]; gold is extremely valuable and is at the core of most of the developed economies of the world; and coltan is fundamental to almost all of our electronics, from mobile phones to laptops to cameras to games consoles. But it is definitely possible. Global Witness believes that: A greater international interest in tackling the resource dimension of the conflict and increased sensitivity to criticism on the part of companies and traders may provide a long-waited opportunity for more effective action to break the links between mineral trade and armed conflict in North and South Kivu.[109]
Arabica Robusta

Pambazuka - Conflict minerals: Cover for Western mining interests? - 0 views

  • As global awareness grows around the Congo and the silence is finally being broken on the current and historic exploitation of black people in the heart of Africa, a myriad of Western-based ‘prescriptions’ are being proffered. Most of these prescriptions are devoid of social, political, economic and historical context and are marked by remarkable omissions. The conflict mineral approach or efforts emanating from the United States and Europe are no exception to this symptomatic approach, which serves more to perpetuate the root causes of Congo’s challenges than to resolve them.
  • It is amazing that the conflict mineral approach shout loudly about making sure that the trade in minerals does not benefit armed groups, but the biggest armed beneficiary of Congo’s minerals is the Rwandan regime headed by Paul Kagame. Nonetheless, the conflict mineral approach is remarkably silent about Rwanda’s complicity in the fuelling of the conflict in the Congo and the fleecing of Congo’s riches.
  • The conflict mineral approach, like the Blood Diamond campaign from which it draws its inspiration, is silent on the question of resource sovereignty, which has been a central question in the geo-strategic battle for Congo’s mineral wealth. It was over this question of resource sovereignty that the West assassinated Congo’s first democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba and stifled the democratic aspirations of the Congolese people for over three decades by installing and backing the dictator Joseph Mobutu. In addition, the United States also backed the 1996 and 1998 invasions of Congo by Rwanda and Uganda instead of supporting the non-violent, pro-democracy forces inside the Congo. Unfortunately – and to the chagrin of the Congolese people – some of the strongest advocates of the conflict mineral approach are former Clinton administration officials, who supported the invasions of Congo by Rwanda and Uganda. This may in part explains the militaristic underbelly of the conflict mineral approach, which has as its so-called second step a comprehensive counterinsurgency.
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  • Hold to account companies and individuals through sanctions trafficking in minerals, whether with rebel groups or neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda and Uganda. Canada has chimed in as well but has been deadly silent on the exploitative practices of its mining companies in the Congo. Canada must do more to hold its mining companies accountable as is called for in Bill C-300.
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