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Hold to account companies and individuals through sanctions trafficking in minerals, whether with rebel groups or neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda and Uganda. Canada has chimed in as well but has been deadly silent on the exploitative practices of its mining companies in the Congo. Canada must do more to hold its mining companies accountable as is called for in Bill C-300.

This is a long debate that I often have with Severine Autesserre, whose recent book on the Congo you should read. She argues that the main reason that violence has continued in the eastern Congo is because we have not focus on the local dynamics of violence, including conflicts over land and local governance.

These issues are certainly very important, there is no doubt. But I would argue that the main drivers of violence since 2003 in the Kivus have been regional and national elites.

But once, again, just because people like myself (and Global Witness, and HRW, and Amnesty) endorse the minerals bill doesn't mean we should forget about all the other soap boxing we have done in the past on land reform, security sector reform, governance, demobilization programs, etc. etc. etc.

"The problem is that no one ever listened to us. I can't tell you how many briefings I've had with State Dept, FCO, DFID, EU and the AU about these issues. There was not enough of a domestic lobby for them to care. Now, Americans care because there has been intensive lobbying by advocacy groups, who sometimes simplify and bend the truth to pound their message through. I don't like that one bit, and it can lead to bad policy."

Would the legislation have come through without the simplified advocacy campaigns suggesting that DRC minus conflict minerals equals peace? If not, which do you take - the mass acceptance version that gets results, but not necessarily the right ones, or the more nuanced and low-key approach (the long and difficult road full of apathy) that may not move things enough to get policy through? Can the blunt simplified campaigns start that way, and be made more nuanced as more people get on board?

The book insists mostly on grassroots causes of violence, and on the need for support to local peacebuilding, because policy and academic writing have usually ignored them. But I acknowledge the national and regional causes of violence in the book (I actually have a whole chapter on these top-down causes) and I emphasize the need for conflict resolution at all levels. While I argue that citizenship and land issues are important, I also emphasize the significance of economic and social issues, just like you do in your post.

What I’m really trying to get to is that monitoring, the law and audits, along with public shaming, have almost certainly got as far as they’re capable of getting in hte supply chain and I cannot see Enough as doing anything other than creating lots of jobs for people authorised by Enough to work as supply chain auditors…to no effect other than a paycheque.

China is the world’s largest consumer of tin, and most of the smelting happens in southeast Asia. However, most of the trading companies that purchase Congolese tin ore are based in Europe – Amalgamated Metal Corp (AMC) used to buy around half of the Kivu’s tin production, and Belgium-based Traxys and Trademet buy a fair chunk of the rest. Pressure them last year had a significant impact: they suspended all exports from the Kivus after allegations that they were indirectly financing rebel groups. While they may very well try to hide behind front companies in BRIC countries, that might eventually be more of a nuisance than just complying with basic due diligence.

due diligence and sanctions for non-compliant companies could provide the necessary incentive structures for companies and the Congolese state to strengthen their regulatory agencies, clear the soldiers out of the mines and render the trade more accountable and transparent. That could then finally prompt companies to invest in industrial tin mining in the Kivus – the Bisie polygon in particular – which would in turn cut out a lot of the crooked middlemen and militias that currently benefit from the trade and who parasitize the Congolese state.

The important fact is not the size of the Congolese market to the global market. The important fact is the size of the companies affected by the legislation to the producers (exporters/processors).

On the second point, I think you missed a key component. There is a background constraint to the equations you did, which is what can be done by the US. ENOUGH worked on a policy that resonated with US constituencies AND was directly material to the US Congress AND could be implemented through US legislation. So they can’t just advocate for any policy at all, but policies that are relevant in the US. Importantly, you ignore that ENOUGH does campaign on all sorts of other issues, including support for peacekeepers. This is not absent from their campaign materials. It was absent from the legislation, because that clearly would not be material to a financial reform bill. This is also a matter of facts. We can see ENOUGH’s support for peacekeepers, and we will see that in the future. On point three, it is not a question of facts. It is clearly stated as a counterfactual. “What if Congress doesn’t pay attention to other important issues?” I’m not sure what facts one can appeal to. I also find it highly unlikely that this legislation will distract Congressional attention from other DRC issues in the future. I suspect it is much more likely that it will RAISE the profile of the DRC in foreign affairs issues for Congress as a result of extensive lobbying. The “advocacy space” is not fixed. In fact, it might be expanded by the result of lobbying. But regardless, there is no “fact” to appeal to resolve this argument. Finally, Jason is right that the legislation creates an incentive structure for responsible supply chains, which in the long run will likely be a good thing.

An unintended consequence of this legislation will be the increased cost of doing business and possible end of doing business with 9 other African countries who may transship some Congolese material but also produce their own. If economies in the 9 other African countries listed in this law are injured as a consequence and livelihoods reduced then instability and poverty are the results of this well intentioned and poorly crafted legislation. Instability and poverty that could well lead to increased civil conflict in those countries.

Of course, in the short-term, some companies will choose to pull their business out of Congo altogether. This is not our objective, but it is a serious issue. Miners will lose jobs, and the main risk is that ex-combatants will rejoin militias. Here’s where we get back to the point that addressing conflict minerals trade has to be part of a much broader strategy, one that will span many years and focus on spurring broad economic recovery, promoting good governance and cracking down on corruption, and revitalizing peacebuilding efforts. In particular, companies that have long benefited from Congo’s cheap mineral trade should work with donors to create a fund dedicated to supporting alternative livelihoods for miners

The Security and Exchange Commission is just beginning to work out the details of how the conflict minerals law will be implemented, and industry groups are lobbying hard to see that the SEC regulations carry as little weight as possible, by narrowly defining, for instance, which companies have to report on their activities in eastern Congo.

Addressing the minerals trade is particularly important because until recently it was neglected, disregarded by diplomats and policymakers in negotiations and peace talks. Also, international advocacy on conflict minerals can be more effective than on other issues in the conflict, because of the international dimension of the trade.