Group items tagged

n European capitals elaborate plans are already being hatched to try to avoid being spotted shaking hands or being photographed with the leader the US state department has dubbed Europe's last dictator and whose ubiquitous security service still proudly calls itself the KGB.

The policy being launched in Prague is an attempt to use trade, travel and aid to forge greater integration between the EU and the former Soviet bloc states, while at the same time aiming to fob off the clamour from countries such as Ukraine and Georgia for full EU membership and seeking to counter Russian influence in what the Kremlin calls its "near abroad".

Lukashenko and dozens of regime cronies were placed on an EU travel blacklist for rigging elections in 2006, but the entry ban was suspended for the second time last month, meaning that he is free to take up the invitation to Prague.

The Dutch and the Swedes have been the biggest opponents of inviting Lukashenko, while the Germans, Poles and Italians have been strongest in arguing for engaging Minsk. Lukashenko will score a new coup later this month by exploiting the lifting of the travel ban and going to Rome, where he is to be received by the Pope.

"My understanding is he's not going to come to the summit," said the Brussels diplomat, reflecting the widespread wish that Lukashenko stay away to avoid embarrassment for all."Let's hope the question will not arise. We don't like what we see in Belarus," said the ambassador. Another west European diplomat did not rule out some boycotts of the Prague summit if the Belarus leader confirms his attendance.

Last week, the Economist called for the United States to reduce its aid to Israel if the Netanyahu government continues to reject a two-state solution.  The Boston Globe offered a similar view earlier this week, advising Obama to tell Netanyahu "to take the steps necessary for peace or risk compromising Israel's special relationship with America." A few days ago, Ha’aretz reported that the Obama Administration was preparing Congressional leaders for a possible confrontation with the Netanyahu government.

We already know what it means for the United States to put pressure on the Palestinians, because Washington has done that repeatedly -- and sometimes effectively -- over the past several decades.  During the 1970s, for example, the United States supported King Hussein’s violent crackdown on the PLO cadres who were threatening his rule in Jordan. During the 1980s, the United States refused to recognize the PLO until it accepted Israel’s right to exist.  After the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the Bush administration refused to deal with Yasser Arafat and pushed hard for his replacement. After Arafat's death, we insisted on democratic elections for a new Palestinian assembly and then rejected the results when Hamas won. The United States has also gone after charitable organizations with ties to Hamas and backed Israel’s recent campaign in Gaza.

In short, the United States has rarely hesitated to use its leverage to try to shape Palestinian behavior, even if some of these efforts -- such as the inept attempt to foment a Fatah coup against Hamas in 2007 -- have backfired.

The United States has only rarely put (mild) pressure on Israel in recent decades (and never for very long), even when the Israeli government was engaged in actions (such as building settlements) that the U.S. government opposed.  The question is: if the Netanyahu/Lieberman government remains intransigent, what should Obama do?

4. Downgrade existing arrangements for “strategic cooperation.”  There are now a number of institutionalized arrangements for security cooperation between the Pentagon and the Israel Defense Forces and between U.S. and Israeli intelligence. The Obama administration could postpone or suspend some of these meetings, or start sending lower-grade representatives to them.

2. Change the Rhetoric. The Obama administration could begin by using different language to describe certain Israeli policies.  While reaffirming America’s commitment to Israel’s existence as a Jewish-majority state, it could stop referring to settlement construction as “unhelpful,” a word that makes U.S. diplomats sound timid and mealy-mouthed.  Instead, we could start describing the settlements as “illegal” or as “violations of international law.”

U.S. officials could even describe Israel’s occupation as “contrary to democracy,” “unwise,” “cruel,” or “unjust.”  Altering the rhetoric would send a clear signal to the Israeli government and its citizens that their government’s opposition to a two-state solution was jeopardizing the special relationship.

3. Support a U.N. Resolution Condemning the Occupation.  Since 1972, the United States has vetoed forty-three U.N. Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel (a number greater than the sum of all vetoes cast by the other permanent members)

If the Obama administration wanted to send a clear signal that it was unhappy with Israel’s actions, it could sponsor a resolution condemning the occupation and calling for a two-state solution.

1. Cut the aid package? If you add it all up, Israel gets over $3 billion in U.S. economic and military aid each year, which works out to about $500 per Israeli citizen. There’s a lot of potential leverage here, but it’s probably not the best stick to use, at least not at first. Trying to trim or cut the aid package will trigger an open and undoubtedly ugly confrontation in Congress (where the influence of AIPAC and other hard-line groups in the Israel lobby is greatest). So that’s not where I’d start.

There is in fact a precedent for this step: after negotiating the original agreements for a “strategic partnership,” the Reagan administration suspended them following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Today, such a step would surely get the attention of Israel’s security establishment.

5. Reduce U.S. purchases of Israeli military equipment. In addition to providing Israel with military assistance (some of which is then used to purchase U.S. arms), the Pentagon also buys millions of dollars of weaponry and other services from Israel’s own defense industry. Obama could instruct Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to slow or decrease these purchases, which would send an unmistakable signal that it was no longer "business-as-usual." Given the battering Israel’s economy has taken in the current global recession, this step would get noticed too.

6. Get tough with private organizations that support settlement activity. As David Ignatius recently noted in the Washington Post, many private donations to charitable organizations operating in Israel are tax-deductible in the United States, including private donations that support settlement activity. This makes no sense: it means the American taxpayer is indirectly subsidizing activities that are contrary to stated U.S. policy and that actually threaten Israel’s long-term future.  Just as the United States has gone after charitable contributions flowing to terrorist organizations, the U.S. Treasury could crack down on charitable organizations (including those of some prominent Christian Zionists) that are supporting these illegal activities. 

7. Place more limits on U.S. loan guarantees. The United States has provided billions of dollars of loan guarantees to Israel on several occasions, which enabled Israel to borrow money from commercial banks at lower interest rates.  Back in 1992, the first Bush administration held up nearly $10 billion in guarantees until Israel agreed to halt settlement construction and attend the Madrid peace conference, and the dispute helped undermine the hard-line Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir and bring Yitzhak Rabin to power, which in turn made the historic Oslo Agreement possible.

8. Encourage other U.S. allies to use their influence too. In the past, the United States has often pressed other states to upgrade their own ties with Israel.  If pressure is needed, however, the United States could try a different tack.  For example, we could quietly encourage the EU not to upgrade its relations with Israel until it had agreed to end the occupation.

most of these measures could be implemented by the Executive Branch alone, thereby outflanking die-hard defenders of the special relationship in Congress.  Indeed, even hinting that it was thinking about some of these measures would probably get Netanyahu to start reconsidering his position.

Most importantly, Obama and his aides will need to reach out to Israel’s supporters in the United States, and make it clear to them that pressing Israel to end the occupation is essential for Israel’s long-term survival.

He will have to work with the more far-sighted elements in the pro-Israel community -- including groups like J Street, the Israel Policy Forum, Brit Tzedek v'Shalom,  and others

In effect, the United States would be giving Israel a choice: it can end its self-defeating occupation of Palestinian lands, actively work for a two-state solution, and thereby remain a cherished American ally.  Or it can continue to expand the occupation and face a progressive loss of American support as well as the costly and corrupting burden of ruling millions of Palestinians by force.

Indeed, that is why many—though of course not all--Israelis would probably welcome a more active and evenhanded U.S. role. It was former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who said "if the two-state solution collapses, Israel will face a South-Africa style struggle for political rights." And once that happens, he warned, “the state of Israel is finished."

The editor of Ha’aretz, David Landau, conveyed much the same sentiment last September when he told former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the United States should "rape" Israel in order to force a solution. Landau's phrase was shocking and offensive, but it underscored the sense of urgency felt within some segments of the Israeli body politic.

"The US strongly supports Turkey's bid to become a member of the European Union," he said. "Europe gains by the diversity of ethnicity, culture and faith - it is not diminished by it. And Turkish membership would broaden and strengthen Europe's foundation once more."

Soli Ozel, an analyst at Bilgi University in Istanbul, said Obama had pressed "all the right buttons". "It looked at both sides of Turkey's identity, secular and Islamic," he said.

According to diplomatic sources, the decisive impulse came from the US. Obama spoke with Gül and telephoned with Erdogan -- and was able to assuage their concerns. Erdogan said that Obama offered him certain unnamed guarantees -- allegedly they had to do with the Denmark-based Kurdish broadcaster Roj TV as well as with top NATO posts for Turkey.

Once the drama had come to an end, Rasmussen immediately sought to ease the tension, saying he would do "his utmost" for the partnership with Turkey. Relations with the Muslim world, he said, were decisive, and he even promised a review of the television station Roj TV -- a pledge apparently made at the request of Erdogan. Previously, Rasmussen had been unwilling to stop broadcasts in his country of the satellite TV channel.

He pledged to reduce the US nuclear stockpile, and urged others to do the same. But as long as a nuclear threat existed, the US would retain its nuclear capability, although it would work to reduce its arsenal.

He said his administration would work to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force in order to achieve a global ban on nuclear testing. The agreement would ban all nuclear explosions for any purpose, but cannot currently come into effect as nuclear powers such as the US and China have not ratified it, and India and Pakistan have not signed it.

The most immediate and extreme threat to global security, the president said, was the possibility of terrorists possessing nuclear weapons.

"Al-Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb. And that it would have no problem in using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe." Mr Obama announced a new effort to secure sensitive nuclear material within four years and break down the black market in the trade in illicit weapons.

He also said he would negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia by the end of this year. The speech came days after he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev - meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in London - agreed to reopen negotiations about reducing nuclear warheads. They aim to produce a new arms control treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start) that expires at the end of the year.

"As long as the threat from Iran exists, we will go forward with a missile defence system," he said.

At Obama's first meeting with Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's president, in London on Wednesday, both agreed on fast-track negotiations to slash their nuclear stockpiles by about a third from the end of this year

Obama would use the speech to urge the US Senate to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty proscribing nuclear bomb trials, a treaty already endorsed by the other main nuclear powers, Russia, Britain, and France. The US has about 10,000 of the world's estimated 24,000 nuclear weapons, and Russia 13,000.

John Hutton, the defence secretary, told the Guardian Britain could despatch up to 1,000 more soldiers this summer, and Nato officials were confident that Europeans would supply up to a further 3,000.

Obama made it plain yesterday that the chances of a better transatlantic relationship hinged on European readiness to "step up to the plate" in Afghanistan and to "share the burden" for his surge.

"It is important for Europe to understand that even though I am president and George Bush is not president, al-Qaida is still a threat," Obama said. "I've come to Europe this week to renew our partnership ... America is changing but it cannot be America alone that changes." He warned that the risk of an al-Qaida attack was higher in Europe than in the US.

"I don't think the hard end of the security mission is being properly shared, and that is the view of many others including the president," said Hutton. "Europe has got to see al-Qaida is every bit a direct threat to Europe and the UK, as it is to the US." He said Nato could no longer use its dislike of Bush to avoid a commitment in Afghanistan.

Clinton had pressed for Iranian participation in The Hague conference, stressing the importance of finding a regional solution to the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and western officials were encouraged that Akhundzadeh, a deputy foreign minister and former charge d'affaires in London, was sent by Tehran.

Akhundzadeh told ministers from more than 70 countries at the meeting: "Welcoming the proposals for joint co-operation offered by the countries contributing to Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully prepared to participate in the projects aimed at combating drug trafficking and plans in line with developing and reconstructing Afghanistan."

He repeated Tehran's criticism of the Nato role in Afghanistan, but used relatively moderate language, saying: "The presence of foreign forces has not improved things and it seems that an increase in the number of foreign forces will prove ineffective, too."

Akhundzadeh added: "The military expenses need to be redirected to the training of the Afghan police and army and Afghanisation should lead the government building process" - an apparent nod towards the Obama administration's decision to send 4,000 more American military trainers.

Western officials expressed hopes that the west and Iran could return to the close co-operation over Afghanistan that took place in the months after the 9/11 attacks. Iranian officials even helped the US target the Taliban, but the relationship cooled after Bush's "axis of evil" speech.

"There is a meeting of minds on drugs, development issues and the [August Afghan] elections, though not on foreign troops, on which they made clear their objections."

Malloch Brown acknowledged that Iran had done some "bad things" in both Afghanistan and Iraq, supplying weaponry to insurgents that had been used against British soldiers.But he argued: "This is Iran supporting its proxies because of a lack of diplomatic partnership around Iraq and Afghanistan. If this is a rapprochement, whether it is overall rapprochement or just aimed at stabilising Afghanistan, it offers the prospect of this behaviour getting moderated and hopefully stopping."