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At the start of the foreign secretary's evidence to the Chilcot panel, Sir Roderic Lyne, a member of the inquiry panel, said it had heard "three rather different explanations as to why we took military action against Iraq in 2003".Tony Blair emphasised the need to impose regime change on Iraq, Lyne said. But Jack Straw, the foreign secretary at the time of the war, stressed the importance of dealing with Iraq's presumed weapons of mass destruction, Lyne said.And Gordon Brown, when he gave evidence on Friday last week, said he supported the war because he thought the will of the international community had to be enforced.

In his evidence Blair said the inquiry should consider what would have happened if the Iraq war had not taken place. He said that an Iraq still led by Saddam Hussein, competing with Iran to acquire WMD and support terrorism, could be an even greater threat today than Iraq was in 2003.

Miliband went on: "The authority of the UN would have been severely dented. If, in the hypothetical case you are putting, we had marched to the top of the hill of pressure and marched down again without disarming Saddam Hussein, that would really have been quite damaging [to the ability of the UN to work together].

Fresh evidence is revealed today about how MI6 and the CIA were told through secret channels by Saddam Hussein's foreign minister and his head of intelligence that Iraq had no active weapons of mass destruction.

British and US intelligence agencies were informed by top sources months before the invasion that Iraq had no active WMD programme, and that the information was not passed to subsequent inquiries.

Naji Sabri, Saddam's foreign minister, told the CIA's station chief in Paris at the time, Bill Murray, through an intermediary that Iraq had "virtually nothing" in terms of WMD.Sabri said in a statement that the Panorama story was "totally fabricated".

the Clinton administration entered office in 1993 and proceeded to adopt a strategy of "dual containment." Until that moment, the United States had acted as an "offshore balancer" in the Persian Gulf, and we had carefully refrained from deploying large air or ground force units there on a permanent basis. We had backed the Shah of Iran since the 1940s, and then switched sides and tilted toward Iraq during the 1980s. Our goal was to prevent any single power from dominating this oil-rich region, and we cleverly played competing powers off against each other for several decades. With dual containment, however, the United States had committed itself to containing two different countries -- Iran and Iraq -- who hated each other, which in turn forced us to keep lots of airplanes and troops in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We did this, as both Kenneth Pollack and Trita Parsi have documented, because Israel wanted us to do it, and U.S. officials foolishly believed that doing so would make Israel more compliant during the Oslo peace process. But in addition to costing a lot more money, keeping U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia for the long term also fueled the rise of al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden was deeply offended by the presence of "infidel" troops on Saudi territory, and so the foolish strategy of dual containment played no small role in causing our terrorism problem. It also helped derail several attempts to improve relations between the United States and Iran. Dual containment, in short, was a colossal blunder.

But no strategy is so bad that somebody else can't make it worse. And that is precisely what George W. Bush did after 9/11. Under the influence of neoconservatives who had opposed dual containment because they thought it didn't go far enough, Bush adopted a new strategy of "regional transformation." Instead of preserving a regional balance of power, or containing Iraq and Iran simultaneously, the United States was now going to use its military power to topple regimes across the Middle East and turn those countries into pro-American democracies. This was social engineering on a scale never seen before. The American public and the Congress were unenthusiastic, if not suspicious, about this grand enterprise, which forced the Bush administration to wage a massive deception campaign to get them on board for what was supposed to be the first step in this wildly ambitious scheme. The chicanery worked, and the United States launched its unnecessary war on Iraq in March 2003.

wrecking Iraq -- which is what we did -- destroyed the balance of power in the Gulf and improved Iran's geopolitical position. The invasion of Iraq also diverted resources away from the war in Afghanistan, which allowed the Taliban to re-emerge as a formidable fighting force. Thus, Bush's decision to topple Saddam in 2003 led directly to two losing wars, not just one. And these wars were enormously expensive to boot. Combined with Bush's tax cuts and other fiscal irresponsibilities, this strategic incompetence caused the federal deficit to balloon to dangerous levels and helped bring about the fiscal impasse that we will be dealing with for years to come.

An American former military contractor who claims he was imprisoned and tortured by the US army in Iraq has been allowed by a judge to sue the former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld personally for damages.

Mike Kanovitz, the Chicago lawyer representing the plaintiff, says it appears the military wanted to keep his client behind bars so he would be unable tell anyone about an important contact he made with a leading sheik while helping to collect intelligence in Iraq.The plaintiff says he was the first American to open direct talks with Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha, who became an important US ally and later led a revolt of Sunni sheiks against al-Qaida before being killed by a bomb."The US government wasn't ready for the rest of the world to know about it, so they basically put him on ice," Kanovitz said. "If you've got unchecked power over the citizens, why not use it?"

this is the second time a federal judge has allowed a US citizen to sue Rumsfeld personally.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown has said the 2003 war was "right", as he gives evidence to the UK's Iraq inquiry.

he had been convinced by his own intelligence briefings that Iraq was a threat that "had to be dealt with". But the main issue for him was that Iraq was in breach of UN resolutions - and that "rogue states" could not be allowed to flout international law.

If the international community could not act together over Iraq, Mr Brown said he feared the "new world order we were trying to create would be put at risk".

"My decision to support military action in respect of Iraq was the most difficult decision I have ever faced in my life," he wrote. "I was also fully aware that my support for military action was critical. If I had refused that, the UK's participation in the military action would not, in practice, have been possible. There almost certainly would have been no majority either in cabinet or in the Commons."He went on to say he had made a choice to support Blair, adding: "I have never backed away from it, and I do not intend to do so, and fully accept the responsibilities which flow from that. I believed at the time, and I still believe, that we made the best judgments we could have done in the circumstances."

During his oral evidence to the inquiry, Straw said the "psyche" of decision-makers had been influenced by past conflicts. "The lesson of Suez was to stay close to the Americans, and the lesson of the Falklands was to take note of the intelligence," he said

Straw said one of his aims before the invasion was to get the George Bush administration to "go down the UN route. A key part of our approach was to ... try to get to a point where the US objective was not regime change but the disarmament of Iraq," he added.

"The then leaders of the United States and Great Britain," Tutu argues, "fabricated the grounds to behave like playground bullies and drive us further apart. They have driven us to the edge of a precipice where we now stand – with the spectre of Syria and Iran before us."

But it is Tutu's call for Blair and Bush to face justice in The Hague that is most startling. Claiming that different standards appear to be set for prosecuting African leaders and western ones, he says the death toll during and after the Iraq conflict is sufficient on its own for Blair and Bush to be tried at the ICC."On these grounds, alone, in a consistent world, those responsible for this suffering and loss of life should be treading the same path as some of their African and Asian peers who have been made to answer for their actions in The Hague," he says.