Qualia (Tye) - 0 views
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something it is like
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intrinsic properties of experiences that are also ineffable, nonphysical, and ‘given’ to their subjects incorrigibly
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The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience.
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provide further support for the contention that some sort of representational account is appropriate for qualia.
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qualia are really representational contents of experiences into which the represented qualities enter
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there can be differences in the representational contents of experiences without any phenomenal difference.
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Phenomenally, our experiences are all very much alike, notwithstanding certain higher-level representational differences
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This content is plausibly viewed as nonconceptual. It forms the output of the early, largely modular sensory processing and the input to one or another system of higher-level cognitive processing
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my current visual experience of a red object not only represents the object as red (this is my focal awareness) but also represents itself as red
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If these differences in content are of the right sort then, according to the wide representationalist, microphysical twins cannot fail to differ with respect to the phenomenal character of their experiences.
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Qualia are not intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which their subjects are directly aware, qualities that are necessarily shared by internal duplicates however different their environments may be. Rather, they are representational contents certain inner states possess, contents whose nature is fixed at least in part by certain external relations between individuals and their environments
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experience of one sort or another is present but in which there is no state with representational content.
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The sensory state that nature designed in your species to track blue in the setting in which your species evolved will continue to do just that even if through time, on Inverted Earth, in that alien environment, it is usually caused in you by looking at yellow things.
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"Philosophers often use the term 'qualia' (singular 'quale') to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem."