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Javier E

The Worst Cat Memes You've Ever Seen - The Atlantic - 0 views

  • Taken seriously, the content of these posts is deeply offensive and dehumanizing. But the people sharing them get to hide behind a thin veil of irony: They’re just some funny cats. If you’re offended, that’s your problem
  • Trump is well versed in this tactic—he routinely attempts to walk right up to the edge of plausible deniability. Consider, for example, the time he floated the idea of executing one of his top generals
  • this behavior has been called doing it “for the lulz.” As Adrian Chen chronicled in The Nation in 2014, lulz—a perversion of lol—justifies heinous behavior online. The term came out of the bowels of 4chan in the mid-aughts and typically means maniacally laughing at a victim. It has often been associated with jokes about topics such as the Holocaust, suicide, terrorism, and rape
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  • The lulz have always been a tool to obfuscate that an individual was being racist, sexist, or generally hateful
  • The endgame of prior for-the-lulz moments provides clues as to where the MAGA cat memes are headed. The casual misogyny that the trolls of 4chan espoused eventually culminated in cyberstalking and online harassment of women that was sometimes so pernicious, it drove them away from the internet altogether
Javier E

Opinion | Manliness, Cat Ladies, Fertility Panic and the 2024 Election - The New York Times - 0 views

  • post-liberalism. And I think that’s a very important term here. It’s also a loosely defined one. And that comes from people like law professor Adrian Vermeule and Patrick Deneen, who is a political theorist at Notre Dame. And they basically take an argument or vision of the world that challenges liberalism’s emphasis on the individual. Instead of saying the state is meant to be an engine for individual self-fulfillment or to allow people to live life as best they want it, they argue that there’s a shared telos, a purpose, a common good to politics. And for them, it’s primarily defined by Catholic doctrine, and the purpose of politics should be moving us toward that goal. And part of that envisions the nation almost as an organic whole rather than a series of discrete individuals making choices. So it’s the question of what is good for the body politic as a unit, and that includes perpetuity, survival, children — hence the natalism that’s so important in Vance’s thought.
  • You’ve made this point about the differences between what you call sort of the neopatriarchy right and the Barstool conservatism right. And the Barstool conservatism right has been a little less excited about some of what it is hearing from Vance. Can you walk through the difference there?
  • The neopatriarchal right, the one that Vance has really aligned itself with, is a group that says a major focus of the state should be on fostering traditional morality and family formation. They don’t explicitly say women shouldn’t be working most of the time — though sometimes they do — but it basically means an emphasis on traditional loosely defined family structure. So you got to have kids, you got to get married, you shouldn’t be having sex out of marriage, birth control is probably bad. You can see some of this in the book by the head of the Heritage Foundation, which JD Vance wrote the foreword to. The publications have been delayed, but some of the excerpts have leaked, and he makes exactly this kind of argument about birth control specifically and other family planning choices.
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  • So that’s one version of conservatism when it comes to views of the family, but another one, which honestly I think fits Donald Trump a little bit better, is this Barstool conservative. It’s a term that’s named after Barstool Sports, the popular sports website. The term was coined by Matthew Walther, a conservative columnist. And Walther’s argument is that these kinds of conservatives aren’t social conservatives like he is. They are people who really are frustrated with the left’s control of culture in the same way that the neopatriarchal right is, but for completely different reasons. They’re angry that they can’t say sexist stuff in public. They’re angry that sexual harassment has become something whose prohibitions are strictly enforced and they think prevent, you know, flirting in the workplace or something like that. They like seeing cheerleaders at football halftime shows.
  • And these dudes — I use that term very explicitly because it really speaks to the self-identity, right? These dudes are very, very different from the people who are telling you, don’t have sex before marriage, have a family as soon as you can. And while those distinctions are papered over when they’re fighting and at loggerheads against the left in a kind of alliance, they really disagree fundamentally on certain key issues.
  • Emba: One of the things that is unspoken in this clip, but seems very important, is the idea that citizens have to create the citizens to replace them in whatever country they’re in, which sort of negates the idea that immigration could be a possible way to help expand a society or prop up a civilization. This idea that, in fact, immigration is a bad thing and we should be wary of it, is a huge part of the Republican Party’s platform.
  • Right now, we’re seeing men only earn about 74 bachelor’s degrees for every 100 that women earn. Wages for men, especially working-class men, have basically stagnated since the 1970s or even declined — wages for men everywhere except the very top of the economic ladder. And so I think that men now in competition with women generally are feeling a little bit of anxiety — perhaps more than a little bit, I would say — and uncertainty about where they fit in America, both in a social sense and in the economy. That stress was already on the ground and underlying our political landscape.
  • And then, especially around the #MeToo movement in 2018, when the terrible behavior of certain men became really noticeable and women felt compelled to speak out about their own experiences, there was a general aura that masculinity was a bad thing. And a lot of men, I think, felt attacked. They felt that women were not just succeeding but actually holding them back and discriminating against them. In real life, I think this was not necessarily the case. I think that men and women clearly need each other to survive. But the discourse — especially the popular discourse on TV, on podcasts, did seem, I think, offensive to a large group of men and made them resentful.
  • Beauchamp: The other thing I want to add is that trans issues play a really important gluing role in the conservative coalition. We’ve been talking a lot about the distinction between Barstool conservatives and neopatriarchal conservatives. One way that you get people who have such different views on gender and social roles to align is by creating a shared enemy. And trans people are, for different reasons, disfavored by both groups. These two factions, they can both agree that liberals should not be allowed to be deciding what gender means or changing the way the bathrooms work or letting men into women’s sports in their view.
  • Emba: I think you’re actually observing something really real, and I would agree with you there. First of all, we have to think of the material conditions of the last couple of decades. We’ve seen a shift in the economy away from traditional and perhaps masculine-favoring manufacturing jobs and labor jobs to social skills jobs that have tended to favor or at least allow women to enter the marketplace. Post the 1970s, women who were previously barred or kept out of schools and employment entered the work force and entered the educational market and have really succeeded and, in many cases, are outpacing men.
  • Emba: In the past, Republicans have put themselves forward as the party of masculinity. The Democrats, the liberals are sort of the female party. But Tim Walz versus that vision of masculinity is turning that vision on its head. In the same way that Republicans seem to have gone from the party of freedom to the anti-freedom party, they have gone from the party of real masculinity, of men who shoot guns and work in the yard to, I don’t know, World Wrestling Federation performers?
  • So often when you see conservatives talking about a lack of family formation, they’re talking about a specific kind of family that aligns with their ideals. Which is why, even though there’s a lot of talk about how Americans aren’t having enough children, how there aren’t enough babies, how we’re below replacement rate, politicians like JD Vance have still voted against policies that would allow Americans to access I.V.F. and fertility treatments. There is the right kind of family that’s supposed to be reproducing, and that’s the family that they’re worried about.
  • Beauchamp: Apocalypses, imagined or real, tell you a lot about a political movement. And one thing I think that’s really interesting is the shift in the conservative vision of a future apocalypse from being the debt and the deficit, which used to be really the centerpiece of conservative fears about the future. And that’s declined in prominence in conservative movement rhetoric, with a lot of the family formation stuff and declining birthrates becoming a much more central theme.
  • Beauchamp: If you listen to Harris’s speeches — or Tim Walz’s, for that matter — there’s one word that they use over and over again, and that word is freedom. And there’s good reason for that. Freedom is one of those contested American values that used to be the centerpiece of Republican rhetoric
  • if you can convince voters that Republicans are anti-freedom — and Dobbs was really the opening here, Dobbs and election denial, right? They’re going after your freedom to have the kind of family you want and your freedom to vote
  • Those two things end up becoming really, really powerful in making Democrats seem like the live-and-let-live party, the one that wants to embody the American ethos of freedom.
  • Harris is not just saying, vote for me because my policies will give you a better world. What she’s saying is, vote for me because I’m the one who stands up for this essential American and crucially liberal value of freedom
  • If JD Vance wants to be the candidate of post-liberals, Harris is saying, great, I’m going to be the candidate of liberals. I’m going to be the candidate of liberalism. I’m for freedom. And what are you for? You’re for weird attacks on childless cat ladies and vague ideas about a structured society that you don’t even really want to own, because they’re unpopular. And it’s put her on immensely effective rhetorical ground.
  • The Great Replacement Theory is something that the right has mentioned often and that Tucker Carlson mainstreamed on his show — that Democrats and liberals are somehow going to bring in immigrants to replace American citizens who aren’t having enough children, to fill up America by themselves basically, and that this is a bad thing.
  • Democrats seem to have gone or are trying to go from a party of feminized soy boys — as they used to be insulted by Republicans — to, yes, the party of Tim Walz, a dad who wears a camouflage hat. The memes circulating of him online are of a guy from the Midwest who’s straight-talking, loves eating meat and will help you fix your car when it’s on the side of the road. And this is a vision of masculinity that is still very stereotypically masculine. He’s a football coach. He was in the military. But also positive. One might call it a tonic masculinity. He’s male, but he’s helpful. He supports women, but he says he’s not trying to be in their business and legislate how they should use their uteri.
Javier E

Opinion | Ukraine Is Poking the Russian Bear - The New York Times - 0 views

  • the importance of the news stories that flood our lives: Which ones will historians still be talking about in 50 years? Are there any that they’ll be talking about in 100?
  • yes. Without question, historians will be discussing the Russia-Ukraine war even 100 years from now. It’s a bloody slugfest between two advanced nations in Europe that has immense strategic implications for the United States (and the world)
  • It’s a struggle that’s changing the nature of warfare — with its mass use of drones and other new technologies — and it could alter the global balance of power, especially if Western will fails and Russia overwhelms Ukraine.
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  • Ukraine has disrupted Vladimir Putin’s propaganda. As Frederick Kagan argues, Putin has tried to present the image of a “reconstituted Red Army with the limitless human resources and the ability to overwhelm Ukraine and the will to outlast the West, and that the outcome of the war is not in doubt.” Yet Ukraine’s attack has “shattered” that image.
  • At the same time, Russia hasn’t demonstrated any real ability to engineer a decisive breakthrough of Ukrainian lines, either. Yes, it has advanced during its current offensive, but at a terrible cost. Last month the British Defense Ministry estimated, for example, that Russia suffered more than 70,000 total casualties in May and June alone.
  • The fog of war is very thick. All the people I talked to emphasized the same thing — every conclusion is tentative. It’s hard to gain a definitive view of the battlefield. The Ukrainian attack may not change the war in any material way. Don’t overhype its potential.
  • While the Ukrainian attack has advanced only a few miles across the Russian border, it is causing mass evacuations in the conflict zone and — to an extent — sends a message to Russians: The war is coming home.
  • This is no normal election, where candidates compete over policies that are left or right but squarely within the American mainstream. Instead, Harris is on the right side of the two biggest issues in the election: protecting American democracy and stopping Russian aggression. We disagree on many other issues, but we agree on those two, and that agreement is more than enough to earn my vote.
Javier E

How Joe Rogan Remade Austin - The Atlantic - 0 views

  • the essence of the Joe Rogan brand: He is bawdy around his fans, respectful of his wife, loyal to his friends, and indulgent with his golden retriever, who has 900,000 followers on Instagram. He maintains a self-deprecating sense of humor that’s rare among men who could buy an island if they wanted one
  • His politics defy easy categorization—he hates Democratic finger-wagging but supports gay marriage and abortion rights. (“I’m so far away from being a Republican,” he said on a podcast in 2022.) He voted for a third-party candidate in 2020, and in early August expressed his admiration for Robert F. Kennedy Jr
  • He sees himself as an outsider, nontribal, just an average Joe. The best way to think of him, one of my friends told me, is as if “Homer Simpson got swole.”
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  • Another way to think of him: as perhaps the single most influential person in the United States. His YouTube channel has 17 million subscribers. His podcast, The Joe Rogan Experience, which launched in 2009, has held the top spot on the Spotify charts consistently for the past five years
  • Go to a cocktail mixer, an ayahuasca party, or a Brazilian-jiu-jitsu gym here and you might run into Tim Ferriss, the author of The 4-Hour Workweek; or the podcasters Lex Fridman, Chris Williamson, Ryan Holiday, Michael Malice, or Aubrey Marcus. Elon Mus
  • Rogan and his fans are often called “heterodox,” which is funny, because this group has converged on a set of shared opinions, creating what you might call a heterodox orthodoxy:
  • Diversity-and-inclusion initiatives mean that identity counts more than merit; COVID rules were too strict; the pandemic probably started with a lab leak in China; the January 6 insurrection was not as bad as liberals claim; gender medicine for children is out of control; the legacy media are scolding and biased; and so on
  • The Roganverse neatly caters to this audience because it is, in essence, a giant talk-show circuit:
  • The heterodox sphere has low trust in institutions—the press, academia, the CDC—and prefers to listen to individuals
  • Follow his Instagram, and his tastes soon become apparent: energy drinks, killing wild animals, badly lit steaks, migraine-inducing AI graphics, dad-rock playlists, and shooting the breeze with his buddies.
  • Rogan’s support of Gillis demonstrates why members of his inner circle are so loyal to him. Not only has Rogan personally boosted their careers on his podcast and in his club, but his popularity has forced the comedy industry to recalibrate its tolerance for offense.
  • What fans love about Rogan is the same thing his critics hate: an untamable curiosity that makes him open to plainly marginal ideas. One guest tells him that black holes are awesome. A second tells him that the periodic table needs to be updated because carbon has a “bisexual tone.” A third tells him that a deworming drug could wipe out COVID. He approaches all of them—tenured professors, harmless crackpots, peddlers of pseudoscience—with the same stoner wonderment.
  • Media Matters for America, a progressive journalism-watchdog organization, has accused Rogan and his guests of using his podcast to “promote conspiracy theorists and push anti-trans rhetoric.”
  • The liberal case against Rogan usually references one of two culture-war flash points: COVID and gender
  • “Free health care—yes!” Rogan tells his audiences these days onstage in Austin, riffing on the political demands of the left. “Education for all—right on! … Men can get pregnant—fuck! I didn’t realize it was a package deal.”
  • During the pandemic, The JRE also drew audience members who were frustrated with the limits of acceptable discussion, at a time when Facebook and YouTube were banning or restricting what they labeled misinformation. Rogan didn’t accept the proposition that Americans should shut up and listen to mainstream experts, and that led to him hosting vaccine denialists and conspiracists, and promoting an unproven deworming drug as a treatment for COVID
  • noble lie. This refers to the fact that Anthony Fauci initially told regular people not to wear masks in part because he was worried about supply shortages for doctors and nurses, but it has come to stand in for the wider accusation that public-health experts did not trust Americans with complex data during the pandemic, and instead simply told them what to do.
  • Her experience echoes that of other Rogan fans on the coasts, for whom the pandemic brought the realization that their values differed from those around them; at the time, the persistence of masking was a visible symbol of that difference. “It’s the Democrats’ MAGA hat,” Rogan told a guest in November 2022. “They’re letting you know, I’m on the good team.” Move to Texas, went the promise, and you won’t have to see that anymore.
  • When I visited the UATX offices, in an Art Deco building in downtown Austin, the provost, Jacob Howland, told me that he wanted “to get the politics out of the classroom,” and that faculty members will have succeeded if the students can’t guess how they vote from what they say in class. Just as in Rogan’s comedy club, smartphones are banned in class—“so that students can’t be distracted by them, or, for example, record other students and tell the world, ‘Oh, you know, this student had this opinion, and it’s unacceptable, and I’m putting it out there on TikTok.’ ”
  • Many on the left, however, suspect that heterodox just means “right-wing and in denial.” An attendee at last year’s Forbidden Courses sent me a slide showing survey results about the students’ political leanings: Out of 29 respondents, 19 identified as conservative
  • One major UATX donor is Harlan Crow, the billionaire who has bankrolled Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’s lifestyle for years; he sat in the back of some 2023 summer-school lectures. Another is the Austin-based venture capitalist Joe Lonsdale, who co-founded Palantir with Peter Thiel and others. He recently gave $1 million to a pro-Trump super PAC.
  • The Joe Rogan coalition may indeed represent a real strand in American intellectual and political life—a normie suspicion of both MAGA hats and eternal masking, mixed with tolerance for kooky ideas. But it is fracturing.
  • Today, fractures are obvious across the wider anti-woke movement—and they must be serious, because people have started podcasting about them.
  • There’s a real tension in the Roganverse between the stated desire to escape polarization and the appeal of living in an endless 2020, when the sharp definition of the opposing sides yielded growing audiences and made unlikely political alliances possible.
  • Those contradictory impulses are evident in Austin. Jon Stokes, a co-founder of the AI company Symbolic, described the city to me as the “DMZ of the culture wars,” while the podcaster David Perell put it like this: “Moving to Austin is the geographical equivalent of saying ‘I don’t read the news anymore.’ ”
  • relentless criticism from the left has pushed him and his fellow travelers closer to people who talk like this. Look at Elon Musk, who has developed an obsession with defeating the “woke mind virus” and an addiction to posting about his grievances.
  • During his stand-up set, Rogan said that Jones was right about the existence of “false flags”—events staged by the government or provocateurs to discredit a cause. Then he whispered to himself that Jones had gotten “one thing wrong.” He had gotten a lot of things right too, Rogan said at normal volume. Then his voice dropped again: “It was a pretty big thing, though.”
  • Rogan is a guy who started a podcast in 2009 to smoke weed with his fellow comics and talk about martial arts—and who, like many Americans, has taken part in a great geographical sorting, moving to be closer to people whose values he shares. He speaks to people who feel silenced, both elite and normie, even as he’s turned the very idea that opinions like his are being “silenced” into a joke in itself.
Javier E

Help Me Understand… Why Trump Won - Yascha Mounk - 0 views

  • it strikes me that there is a missing question in the debate, one which commentators—including me—might be avoiding in part because they have a less developed answer to it.
  • Donald Trump is not especially popular. Most Americans continue to believe that both he and the party he has shaped in his own image are too extreme.
  • the simple truth is that Hispanics have also swung to Trump in the overwhelmingly Mexican-American districts of southern Texas or the heavily Puerto Rican neighborhoods of New York City.
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  • Why did Trump win?
  • any attentive reader of the more sophisticated forecasters in the game should have known that Tuesday’s outcome was one of the likely scenarios. As Silver emphasized throughout, polls have historically been off by an average of about three points—and given how close the race looked in many swing states, a three point miss in one or another direction would likely hand a clear victory to either Harris or Trump.
  • That is pretty much exactly what happened. And so anyone who now claims that forecasters did not consider Tuesday’s results a realistic possibility has failed a simple test of reading comprehension.
  • I’m a center-left Democrat with lots of degrees. I’m aghast and frightened by Trump’s victory. But I think it’s due to the opposite of racism and misogyny and transphobia. I think he won because of anti-anti-racism and anti-misandry and love of children combined with acceptance of gays.
  • Normies not overeducated out of common sense rejected identitarian politics. DEI departments, struggle sessions, Robin Angelo and Ta-Nehisi Coates, quotas limiting Asian-Americans, literacy and math as white supremacy, buying a fixer-upper in a poor neighborhood as settler colonialism, all of it.
  • Men—a rainbow coalition of them—finally got fed up with decades of rhetoric about toxic masculinity, testosterone poisoning, rape culture, patriarchy. They saw that for most men in this country, the reality was poor results in school, lousy job prospects, inability to form a family, and a culture in which dissing any identity group is a capital offense unless it’s men you’re dissing and then that’s fine.
  • And regular folks not caught up in the strange mania to over-treat the normal nuttiness of puberty with life-altering chemicals and surgery said stop—confusion is fine, it’s not a disease, and didn’t we recently decide that homosexuality is okay, so why are doctors suddenly trying to cut it out of children?
  • Revulsion at these things is viscerally powerful, existentially clear. Trump’s unfitness for office is more abstract, more distant. The calculation for many was he will mess up Washington, DC and the rest of the globe but it’s more important to save myself and mine. Voting for more of the same will just lead to more of the same. And enough of that. Enough.
  • I will tell you why I voted for Trump. My wife and I are masters/PhD educated Brooklynites who work in academia. Several weeks ago my wife was teaching a class and a student very proudly mentioned they would never willingly collect anything produced by a white man. It’s not that this was said, it’s that this is a common and acceptable position for democrats even though you’ll say it isn’t. I’m tired of the hypocrisy. What the democrat worldview says reality is like is neither true nor morally supportable.
  • many NYT comments the other day that said things like “Trump and Musk are the true elitists.” No, guys. No they’re not. It’s not about money. It’s about who gets to tell you what to say and who gets to break “the rules” and who doesn’t. It’s about what you can talk about and what you can’t. It’s about laws for some presented as if they’re for all. It’s about what you’re allowed to see. It is a fundamental, hypocritical rot that is just so clearly there
Javier E

Everyone Online Sounds Like an Absolute Fucking Poseur Lately - 0 views

  • part of the basic confusion of that little cultural moment was to suppose that snark (reflexive, dismissive negativity) and smarm (treacly positivity in which power might hide) were antonyms. But Millennial snot demonstrates that they were always kissing cousins, easily integrated, two complementary spices begging to be added to the same chowder.
  • Millennial snot is smarmy in that it depends on the speaker’s certainty that they are the good, righteous being in every exchange, and it is snarky in that it operates under a logic of being limitlessly disaffected, an asserted perpetual superiority that’s always believed to be apparent to everyone. It’s a simulation of being witty and cutting the way people are in movies, impressed with the self and literally nothing else, like asking ChatGPT to make you into the cool kid at the back of the class that you’ve always longed to be. Millennial snot so easily integrates two supposedly opposed approaches to communicative integrity because it’s the vocabulary of people who have no particular interest in integrity. They simply want to feel powerful, if however briefly, if only in insincere and meaningless online exchanges.
  • The purveyors of Millennial snot attempt to fool themselves and the world about their level of self-belief with two primary tools: one, through embracing the preening sanctimony of contemporary left politics, acting as though they simply are the campaigns against racism or injustice or need, themselves, expressed of course in an obfuscatory academic vocabulary; two, through the language of droll disdain that has become the default idiom of the 21st century as insecurity has become the universal marinade of American elite life.
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  • the fusion of modern progressivism’s self-celebratory nature, the discourse norms of our most overeducated age cohort, and the reflexive retreat into triviality as a self-defense strategy
  • It’s the idiom of a failed generation, the unconvincing puffery of millions of unhappy front-of-class kids who have spent their adulthoods expecting the pure beauty of their creative souls to someday be rewarded with fame and riches, somehow, just like Orson Welles giving Kermit and the rest of the Muppets the standard rich and famous contract. It floats the ineradicable belief that success is just around the corner, exactly the way it seemed to be when they wore jumpsuits to warehouse parties in 2005.
  • I am obsessed with the way that such a vast portion of those who regularly communicate online do so in styles of language that are utterly artificial, borrowed from “marginalized groups,” when the people doing the borrowing are so often the very people who are endlessly sensitive to cultural borrowing
  • I don’t think much of the concept of cultural appropriation. In fact I’ve always seen it as the worst kind of academic-political overreach, the product of people looking for new vectors of offense when the whole huge world of material bigotry and inequality is already orbiting all around u
  • All culture is appropriated. There is quite literally nothing that exists in culture that is not the product of some amount of borrowing, and influence always extends in both directions
  • It all comes down to the same two culprits, which are not at all restricted only to Millennials but which are particularly acute for my generational cohort: fear of aging and the elevation of insecurity to a virtue.
  • As for the second, well, it’s the enforcement of insecurity, the way cultural elites have created an expectation that all decent people should perform a total lack of self-confidence and perpetual anxiety for others, so that no one feels judged for their own lack of self-esteem.
  • It’s related, oddly, to my constant, fruitless complaints about modern mental health culture. As we’ve seen in that domain, there appears to be no way to end the stigma regarding something without ending up actively celebrating that something.
Javier E

The Twilight of America's Excuses - 0 views

  • In baseball, they often say that a losing pitcher played “good enough to win.” The idea here is that the pitcher can’t win games by himself, because he doesn’t score runs. All he can do is put his team in a position to win by holding the other team’s offense in check.
  • So a pitcher who gives up 1 run in 9 innings and loses 1–0? That’s not on him. He pitched good enough to win. It was the team that let him down by not providing run support.
  • That’s basically how I feel about the Harris campaign as we start closing arguments. She put America in a position to win by running a smart, vigorous campaign and giving the country a clear choice between a physically decrepit, mentally unfit gangster and a young, viable, centrist vice president.
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  • If she loses, a whole lot of excuses we’ve been making for America are going to dry up, right quick.
  • Over the last 10 years we have all, at one point or another, manufactured excuses for why Donald Trump happened.
  • If Donald Trump happened because a significant percentage of our fellow citizens wanted him, and all his works, and all his empty promises, then there was nothing to be done. If 47 percent of the country wants fascism, then eventually it will get fascism. You can’t simply dissolve the people and elect another.
  • So we looked for rationalizations to explain why so many Americans were voting for Trump in the hopes that, if we addressed these excuses, they would stop choosing him.
  • Let’s take a tour through our history of rationalization.
  • Bob Woodward, who is as jaded and cynical as anyone in Washington, had this to say about Biden in the epilogue to his new book, War:
  • Joe Biden passed bipartisan gun reform. The CHIPS Act. The Inflation Reduction Act. He passed as much major, bipartisan legislation as any president in a generation.
  • People hate partisanship and just want a president who gets things done.
  • War, this book on Biden, however, gave me what was often a real-time, inside-the-room look at genuine good faith efforts by the president and his core national security team to wield the levers of executive power responsibly and in the national interest. At the center of good governance, as evidenced by this book, is teamwork.
  • The legacy of the Biden presidency will be the core national security team that he built and kept in place for nearly four years. They brought decades of experience as well as basic human decency.
  • As this book shows, there were failures and mistakes. The full story is, of course, not yet known. But based on the evidence available now, I believe President Biden and this team will be largely studied in history as an example of steady and purposeful leadership.
  • And yet Biden gets approximately zero credit from voters for any of this.
  • Voters just thought Biden was too old to do the job. They had genuine concerns about his age and mental ability.
  • And yet suddenly age is . . . not a concern for voters.
  • Meanwhile, Trump is now the oldest person to ever run for president. He is manifestly in bad physical shape—just look at his pallor. Mentally he is so unbalanced that he does stuff like this and talks like this.
  • Democrats took these concerns so seriously that the president stepped aside and blessed someone else to run in his stead. This action was without precedent.The president’s replacement was youthful, but with deep experience in elected office and the executive branch.
  • Voters don’t want a California-style progressive elitist.
  • This was a worry when Harris first took the mantle. But she positioned herself from the start as a center-left moderate: a self-professed capitalist who loves small businesses, is a champion of law and order, and a proponent of American military might.
  • Her running mate is a blue-collar guy from a populist Midwestern political tradition. They’re both gun owners.And for some reason, none of this seems to be resonating with the people who worried that she was too “progressive.”
  • nflation. Everything is about inflation. Why can’t you understand that?Inflation is down to 2.4 percent, has been falling for five straight months, and inflation-adjusted wages are up 4.3 percent over the last two years.I’m sorry, but those are just the facts. Science.
  • People don’t care about fancy economic indicators. They judge the economy on what they see in their real lives. They judge the economy based on the price of gas.
  • Gas is currently at near its lowest price since 2021. It is roughly the same price it was in 2018. (During the Greatest Economy in History.) And because these are nominal prices—meaning, not adjusted for inflation—the real-dollar cost of gas right now is quite cheap.
  • Sorry, the price of gas doesn’t matter. It’s the price of eggs that tells people how the economy is doing.
  • Hold on. In January 2023, egg prices skyrocketed to $4.82 a dozen. That’s when everyone said the price of eggs drove voter sentiment. But six months later the price of eggs was down to $2.09 a dozen and everyone said the price of eggs didn’t matter any more.
  • Well, egg prices are back up—they’re $3.82 a dozen today. So eggs are how people evaluate macroeconomic conditions again.The USDA publishes a list of consumer prices for various grocery items. Here’s a tidbit from the September 2024 report:From July to August 2024, prices increased for seven food-at-home categories, declined for six categories, and remained steady for two categories.It would be helpful to know which prices will determine how voters feel about the economy?
  • In 2016, voters didn’t want to vote for Hillary Clinton because she had too much baggage. She’d been a despised figure in American politics for 20 years. Voters wanted a fresh face with high favorables.
  • I didn’t realize we were going to relitigate 2016, but fine. Kamala Harris is a fresh face who is also completely vetted—she’s been an attorney general, a senator, and vice president. And her favorable rating is net positive! The general public likes her!So she should win this election, right?
  • Today, there aren’t any excuses left. Something like 47 percent of American voters have seen Trump, understood what he was, and wanted it.
  • Win or lose, that’s the fundamental reality this race has laid bare. The next era in American politics will be defined by how we grapple with the implications of this reality for civic life and self-governance.
Javier E

Opinion | Let's Not Lose Sight of Who Trump Is - The New York Times - 0 views

  • The outcome of the election, it almost goes without saying, puts America on a right-wing populist path, inching ever closer toward a form of autocratic rule rarely, if ever, seen in the nation’s history.
  • Trump’s campaign was openly racist, xenophobic and authoritarian and his supporters appear to be willing to jettison democracy in support of an autocratic demagogue who promises to “fix everything” while pandering to their angers, resentments and prejudices.
  • Fukuyama went on to say:The move of the working class to the Republicans is now much more entrenched. For Blacks and Hispanics voting for Trump, class was much more important than identity, and Democrats failed to understand that. I really think that the importance of the transgender issue was underappreciated by the Democrats. They simply thought it was the latest civil rights issue when the actual policy was really crazy and offensive to working class voters.
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  • The MAGA/Republican coalition is clearly a viable competitor. Indeed, the coalition just won the White House — and the Senate. The coalition has proved its ability to retain strong support with the working-class, rural, non-college-educated base, still attract most of the rest of the older Republican electorate, and has demonstrated the capacity to grow into new areas such as Latino and Black men.
  • Early predictions of inevitable demographic shifts toward the Democrats missed how identity is complex, and how it can change. In our era of intense polarization, coalitions don’t have to be overwhelming. They just need to be big enough to push a party over in the swing states.
  • The first time a person is elected, for example, Reagan in 1980, we vote based on promise, aspiration and potential. The re-election campaign, which this is more comparable to, for Trump, is about legitimation. Voters know what they are getting and say that is who they want in office.
  • Trump, Zelizer pointed out, “has been extraordinarily transparent about his hostility toward core democratic principles — the peaceful transition of power, confidence in the election system, limitations on presidential power and more.”
  • “When you win an election this broadly,” Francis Fukuyama, a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, argued in an email, “you’re entitled to move ahead with your agenda. The only limitations will be capacity (hard to deport 11 million people) and the courts which haven’t been completely made subservient.”
  • How big a role did gender play in Harris’s defeat?“Many men and non-college-educated women,” Cain argued, “still equate women with weakness and blustery masculinity with strength.”
  • conservative power is consolidated in a way that makes the Biden administration look like the fluke, the last gasp of a dying order.
  • The MAGA coalition, in contrast,doesn’t feel like the last stand of a dying electorate at all since Trump actually has managed to diversify the Republican electorate in a broad way. And doesn’t seem like the tyranny of a minority, because — though tyranny it may turn into — it would be the tyranny of the majority, since it looks like he’s clearly on track to win the popular vote.
  • The primary threat Trump poses, Fukuyama argued,is to the rule of law. He’s been very clear in the last few months and weeks that he’s really out for revenge. He wants to take revenge on all the people that he believes have been prosecuting him and or persecuting him. And I think that this is where Schedule F (Trump’s proposal to politicize the top ranks of the civil service) really matters. I think he’s going to put people in key positions in the Justice Department that will enable them to open up investigations.
  • Fukuyama expects Viktor Orban of Hungary to provide Trump a governing model with “this kind of steady, slow erosion of one check and balance against executive power after another.”
  • Donald Trump’s theory of the case was broadly correct. He and his campaign managers believed that it was possible to build on Republicans’ growing strength among white working-class voters to create a multiethnic working-class coalition. He was right: He made strides among Latinos and African Americans, especially men. He increased his share of the Black male vote from 12 percent to 20 percent and carried Hispanic men by nine points, 54 percent to 45 percent.
  • The Trump campaign, Galston went on to say,decided that Harris’s stance on transgender issues was the Willie Horton of 2024 and invested heavily in negative advertising that dominated the airwaves. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this campaign helped weaken Harris’s effort to portray herself as a common-sense center-left candidate rather than an emissary from San Francisco.
  • Once in power with a supine Republican-controlled Congress and judiciary, Trump will govern despotically as a populist based on his uninformed and increasingly delusional understanding of the nation and its challenges, wreaking havoc on the American political economy and the global political order.
  • The scale of Trump’s electoral success and the red shift in Congress makes it clear that Americans have rejected the policies and priorities of the Democratic Party. Many voters cast their ballots based on their perceptions of the economy. Although Harris attempted to highlight improvements in macroeconomic indicators, voters struggling with rising costs for essentials like milk, bread, and gas felt little connection between their financial troubles and abstract measures like G.D.P. growth.
  • According to Westwood, “What seems to unify the majority of voters is dissatisfaction with the vision of America articulated by Harris and the Democratic Party.”
  • The election outcome suggests that voters did not place much weight on the fear that Trump would undermine a “vision of America,” despite his history of doing just that.
  • The election results are in line with work suggesting that people care more about policy outcomes than democracy. Research shows that when people are asked whether they want a candidate that supports their preferred policy but subverts democracy versus a candidate that doesn’t support their preferred policy but is more democratic, they tend to choose the former. Policy trumps democracy.
  • Young men of lesser education are hit twice, both in marriage and in labor markets. It is not surprising that they are most likely to voice their grievances in expressions of political dissatisfaction with the status quo. Add onto this that almost without exception around the Western Hemisphere women now constitute the majority of college students and graduates and the full picture of change comes into view.
  • While most of the experts I contacted view the 2024 election as a major, and perhaps realigning, development in American politics, some were more cautious in their views.
  • my reading of 2024 is that this was a pedestrian “time for a change” election.
  • Polling, she added,had long shown that voters were very sour on the direction of the country, the high cost of living after the Covid shocks, and the scale of undocumented immigration. Polls were clear that Trump was more trusted on all those issues. Trump’s behavior on Jan. 6, 2021, probably was troubling to at least some of those who voted for him, as was his divisive rhetoric. But in a two-party system, voters’ choices were severely limited. They could either support Kamala Harris, the sitting vice president of an administration they blamed for the state of the country, or former President Trump, the only alternative on offer.
  • much of that expansion can be understood as swing voters moving against an unpopular administration. Harris underperformed Biden with almost all demographic groups. I wouldn’t see the voters who joined the Trump column this year as permanent parts of the Trump coalition. We need to see this expanded coalition hold together for additional cycles before we can draw firm conclusions about change in the G.O.P. generally.
  • Americans, in poll after poll, told us how this result should be interpreted — as a reaction to inflation and personal economic unease among many voters. Experts may understand that inflation was an inevitable outcome of successful efforts to save the economy during a global pandemic, that it is now largely under control in the United States, and that we fared better than most peer nations. But, average Americans have been feeling it in their pocketbooks for the last few years. It is incredibly difficult for the incumbent party to win when voters feel their spending power has decreased.
  • Donald Trump’s recasting of the Republican Party achieved a decisive victory over the combined forces of moderate center-left and radical left-libertarian political currents uneasily cohabiting under the umbrella of the Democratic Party. Historians may place the 2024 election, or the 2016-24 sequence, in significance for the United States on a par with the elections of 1860, 1876, 1896 and 1932.
  • The New Deal party system that was in full force until 1964 has been fully replaced by a new alignment. 2024 ratifies a lasting realignment in the American party system.
  • Driving the transformation of politics here and abroad, in Kitschelt’s view, are “changing ‘labor markets’ and changing ‘marriage/family markets.’”
  • These changes, according to Kitschelt,have produced new “winners” and “losers.” Changing labor markets have eroded the earnings potential of less educated people, and particularly those in occupations that were in demand in manufacturing. Changing marriage markets have reduced the bargaining power of men to dominate gender relations and the choice of offspring.
  • The problem now facing Democrats, Lelkes noted, is that they “will have to grapple with the fact that they are seen as the cultural elite and this is off-putting to a majority of the country, who do not see their values represented by highly educated city dwellers.”
  • The moderate and progressive left in the United States thought it could count on disadvantaged minorities as fixed components of a left-wing “rainbow coalition.” But it now turns out in the United States — and elsewhere — that these ethnic groups are internally divided by the same kinds of knowledge-society-induced divisions based on education, occupation and gender that run through the ethnic majority population
  • And right-wing populist authoritarians are increasingly skilled to sense these divisions and make their appeals resonate among the aggrieved elements of these minorities, especially younger people without college education, particularly young men.
  • The rise of Trumpism in the United States — and right-wing populist authoritarianism around the world — throws down the gauntlet to the remaining liberal and progressive forces to come up with new ideas for institutional innovation and policy reform that include those who have hitherto been losers of multiple decades of social change. The 2024 U.S. election is a signal that the political projects of the existing left have failed.
  • The pool of new “losers” is not represented by the Democratic Party and was not by the old Republican Party. A political entrepreneur — Donald Trump — has managed to activate them to drive his ascent. Aggrieved people look for an outlet and recently found one in Donald Trump, many of them never previously Republicans, but now Trumpists.
  • Kitschelt’s conclusion is both dark and bleak, suggesting that if Trump’s policies fail to produce a boom economy, his inclination toward authoritarianism will intensify as he tries to hold power in the face of growing public opposition:
  • When backed into a corner by policy failure, the greatest danger, then, becomes Donald Trump’s and his strategists’ inclination to suffocate opposition.
  • It is at this moment of policy failure, Kitschelt wrote, thatThe hour of political authoritarianism arrives, when the new wagers to create economic affluence among the less well-off and to resurrect the old kinship relations of industrial society turn sour and generate disenchantment among Trump’s own following.
  • Trump then may well want to make sure that his disenchanted supporters — as well as those who always opposed Trumpism — will not get another chance to express their opinions.
  • If the scenario Kitschelt depicts comes to pass, American voters will finally get to see the real Donald Trump — when it may be too late to do anything about it.
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