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In one of the most subtle early analyses of what he tellingly called “Liberation Technology,” Larry Diamond argued that new digital tools would empower “citizens to report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, mobilize protest, monitor elections, scrutinize government, deepen participation, and expand the horizons of freedom.” Diamond’s article was published in the summer of 2010.

Twitter, Andrew Sullivan wrote in The Atlantic, had proven to be a “critical tool for organizing.” In twenty-first-century conflict, Nicholas Kristof echoed in The New York Times, “government thugs firing bullets” would increasingly come up against the resistance of “young protesters firing ‘tweets.’”

As Clay Shirky argued in Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations, even in longstanding democracies like the United States the power of digital technology made it much easier for activists to coordinate

thanks to Twitter, Donald Trump did not need the infrastructure of traditional media outlets. Instead, he could tweet messages directly to his millions of followers. Once he had done so, established broadcasters faced a stark choice: ignore the main subject of conversation and make themselves irrelevant—or discuss each tweet at length, thereby amplifying Trump’s message even as they ostensibly scrutinized it. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they chose the latter course of action.

Breathless claims about digital technology’s liberating potential turned into equally breathless prognostications of doom. Social media was declared the most dangerous foe of liberal democracy.

The truth about social media is not that it is necessarily good or bad for liberal democracy. Nor is it that social media inherently strengthens or undermines tolerance.

On the contrary, it is that social media closes the technological gap between insiders and outsiders.

At times, this meant marginalizing passionate critics of the status quo—and thus making it harder for the weak and powerless to make their voices heard. At other times, it meant declining to publish conspiracy theories, outright lies, or racist rants—and thus stabilizing liberal democracy

The credibility of those claims depends on what they are compared to. So long as the memory of absolute monarchy was recent, and a more directly democratic system seemed unfeasible, liberal democracies could claim to empower the people.

One response has been to put pressure on Twitter and Facebook to change their algorithms and enforce stricter community guidelines; this is the tack that most tech critics have taken in the United State

Another response has been to limit what can be said on social media platforms by coercive legislation; this is the stance that European governments have adopted, with remarkable speed.

it seems at least as plausible to think that Americans won’t be willing to compromise on their First Amendment rights; that they will decamp to more freewheeling alternatives if existing social media platforms are tamed; and, indeed, that more subtle, yet no less powerful, forms of hate will continue to spread on existing platforms even if its most outrageous manifestations are suppressed.

There is, then, a very real possibility that the rise of digital technology, and the concomitant spread of essentially costless communication, have set up a direct clash between two of our most cherished values: freedom of speech and the stability of our political system.

the challenge is even more fundamental.

Rather, the daily experience of liking and sharing posts on social media may habituate users to a simulated form of direct democracy that makes the existing institutions of representative democracy appear intolerably outmoded.

Could digital natives—reared on the direct efficacy of social media—simply be less willing to tolerate the slow, indirect workings of analogue institutions designed in the eighteenth century?

And might they therefore be more resistant to accepting the democratic myth that has long underwritten the stability of the American Republic?

The political systems of countries like Great Britain and the United States were founded not to promote, but to oppose, democracy; they only acquired a democratic halo in retrospect, thanks to more recent claims that they allowed the people to rule.

the rise of the Internet and social media is making the ideological foundation of liberal democracy—which has had a tight hold over our imagination for the better part of two centuries—look increasingly brittle.

This held true for the century or so during which democracy enjoyed an unprecedented ideological hegemony. In the age of the Internet, it no longer does. As a result, the democratic myth that helped to make our institutions look uniquely legitimate is losing its hold.

The undemocratic roots of our supposedly democratic institutions are clearly on display in Great Britain. Parliament was not designed to put power in the hands of the people; it was a blood-soaked compromise between a beleaguered monarch and the upper echelons of the country’s elite

Because the US was founded in a more ideologically self-conscious manner, the same history is even more evident here. For the Founding Fathers, the election of representatives, which we have come to regard as the most democratic way to translate popular views into public policy, was a mechanism for keeping the people at bay

In short, the Founding Fathers did not believe a representative republic to be second best; they found it far preferable to the factious horrors of a true democracy.

It was only in the nineteenth century, as egalitarian sentiment rose on both sides of the Atlantic, that a set of entrepreneurial thinkers began to dress an ideologically self-conscious republic up in the unaccustomed robes of a born-again democracy.

Only gradually did the US make real improvements to its democratic process.

And crucial to that transformation was a story about the limits of democratic governance under modern conditions.

In ancient Athens, so the story went, the people—or at least those who were regarded as the people, which is to say adult male citizens—could rule directly because there were relatively few of them, because the territory of the state was so small, and because they had leisure to govern since so many of them owned slaves who took care of their daily needs

As John Adams noted, the people “can never act, consult, or reason together, because they cannot march five hundred miles, nor spare the time, nor find a space to meet.” In industrial nations that expanded over a huge territory direct democracy was thought to be impossible.

While representative institutions had been founded in ideological opposition to democracy, they were now re-described as the closest instantiation of that ideal possible under modern conditions. Thus, the founding myth of liberal-democratic ideology—the improbable fiction that representative government would facilitate the rule of the people—was born.

we have not even started to address the issue of how to make the democratic promise of our political system ring true for a new generation.

or a long century, the founding myth of liberal democracy retained sufficient footing in reality to keep a deep hold over the popular imagination, and help one political system conquer half the globe. But that basis is now crumbling

With the advent of the Internet, John Adams’s worry about the people’s inability to deliberate together has come to seem quaint

The physical agora of ancient Athens could be replaced by a virtual agora that would allow millions to debate and vote on policy proposals with even greater ease. As a result, citizens now have a much more instinctive sense that our democratic institutions are highly mediated.

They know that if we wanted to design a system of government that truly allowed the people to rule, it would not look much like the representative democracy of today.

The rise of the Internet and social media has thus created a giant mismatch between the direct efficiency of our digital lives and the cumbersome inefficiency of our formal institutions—and that has accentuated the contrast between our system’s promise to let the people rule and the reality that the people rarely feel as though they can have a real impact on the most important decisions facing their country

The Internet threatens to end the hegemony of liberal democracy not only by amplifying the voice of a small band of haters and extremists, but also by alienating a much larger number of digital natives from the decidedly analogue institutions by which they are governed.

We have only just begun to face up to the first big corrosive influence of digital technology on our politics: the way in which social media has helped to mainstream extremists

We’re only beginning to understand how we can stop vast platforms like Facebook and Twitter from spreading hate and fake news—and whether that will even prove possible without sacrificing constitutive elements of our political system

The rising tide of egalitarian sentiment during the nineteenth century should, by rights, have come into conflict with a set of avowedly aristocratic institutions. Instead, its fresh packaging gave the representative institutions of the United States and the United Kingdom a new lease on life. It pleased the elites who continued to get their way on the most important issues as much as it pleased the egalitarians who came to see it as a realization of their aspirations.

the widespread frustration with the state has less to do with excessive bureaucracy or overly cumbersome processes than it does with the underlying reality of the economy and the welfare state: what political scientists call the “performance legitimacy” of our political system has suffered from a combination of rising living costs, stagnating real wages, growing inequality, and dwindling social services.

More important, the real barrier to public participation in politics has always been interest, time, and expertise as much as it has been technology

Even if it were easy to weigh in, even vote, on every decision made at the local, county, state, and federal level, most citizens would hardly marshal the enthusiasm to be so intimately engaged with such a wide variety of questions of public policy.

Nor would most citizens miraculously develop the expertise to assess, for example, what kinds of regulations are needed to keep a power plant safe

A dozen years after the invention of Facebook, by contrast, the new technology has spread to every corner of the globe. Some two billion people actively use the platform.

there can be little doubt that, in the short run—which is to say, for the rest of our lives—it will make for a more chaotic world.

Unfettered by the constraints of the old media system, and buoyed by a growing popular cynicism about democracy’s promise, the demagogues have been willing to say whatever it takes to get elected—to flatter and deceive, to obfuscate, and even to incite hatred of their fellow citizens. Perhaps their rhetoric will prove to be unstoppable. As one state legislator recently pointed out to me, it is difficult for a rational politician to win a debate with a three-sentence answer when his rival is offering a one-sentence answer—especially when the other candidate can blast his simplistic take all over Twitter and Facebook.

All is not lost. But to revitalize liberal democracy in the digital age, it will not be enough to think carefully about how to enforce privacy rights or stifle the most hateful voices on the Internet. We must also think anew about how to fill the democratic promise with meaning for a new generation that has lost the belief in the democratic myth that long provided legitimacy for our political system.

A eso se suma un factor importante: su caudillo y parte de la dirigencia del proyecto masista, vienen de la marginalidad social (a diferencia de los conductores políticos de la revolución nacional del 52 que eran parte de una clase media intelectual), que se han abierto a empellones un espacio político y no entienden otro modo de hacer política que no sea confrontando y doblegando al adversario.

le preguntó a Evo Morales por qué confrontaba tanto, la repuesta de Evo fue categórica: “mira dónde he llegado confrontando”.     La hegemonía y la confrontación son parte de la esencia y están en medula espinal del masismo.

El MAS se identifica mejor con la postulación de Abimael Guzmán de que “al margen del poder todo es ilusión” O con el planteamiento de Carlos Mariátegui que afirma: “La primera tarea del revolucionario es tomar el poder, la segunda, no dejarlo jamás”:

El MNR después del triunfo de la revolución del 9 de abril fue implacable con sus detractores, no dudó en crear campos de concentración y violar derechos humanos. Paz Estenssoro hizo suyo aquel dicho popular que dice: “que para hacer una torta hay que romper muchos huevos” y no le tembló la mano a la hora de ser duro.

Lo propio ocurre el año 2006 cuando el MAS captura el poder. Solo podía instalar el “proceso de cambio” desde la óptica del hegemonismo político y la confrontación.

La Asamblea Constituyente que motivó el cambio de la Constitución Política, la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos, el control por parte del Estado de empresas como YPFB, Entel y otras, el nacimiento del Estado Plurinacional en vez de la República, el empoderamiento de sectores indígenas, el ingreso de sectores sociales al manejo del aparato del Estado, eran imposibles de lograr si un MAS hegemónico y confrontacional.

Es cierto que lo hegemónico y confrontacional trae aparejado el abuso, el atropello, la violación a derechos humanos y otras consecuencias que van contra la esencia de la democracia occidental. Pero al MAS no le interesa eso, porque no se identifica con la democracia occidental.

En nuestro país, la revolución nacional de 1952 fue hegemónica y confrontacional. Es imposible pensar la implementación de la Nacionalización de las minas, la Reforma Agraria, la Reforma Educativa, el Voto Universal y todas las medidas de la Revolución Nacional sin un partido hegemónico, como era en ese momento era el MNR y sin una confrontación abierta con todos los exponentes y defensores del Estado Minero-Feudal pre 52.

Solo el cambio de correlación de fuerzas y de realidad social y económica harán que el MAS tenga otra actitud.

Puede ceder espacios al adversario cuando éstos se someten o son funcionales. También respeta al rival cuando tiene fuerza propia, pero trabaja para debilitarlo y arrinconarlo.

Por eso causa hilaridad cuando la oposición le reclama al MAS conductas democráticas occidentales.

El MAS entrará en un escenario democrático cuando su subsistencia política dependa de ser parte de una democracia de pactos. Tal como lo entendió el MNR el año 1985 cuando supo que ya no era hegemónico y su única forma de gobernar era en con pactos y alianzas. Igual ocurrió con Banzer que entendió que en democracia no podía gobernar sin acuerdos políticos, como lo hizo cuando fue dictador y su poder se basaba en las bayonetas.

desde caída de Evo Morales y del retorno al poder de del MAS de la mano de Luis Arce y David Choquehuanca sea han y se están desarrollando una serie de contradicciones dentro del bloque nacional-popular.

La primera constatación que el triunfo de Arce y Choquehuanca establece es que el bloque nacional popular distingue claramente lo que es el denominado “proceso de cambio” y el rol dentro el mismo de Evo Morales.

Está claro que para la mayoría de las bases de lo nacional- popular el proceso de cambio se encuentra encima de Evo Morales.

En todo caso, las fricciones, divisiones o desgajes del bloque nacional –popular no van a reforzar a tiendas políticas que estén en una visión “neoliberal” o forman parte de lo que las bases populares denominen la derecha. Se quedan dentro la narrativa popular- nacional y dentro el movimiento del “proceso de cambio.”

Durante la campaña electoral presidencial es donde se consolida el hecho de que MAS puede hacer política y ganar sin Evo La campaña también sirve para la irrupción de lideratos como Eva Copa, Choquehuanca, Andrónico y el propio Lucho Arce.

Ya en los últimos años del gobierno de Evo se desataron fuertes críticas al entorno del entonces presidente y a la forma vertical del manejo del instrumento político que hacía Morales.

A esto se suma, el rechazo que tiene en la actualidad la figura de Evo Morales en sectores de clase media, no solo en el sector profesional o en sus capas altas, sino en gente de clase media que sigue viendo con simpatía y es querendona del “proceso de cambio”. Y que reconoce que el mismo obtuvo resultados positivos para el país.

La elección subnacional confirmó el rechazo a Evo sobre todo en la mayoría de las ciudades capitales. La cosa se agrava cuando fuerzas políticas como Jallalla y MTS son los verdugos electorales del MAS, derrotándolo en lugares importantes y estratégicos.

Este cuadro interno del bloque de la Nacional- Popular, en concordancia con el resultado electoral de las últimas elecciones de gobernaciones y alcaldías han motivado que el masismo se lance a ejecutar y tomar la iniciativa bajo la siguiente estrategia: Introdujo en el ajedrez político el tema de convalidar la tesis del “golpe de Estado” para desarrollar los siguientes puntos:

a) El enemigo común

La explicación es muy simple, a todos los adscritos a la narrativa nacional-popular les conviene que se aniquile o cuando menos se arrincone a la oposición que dice representar “la modernidad y el neoliberalismo” para que la definición política y sobre todo el futuro de la misma se desarrolle dentro sus filas.

Una vez conseguido el objetivo de lograr la unidad contra el enemigo común se produce el segundo paso:

b) El escarmiento, la amenaza y el aislamiento

nmediatamente el MAS comienza con el escarmiento, metiendo a la cárcel a la ex presidenta, a sus ministros, a militares y policías. Se trata de una medida de fuerza donde el partido de gobierno demuestra no tener piedad con sus adversarios. Con la detención de la ex presidenta y sus colaboradores se busca demostrar la ilegitimidad e ilegalidad del régimen de Jeanine Añez, pero ante todo establecer que es un acto de “justicia” y reivindicación con la ciudad de El Alto por los hechos de Senkata, que quiere transmitir el mensaje que ya nadie podrá atacar impunemente a los habitantes de la principal ciudad Aymara del país, porque ellos son los únicos dueños de su territorio.

Sobre estos dos movimientos de ajedrez que el MAS realizó: el primero la táctica del enemigo a común y segundo la política del escarmiento, la amenaza y el aislamiento, el MAS trabaja la posibilidad de tres desemboques que son los siguientes:

La amenaza es contra los demás jefes políticos que tienen que saber que sobre ellos está la espada de Damocles, que en cualquier momento pueden ser judicializados e ir presos.

El aislamiento es dirigido: aislar y dividir a las autoridades electas para que por su cuenta busquen salvar sus espacios de poder ya sea sometiéndose o negociando con el poder central.

Pero el aislamiento está focalizado contra Camacho para aislarlo del resto del país y debilitarlo poco a poco. Lo sugestivo es que, globalmente, estas acciones han funcionado.

Nadie se ha roto las vestiduras por el apresamiento de la ex presidenta y sus colaboradores, la indignación que causó el hecho fue muy focalizada en ciertos sectores sociales y una lluvia de tres días. Esto debido al poco peso y representatividad que tiene la expresidenta Añez en la sociedad boliviana.

Respecto a los militares presos, pasa lo mismo, ya ni siquiera en su institución generan solidaridad de cuerpo, porque hoy en la cabeza de los militares bolivianos está la preocupación de ascender al grado superior y terminar la carrera militar con una buena jubilación que defender a un camarada caído. En la policía sucede lo mismo

Es evidente que la presión internacional juega su rol, pero gobiernos de corte hegemónico y confrontacional, siempre ignoran esta presión, incluso actúan contra ella.

El apresamiento de militares y policías es el decirles a ambos que el poder civil y constitucional está encima y quien se atreva a violar tal situación, solo tendrá como destino la cárcel. Con ello se quiere desechar cualquier intento de subversión y de amotinamiento en el futuro.

1.- El retorno al poder del “comandante” Evo Morales

Se trata de una línea política de los sectores duros del Evismo, que quieren el retorno inmediato de Evo al poder porque, según ellos, fue derrocado por un “golpe de Estado” después, desde su visión, de haber “ganado” la elección del 2019. Y por lo tanto se le debería devolver el poder.

Este ha sido y es la razón primaria de imponer en el escenario político la temática del “golpe de Estado”.

Evidentemente, tal estrategia del sector duro solo podrá ser victoriosa en un escenario ya no de confrontación, sino de enfrentamiento entre bolivianos. Pero los duros del Evismo creen que ese el mejor camino porque así se adelantaría la eliminación de los adversarios del “proceso de cambio” y de Evo, asegurando el poder para el próximo decenio.

Objetivamente no hay condiciones para que esta línea política, llamada por propios y extraños la vía venezolana, pueda tener éxito. Pero a veces el fanatismo y la violencia consiguen objetivos que la racionalidad se niega admitir.

Sin embargo, hay factores subjetivos que quieren que se desarrolle la vía denominada Venezuela.

Para nadie es un secreto que la obsesión que tiene por el poder Evo Morales es casi patológica. Para él es un difícil imaginar una vida fuera de la presidencia.

Otro factor es su círculo íntimo que saben que no volverán a gozar las mieles del poder que durante 14 años disfrutaron si Evo no vuelve a la casa grande del pueblo, porque las propias bases sociales del “proceso de cambio “los ha vetado.

los cocaleros del Chapare que tienen interés políticos y económicos casados con el Evismo.

Todo eso hace que dentro el MAS haya una tendencia que quiere el inmediato retorno de su “Comandante” Evo a la casa grande del pueblo.

2.- Recomposición del cuadro político vía adelanto de elecciones. –

Otra de las estrategias que está puesta en el ajedrez político es hacer que haya un desemboque político que termine en el adelantamiento de elecciones. Hecho que, según los promotores de este planteamiento, abriría el camino del retorno de Evo Morales al poder.

La ruta a seguir para lograr tal objetivo parece muy simple y posible de lograr. Se requiere promover una cadena de renuncias en el poder ejecutivo, que comience con la renuncia del presidente, continúe con la de David Choquehuanca y termine en con la asunción de Andrónico a la presidencia, quien por constitución tendría que convocar a nuevos comicios electorales, donde Evo ya pueda candidatear.

hay aspectos más profundos que ponen trabas a esta estrategia, veamos lo más importante:

En primera instancia, no se puede asegurar que Evo sea el candidato de unidad del bloque nacional-popular. Lo más probable es que la emergencia aymara y generacional del bloque nacional-popular se exprese en una formula distinta cuya cabeza no sea Evo Morales, lo que adelantaría la competencia interna por el liderato.

Un segundo aspecto es que en las actuales condiciones una victoria electoral de Evo está en duda. Indudablemente éste es el peor momento electoral de Evo Morales, porque tiene una fuerte ruptura con sectores de la clase media. No se puede afirmar que ese quiebre de Evo con la clase media sea irreversible, pero hoy por hoy es muy fuerte.

3.- Arce, factor de equilibrio coyuntural

Una tercera posibilidad de llegada de la última arremetida política  del MAS es buscar fortalecer la actual presidencia de Luis Arce, sacándola de parsimonia y lentitud.

En esta coyuntura el MAS tendría que cerrar filas en torno al gobierno para encarar con cierta coherencia el tema económico, la pandemia y la cuestión política.

Con un bloque nacional- popular unido Luis Arce puede viabilizar en la sociedad un plan de medidas económicas para lograr la reactivación de la economía y controlar el desarrollo de la pandemia.

Pero la más importante es que, en la interna del bloque nacional-popular, el presidente Arce, en este momento, es un factor equilibrio y unidad de las diferentes visiones e intereses que tienen todas las corrientes que se encuentran disputando el liderato y la conducción de la misma.

Por ello, sin tener claros patrocinadores puede ser la tendencia que se acabe de imponer.

Pero lo que debe quedar claro es que en ningún escenario los actores de lo nacional –popular buscan acuerdo o concertación con las fuerzas que son del polo político denominado neoliberal y anti masista. Sino todos coinciden en someterlos o arrinconarlos.

El triste vía crucis de la oposición

¿En qué momento las cúpulas de los partidos que fueron actores del ciclo neoliberal entre 1895-2006 perdieron el rumbo para ser abatidos y derrotados por las masas populares que rescataban el discurso de la nacional-popular? ¿Qué les paso? ¿Qué errores cometieron? ¿Qué fue lo que no entendieron?

Veamos algunos factores que explican y ayudan a comprender tal situación:

a) Perder el poder y perder la oposición

Uno de los síntomas más fuertes de la crisis del ciclo neoliberal se develó el 26 de junio del 2002, cuatro días antes de la elección presidencial, el entonces embajador de EEUU en Bolivia, Rocha, lanzó una amenaza en el Chapare, con Tuto Quiroga al lado (Tuto entonces presidente de Bolivia) advirtiendo que el mercado del gas a California estaba abierto a una Bolivia que salga del circuito coca-cocaína. En una clara intromisión, el entonces embajador norteamericano en Bolivia pedía que los bolivianos abrieran los ojos, pensaran en sus hijos y nietos y no votaran por Evo Morales, pero como sucede en estos casos el efecto fue un bumerang.

Pero lo más trágico vino después, cuando todas las tendencias políticas importantes del ciclo neoliberal entraron en bloque al gobierno de Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.

Durante el tiempo que duró el ciclo neoliberal, el sistema político controló ambos espacios y aún cuando eran parte de una misma visión “neoliberal y de modernización”, tenían percepciones y matices diferentes. Y aun cuando eran rivales políticos, en algunos casos profundamente antagónicos, crearon un mecanismo de alternancia política donde los roles se intercambian.

Entonces, se tenía la sensación de una democracia moderna y estable, con alternancia. Pero, el error de ingresar todos al último gobierno de Goni demostró que el “sistema de partidos” era tan frágil como una cáscara de huevo.

Indudablemente, no se puede negar el aporte de los lideres del ciclo “neoliberal”. Sin el coraje y la valentía de Siles Suazo, no se habría reconquistado la democracia. Sin el 21060 de Víctor Paz no se habría estabilizado la economía nacional. Sin la conversión democrática de Banzer no se habría desterrado el golpismo como opción. Sin la participación popular de Goni no se habría fortalecido el poder de los municipios. Sin los acuerdos políticos que promovió y se firmó en la presidencia de Jaime Paz no se habría afianzado la democracia boliviana. También en la gestión de Paz Zamora se encontró el pozo San Alberto, Reserva gasífera sobre la cual se ha sustentando económicamente el “proceso de cambio”.

Pero todos estos aciertos no los exime de no haber entendido lo principal: la irrupción de la Bolivia profunda, que no sólo quería inclusión social, sino ser el sujeto histórico que cumpliera su rol protagónico. Es decir, lo nacional-popular quería ser el actor de su propio destino.

Carlos escribió un libro titulado “Presidencia Sitiada”, libro donde evalúa su presidencia y narra todas las presiones que tuvo que encarar su paso por el gobierno desde diferentes frentes que hicieron de su presidencia sea una presidencia “sitiada”. Pero si alguien conspiró contra la gestión de Carlos Mesa, fue el propio Carlos Mesa. Indeciso y vacilante, nunca le dio un rumbo a su gobierno. Se negó a gobernar con la coalición parlamentaria que había armado Goni. No aprobó la ley de hidrocarburos, ni se atrevió a nacionalizar los mismos, cuando tal exigencia ya era una demanda nacional.

Lo evidente es que el gobierno de Carlos Mesa cerró el ciclo neoliberal en Bolivia. Mesa se encargó de sepultarlo y de empedrar el camino del ascenso de Evo Morales.

Pero los desaciertos continuaron. Tuto Quiroga, por decisión propia, liquidó ADN. El MNR se despedazó con la caída de Goni. En el la MIR, la cúpula máxima se negó a viabilizar la candidatura presidencial Hormando Vaca, en un momento en que Hormando Vaca era la mayor referencia política de Santa Cruz y que el dirigente cruceño se perfilaba como un factor de recambio y oxigenación del mirismo.

la persistencia de los “segundones” en la vitrina de política solo es la tranca que atrasa la conformación de una opción que, desde la visión “neoliberal moderna”, tenga posibilidad de generar una política renovada que dispute el poder. Y no es que un cambio generacional de actores políticos resuelva el tema de un día a otro, pero es el primer paso que inevitablemente se debe seguir. El país demanda la instauración de un nuevo ciclo político con nuevos protagonistas.

Jeaninne: cuando las ambiciones matan

hay responsables detrás las sombras del encarcelamiento de Añez. Son todos aquellos que aprovechando de su ingenuidad y poca formación política la utilizaron.

la presidencia Añez se perdió en su laberinto, cuando si hubiese cumplido con el objetivo para el cual fue elegida, habría tenido una gestión decorosa y salido de palacio por la puerta grande.

a la ex mandataria la mató políticamente su propia ambición.

Oposición con complejo y sin discurso ideológico-político

Pero el más grande error de la actual oposición es no haber asimilado, que el proceso cambio, fue una transformación que cambió la realidad del país y los dejó sin discurso político. Ante esta realidad les vino un complejo:

Tienen miedo decir que son neoliberales, que proponen la economía de libre mercado y que están contra el “populismo”.

No saben qué hacer ante la emergencia indígena, quechua y aymara.

No han diseñado en 14 años de Masismo una propuesta alternativa.

Lo demostraron cuando se instauró el gobierno de transición, sin saber qué hacer, solo pavimentaron el retorno del MAS.

no tienen estrategia para tomar el poder, ni siquiera para derrotar a lo que denominan autoritarismo.

Incapaces de crear una opción política solida que canalice el voto del eje anti masista, a la hora de verdad se fragmentan y optan por la vía del sálvese quien pueda, negociando cada quien por su cuenta.

La economía, la madre del cordero

Todos vuelcan los ojos sobre la economía y dicen que al estamos entrando en el periodo de las vacas flacas, que el actual gobierno ya no dispone ni dispondrá de recursos financieros para derrochar y que el país entrará en una crisis económica que será su tumba porque se sumará la crisis de salud y otros temas.

Prefiero explicarlo en términos más sencillos.

El país está en este momento en la necesidad de conseguir dinero “cash” para reactivar su economía y no comerse sus reservas En tanto consigue dinero se deberá, como en cualquier hogar, amarrarse el cinturón y tomar algunas medidas de acuerdo a una escala de prioridades, buscando cubrir el bienestar de cada uno de sus miembros.

No se puede realizar una adecuada política económica si no se consideran las variables de orden social.

Me preguntarán: ¿cómo lo hicieron antes?

La respuesta es muy simple, lo hicieron en un escenario político de reflujo del movimiento popular y por la fuerza, como lo hizo Banzer en el año 1972 que era una dictadura militar que había derrotado el 21 de agosto de 1971 al gobierno de Torres y al movimiento popular. Lo hizo Víctor Paz con el 21060, a partir de una fuerte coalición política con la ADN, movilizando al ejercito, pero sobre la derrota política y social de lo nacional-popular expresado en la UDP.

Pero hoy es diferente, hay un empoderamiento de los sectores marginados del país que ni siquiera a Evo Morales le permitieron devaluar la moneda.

Lo mismo sucede con la idea de liberarizar la economía, porque simplemente la actual Constitución ha blindado el manejo de los recursos naturales y que las empresas estratégicas sean solo de carácter estatal. Esto conspira contra la atracción libre de capitales a nuestra economía.

Esto lleva a que el actual gobierno, por su legalidad y legitimidad política, es el que tiene más posibilidades que cualquier opositor de encarar la crisis. Esto debido a que es la única fuerza política que puede lograr un consenso social y político

Lo triste de la oposición es que no solo no tiene propuesta económica, sino que carece de credibilidad en los grandes sectores sociales que opinan que no pueden conducir con éxito una crisis económica.

Por ello, jugar a la crisis económica es dar un salto al vacío. Desear que la crisis económica derroque al MAS es una estupidez, porque no sólo arrastrará al MAS, sino a toda la oposición y creará un caos nacional de imprevisibles consecuencias.

Por ello, nadie quiere que se agrave la crisis económica.

Por ello, es que todos pondrán su esfuerzo para que eso no ocurra.

De ahí que la economía es la madre del cordero que como siempre, será el escenario sobre el cual se desarrollarán las distintas estrategias políticas.

A manera de conclusión.

1.-Lo primero que observo es que la sociedad en general está demandando la conformación de un nuevo ciclo político, con nuevos actores. Este es un fenómeno común tanto dentro del campo nacional-popular (la izquierda) como al interior de quienes se afilian en el campo neoliberal moderno (derecha).

La diferencia está que en el campo nacional-popular este fenómeno se está generando desde las bases, con gran ímpetu democrático. Mientras que en la vereda del campo neoliberal y anti -masista es más el reclamo espontáneo des sus militantes y simpatizantes  Y esto tiene una explicación, el campo nacional tuvo y todavía tiene un partido político de expansión nacional, como es el MAS

Mientras que las fuerzas anti-mas nunca lograron estructurar un partido de alcance nacional. Sus expresiones políticas como sus lideratos siempre han sido regionales o expresiones de ciertos segmentos específicos.

No pudieron generar un verdadero movimiento nacional que tengan una solida expresión partidaria, esta ausencia es su gran debilidad. Por eso no es locura, ni irracionalidad que algunos miembros de esta tendencia hagan vigilia en la puerta de cuarteles y pidan que los militares tomen el poder. Es simplemente la constatación de que no confían en .Y no los ven con la suficiente fuerzas para derrotar al masismo democráticamente en una elección presidencial, y ante esa evidencia prefieren el retorno al poder de los militares.

Pero lo más grave de esta conducción, que son remanentes del viejo sistema político, aprovecharon la rebelión de las pititas y se pusieron en la ola política, instaurando y siendo parte de manera directa o indirecta del gobierno de Jeanine, hicieron tan mal cosas que de un plumazo los barrió el bloque nacional-popular. Por ello, quien más renovación política necesita es el campo “neoliberal-moderno”.

2.-La renovación requiere política, requiere la jubilación de todos los actores del viejo sistema político y esto llega también a Evo Morales.

Esta situación creará un conflicto en el campo-nacional-popular porque Evo no cederá espacio, dará pelea y buscará la forma de volver a ser la cabeza del eje nacional-popular. Pero a diferencia de coyunturas pasadas, Evo ya tiene interpelación y rivales que le quieren disputar la conducción y el liderato del proceso de cambio.

3.-Considero que, en las actuales condiciones el nuevo liderato de lo “neoliberal –moderno” debe tener las siguientes características:

A.-) Tiene que ser un liderato transversal que tenga aceptación en clases sociales y regiones

B.-) Tiene que saber a lo que se enfrenta, por ejemplo, cuando se habla de autoritarismo tiene que saber de dónde proviene y cuáles las causas de ese autoritarismo.

Desde mi punto de vista hay dos tipos de autoritarismo, el que emerge de la acción militar o golpista, a los que es fácil enfrentarlos porque tienen la ola social en contra. Y hay autoritarismos que emergen con base social y apoyo popular porque encarnan las aspiraciones de las mayorías nacionales y, generalmente, las identifican con un caudillo.

Lo que quiero significar es que para vencer el “autoritarismo “del MAS hay que vencer las causas que lo generaron.  En otras palabras, hay que derrotar el racismo, la exclusión social, el regionalismo, etc. En resumen, todo lo que la democracia de pactos no encaró y dio origen al masismo.

C.-) Tiene que tener una propuesta clara que pueda demostrar a los sectores populares afines a lo nacional-popular, que el camino del libre mercado, de la inversión privada, la concertación, la democracia de pactos etc., les dará mejores días que el camino del Estatismo.

4.- En el campo nacional –popular se está produciendo la emergencia de una línea Aymara, que quiere ponerse a la cabeza del proceso de cambio, porque cree que ha llegado su momento. Y que seguramente dará una fuerte pelea interna. Dirigentes como Eva Copa, David Choquehuanca, el propio Patzi y Santos Quispe son expresión de ello.

Muchos pueden pensar que ahí empieza un periodo de división, pero en mi criterio eso es hilar muy fino y no entender que los aymaras y quechuas se han dado cuenta que en su unidad está su fuerza y que incluso con variantes ideológicas dentro de ellos pueden gobernar el país por muchos años

Ya es muy difícil pensar, por no decir imposible, que los Aymaras y Quechuas voten para presidente por un “blanquito” clasemediero con aires de aristócrata

Pero hay algo más, los aymaras y quechuas no sólo quieren conducir el proceso de cambio y el poder, quieren tener el control territorial del país.

Y han iniciado su larga marcha, para decirlo en palabras de Mao, sobre las tierras bajas Ya tienen una gran presencia en Pando y Beni y una creciente presencia en Santa Cruz.

Se estima que el 2035 el 45% de la población boliviana vivirá en Santa Cruz y de ese 45% la mitad será colla o de ascendencia colla. Y es un proceso que parece irreversible, fruto del desarrollo antropológico y sociológico del país.

Por otro lado, desde la visión Aymara y Quechua solo cuando ellos tengan el control total de nuestro territorio se podrá construir una identidad nacional

5.- Sin embargo, todo el desarrollo del tema va e irá de modo paralelo al tema económico. La economía marcará el ritmo de la política. Regulará las marchas y contramarchas de las intenciones políticas de uno lado y del otro.

Por otro lado, los recién electos gobernadores y alcaldes están desesperadamente buscando tener relación con el gobierno para viabilizar su gestión y contar para ello con recursos económicos.

Ente sentido, resulta infantil y de poca creatividad decir que el presidente Arce es un vulgar títere de Evo, quienes han estado en los altos niveles del aparato del Estado, saben que el presidente tiene el poder del bolígrafo.

Que Evo tiene influencia en el actual gobierno es natural, es el líder y el caudillo del partido de gobierno. Pero de ahí a afirmar que tiene el mismo poder que cuando era presidente es absurdo.

Arias, Fernández, Copa, Manfred, Camacho y todas las demás autoridades electas en la subnacionales están obligadas a sentarse a negociar con el gobierno para tener recursos financieros en su gestión. Una gestión sin plata acaba en corto tiempo siendo cuestionada. Por eso, a nadie con poder local o regional le conviene que la crisis económica se agrave.

Mucho más a lideratos como el de Eva Copa o Fernando Camacho que son lideratos emergentes que desean tener proyección nacional.

Del triunfalismo al pánico

Los resultados de la última contienda electoral sub-nacional dibujarán un cuadro político interesante que todavía motiva una serie de lecturas e interpretaciones

Si bien es cierto que, con respecto a las últimas elecciones nacionales y subnacionales, en las que el MAS participó, su votación bajó considerablemente, no es menos cierto que el MAS es la primera y única fuerza política organizada con presencia nacional a lo largo y ancho del país.

Su victoria en más de 240 municipios y el hecho de que casi en todos los lugares donde hubo elecciones subnacionales si no ganó obtuvo el segundo lugar. Sumado al hecho que, aún cuando, no se comparta con sus ideas, es un partido que tiene un proyecto político, una realidad que trae como consecuencia un equilibrio en la balanza electoral.

Después de la euforia comenzó a imperar la sensatez Emergieron voces contrarias al núcleo duro antimasista. Eva Copa fue la primera en señalar que agradecía a Evo por darle la oportunidad de hacer política destacaba su adhesión a la narrativa nacional –popular y al denominado “proceso de cambio” y reiteraba que jamás pactaría con la derecha.

El propio Camacho planteó estar dispuesto a trabajar con todos en función del desarrollo de Santa Cruz y del país.

Todo estaba muy claro: la oposición reconocía el poder y la autoridad del gobierno central, a cambio que éste también reconociera y respetará los espacios de poder regional que los adversarios del MAS habían logrado a través del voto popular conseguido en las urnas.

Se podía prever, en ese contexto, que estaban sentadas las bases para generar un acuerdo político de concertación y convivencia. Acuerdo político del que estarían excluidos figuras como Doria Medina, Tuto Quiroga, Rubén Costas, Luis Revilla, Jeanine Añez y el propio Carlos Mesa no solo por su baja incidencia en la sociedad boliviana, sino porque padecen de Covid político y se encuentran en terapia intensiva entre la muerte o la sobrevivencia política.

in embargo, sorprendentemente, el MAS patea el tablero.  

De manera inesperada introduce en el escenario político el tema del “golpe de Estado” y ordena el apresamiento de ex ministros de Estado y de la ex presidenta Jeanine Añez, desatando así una artillería de procesos y acusaciones judiciales contra la oposición por conspiración y sedición, debido a su supuesta participación en el “golpe” que habría derrocado a Evo Morales. En ese momento, sectores de oposición pasan del triunfalismo al pánico.

Pero ¿por qué el MAS reaccionó así? Cabe preguntarse ¿Lo hizo por debilidad? ¿Cometió un error político? ¿Quiso mostrar su musculatura social y política? O ¿es una jugada política planificada?

Estas interrogantes trataremos de responder.

Desde nuestra óptica, el accionar del MAS tiene dos vertientes: la primera de concepción político-ideológica y la segunda de estrategia política que tiene que ver más que ver con lo que se denomina la real política

Cuando el poder se entiende como la hegemonía y la confrontación

To contain such a pathogen, nations must develop a test and use it to identify infected people, isolate them, and trace those they’ve had contact with. That is what South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong did to tremendous effect. It is what the United States did not.

That a biomedical powerhouse like the U.S. should so thoroughly fail to create a very simple diagnostic test was, quite literally, unimaginable. “I’m not aware of any simulations that I or others have run where we [considered] a failure of testing,”

The testing fiasco was the original sin of America’s pandemic failure, the single flaw that undermined every other countermeasure. If the country could have accurately tracked the spread of the virus, hospitals could have executed their pandemic plans, girding themselves by allocating treatment rooms, ordering extra supplies, tagging in personnel, or assigning specific facilities to deal with COVID-19 cases.

None of that happened. Instead, a health-care system that already runs close to full capacity, and that was already challenged by a severe flu season, was suddenly faced with a virus that had been left to spread, untracked, through communities around the country.

With little room to surge during a crisis, America’s health-care system operates on the assumption that unaffected states can help beleaguered ones in an emergency.

That ethic works for localized disasters such as hurricanes or wildfires, but not for a pandemic that is now in all 50 states. Cooperation has given way to competition

Partly, that’s because the White House is a ghost town of scientific expertise. A pandemic-preparedness office that was part of the National Security Council was dissolved in 2018. On January 28, Luciana Borio, who was part of that team, urged the government to “act now to prevent an American epidemic,” and specifically to work with the private sector to develop fast, easy diagnostic tests. But with the office shuttered, those warnings were published in The Wall Street Journal, rather than spoken into the president’s ear.

Rudderless, blindsided, lethargic, and uncoordinated, America has mishandled the COVID-19 crisis to a substantially worse degree than what every health expert I’ve spoken with had feared. “Much worse,”

“Beyond any expectations we had,” said Lauren Sauer, who works on disaster preparedness at Johns Hopkins Medicine. “As an American, I’m horrified,” said Seth Berkley, who heads Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. “The U.S. may end up with the worst outbreak in the industrialized world.”

it will be difficult—but not impossible—for the United States to catch up. To an extent, the near-term future is set because COVID-19 is a slow and long illness. People who were infected several days ago will only start showing symptoms now, even if they isolated themselves in the meantime. Some of those people will enter intensive-care units in early April

A “massive logistics and supply-chain operation [is] now needed across the country,” says Thomas Inglesby of Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. That can’t be managed by small and inexperienced teams scattered throughout the White House. The solution, he says, is to tag in the Defense Logistics Agency—a 26,000-person group that prepares the U.S. military for overseas operations and that has assisted in past public-health crises, including the 2014 Ebola outbreak.

The first and most important is to rapidly produce masks, gloves, and other personal protective equipment

it would also come at a terrible cost: SARS-CoV-2 is more transmissible and fatal than the flu, and it would likely leave behind many millions of corpses and a trail of devastated health systems.

This agency can also coordinate the second pressing need: a massive rollout of COVID-19 tests.

These measures will take time, during which the pandemic will either accelerate beyond the capacity of the health system or slow to containable levels. Its course—and the nation’s fate—now depends on the third need, which is social distancing.

There are now only two groups of Americans. Group A includes everyone involved in the medical response, whether that’s treating patients, running tests, or manufacturing supplies. Group B includes everyone else, and their job is to buy Group A more time. Group B must now “flatten the curve” by physically isolating themselves from other people to cut off chains of transmission.

Given the slow fuse of COVID-19, to forestall the future collapse of the health-care system, these seemingly drastic steps must be taken immediately, before they feel proportionate, and they must continue for several weeks.

Persuading a country to voluntarily stay at home is not easy, and without clear guidelines from the White House, mayors, governors, and business owners have been forced to take their own steps.

when the good of all hinges on the sacrifices of many, clear coordination matters—the fourth urgent need

Pundits and business leaders have used similar rhetoric, arguing that high-risk people, such as the elderly, could be protected while lower-risk people are allowed to go back to work. Such thinking is seductive, but flawed. It overestimates our ability to assess a person’s risk, and to somehow wall off the ‘high-risk’ people from the rest of society. It underestimates how badly the virus can hit ‘low-risk’ groups, and how thoroughly hospitals will be overwhelmed if even just younger demographics are falling sick.

A recent analysis from the University of Pennsylvania estimated that even if social-distancing measures can reduce infection rates by 95 percent, 960,000 Americans will still need intensive care.

There are only about 180,000 ventilators in the U.S. and, more pertinently, only enough respiratory therapists and critical-care staff to safely look after 100,000 ventilated patients. Abandoning social distancing would be foolish. Abandoning it now, when tests and protective equipment are still scarce, would be catastrophic.

If Trump stays the course, if Americans adhere to social distancing, if testing can be rolled out, and if enough masks can be produced, there is a chance that the country can still avert the worst predictions about COVID-19, and at least temporarily bring the pandemic under control. No one knows how long that will take, but it won’t be quick. “It could be anywhere from four to six weeks to up to three months,” Fauci said, “but I don’t have great confidence in that range.”

there are three possible endgames: one that’s very unlikely, one that’s very dangerous, and one that’s very long.

The first is that every nation manages to simultaneously bring the virus to heel, as with the original SARS in 2003. Given how widespread the coronavirus pandemic is, and how badly many countries are faring, the odds of worldwide synchronous control seem vanishingly small.

The second is that the virus does what past flu pandemics have done: It burns through the world and leaves behind enough immune survivors that it eventually struggles to find viable hosts. This “herd immunity” scenario would be quick, and thus tempting

The U.S. has fewer hospital beds per capita than Italy. A study released by a team at Imperial College London concluded that if the pandemic is left unchecked, those beds will all be full by late April. By the end of June, for every available critical-care bed, there will be roughly 15 COVID-19 patients in need of one.  By the end of the summer, the pandemic will have directly killed 2.2 million Americans,

The third scenario is that the world plays a protracted game of whack-a-mole with the virus, stamping out outbreaks here and there until a vaccine can be produced. This is the best option, but also the longest and most complicated.

there are no existing vaccines for coronaviruses—until now, these viruses seemed to cause diseases that were mild or rare—so researchers must start from scratch.

The first steps have been impressively quick. Last Monday, a possible vaccine created by Moderna and the National Institutes of Health went into early clinical testing. That marks a 63-day gap between scientists sequencing the virus’s genes for the first time and doctors injecting a vaccine candidate into a person’s arm. “It’s overwhelmingly the world record,” Fauci said.

The initial trial will simply tell researchers if the vaccine seems safe, and if it can actually mobilize the immune system. Researchers will then need to check that it actually prevents infection from SARS-CoV-2. They’ll need to do animal tests and large-scale trials to ensure that the vaccine doesn’t cause severe side effects. They’ll need to work out what dose is required, how many shots people need, if the vaccine works in elderly people, and if it requires other chemicals to boost its effectiveness.

No matter which strategy is faster, Berkley and others estimate that it will take 12 to 18 months to develop a proven vaccine, and then longer still to make it, ship it, and inject it into people’s arms.

as the status quo returns, so too will the virus. This doesn’t mean that society must be on continuous lockdown until 2022. But “we need to be prepared to do multiple periods of social distancing,” says Stephen Kissler of Harvard.

First: seasonality. Coronaviruses tend to be winter infections that wane or disappear in the summer. That may also be true for SARS-CoV-2, but seasonal variations might not sufficiently slow the virus when it has so many immunologically naive hosts to infect.

Second: duration of immunity. When people are infected by the milder human coronaviruses that cause cold-like symptoms, they remain immune for less than a year. By contrast, the few who were infected by the original SARS virus, which was far more severe, stayed immune for much longer.

scientists will need to develop accurate serological tests, which look for the antibodies that confer immunity. They’ll also need to confirm that such antibodies actually stop people from catching or spreading the virus. If so, immune citizens can return to work, care for the vulnerable, and anchor the economy during bouts of social distancing.

Aspects of America’s identity may need rethinking after COVID-19. Many of the country’s values have seemed to work against it during the pandemic. Its individualism, exceptionalism, and tendency to equate doing whatever you want with an act of resistance meant that when it came time to save lives and stay indoors, some people flocked to bars and clubs.

“We can keep schools and businesses open as much as possible, closing them quickly when suppression fails, then opening them back up again once the infected are identified and isolated. Instead of playing defense, we could play more offense.”

The vaccine may need to be updated as the virus changes, and people may need to get revaccinated on a regular basis, as they currently do for the flu. Models suggest that the virus might simmer around the world, triggering epidemics every few years or so. “But my hope and expectation is that the severity would decline, and there would be less societal upheaval,”

After infections begin ebbing, a secondary pandemic of mental-health problems will follow.

But “there is also the potential for a much better world after we get through this trauma,”

Testing kits can be widely distributed to catch the virus’s return as quickly as possible. There’s no reason that the U.S. should let SARS-CoV-2 catch it unawares again, and thus no reason that social-distancing measures need to be deployed as broadly and heavy-handedly as they now must be.

Pandemics can also catalyze social change. People, businesses, and institutions have been remarkably quick to adopt or call for practices that they might once have dragged their heels on, including working from home, conference-calling to accommodate people with disabilities, proper sick leave, and flexible child-care arrangements.

Perhaps the nation will learn that preparedness isn’t just about masks, vaccines, and tests, but also about fair labor policies and a stable and equal health-care system. Perhaps it will appreciate that health-care workers and public-health specialists compose America’s social immune system, and that this system has been suppressed.

Attitudes to health may also change for the better. The rise of HIV and AIDS “completely changed sexual behavior among young people who were coming into sexual maturity at the height of the epidemic,”

Years of isolationist rhetoric had consequences too.

“People believed the rhetoric that containment would work,” says Wendy Parmet, who studies law and public health at Northeastern University. “We keep them out, and we’ll be okay. When you have a body politic that buys into these ideas of isolationism and ethnonationalism, you’re especially vulnerable when a pandemic hits.”

Pandemics are democratizing experiences. People whose privilege and power would normally shield them from a crisis are facing quarantines, testing positive, and losing loved ones. Senators are falling sick. The consequences of defunding public-health agencies, losing expertise, and stretching hospitals are no longer manifesting as angry opinion pieces, but as faltering lungs.

After COVID-19, attention may shift to public health. Expect to see a spike in funding for virology and vaccinology, a surge in students applying to public-health programs, and more domestic production of medical supplies.

The lessons that America draws from this experience are hard to predict, especially at a time when online algorithms and partisan broadcasters only serve news that aligns with their audience’s preconceptions.

“The transitions after World War II or 9/11 were not about a bunch of new ideas,” he says. “The ideas are out there, but the debates will be more acute over the next few months because of the fluidity of the moment and willingness of the American public to accept big, massive changes.”

One could easily conceive of a world in which most of the nation believes that America defeated COVID-19. Despite his many lapses, Trump’s approval rating has surged. Imagine that he succeeds in diverting blame for the crisis to China, casting it as the villain and America as the resilient hero.

One could also envisage a future in which America learns a different lesson. A communal spirit, ironically born through social distancing, causes people to turn outward, to neighbors both foreign and domestic. The election of November 2020 becomes a repudiation of “America first” politics. The nation pivots, as it did after World War II, from isolationism to international cooperation

The U.S. leads a new global partnership focused on solving challenges like pandemics and climate change.

In 2030, SARS-CoV-3 emerges from nowhere, and is brought to heel within a month.

On the Global Health Security Index, a report card that grades every country on its pandemic preparedness, the United States has a score of 83.5—the world’s highest. Rich, strong, developed, America is supposed to be the readiest of nations. That illusion has been shattered. Despite months of advance warning as the virus spread in other countries, when America was finally tested by COVID-19, it failed.

What happened in 2012, when the oldest Gen-Z babies were in their middle teens? That was the year Facebook acquired Instagram and young people flocked to the latter site. It was also “the beginning of the selfie era.”

Mr. Haidt’s research, confirmed by that of others, shows that depression rates started to rise “all of a sudden” around 2013, “especially for teen girls,” but “it’s only Gen Z, not the older generations.” If you’d stopped collecting data in 2011, he says, you’d see little change from previous years. “By 2015 it’s an epidemic.” (His data are available in an open-source document.)

Mr. Haidt imagines “literally launching our children into outer space” and letting their bodies grow there: “They would come out deformed and broken. Their limbs wouldn’t be right. You can’t physically grow up in outer space. Human bodies can’t do that.” Yet “we basically do that to them socially. We launched them into outer space around the year 2012,” he says, “and then we expect that they will grow up normally without having normal human experiences.”

Social media and selfies hit a generation that had led an overprotected childhood, in which the age at which children were allowed outside on their own by parents had risen from the norm of previous generations, 7 or 8, to between 10 and 12.

That meant the first social-media generation was one of “weakened kids” who “hadn’t practiced the skills of adulthood in a low-stakes environment” with other children. They were deprived of “the normal toughening, the normal strengthening, the normal anti-fragility.

Now, their childhood “is largely just through the phone. They no longer even hang out together.” Teenagers even drive less than earlier generations did.

Mr. Haidt especially worries about girls. By 2020 more than 25% of female teenagers had “a major depression.” The comparable number for boys was just under 9%.

The comparable numbers for millennials at the same age registered at half the Gen-Z rate: about 13% for girls and 5% for boys. “Kids are on their devices all the time,”

Most girls, by contrast, are drawn to “visual platforms,” Instagram and TikTok in particular. “Those are about display and performance. You post your perfect life, and then you flip through the photos of other girls who have a more perfect life, and you feel depressed.

He calls this phenomenon “compare and despair” and says: “It seems social because you’re communicating with people. But it’s performative. You don’t actually get social relationships. You get weak, fake social links.”

Mr. Haidt says he has no antipathy toward the young, and he calls millennials “amazing.”

To illustrate his point about Gen Z, Mr. Haidt challenges people to name young people today who are “really changing the world, who are doing big things that have an impact beyond their closed ecosystem.”

He can think of only two, neither of them American: Greta Thunberg, 19, the Swedish climate militant, and Malala Yousafzai, 25, the Pakistani advocate for female education

I’m predicting that they will be less effective, less impactful, than previous generations.” Why? “You should always keep your eye on whether people are in ‘discover mode’ or ‘defend mode.’ ” In the former mode, you seize opportunities to be creative. In the latter, “you’re not creative, you’re not future-thinking, you’re focused on threats in the present.”

University students who matriculated starting in 2014 or so have arrived on campus in defend mode: “Here they are in the safest, most welcoming, most inclusive, most antiracist places on the planet, but many of them were acting like they were entering some sort of dystopian, threatening, immoral world.”

56% of liberal women 18 to 29 responded affirmatively to the question: Has a doctor or other healthcare provider ever told you that you have a mental health condition? “Some of that,” Mr. Haidt says, “has to be just self-presentational,” meaning imagined.

This new ideology . . . valorizes victimhood. And if your sub-community motivates you to say you have an anxiety disorder, how is this going to affect you for the rest of your life?” He answers his own question: “You’re not going to take chances, you’re going to ask for accommodations, you’re going to play it safe, you’re not going to swing for the fences, you’re not going to start your own company.”

Whereas millennial women are doing well, “Gen-Z women, because they’re so anxious, are going to be less successful than Gen-Z men—and that’s saying a lot, because Gen-Z men are messed up, too.”

The problem, he says, is distinct to the U.S. and other English-speaking developed countries: “You don’t find it as much in Europe, and hardly at all in Asia.” Ideas that are “nurtured around American issues of race and gender spread instantly to the U.K. and Canada. But they don’t necessarily spread to France and Germany, China and Japan.”

something I hear from a lot of managers, that it’s very difficult to supervise their Gen-Z employees, that it’s very difficult to give them feedback.” That makes it hard for them to advance professionally by learning to do their jobs better.

“this could severely damage American capitalism.” When managers are “afraid to speak up honestly because they’ll be shamed on Twitter or Slack, then that organization becomes stupid.” Mr. Haidt says he’s “seen a lot of this, beginning in American universities in 2015. They all got stupid in the same way. They all implemented policies that backfire.”

Mr. Haidt, who describes himself as “a classical liberal like John Stuart Mill,” also laments the impact of social media on political discourse

“Social media is incompatible with liberal democracy because it has moved conversation, and interaction, into the center of the Colosseum. We’re not there to talk to each other. We’re there to perform” before spectators who “want blood.”

Is there a solution? “I’d raise the age of Internet adulthood to 16,” he says—“and enforce it.”

By contrast, “life went onto phone-based apps 10 years ago, and the protections we have for children are zero, absolutely zero.” The damage to Generation Z from social media “so vastly exceeds the damage from Covid that we’re going to have to act.”

Gen Z, he says, “is not in denial. They recognize that this app-based life is really bad for them.” He reports that they wish they had childhoods more like those of their parents, in which they could play outside and have adventur

after using ThinkUp for about six months, I’ve found it to be an indispensable guide to how I navigate social networks.

“The goal is to make you act like less of a jerk online,” Ms. Trapani said. “The big goal is to create mindfulness and awareness, and also behavioral change.”

people often tweet and update without any perspective about themselves. That’s because Facebook and Twitter, as others have observed, have a way of infecting our brains.

Because social networks often suggest a false sense of intimacy, they tend to lower people’s self-control.

Like a drug or perhaps a parasite, they worm into your devices, your daily habits and your every free moment, and they change how you think.Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story

For those of us most deeply afflicted, myself included, every mundane observation becomes grist for a 140-character quip, and every interaction a potential springboard into an all-consuming, emotionally wrenching flame battle.

One of the biggest dangers is saying something off the cuff that might make sense in a particular context, but that sounds completely off the rails to the wider public. The problem, in other words, is acting without thinking — being caught up in the moment, without pausing to reflect on the long-term consequences. You’re never more than a few taps away from an embarrassment that might ruin your career, or at least your reputation, for years to come.

More basically, though, it’s helped me pull back from social networks. Each week, ThinkUp tells me how often I’ve tweeted. Sometimes that number is terribly high — a few weeks ago it was more than 800 times — and I realize I’m probably overtaxing my followers

getting a daily reminder from ThinkUp that there are good ways and bad ways to behave online — has a tendency to focus the mind.

ThinkUp charges $5 a month for each social network you connect to it. Is it worth it? After all, there’s a better, more surefire way of avoiding any such long-term catastrophe caused by social media: Just stop using social networks.

even though “never tweet” became a popular, ironic thing to tweet this year, actually never tweeting, and never being on Facebook, is becoming nearly impossible for many people.

your online profile plays an important role in how you’re perceived by potential employers. In a recent survey commissioned by the job-hunting site CareerBuilder, almost half of companies said they perused job-seekers’ social networking profiles to look for red flags and to see what sort of image prospective employees portrayed online.

The main issue constraining growth, the founders say, is that it has been difficult to explain to people why they might need ThinkUp.

That may change as more people falter on social networks, either by posting unthinking comments that end up damaging their careers, or simply by annoying people to the point that their online presence becomes a hindrance to their real-life prospects.

A simplistic answer would be that such pressure does not conflict with free speech because the First Amendment applies only to government censorship, not to restrictions imposed by individuals.

Many of the reasons why Americans object to official censorship also apply to the suppression of speech by private means. If we conceive of free speech as promoting the search for truth—as the metaphor of “the marketplace of ideas” suggests—we should be troubled whether that search is hindered by public officials or private citizens.

If the point of free speech is to facilitate the open debate that is essential for self-rule, any measure that impairs that debate should give us pause, regardless of its source.

But although social restraints on speech raise many of the same concerns as government censorship, they differ in important ways.

First, much of the social pressure that critics complain about is itself speech.

When activists denounce Yiannopoulos as a racist or Murray as a white nationalist, they are exercising their own right to free expression. Likewise when students hold protests or marches, launch social media campaigns, circulate petitions, boycott lectures, demand the resignation of professors and administrators, or object to the invitation of controversial speakers. Even heckling

one of the central tenets of modern First Amendment law is that the government cannot suppress speech if those harms can be thwarted by alternative means. And the alternative that judges and scholars invoke most frequently is the mechanism of counter-speech.

Put bluntly, the implicit goal of all argument is, ultimately, to quash the opposing view.

Counter-speech can take many forms. It can be an assertion of fact designed to rebut a speaker’s claim. It can be an expression of opinion that the speaker’s view is misguided, ignorant, offensive, or insulting. It can even be an accusation that the speaker is racist or sexist, or that the speaker’s expression constitutes an act of harassment, discrimination, or aggression.

In other words, much of the social pushback that critics complain about on campus and in public life—indeed, the entire phenomenon of political correctness—can plausibly be described as counter-speech.

It’s worth asking, though, why expression that shames or demonizes a speaker is not a legitimate form of counter-speech.

To argue that a speaker’s position is racist or sexist is to say something about the merits of her position, given that most people think racism and sexism are bad. Even arguing that the speaker herself is racist goes to the merits, since it gives the public context for judging her motives and the consequences of her position.  

Besides, what principle of free speech limits discussion to the merits? Political discourse often strays from the merits of issues to personal or tangential matters. But the courts have never suggested that such discourse is outside the realm of free speech.

Cohen v. California, “We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.”

Are these forms of social pressure inconsistent with the values of free speech?  That is a more complicated question than many observers seem willing to acknowledge.

The problem with this argument is that all counter-speech has a potential chilling effect. Any time people refute an assertion of fact by pointing to evidence that contradicts it, speakers may be hesitant to repeat that assertion.

Fine, the critics might say. But much of the social pressure on campus does not just demonize; it is designed to, and often does, chill unpopular speech.

This highlights a paradox of free speech, and of our relationship to it. On the one hand, Americans are encouraged to be tolerant of opposing ideas in the belief that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market

On the other hand, unlike the government, Americans are not expected to remain neutral observers of that market. Instead, we are participants in it; the market works only if we take that participation seriously, if we exercise our own right of expression to combat ideas we disagree with, to refute false claims, to discredit dangerous beliefs

This does not mean we are required to be vicious or uncivil. But viciousness and incivility are legitimate features of America’s free speech tradition

This, one suspects, is what bothers many critics of political correctness: the fact that so much of the social pressure and pushback takes on a nasty, vindictive tone that is painful to observe. But free speech often is painful.

Many critics, particularly on the left, seem to forget this. Although they claim to be promoting an expansive view of free speech, they are doing something quite different. They are promoting a vision of liberalism, of respect, courtesy, and broadmindedness

That is a worthy vision to promote, but it should not be confused with the dictates of free speech, which allows for a messier, more ill-mannered form of public discourse. Free speech is not the same as liberalism. Equating the two reflects a narrow, rather than expansive, view of the former.

Does this mean any form of social pressure targeted at speakers is acceptable? Not at all. One of the reasons government censorship is prohibited is that the coercive power of the state is nearly impossible to resist

Social pressure that crosses the line from persuasion to coercion is also inconsistent with the values of free speech.

This explains why violence and threats of violence are not legitimate mechanisms for countering ideas one disagrees with. Physical assault—in addition to not traditionally being regarded as a form of expression —too closely resembles the use of force by the government.

What about other forms of social pressure? If Americans are concerned about the risk of coercion, the question is whether the pressures are such that it is reasonable to expect speakers to endure them. Framed this way, we should accept the legitimacy of insults, shaming, demonizing, and even social ostracism, since it is not unreasonable for speakers to bear these consequences.

a system that relies on counter-speech as the primary alternative to government censorship should not unduly restrict the forms counter-speech can take.

Heckling raises trickier questions. Occasional boos or interruptions are acceptable since they don’t prevent speakers from communicating their ideas. But heckling that is so loud and continuous a speaker literally cannot be heard is little different from putting a hand over a speaker’s mouth and should be viewed as antithetical to the values free speech.  

Because social restraints on speech do not violate the Constitution, Americans cannot rely on courts to develop a comprehensive framework for deciding which types of pressure are too coercive. Instead, Americans must determine what degree of pressure we think is acceptable.

In that respect, the critics are well within their right to push for a more elevated, civil form of public discourse. They are perfectly justified in arguing that a college campus, of all places, should be a model of rational debate

But they are not justified in claiming the free speech high ground. For under our free speech tradition, the crudest and least reasonable forms of expression are just as legitimate as the most eloquent and thoughtful

There’s a notion that the social web was once useful, or at least that it could have been good, if only we had pulled a few levers: some moderation and fact-checking here, a bit of regulation there, perhaps a federal antitrust lawsuit. But that’s far too sunny and shortsighted a view.

Today’s social networks, Facebook chief among them, were built to encourage the things that make them so harmful. It is in their very architecture.

I realized only recently that I’ve been thinking far too narrowly about the problem.

Megascale is nearly the existential threat that megadeath is. No single machine should be able to control the fate of the world’s population—and that’s what both the Doomsday Machine and Facebook are built to do.

Facebook does not exist to seek truth and report it, or to improve civic health, or to hold the powerful to account, or to represent the interests of its users, though these phenomena may be occasional by-products of its existence.

The company’s early mission was to “give people the power to share and make the world more open and connected.” Instead, it took the concept of “community” and sapped it of all moral meaning.

Facebook—along with Google and YouTube—is perfect for amplifying and spreading disinformation at lightning speed to global audiences.

Facebook decided that it needed not just a very large user base, but a tremendous one, unprecedented in size. That decision set Facebook on a path to escape velocity, to a tipping point where it can harm society just by existing.

No one, not even Mark Zuckerberg, can control the product he made. I’ve come to realize that Facebook is not a media company. It’s a Doomsday Machine.

Scale and engagement are valuable to Facebook because they’re valuable to advertisers. These incentives lead to design choices such as reaction buttons that encourage users to engage easily and often, which in turn encourage users to share ideas that will provoke a strong response.

Every time you click a reaction button on Facebook, an algorithm records it, and sharpens its portrait of who you are.

The hyper-targeting of users, made possible by reams of their personal data, creates the perfect environment for manipulation—by advertisers, by political campaigns, by emissaries of disinformation, and of course by Facebook itself, which ultimately controls what you see and what you don’t see on the site.

there aren’t enough moderators speaking enough languages, working enough hours, to stop the biblical flood of shit that Facebook unleashes on the world, because 10 times out of 10, the algorithm is faster and more powerful than a person.

At megascale, this algorithmically warped personalized informational environment is extraordinarily difficult to moderate in a meaningful way, and extraordinarily dangerous as a result.

These dangers are not theoretical, and they’re exacerbated by megascale, which makes the platform a tantalizing place to experiment on people

Even after U.S. intelligence agencies identified Facebook as a main battleground for information warfare and foreign interference in the 2016 election, the company has failed to stop the spread of extremism, hate speech, propaganda, disinformation, and conspiracy theories on its site.

it wasn’t until October of this year, for instance, that Facebook announced it would remove groups, pages, and Instragram accounts devoted to QAnon, as well as any posts denying the Holocaust.

In the days after the 2020 presidential election, Zuckerberg authorized a tweak to the Facebook algorithm so that high-accuracy news sources such as NPR would receive preferential visibility in people’s feeds, and hyper-partisan pages such as Breitbart News’s and Occupy Democrats’ would be buried, according to The New York Times, offering proof that Facebook could, if it wanted to, turn a dial to reduce disinformation—and offering a reminder that Facebook has the power to flip a switch and change what billions of people see online.

reducing the prevalence of content that Facebook calls “bad for the world” also reduces people’s engagement with the site. In its experiments with human intervention, the Times reported, Facebook calibrated the dial so that just enough harmful content stayed in users’ news feeds to keep them coming back for more.

Facebook’s stated mission—to make the world more open and connected—has always seemed, to me, phony at best, and imperialist at worst.

Facebook is a borderless nation-state, with a population of users nearly as big as China and India combined, and it is governed largely by secret algorithms

How much real-world violence would never have happened if Facebook didn’t exist? One of the people I’ve asked is Joshua Geltzer, a former White House counterterrorism official who is now teaching at Georgetown Law. In counterterrorism circles, he told me, people are fond of pointing out how good the United States has been at keeping terrorists out since 9/11. That’s wrong, he said. In fact, “terrorists are entering every single day, every single hour, every single minute” through Facebook.

Evidence of real-world violence can be easily traced back to both Facebook and 8kun. But 8kun doesn’t manipulate its users or the informational environment they’re in. Both sites are harmful. But Facebook might actually be worse for humanity.

In previous eras, U.S. officials could at least study, say, Nazi propaganda during World War II, and fully grasp what the Nazis wanted people to believe. Today, “it’s not a filter bubble; it’s a filter shroud,” Geltzer said. “I don’t even know what others with personalized experiences are seeing.”

Mary McCord, the legal director at the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection at Georgetown Law, told me that she thinks 8kun may be more blatant in terms of promoting violence but that Facebook is “in some ways way worse” because of its reach. “There’s no barrier to entry with Facebook,” she said. “In every situation of extremist violence we’ve looked into, we’ve found Facebook postings. And that reaches tons of people. The broad reach is what brings people into the fold and normalizes extremism and makes it mainstream.” In other words, it’s the megascale that makes Facebook so dangerous.

Facebook’s megascale gives Zuckerberg an unprecedented degree of influence over the global population. If he isn’t the most powerful person on the planet, he’s very near the top.

“The thing he oversees has such an effect on cognition and people’s beliefs, which can change what they do with their nuclear weapons or their dollars.”

Facebook’s new oversight board, formed in response to backlash against the platform and tasked with making decisions concerning moderation and free expression, is an extension of that power. “The first 10 decisions they make will have more effect on speech in the country and the world than the next 10 decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court,” Geltzer said. “That’s power. That’s real power.”

Facebook is also a business, and a place where people spend time with one another. Put it this way: If you owned a store and someone walked in and started shouting Nazi propaganda or recruiting terrorists near the cash register, would you, as the shop owner, tell all of the other customers you couldn’t possibly intervene?

In 2004, Zuckerberg said Facebook ran advertisements only to cover server costs. But over the next two years Facebook completely upended and redefined the entire advertising industry. The pre-social web destroyed classified ads, but the one-two punch of Facebook and Google decimated local news and most of the magazine industry—publications fought in earnest for digital pennies, which had replaced print dollars, and social giants scooped them all up anyway.

In other words, if the Dunbar number for running a company or maintaining a cohesive social life is 150 people; the magic number for a functional social platform is maybe 20,000 people. Facebook now has 2.7 billion monthly users.

in 2007, Zuckerberg said something in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that now takes on a much darker meaning: “The things that are most powerful aren’t the things that people would have done otherwise if they didn’t do them on Facebook. Instead, it’s the things that would never have happened otherwise.”

We’re still in the infancy of this century’s triple digital revolution of the internet, smartphones, and the social web, and we find ourselves in a dangerous and unstable informational environment, powerless to resist forces of manipulation and exploitation that we know are exerted on us but remain mostly invisible

The Doomsday Machine offers a lesson: We should not accept this current arrangement. No single machine should be able to control so many people.

we need a new philosophical and moral framework for living with the social web—a new Enlightenment for the information age, and one that will carry us back to shared reality and empiricism.

localized approach is part of what made megascale possible. Early constraints around membership—the requirement at first that users attended Harvard, and then that they attended any Ivy League school, and then that they had an email address ending in .edu—offered a sense of cohesiveness and community. It made people feel more comfortable sharing more of themselves. And more sharing among clearly defined demographics was good for business.

we need to adopt a broader view of what it will take to fix the brokenness of the social web. That will require challenging the logic of today’s platforms—and first and foremost challenging the very concept of megascale as a way that humans gather.

The web’s existing logic tells us that social platforms are free in exchange for a feast of user data; that major networks are necessarily global and centralized; that moderators make the rules. None of that need be the case.

We need people who dismantle these notions by building alternatives. And we need enough people to care about these other alternatives to break the spell of venture capital and mass attention that fuels megascale and creates fatalism about the web as it is now.

We must also find ways to repair the aspects of our society and culture that the social web has badly damaged. This will require intellectual independence, respectful debate, and the same rebellious streak that helped establish Enlightenment values centuries ago.

Right now, too many people are allowing algorithms and tech giants to manipulate them, and reality is slipping from our grasp as a result. This century’s Doomsday Machine is here, and humming along.

Over the past four decades, governments have slashed budgets and privatized basic services. This has two important consequences for public health

First, people are unlikely to trust institutions that do little for them.

second, public health is no longer viewed as a collective endeavor, based on the principle of social solidarity and mutual obligation. People are conditioned to believe they’re on their own and responsible only for themselves.

an important source of vaccine hesitancy is the erosion of the idea of a common good.

“People are thinking, ‘If the government isn’t going to do anything for us,’” said Elden, “‘then why should we participate in vaccines?’”

Since the spring, when most American adults became eligible for Covid vaccines, the racial gap in vaccination rates between Black and white people has been halved. In September, a national survey found that vaccination rates among Black and white Americans were almost identical.

Other surveys have determined that a much more significant factor was college attendance: Those without a college degree were the most likely to go unvaccinated.

Education is a reliable predictor of socioeconomic status, and other studies have similarly found a link between income and vaccination.

It turns out that the real vaccination divide is class.

compared with white Americans, communities of color do experience the American health care system differently. But a closer look at the data reveals a more complicated picture.

during the 1950s polio campaigns, for example, most people saw vaccination as a civic duty.

But as the public purse shrunk in the 1980s, politicians insisted that it’s no longer the government’s job to ensure people’s well-being; instead, Americans were to be responsible only for themselves and their own bodies

Entire industries, such as self-help and health foods, have sprung up on the principle that the key to good health lies in individuals making the right choices.

Without an idea of the common good, health is often discussed using the language of “choice.”

there are problems with reducing public health to a matter of choice. It gives the impression that individuals are wholly responsible for their own health.

This is despite growing evidence that health is deeply influenced by factors outside our control; public health experts now talk about the “social determinants of health,” the idea that personal health is never simply just a reflection of individual lifestyle choices, but also the class people are born into, the neighborhood they grew up in and the race they belong to.

food deserts and squalor are not easy problems to solve — certainly not by individuals or charities — and they require substantial government action.

Many medical schools teach “motivational interviewing,”

the deeper problem:

Being healthy is not cheap. Studies indicate that energy-dense foods with less nutritious value are more affordable, and low-cost diets are linked to obesity and insulin resistance.

This isn’t surprising, since we shop for doctors and insurance plans the way we do all other goods and services

Another problem with reducing well-being to personal choice is that this treats health as a commodity.

mothers devoted many hours to “researching” vaccines, soaking up parental advice books and quizzing doctors. In other words, they act like savvy consumers

When thinking as a consumer, people tend to downplay social obligations in favor of a narrow pursuit of self-interest. As one parent told Reich, “I’m not going to put my child at risk to save another child.”

Such risk-benefit assessments for vaccines are an essential part of parents’ consumer research.

Vaccine uptake is so high among wealthy people because Covid is one of the gravest threats they face. In some wealthy Manhattan neighborhoods, for example, vaccination rates run north of 90 percent.

For poorer and working-class people, though, the calculus is different: Covid-19 is only one of multiple grave threats.

When viewed in the context of the other threats they face, Covid no longer seems uniquely scary.

Most of the people we interviewed in the Bronx say they are skeptical of the institutions that claim to serve the poor but in fact have abandoned them.

he and his friends find reason to view the government’s sudden interest in their well-being with suspicion. “They are over here shoving money at us,” a woman told us, referring to a New York City offer to pay a $500 bonus to municipal workers to get vaccinated. “And I’m asking, why are you so eager, when you don’t give us money for anything else?”

These views reinforce the work of social scientists who find a link between a lack of trust and inequality. And without trust, there is no mutual obligation, no sense of a common good.

The experience of the 1960s suggests that when people feel supported through social programs, they’re more likely to trust institutions and believe they have a stake in society’s health.

Research shows that private systems not only tend to produce worse health outcomes than public ones, but privatization creates what public health experts call “segregated care,” which can undermine the feelings of social solidarity that are critical for successful vaccination drives

In one Syrian city, for example, the health care system now consists of one public hospital so underfunded that it is notorious for poor care, a few private hospitals offering high-quality care that are unaffordable to most of the population, and many unlicensed and unregulated private clinics — some even without medical doctors — known to offer misguided health advice. Under such conditions, conspiracy theories can flourish; many of the city’s residents believe Covid vaccines are a foreign plot.

In many developing nations, international aid organizations are stepping in to offer vaccines. These institutions are sometimes more equitable than governments, but they are often oriented to donor priorities, not community needs.

“We have starvation and women die in childbirth.” one tribal elder told us, “Why do they care so much about polio? What do they really want?”

In America, anti-vaccine movements are as old as vaccines themselves; efforts to immunize people against smallpox prompted bitter opposition in the turn of the last century. But after World War II, these attitudes disappeared. In the 1950s, demand for the polio vaccine often outstripped supply, and by the late 1970s, nearly every state had laws mandating vaccinations for school with hardly any public opposition.

What changed? This was the era of large, ambitious government programs like Medicare and Medicaid.

The anti-measles policy, for example, was an outgrowth of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty initiatives.