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Javier E

El juego del poder | www.inmediaciones.org - 0 views

  • El MAS en su emergencia en el escenario político es la condensación de lo nacional popular que el ciclo neoliberal, con sus luces y sombras, había marginado y excluido. Su fuerza sale de la Bolivia profunda, que no tiene tradición democrática y que como toda expresión popular tiene la confrontación y la pelea como método de lucha.
  • Esta visión se refuerza porque su núcleo duro viene de la lucha sindical campesina. Y de la aparición de El Alto como factor de decisión política. El MAS se convierte en el catalizador de las fuerzas que vencen al neoliberalismo, no por la fuerza de las urnas sino en las calles y encarna la posibilidad de instaurar un ciclo político distinto al neoliberalismo, que en ese momento, es lo que la gran mayoría de la sociedad boliviana reclama.
  • El discurso democrático es solo un medio para lograr su objetivo. Y las mayorías nacionales así lo entienden y le dan todo el respaldo para que tenga la hegemonía política y así, desarrolle su proyecto
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  • A eso se suma un factor importante: su caudillo y parte de la dirigencia del proyecto masista, vienen de la marginalidad social (a diferencia de los conductores políticos de la revolución nacional del 52 que eran parte de una clase media intelectual), que se han abierto a empellones un espacio político y no entienden otro modo de hacer política que no sea confrontando y doblegando al adversario.
  • le preguntó a Evo Morales por qué confrontaba tanto, la repuesta de Evo fue categórica: “mira dónde he llegado confrontando”.     La hegemonía y la confrontación son parte de la esencia y están en medula espinal del masismo.
  • El MAS se identifica mejor con la postulación de Abimael Guzmán de que “al margen del poder todo es ilusión” O con el planteamiento de Carlos Mariátegui que afirma: “La primera tarea del revolucionario es tomar el poder, la segunda, no dejarlo jamás”:
  • El MNR después del triunfo de la revolución del 9 de abril fue implacable con sus detractores, no dudó en crear campos de concentración y violar derechos humanos. Paz Estenssoro hizo suyo aquel dicho popular que dice: “que para hacer una torta hay que romper muchos huevos” y no le tembló la mano a la hora de ser duro.
  • Lo propio ocurre el año 2006 cuando el MAS captura el poder. Solo podía instalar el “proceso de cambio” desde la óptica del hegemonismo político y la confrontación.
  • La Asamblea Constituyente que motivó el cambio de la Constitución Política, la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos, el control por parte del Estado de empresas como YPFB, Entel y otras, el nacimiento del Estado Plurinacional en vez de la República, el empoderamiento de sectores indígenas, el ingreso de sectores sociales al manejo del aparato del Estado, eran imposibles de lograr si un MAS hegemónico y confrontacional.
  • Es cierto que lo hegemónico y confrontacional trae aparejado el abuso, el atropello, la violación a derechos humanos y otras consecuencias que van contra la esencia de la democracia occidental. Pero al MAS no le interesa eso, porque no se identifica con la democracia occidental.
  • En nuestro país, la revolución nacional de 1952 fue hegemónica y confrontacional. Es imposible pensar la implementación de la Nacionalización de las minas, la Reforma Agraria, la Reforma Educativa, el Voto Universal y todas las medidas de la Revolución Nacional sin un partido hegemónico, como era en ese momento era el MNR y sin una confrontación abierta con todos los exponentes y defensores del Estado Minero-Feudal pre 52.
  • Solo el cambio de correlación de fuerzas y de realidad social y económica harán que el MAS tenga otra actitud.
  • Puede ceder espacios al adversario cuando éstos se someten o son funcionales. También respeta al rival cuando tiene fuerza propia, pero trabaja para debilitarlo y arrinconarlo.
  • Por eso causa hilaridad cuando la oposición le reclama al MAS conductas democráticas occidentales.
  • El MAS entrará en un escenario democrático cuando su subsistencia política dependa de ser parte de una democracia de pactos. Tal como lo entendió el MNR el año 1985 cuando supo que ya no era hegemónico y su única forma de gobernar era en con pactos y alianzas. Igual ocurrió con Banzer que entendió que en democracia no podía gobernar sin acuerdos políticos, como lo hizo cuando fue dictador y su poder se basaba en las bayonetas.
  • desde caída de Evo Morales y del retorno al poder de del MAS de la mano de Luis Arce y David Choquehuanca sea han y se están desarrollando una serie de contradicciones dentro del bloque nacional-popular.
  • La primera constatación que el triunfo de Arce y Choquehuanca establece es que el bloque nacional popular distingue claramente lo que es el denominado “proceso de cambio” y el rol dentro el mismo de Evo Morales.
  • Está claro que para la mayoría de las bases de lo nacional- popular el proceso de cambio se encuentra encima de Evo Morales.
  • En todo caso, las fricciones, divisiones o desgajes del bloque nacional –popular no van a reforzar a tiendas políticas que estén en una visión “neoliberal” o forman parte de lo que las bases populares denominen la derecha. Se quedan dentro la narrativa popular- nacional y dentro el movimiento del “proceso de cambio.”
  • Durante la campaña electoral presidencial es donde se consolida el hecho de que MAS puede hacer política y ganar sin Evo La campaña también sirve para la irrupción de lideratos como Eva Copa, Choquehuanca, Andrónico y el propio Lucho Arce.
  • Ya en los últimos años del gobierno de Evo se desataron fuertes críticas al entorno del entonces presidente y a la forma vertical del manejo del instrumento político que hacía Morales.
  • A esto se suma, el rechazo que tiene en la actualidad la figura de Evo Morales en sectores de clase media, no solo en el sector profesional o en sus capas altas, sino en gente de clase media que sigue viendo con simpatía y es querendona del “proceso de cambio”. Y que reconoce que el mismo obtuvo resultados positivos para el país.
  • La elección subnacional confirmó el rechazo a Evo sobre todo en la mayoría de las ciudades capitales. La cosa se agrava cuando fuerzas políticas como Jallalla y MTS son los verdugos electorales del MAS, derrotándolo en lugares importantes y estratégicos.
  • Este cuadro interno del bloque de la Nacional- Popular, en concordancia con el resultado electoral de las últimas elecciones de gobernaciones y alcaldías han motivado que el masismo se lance a ejecutar y tomar la iniciativa bajo la siguiente estrategia: Introdujo en el ajedrez político el tema de convalidar la tesis del “golpe de Estado” para desarrollar los siguientes puntos:
  • a) El enemigo común
  • La explicación es muy simple, a todos los adscritos a la narrativa nacional-popular les conviene que se aniquile o cuando menos se arrincone a la oposición que dice representar “la modernidad y el neoliberalismo” para que la definición política y sobre todo el futuro de la misma se desarrolle dentro sus filas.
  • Una vez conseguido el objetivo de lograr la unidad contra el enemigo común se produce el segundo paso:
  • b) El escarmiento, la amenaza y el aislamiento
  • nmediatamente el MAS comienza con el escarmiento, metiendo a la cárcel a la ex presidenta, a sus ministros, a militares y policías. Se trata de una medida de fuerza donde el partido de gobierno demuestra no tener piedad con sus adversarios. Con la detención de la ex presidenta y sus colaboradores se busca demostrar la ilegitimidad e ilegalidad del régimen de Jeanine Añez, pero ante todo establecer que es un acto de “justicia” y reivindicación con la ciudad de El Alto por los hechos de Senkata, que quiere transmitir el mensaje que ya nadie podrá atacar impunemente a los habitantes de la principal ciudad Aymara del país, porque ellos son los únicos dueños de su territorio.
  • Sobre estos dos movimientos de ajedrez que el MAS realizó: el primero la táctica del enemigo a común y segundo la política del escarmiento, la amenaza y el aislamiento, el MAS trabaja la posibilidad de tres desemboques que son los siguientes:
  • La amenaza es contra los demás jefes políticos que tienen que saber que sobre ellos está la espada de Damocles, que en cualquier momento pueden ser judicializados e ir presos.
  • El aislamiento es dirigido: aislar y dividir a las autoridades electas para que por su cuenta busquen salvar sus espacios de poder ya sea sometiéndose o negociando con el poder central.
  • Pero el aislamiento está focalizado contra Camacho para aislarlo del resto del país y debilitarlo poco a poco. Lo sugestivo es que, globalmente, estas acciones han funcionado.
  • Nadie se ha roto las vestiduras por el apresamiento de la ex presidenta y sus colaboradores, la indignación que causó el hecho fue muy focalizada en ciertos sectores sociales y una lluvia de tres días. Esto debido al poco peso y representatividad que tiene la expresidenta Añez en la sociedad boliviana.
  • Respecto a los militares presos, pasa lo mismo, ya ni siquiera en su institución generan solidaridad de cuerpo, porque hoy en la cabeza de los militares bolivianos está la preocupación de ascender al grado superior y terminar la carrera militar con una buena jubilación que defender a un camarada caído. En la policía sucede lo mismo
  • Es evidente que la presión internacional juega su rol, pero gobiernos de corte hegemónico y confrontacional, siempre ignoran esta presión, incluso actúan contra ella.
  • El apresamiento de militares y policías es el decirles a ambos que el poder civil y constitucional está encima y quien se atreva a violar tal situación, solo tendrá como destino la cárcel. Con ello se quiere desechar cualquier intento de subversión y de amotinamiento en el futuro.
  • 1.- El retorno al poder del “comandante” Evo Morales
  • Se trata de una línea política de los sectores duros del Evismo, que quieren el retorno inmediato de Evo al poder porque, según ellos, fue derrocado por un “golpe de Estado” después, desde su visión, de haber “ganado” la elección del 2019. Y por lo tanto se le debería devolver el poder.
  • Este ha sido y es la razón primaria de imponer en el escenario político la temática del “golpe de Estado”.
  • Evidentemente, tal estrategia del sector duro solo podrá ser victoriosa en un escenario ya no de confrontación, sino de enfrentamiento entre bolivianos. Pero los duros del Evismo creen que ese el mejor camino porque así se adelantaría la eliminación de los adversarios del “proceso de cambio” y de Evo, asegurando el poder para el próximo decenio.
  • Objetivamente no hay condiciones para que esta línea política, llamada por propios y extraños la vía venezolana, pueda tener éxito. Pero a veces el fanatismo y la violencia consiguen objetivos que la racionalidad se niega admitir.
  • Sin embargo, hay factores subjetivos que quieren que se desarrolle la vía denominada Venezuela.
  • Para nadie es un secreto que la obsesión que tiene por el poder Evo Morales es casi patológica. Para él es un difícil imaginar una vida fuera de la presidencia.
  • Otro factor es su círculo íntimo que saben que no volverán a gozar las mieles del poder que durante 14 años disfrutaron si Evo no vuelve a la casa grande del pueblo, porque las propias bases sociales del “proceso de cambio “los ha vetado.
  • los cocaleros del Chapare que tienen interés políticos y económicos casados con el Evismo.
  • Todo eso hace que dentro el MAS haya una tendencia que quiere el inmediato retorno de su “Comandante” Evo a la casa grande del pueblo.
  • 2.- Recomposición del cuadro político vía adelanto de elecciones. –
  • Otra de las estrategias que está puesta en el ajedrez político es hacer que haya un desemboque político que termine en el adelantamiento de elecciones. Hecho que, según los promotores de este planteamiento, abriría el camino del retorno de Evo Morales al poder.
  • La ruta a seguir para lograr tal objetivo parece muy simple y posible de lograr. Se requiere promover una cadena de renuncias en el poder ejecutivo, que comience con la renuncia del presidente, continúe con la de David Choquehuanca y termine en con la asunción de Andrónico a la presidencia, quien por constitución tendría que convocar a nuevos comicios electorales, donde Evo ya pueda candidatear.
  • hay aspectos más profundos que ponen trabas a esta estrategia, veamos lo más importante:
  • En primera instancia, no se puede asegurar que Evo sea el candidato de unidad del bloque nacional-popular. Lo más probable es que la emergencia aymara y generacional del bloque nacional-popular se exprese en una formula distinta cuya cabeza no sea Evo Morales, lo que adelantaría la competencia interna por el liderato.
  • Un segundo aspecto es que en las actuales condiciones una victoria electoral de Evo está en duda. Indudablemente éste es el peor momento electoral de Evo Morales, porque tiene una fuerte ruptura con sectores de la clase media. No se puede afirmar que ese quiebre de Evo con la clase media sea irreversible, pero hoy por hoy es muy fuerte.
  • 3.- Arce, factor de equilibrio coyuntural
  • Una tercera posibilidad de llegada de la última arremetida política  del MAS es buscar fortalecer la actual presidencia de Luis Arce, sacándola de parsimonia y lentitud.
  • En esta coyuntura el MAS tendría que cerrar filas en torno al gobierno para encarar con cierta coherencia el tema económico, la pandemia y la cuestión política.
  • Con un bloque nacional- popular unido Luis Arce puede viabilizar en la sociedad un plan de medidas económicas para lograr la reactivación de la economía y controlar el desarrollo de la pandemia.
  • Pero la más importante es que, en la interna del bloque nacional-popular, el presidente Arce, en este momento, es un factor equilibrio y unidad de las diferentes visiones e intereses que tienen todas las corrientes que se encuentran disputando el liderato y la conducción de la misma.
  • Por ello, sin tener claros patrocinadores puede ser la tendencia que se acabe de imponer.
  • Pero lo que debe quedar claro es que en ningún escenario los actores de lo nacional –popular buscan acuerdo o concertación con las fuerzas que son del polo político denominado neoliberal y anti masista. Sino todos coinciden en someterlos o arrinconarlos.
  • El triste vía crucis de la oposición
  • ¿En qué momento las cúpulas de los partidos que fueron actores del ciclo neoliberal entre 1895-2006 perdieron el rumbo para ser abatidos y derrotados por las masas populares que rescataban el discurso de la nacional-popular? ¿Qué les paso? ¿Qué errores cometieron? ¿Qué fue lo que no entendieron?
  • Veamos algunos factores que explican y ayudan a comprender tal situación:
  • a) Perder el poder y perder la oposición
  • Uno de los síntomas más fuertes de la crisis del ciclo neoliberal se develó el 26 de junio del 2002, cuatro días antes de la elección presidencial, el entonces embajador de EEUU en Bolivia, Rocha, lanzó una amenaza en el Chapare, con Tuto Quiroga al lado (Tuto entonces presidente de Bolivia) advirtiendo que el mercado del gas a California estaba abierto a una Bolivia que salga del circuito coca-cocaína. En una clara intromisión, el entonces embajador norteamericano en Bolivia pedía que los bolivianos abrieran los ojos, pensaran en sus hijos y nietos y no votaran por Evo Morales, pero como sucede en estos casos el efecto fue un bumerang.
  • Pero lo más trágico vino después, cuando todas las tendencias políticas importantes del ciclo neoliberal entraron en bloque al gobierno de Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.
  • Durante el tiempo que duró el ciclo neoliberal, el sistema político controló ambos espacios y aún cuando eran parte de una misma visión “neoliberal y de modernización”, tenían percepciones y matices diferentes. Y aun cuando eran rivales políticos, en algunos casos profundamente antagónicos, crearon un mecanismo de alternancia política donde los roles se intercambian.
  • Entonces, se tenía la sensación de una democracia moderna y estable, con alternancia. Pero, el error de ingresar todos al último gobierno de Goni demostró que el “sistema de partidos” era tan frágil como una cáscara de huevo.
  • Indudablemente, no se puede negar el aporte de los lideres del ciclo “neoliberal”. Sin el coraje y la valentía de Siles Suazo, no se habría reconquistado la democracia. Sin el 21060 de Víctor Paz no se habría estabilizado la economía nacional. Sin la conversión democrática de Banzer no se habría desterrado el golpismo como opción. Sin la participación popular de Goni no se habría fortalecido el poder de los municipios. Sin los acuerdos políticos que promovió y se firmó en la presidencia de Jaime Paz no se habría afianzado la democracia boliviana. También en la gestión de Paz Zamora se encontró el pozo San Alberto, Reserva gasífera sobre la cual se ha sustentando económicamente el “proceso de cambio”.
  • Pero todos estos aciertos no los exime de no haber entendido lo principal: la irrupción de la Bolivia profunda, que no sólo quería inclusión social, sino ser el sujeto histórico que cumpliera su rol protagónico. Es decir, lo nacional-popular quería ser el actor de su propio destino.
  • Carlos escribió un libro titulado “Presidencia Sitiada”, libro donde evalúa su presidencia y narra todas las presiones que tuvo que encarar su paso por el gobierno desde diferentes frentes que hicieron de su presidencia sea una presidencia “sitiada”. Pero si alguien conspiró contra la gestión de Carlos Mesa, fue el propio Carlos Mesa. Indeciso y vacilante, nunca le dio un rumbo a su gobierno. Se negó a gobernar con la coalición parlamentaria que había armado Goni. No aprobó la ley de hidrocarburos, ni se atrevió a nacionalizar los mismos, cuando tal exigencia ya era una demanda nacional.
  • Lo evidente es que el gobierno de Carlos Mesa cerró el ciclo neoliberal en Bolivia. Mesa se encargó de sepultarlo y de empedrar el camino del ascenso de Evo Morales.
  • Pero los desaciertos continuaron. Tuto Quiroga, por decisión propia, liquidó ADN. El MNR se despedazó con la caída de Goni. En el la MIR, la cúpula máxima se negó a viabilizar la candidatura presidencial Hormando Vaca, en un momento en que Hormando Vaca era la mayor referencia política de Santa Cruz y que el dirigente cruceño se perfilaba como un factor de recambio y oxigenación del mirismo.
  • la persistencia de los “segundones” en la vitrina de política solo es la tranca que atrasa la conformación de una opción que, desde la visión “neoliberal moderna”, tenga posibilidad de generar una política renovada que dispute el poder. Y no es que un cambio generacional de actores políticos resuelva el tema de un día a otro, pero es el primer paso que inevitablemente se debe seguir. El país demanda la instauración de un nuevo ciclo político con nuevos protagonistas.
  • Jeaninne: cuando las ambiciones matan
  • hay responsables detrás las sombras del encarcelamiento de Añez. Son todos aquellos que aprovechando de su ingenuidad y poca formación política la utilizaron.
  • la presidencia Añez se perdió en su laberinto, cuando si hubiese cumplido con el objetivo para el cual fue elegida, habría tenido una gestión decorosa y salido de palacio por la puerta grande.
  • a la ex mandataria la mató políticamente su propia ambición.
  • Oposición con complejo y sin discurso ideológico-político
  • Pero el más grande error de la actual oposición es no haber asimilado, que el proceso cambio, fue una transformación que cambió la realidad del país y los dejó sin discurso político. Ante esta realidad les vino un complejo:
  • Tienen miedo decir que son neoliberales, que proponen la economía de libre mercado y que están contra el “populismo”.
  • No saben qué hacer ante la emergencia indígena, quechua y aymara.
  • No han diseñado en 14 años de Masismo una propuesta alternativa.
  • Lo demostraron cuando se instauró el gobierno de transición, sin saber qué hacer, solo pavimentaron el retorno del MAS.
  • no tienen estrategia para tomar el poder, ni siquiera para derrotar a lo que denominan autoritarismo.
  • Incapaces de crear una opción política solida que canalice el voto del eje anti masista, a la hora de verdad se fragmentan y optan por la vía del sálvese quien pueda, negociando cada quien por su cuenta.
  • La economía, la madre del cordero
  • Todos vuelcan los ojos sobre la economía y dicen que al estamos entrando en el periodo de las vacas flacas, que el actual gobierno ya no dispone ni dispondrá de recursos financieros para derrochar y que el país entrará en una crisis económica que será su tumba porque se sumará la crisis de salud y otros temas.
  • Prefiero explicarlo en términos más sencillos.
  • El país está en este momento en la necesidad de conseguir dinero “cash” para reactivar su economía y no comerse sus reservas En tanto consigue dinero se deberá, como en cualquier hogar, amarrarse el cinturón y tomar algunas medidas de acuerdo a una escala de prioridades, buscando cubrir el bienestar de cada uno de sus miembros.
  • No se puede realizar una adecuada política económica si no se consideran las variables de orden social.
  • Me preguntarán: ¿cómo lo hicieron antes?
  • La respuesta es muy simple, lo hicieron en un escenario político de reflujo del movimiento popular y por la fuerza, como lo hizo Banzer en el año 1972 que era una dictadura militar que había derrotado el 21 de agosto de 1971 al gobierno de Torres y al movimiento popular. Lo hizo Víctor Paz con el 21060, a partir de una fuerte coalición política con la ADN, movilizando al ejercito, pero sobre la derrota política y social de lo nacional-popular expresado en la UDP.
  • Pero hoy es diferente, hay un empoderamiento de los sectores marginados del país que ni siquiera a Evo Morales le permitieron devaluar la moneda.
  • Lo mismo sucede con la idea de liberarizar la economía, porque simplemente la actual Constitución ha blindado el manejo de los recursos naturales y que las empresas estratégicas sean solo de carácter estatal. Esto conspira contra la atracción libre de capitales a nuestra economía.
  • Esto lleva a que el actual gobierno, por su legalidad y legitimidad política, es el que tiene más posibilidades que cualquier opositor de encarar la crisis. Esto debido a que es la única fuerza política que puede lograr un consenso social y político
  • Lo triste de la oposición es que no solo no tiene propuesta económica, sino que carece de credibilidad en los grandes sectores sociales que opinan que no pueden conducir con éxito una crisis económica.
  • Por ello, jugar a la crisis económica es dar un salto al vacío. Desear que la crisis económica derroque al MAS es una estupidez, porque no sólo arrastrará al MAS, sino a toda la oposición y creará un caos nacional de imprevisibles consecuencias.
  • Por ello, nadie quiere que se agrave la crisis económica.
  • Por ello, es que todos pondrán su esfuerzo para que eso no ocurra.
  • De ahí que la economía es la madre del cordero que como siempre, será el escenario sobre el cual se desarrollarán las distintas estrategias políticas.
  • A manera de conclusión.
  • 1.-Lo primero que observo es que la sociedad en general está demandando la conformación de un nuevo ciclo político, con nuevos actores. Este es un fenómeno común tanto dentro del campo nacional-popular (la izquierda) como al interior de quienes se afilian en el campo neoliberal moderno (derecha).
  • La diferencia está que en el campo nacional-popular este fenómeno se está generando desde las bases, con gran ímpetu democrático. Mientras que en la vereda del campo neoliberal y anti -masista es más el reclamo espontáneo des sus militantes y simpatizantes  Y esto tiene una explicación, el campo nacional tuvo y todavía tiene un partido político de expansión nacional, como es el MAS
  • Mientras que las fuerzas anti-mas nunca lograron estructurar un partido de alcance nacional. Sus expresiones políticas como sus lideratos siempre han sido regionales o expresiones de ciertos segmentos específicos.
  • No pudieron generar un verdadero movimiento nacional que tengan una solida expresión partidaria, esta ausencia es su gran debilidad. Por eso no es locura, ni irracionalidad que algunos miembros de esta tendencia hagan vigilia en la puerta de cuarteles y pidan que los militares tomen el poder. Es simplemente la constatación de que no confían en .Y no los ven con la suficiente fuerzas para derrotar al masismo democráticamente en una elección presidencial, y ante esa evidencia prefieren el retorno al poder de los militares.
  • Pero lo más grave de esta conducción, que son remanentes del viejo sistema político, aprovecharon la rebelión de las pititas y se pusieron en la ola política, instaurando y siendo parte de manera directa o indirecta del gobierno de Jeanine, hicieron tan mal cosas que de un plumazo los barrió el bloque nacional-popular. Por ello, quien más renovación política necesita es el campo “neoliberal-moderno”.
  • 2.-La renovación requiere política, requiere la jubilación de todos los actores del viejo sistema político y esto llega también a Evo Morales.
  • Esta situación creará un conflicto en el campo-nacional-popular porque Evo no cederá espacio, dará pelea y buscará la forma de volver a ser la cabeza del eje nacional-popular. Pero a diferencia de coyunturas pasadas, Evo ya tiene interpelación y rivales que le quieren disputar la conducción y el liderato del proceso de cambio.
  • 3.-Considero que, en las actuales condiciones el nuevo liderato de lo “neoliberal –moderno” debe tener las siguientes características:
  • A.-) Tiene que ser un liderato transversal que tenga aceptación en clases sociales y regiones
  • B.-) Tiene que saber a lo que se enfrenta, por ejemplo, cuando se habla de autoritarismo tiene que saber de dónde proviene y cuáles las causas de ese autoritarismo.
  • Desde mi punto de vista hay dos tipos de autoritarismo, el que emerge de la acción militar o golpista, a los que es fácil enfrentarlos porque tienen la ola social en contra. Y hay autoritarismos que emergen con base social y apoyo popular porque encarnan las aspiraciones de las mayorías nacionales y, generalmente, las identifican con un caudillo.
  • Lo que quiero significar es que para vencer el “autoritarismo “del MAS hay que vencer las causas que lo generaron.  En otras palabras, hay que derrotar el racismo, la exclusión social, el regionalismo, etc. En resumen, todo lo que la democracia de pactos no encaró y dio origen al masismo.
  • C.-) Tiene que tener una propuesta clara que pueda demostrar a los sectores populares afines a lo nacional-popular, que el camino del libre mercado, de la inversión privada, la concertación, la democracia de pactos etc., les dará mejores días que el camino del Estatismo.
  • 4.- En el campo nacional –popular se está produciendo la emergencia de una línea Aymara, que quiere ponerse a la cabeza del proceso de cambio, porque cree que ha llegado su momento. Y que seguramente dará una fuerte pelea interna. Dirigentes como Eva Copa, David Choquehuanca, el propio Patzi y Santos Quispe son expresión de ello.
  • Muchos pueden pensar que ahí empieza un periodo de división, pero en mi criterio eso es hilar muy fino y no entender que los aymaras y quechuas se han dado cuenta que en su unidad está su fuerza y que incluso con variantes ideológicas dentro de ellos pueden gobernar el país por muchos años
  • Ya es muy difícil pensar, por no decir imposible, que los Aymaras y Quechuas voten para presidente por un “blanquito” clasemediero con aires de aristócrata
  • Pero hay algo más, los aymaras y quechuas no sólo quieren conducir el proceso de cambio y el poder, quieren tener el control territorial del país.
  • Y han iniciado su larga marcha, para decirlo en palabras de Mao, sobre las tierras bajas Ya tienen una gran presencia en Pando y Beni y una creciente presencia en Santa Cruz.
  • Se estima que el 2035 el 45% de la población boliviana vivirá en Santa Cruz y de ese 45% la mitad será colla o de ascendencia colla. Y es un proceso que parece irreversible, fruto del desarrollo antropológico y sociológico del país.
  • Por otro lado, desde la visión Aymara y Quechua solo cuando ellos tengan el control total de nuestro territorio se podrá construir una identidad nacional
  • 5.- Sin embargo, todo el desarrollo del tema va e irá de modo paralelo al tema económico. La economía marcará el ritmo de la política. Regulará las marchas y contramarchas de las intenciones políticas de uno lado y del otro.
  • Por otro lado, los recién electos gobernadores y alcaldes están desesperadamente buscando tener relación con el gobierno para viabilizar su gestión y contar para ello con recursos económicos.
  • Ente sentido, resulta infantil y de poca creatividad decir que el presidente Arce es un vulgar títere de Evo, quienes han estado en los altos niveles del aparato del Estado, saben que el presidente tiene el poder del bolígrafo.
  • Que Evo tiene influencia en el actual gobierno es natural, es el líder y el caudillo del partido de gobierno. Pero de ahí a afirmar que tiene el mismo poder que cuando era presidente es absurdo.
  • Arias, Fernández, Copa, Manfred, Camacho y todas las demás autoridades electas en la subnacionales están obligadas a sentarse a negociar con el gobierno para tener recursos financieros en su gestión. Una gestión sin plata acaba en corto tiempo siendo cuestionada. Por eso, a nadie con poder local o regional le conviene que la crisis económica se agrave.
  • Mucho más a lideratos como el de Eva Copa o Fernando Camacho que son lideratos emergentes que desean tener proyección nacional.
  • Del triunfalismo al pánico
  • Los resultados de la última contienda electoral sub-nacional dibujarán un cuadro político interesante que todavía motiva una serie de lecturas e interpretaciones
  • Si bien es cierto que, con respecto a las últimas elecciones nacionales y subnacionales, en las que el MAS participó, su votación bajó considerablemente, no es menos cierto que el MAS es la primera y única fuerza política organizada con presencia nacional a lo largo y ancho del país.
  • Su victoria en más de 240 municipios y el hecho de que casi en todos los lugares donde hubo elecciones subnacionales si no ganó obtuvo el segundo lugar. Sumado al hecho que, aún cuando, no se comparta con sus ideas, es un partido que tiene un proyecto político, una realidad que trae como consecuencia un equilibrio en la balanza electoral.
  • Después de la euforia comenzó a imperar la sensatez Emergieron voces contrarias al núcleo duro antimasista. Eva Copa fue la primera en señalar que agradecía a Evo por darle la oportunidad de hacer política destacaba su adhesión a la narrativa nacional –popular y al denominado “proceso de cambio” y reiteraba que jamás pactaría con la derecha.
  • El propio Camacho planteó estar dispuesto a trabajar con todos en función del desarrollo de Santa Cruz y del país.
  • Todo estaba muy claro: la oposición reconocía el poder y la autoridad del gobierno central, a cambio que éste también reconociera y respetará los espacios de poder regional que los adversarios del MAS habían logrado a través del voto popular conseguido en las urnas.
  • Se podía prever, en ese contexto, que estaban sentadas las bases para generar un acuerdo político de concertación y convivencia. Acuerdo político del que estarían excluidos figuras como Doria Medina, Tuto Quiroga, Rubén Costas, Luis Revilla, Jeanine Añez y el propio Carlos Mesa no solo por su baja incidencia en la sociedad boliviana, sino porque padecen de Covid político y se encuentran en terapia intensiva entre la muerte o la sobrevivencia política.
  • in embargo, sorprendentemente, el MAS patea el tablero.  
  • De manera inesperada introduce en el escenario político el tema del “golpe de Estado” y ordena el apresamiento de ex ministros de Estado y de la ex presidenta Jeanine Añez, desatando así una artillería de procesos y acusaciones judiciales contra la oposición por conspiración y sedición, debido a su supuesta participación en el “golpe” que habría derrocado a Evo Morales. En ese momento, sectores de oposición pasan del triunfalismo al pánico.
  • Pero ¿por qué el MAS reaccionó así? Cabe preguntarse ¿Lo hizo por debilidad? ¿Cometió un error político? ¿Quiso mostrar su musculatura social y política? O ¿es una jugada política planificada?
  • Estas interrogantes trataremos de responder.
  • Desde nuestra óptica, el accionar del MAS tiene dos vertientes: la primera de concepción político-ideológica y la segunda de estrategia política que tiene que ver más que ver con lo que se denomina la real política
  • Cuando el poder se entiende como la hegemonía y la confrontación
Javier E

Is the Marriage Between Democracy and Capitalism on the Rocks? - The New York Times - 0 views

  • Wolf, the chief economics commentator for The Financial Times, worries that after an efflorescence of democratic capitalism, “that delicate flower” is beginning to wither. Most of his ire is directed at an unhinged financial system that has encouraged a “rentier capitalism” and a “rigged” economy.”
  • “Capitalism cannot survive in the long run without a democratic polity, and democracy cannot survive in the long run without a market economy,” he writes. Capitalism supplies democracy with resources, while democracy supplies capitalism with legitimacy
  • Not so, insists Martin Wolf in his new book, “The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism.
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  • What Friedman believed in was capitalism, or what he called “economic freedom.” Political freedom might come — but capitalism, he said, could do just fine without it.
  • the corporate funders of “Free to Choose” set out to make their case.
  • it was still a time when capitalism’s most enthusiastic supporters evidently felt the need to win the public over to a vision of free markets and minimal government
  • The documentary series “Free to Choose,” which aired on public television in 1980
  • He and other observers are trying to make sense of what might happen next — and, befitting our current bewilderment, they offer a range of perspectives. Some, like Wolf, hope the relationship can be repaired; others argue that the pairing has always been fraught, if not impossible.
  • he has also read his Marx and Engels, looking askance at their solutions while commending them for how “brilliantly” they described capitalism’s relentlessness and omnivorousness. Left to its own devices, capitalism expands wherever it can, plowing its way through national boundaries and local traditions — making it marvelously dynamic or utterly ruinous, and not infrequently both.
  • In Wolf’s case, his anguished tone reflects the scale of his own disillusionment. Born in 1946 in postwar England, he recalls in his preface how “the world seemed solid as I grew up.” He describes the feelings of “confidence” in democracy and capitalism that flourished with the collapse of the Soviet Union
  • Yet the “democratic capitalism” that Wolf wants to preserve was, even by his own lights, short-lived. Democracy itself — or “liberal democracy” with universal suffrage, which Wolf says is the kind of democracy he means — is a “political mayfly.” Democratic capitalism ended, in his account, with the financial crisis of 2008
  • Robert Reich has offered another measure, arguing that democratic capitalism, at least in the United States, began with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal and ended with Reagan, when “corporate capitalism” took over.
  • The left-wing German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck stakes out a decidedly different position, suggesting that the tendency to equate “democratic capitalism” with a few decades of postwar plenty is to misinterpret a “historical compromise between a then uniquely powerful working class and an equally uniquely weakened capitalist class
  • In “How Will Capitalism End?” (2016), Streeck argues that it’s not compromise but the cascade of crises following the postwar boom — inflation, unemployment, market crashes — “that represents the normal condition of democratic capitalism.” Where Wolf wistfully invokes a “delicate flower,” Streeck writes contemptuously of a “shotgun marriage.”
  • the historian Gary Gerstle explores in his fascinating and incisive “The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order” (2022). Before the New Deal order started to falter in the late 1960s and ’70s, Gerstle writes, a majority of Americans believed that capitalism should be managed by a strong state; in the neoliberal order that followed, a majority of Americans believed that the state should be constrained by free markets. Each order began to break down when its traditional ways of solving problems didn’t seem to work
  • capitalism, according to Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, has obtained the status of civic religion. In “The Big Myth: How American Business Taught Us to Loathe Government and Love the Free Market,” the authors argue that industry groups and wealthy donors have engaged in a concerted campaign to promote “market fundamentalism” — “a vision of growth and innovation by unfettered markets where government just gets out of the way.”
  • The main implication of “The Big Myth” seems to be that “market fundamentalism” is so horrifically egregious — enriching the few and despoiling the planet — that Americans had to be plied with propaganda to believe in it.
  • as Gerstle’s book shows, neoliberal ideas proved so seductive because they also happened to dovetail with the stories that Americans wanted to tell about themselves, emphasizing individuality and freedom.
  • A new generation of swashbuckling billionaires entertain the prospect of secession, using their money to realize fantasies of escape, whether through seasteading or spaceships. The book quotes one seasteading enthusiast declaring, “Democracy is not the answer,” but merely “the current industry standard.”
  • Slobodian’s excellent if discomfiting new book, “Crack-Up Capitalism” (forthcoming in April), explores other neoliberal evasions of the nation-state: tax havens, special economic zones, gated communities — enclaves that are “freed from ordinary forms of regulation.
  • in “Globalists” (2018) the historian Quinn Slobodian argues that neoliberals have found ways not just to liberate markets but to “encase” them in international institutions, thereby shielding capitalist activities from democratic accountability. He observes that neoliberals were especially alarmed after World War II by decolonization, adopting a condescending “racialized language” that pitted “the rational West,” with its trade rules and property laws, against a postcolonial South, “with its ‘emotional’ commitment to sovereignty.”
Javier E

Opinion | Bidenomics: The Queen Bee Is Jennifer Harris - The New York Times - 0 views

  • I was thrilled when the Biden administration came in with a plan for big federal investments in the American industrial base, tariffs, support for labor unions and actions against monopolies. No one knew what to call it — Post-neoliberalism? Democratic capitalism? Neopopulism? — but for the first time in generations a U.S. administration was saying that people should control the market, not the other way around.
  • But if it was the right path, why didn’t more voters trust President Biden on the economy?
  • To understand who Ms. Harris is, you have to know who she used to be.
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  • As a young State Department policy planner in the 2000s, she was a lonely voice in Washington raising the alarm about the rise of China. She pushed for tariffs and against trade agreements before it was cool, and was an author of a book called “War by Other Means” about how blind faith in free markets put the United States at a geopolitical disadvantage. For years, she felt like an oddball in Washington, where both parties were still in thrall to neoliberalism.
  • The Hewlett Foundation hired her as the head of an initiative that has given away $140 million so far to people who are devising a new economic philosophy. Then she served a stint in the White House. Today, she’s an intellectual leader of a growing, bipartisan consensus
  • She fell in love with economics and studied it at Wake Forest. After she joined a student delegation to a NATO summit in Prague in 2002, a faculty adviser on that trip offered her a job in Washington working at the National Intelligence Council. In those early years, she believed what everyone else in Washington believed about the economy — that governments ought not meddle with it.
  • if Mr. Trump correctly identified a problem — “China is eating our lunch” — he did not solve it, beyond putting tariffs on Chinese products. His tax cut for the rich hurt rather than helped matters.
  • It’s the Biden administration that came in with a plan to build an economy that was good for workers, not just shareholders, using some strategies Ms. Harris had been talking about for years.
  • The thinking behind it goes like this: Unquestioning belief in the free market created a globalism that funneled money to the 1 percent, which has used its wealth to amass political power at the expense of everyone else. It produced free trade agreements that sent too many U.S. factories to China and rescue plans after the 2008 financial crisis that bailed out Wall Street instead of Main Street.
  • It was her job to track China’s use of subsidies, industrial espionage and currency manipulation to fuel its rise as a manufacturing powerhouse. Ms. Harris argued that tariffs on China were a necessary defense. Nobody agreed. “I was kind of just banging my head against this wall,” she told me. “The wall was a foreign policy establishment that saw markets as sacrosanct.”
  • Barack Obama campaigned on a pledge to renegotiate NAFTA, but he struck up a new trade deal instead — the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Ms. Harris argued against it. “We didn’t have the foggiest idea” of what it would do to our economy, she told me. Nobody listened.
  • it sent Democrats back to the intellectual drawing board. Larry Kramer, then the president of the Hewlett Foundation, recruited her in 2018 to promote alternatives to ideas that had guided U.S. policy for decades. He hoped she could do for free-market skepticism what Milton Friedman and his allies had done for free-market fundamentalism, which became policy under the Reagan administration and eventually was embraced by both parties as truth.
  • She has since rejoined the Hewlett Foundation, where she funds people who are proposing new solutions to economic problems. One grantee, the conservative think tank American Compass, promotes the idea of a domestic development bank to fund infrastructure — an idea with bipartisan appeal.
  • But the work that Ms. Harris and others in the Biden administration have done is unfinished, and poorly understood. The terms “Bidenomics” and “Build Back Better” don’t seem to resonate
  • Ms. Harris acknowledges that these ideas haven’t yet taken hold in the broader electorate, and that high interest rates overshadow the progress that’s been made. It’s too early for voters to feel it, she told me: “The investments Biden has pushed through aren’t going to be felt in a month, a year, two years.”
  • she celebrates the fact that leaders across the political spectrum are embracing the idea that Americans need to “get back to building things in this country.” This election has no candidates blindly promoting the free market. The last one didn’t either. In the battle of ideas, she has already won.
Javier E

The Crash That Failed | by Robert Kuttner | The New York Review of Books - 0 views

  • the financial collapse of 2008. The crash demonstrated the emptiness of the claim that markets could regulate themselves. It should have led to the disgrace of neoliberalism—the belief that unregulated markets produce and distribute goods and services more efficiently than regulated ones. Instead, the old order reasserted itself, and with calamitous consequences. Gross economic imbalances of power and wealth persisted.
  • In the United States, the bipartisan financial elite escaped largely unscathed. Barack Obama, whose campaign benefited from the timing of the collapse, hired the architects of the Clinton-era deregulation who had created the conditions that led to the crisis. Far from breaking up the big banks or removing their executives, Obama’s team bailed them out.
  • criminal prosecution took a back seat to the stability of the system.
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  • the economic security of most Americans dwindled, and the legitimacy of the system was called into question. One consequence has been the rise of the far right; another is Donald Trump.
  • Germany insisted that the struggling countries had to practice austerity in order to restore the confidence of private financial markets. In a deep recession, even orthodox economists at the International Monetary Fund soon recognized that austerity was a perverse recipe for economic recovery.
  • Europe, because of Germany’s worries that these policies would lead to inflation, had no way to extend credit to struggling nations or to raise money through the sale of bonds, which would have allowed the ECB to provide debt relief or to invest in public services.
  • The political result was the same on both sides of the Atlantic—declining prospects for ordinary people, animus toward elites, and the rise of ultra-nationalism
  • Not so in Europe. Parties such as the German Social Democratic Party, the British Labour Party, and the French Socialists disgraced themselves as co-sponsors of the neoliberal formula that brought down the economy.
  • In nation after nation, the main opposition to the party of Davos is neofascism.
  • In his masterful narrative, the economic historian Adam Tooze achieves several things that no other single author has quite accomplished. Tooze has managed to explain a hugely complex global crisis in its multiple dimensions, and his book combines cogent analysis with a fascinating history of the political and economic particulars
  • when the collapse came, it was “a financial crisis triggered by the humdrum market for American real estate.”
  • the collapse reinforced the financial supremacy of Washington and New York. “Far from withering away,” he writes, “the Fed’s response gave an entirely new dimension to the global dollar.”
  • When the entire structure of borrowed money collapsed, the losses more than wiped out all the capital of the banking system—not just in the US but in Europe, because of the intimate interconnection (and contagion) of American and European banks. Had the authorities just stood by, Tooze writes, the collapse would have been far more severe than the Great Depression:
  • While insisting to Congress that the emergency response was mainly to shore up US finance, Bernanke turned the Fed into the world’s central bank. “Through so-called liquidity swap lines, the Fed licensed a hand-picked group of core central banks to issue dollar credits on demand,” Tooze writes. In other words, the Fed simply created enough dollars, running well into the trillions, to prevent the global economy from collapsing for lack of credit.
  • Bernanke instigated government action on an unimagined scale to prop up a private system that supposedly did not need the state
  • Using deposit guarantees, loans to banks, outright capital transfers, and purchases of nearly worthless securities, the Fed and the Treasury recapitalized the banking system. To camouflage what was at work, officials invented unlimited credit pipelines with disarmingly technical names.
  • The blandly named policy of quantitative easing, which drove interest rates down to almost zero, was a euphemism for Fed purchases of immense quantities of private and government securities.
  • The crisis, Tooze writes, “was a devastating blow to the complacent belief in the great moderation, a shocking overturning of the prevailing laissez-faire ideology.” And yet the ideology prevailed
  • In a reversal of New Deal priorities, most of the relief went to the biggest banks, while smaller banks and homeowners were allowed to go under
  • Banks were permitted to invent complex provisional loan “modifications” with opaque terms that favored lenders, rather than using their government subsidies to provide refinancing to reduce homeowner debts
  • How did a nominally center-left administration, elected during a financial crisis caused by right-wing economic ideology and policy, end up in this situation?
  • Turning to Europe, Tooze explores the fatal combination of Germany’s demands for austerity with the structural weakness of the ECB and the vulnerability of the euro.
  • Portugal or Greece now enjoyed interest rates that were only slightly higher than Germany’s, and markets failed to take account of the risk of default, which was more serious than that of devaluation.
  • instead of treating the Greek situation as a crisis to be contained and helping a genuinely reformist new government find its footing, Brussels and Berlin treated Greece as an object lesson in profligacy and an opportunity to insist on punitive terms for financial aid
  • A central player in this tragedy was the European Central Bank. Tooze does a fine job of explaining the delicate dance between the bank’s leaders and its real masters in Germany. Since Germany opposed continent-wide recovery spending, the bank could only pursue monetary policy. The model was the Fed. Yet while the Fed has a congressional “dual mandate” to target both price stability and high employment, the ECB’s charter allowed for price stability only
  • The ECB, with the consent of the Germans, came up with one of those bland-sounding names, Outright Monetary Transactions, for its direct purchases of government bonds. But the program, at the insistence of the Germans, was restricted to nations in compliance with Merkel’s rigid fiscal terms, which limited national deficits and debts. In other words, the money could not go to the very nations where it was needed most, since the hardest-hit countries had to borrow heavily to get themselves out of the recession
  • Reading Tooze, you realize that it’s a miracle that the EU and the euro survived at all—but they did so at terrible human cost.
  • the ideal of liberalized trade, and the use of trade treaties to promote deregulation or privatized regulation of finance, is a major element of the story of how neoliberal hegemony promoted the eventual collapse. But except for a passing reference, trade and globalized deregulation get little mention here.
  • he has almost nothing to say about Janet Yellen. Her nomination as Fed chair in 2013 to succeed Bernanke was an epochal event and an improbable defeat for the proponents of austerity, deregulation, and bank bailouts who influenced Obama’s policymaking. Yellen, a left-liberal economist specializing in labor markets, was the only left-of-center Fed chair other then FDR’s chairman Marriner Eccles. She also believed in tough regulation of banks. The extension of quantitative easing well beyond its intended end was substantially due to Yellen’s concern about wages and employment, and not just price stability, since low interest rates can also help promote recovery.
  • Tooze ends the book with a short chapter called “The Shape of Things to Come,” mainly on the ascent of China, the one nation that avoided all the shibboleths of economic and political liberalism, though it also, of course, does not have a political democracy.
Javier E

The Pied Pipers of the Dirtbag Left Want to Lead Everyone to Bernie Sanders - The New Y... - 0 views

  • “Chapo Trap House,” which started in 2016, typically runs between 60 and 90 minutes. Two episodes are released every week, one for free and one for the nearly 38,000 people who pay $5 a month through the crowdfunding site Patreon. It leads to a financial windfall for the self-professed socialists who are harnessing this rage: $168,800 a month from those subscribers alone.
  • the Sanders campaign maintains a close relationship with the podcast. His senior adviser, David Sirota, and his national press secretary, Briahna Joy Gray, have also been on the podcast. At the Iowa show, a Sanders volunteer stood at the door with fliers and pins to hand out and an email list to gather names.
  • Their followers — on the night in Iowa City more than 700 strong — come to hear them rage for three hours against the student debt, the high rent, the dead-end creative class jobs, and the feeling of hopelessness fighting against a liberal political establishment that seems polite when they are angry.
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  • “It’s really easy to feel alone in America. It’s the loneliest place in the loneliest time,” the co-host Felix Biederman said, speaking of the early days of their work. “But eventually people started to gather around all these posts into the void.”
  • The topic is inequality, raging against the rich.
  • Julius Krein, the conservative founder of the new publication American Affairs, has noticed the new allies.“There is a lot of interesting convergence on some of the anti-woke thinking and many things that, perhaps surprisingly, we agree on, for different reasons,”
  • “It’s fairly easy to have fun, pretty exciting dialogue between right-wing anti-neoliberals and left-wing anti-neoliberals.”
  • “‘Chapo Trap House,’ the entire Dirtbag Left, have tapped that male privilege of intimidating people into assuming you’re cool,” said Amanda Marcotte, a liberal feminist writer for Salon
  • ,
  • These Sanders supporters eschew the idea of party unity as a scam: “I won’t vote for anyone but Bernie in the general, can’t say what the hundreds of thousands of people who listen to my show will do, but I’m only speaking for myself,” Mr. Menaker wrote on Twitter a day after the Iowa caucuses.
  • An additional challenge is that as the free-floating anger they stoke finds community, it is escalating and souring into sometimes violent and ugly rhetoric
  • For the hosts and their fans, those sort of tweets and the podcast language are all jokes. The audience understands the difference, they argue, and anyway the real problem with the Democrats is that they’re overly sensitive. A bunch of self-serious P.M.C.s (members of the professional-managerial class).
  • Over the summer, the “Chapo Trap House” message board, which has nearly 153,000 members who chat about the news and memes of the day, was censured by Reddit, which hosts it
  • They want what Mr. Sanders wants: universal health care, canceled student loans, free college, and an overhaul of the tax system. They want to cut the national prison population by half and to install a ban on fracking. And for them anything less than this is nothing at all
  • “We do everything our parents say, and it doesn’t work,” said Brayson Cope, 18, a college student from Altoona and a Sanders volunteer.His reason for listening to “Chapo" is simple, he said.“They’re angry. I like it because they’re angry.”
  • “The reason for the quarantine is that we have observed repeated rule-breaking behavior in your community, especially in the form of encouragement of violence,”
  • according to fans of the podcast and movement, there are a lot of neoliberal shills out there.
  • For many left-wing groups, the Chapo podcast and its Reddit community are now setting the weekly conversation agenda.
  • “It’s a touchstone,” said Brendan McGillicuddy, 39, who teaches in the cultural studies department at the University of Minnesota. “At my workplace, everyone listens to it, even if you don’t like it.”
  • When Hillary Clinton’s name came up, the reaction was nearly indistinguishable from a Trump rally.“Lock her up,” the co-host Matt Christman said to the crowd.The crowd began to chant: Lock her up. Lock her up.
  • During the three-hour show, there is little vision laid out for what they want, beyond a Sanders presidency. There is a vision for what they want destroyed and how good it will feel to do that. The idea of actually taking power is terrifying, and they say so.“What’s scary is the idea that this could end,” Mr. Biederman said. “What’s scary is we’re not just tossing catharsis into the void, that this is something real. We are there.”
  • “It’s a common experience to be someone with a crappy job who does not have an outlet for your set of beliefs and you feel insane because you’re surrounded by liberals or Evangelicals or whatever stultifying milieu,” he said. “And one day you find a piece of media with some folks who are articulating what you always believed: You’re not crazy, you’re right, this is exactly how the world works, and you’re getting screwed.”
  • He said he knew that the anger the podcast was building could be dangerous, but he said the anger — and the fear of violence it brings — was good.
  • “Educating a generation and saddling them with debt and then not giving them jobs where they have the wage that they presume they should receive based on the amount of time they spent on education,” Virgil said. “That’s a pretty good way to turn them into radicals.”He is a good example of his own target audience: He graduated with $100,000 of debt from Cornell and after college took freelance gigs from Craigslist, hoping to write.
  • While the Chapo hosts rail against the media establishment, they are also deeply entwined with it and largely beloved by it. (Mr. Menaker, for example, grew up on the Upper West Side, the son of a New York Times editor and a New Yorker editor.)
  • He does not want to live in a capitalist society at all.“I think it’s a moral stain to live in this society,” he said. “And every day I think, God I’d rather just leave.”But he’s not sure where he would move
  • Outside the Iowa City show, Adam Angstead, 46, had stepped out of the theater for a cigarette. He works for the Iowa City school district as a substitute teacher five days a week, but he said his employment offers no benefits. On the weekends he works at a diner. Twice a week he sells his blood plasma for extra cash.It’s still not enough. He was trying to pay down his $40,000 in student loans for a while, but it hardly made a dent, and recently he has gotten a deferment. For him, the primary feels like a life-or-death battle.“Being in a room with a bunch of people who think the same thing or close made me think we might not all literally die,” he said. “Bernie’s the only one.”
Javier E

The Chomsky Position On Voting ❧ Current Affairs - 0 views

  • getting Joe Biden elected is important for the left, for reasons that have nothing whatsoever to do with Biden’s own politics. If Donald Trump is reelected, the chance of serious climate action dwindles to nothing, while there is at least a chance of compelling Biden to actually act on his climate platform. It will not be easy. At every turn the Democratic Party will try to compromise and take measures that are symbolic rather than substantive. But there is a conceivable strategy. 
  • Understandably, many leftists are not terribly pleased by the prospect of having to vote for Joe Biden, a man who has shown contempt for them and their values, and has a documented history of predatory behavior towards women. But when voting is considered in terms of its consequences rather than as an expressive act, our personal opinions of Joe Biden become essentially irrelevant. If, under the circumstances we find ourselves in, a Biden presidency is a precondition for any form of left political success, and there are no other options, then we must try to bring it about
  • Isn’t supporting “the lesser of two evils” still supporting evil? Why should I help someone get into office who has shown no willingness to support my policies, who feels entitled to my vote, who is not going to do anything to woo me?
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  • In that election, awful as the choices were, it was necessary to support Edwards. Bumper stickers read “Vote For The Crook: It’s Important.”
  • Reed used this example to show why voting for Clinton was so necessary in a race against Donald Trump, regardless of Clinton’s long record of terrible policies. “Vote for the lying neoliberal warmonger,” Reed said. “It’s important.”
  • He, and many other famous leftists like Angela Davis, Noam Chomsky, and Cornel West, are saying the same thing this time around. “An anti-fascist vote for Biden is in no way an affirmation of Neoliberal politics,” West commented.
  • Some people on the left find this argument very difficult to stomach, though. In a recent conversation on the Bad Faith podcast, Briahna Joy Gray and Virgil Texas debated Chomsky about his stance.
  • In response to the “vote Biden to stop Trump” argument, they and others ask questions like the following:  But if we are willing to vote for the Democrat no matter how awful they are, what incentive will the Democratic party have to ever get better? How are we ever going to get better candidates if we don’t have some standards? Is there really no one we wouldn’t support, if they were the “lesser evil”?
  • while they are important, they can also seem strange if we examine how they would sound in other contexts. After all, think back to David Duke in 1991. Or the German election of 1932. Would it have seemed reasonable, faced with a Klan governorship, to ask: “But if I vote for Edwards, won’t I be incentivizing corruption? Isn’t the lesser evil still evil? Shouldn’t I demand Edwards stop being corrupt before I give him my vote?”
  • It’s also a mistake to think that the decision about whether or not to vote for Democrats in a general election can operate as an effective form of political pressure on Democrats. The mainstream Democratic Party does not see losing elections as a sign that it needs to do more to excite its left flank. John Kerry did not look at the 2000 election and think “My God, I need to work hard to appeal to Nader voters.”
  • The answers to these questions are: (1) maybe, but it doesn’t matter in the situation we’re currently in (2) yes (3) no, because if he declines to stop being corrupt, you’re still going to have to give him your vote, because the alternative is putting a Klansman in office, and “do unlikely thing X or I will help white supremacists win, or at least not work to stop them” is an insane threat to make.
  • The easy way to avoid being troubled by having to vote for people you loathe is to give less importance to the act of voting itself. Don’t treat voting as an expression of your deepest and truest values
  • Don’t let the decision about who to vote for be an agonizing moral question. Just look at the question of which outcome out of the ones available would be marginally more favorable, and vote to bring about that outcome
  • if faced with two bad candidates, forget for the moment about the virtues of the candidates themselves and look only at the consequences for the issues you care about.
  • Voting can have immensely important consequences—the narrow 2000 election put a warmongering lunatic in power and resulted in a colossal amount of unnecessary human suffering.
  • The mainstream (I would call it “propagandistic”) view of political participation is that you participate in politics through voting. But instead, we’re better off thinking of voting as a harm-reduction chore we have to do every few years.
  • (Reed compares it to cleaning the toilet—not pleasant but if you don’t hold your nose and get on with it the long-term consequences will be unbearable.) Most of our political energy should be focused elsewhere. 
  • Reed used an illuminating comparison to explain why it was so important in 2016 to vote for Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump. In the 1991 Louisiana gubernatorial primary, the Republican candidate was former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke. The Democratic candidate was the infamously corrupt Edwin Edwards, who would ultimately end his career in prison on charges of racketeering, extortion, money laundering, mail fraud, and wire fraud. It’s hard to imagine anyone you could possibly trust less in public office than Edwin Edwards… except David Duke.
  • it overemphasizes the role of “deciding who to vote for in the general election” as a tool of politics. One way to get better Democrats in general elections is to run better candidates and win primaries. Another would be to build an actually powerful left with the ability to coordinate mass direct action and shape the political landscape
  • the general election vote itself is not how we effectively exercise pressure, in part because it would be unconscionable to actually go through with anything that made Donald Trump’s win more probable. The threat not to vote for Biden is either an empty one (a bluff) or an indefensible one (because it’s threatening to set the world on fire).
  • The conversation between Chomsky, Gray, and Texas frustrated everyone involved, as these conversations often do. Essentially, for most of the hour, Gray and Texas asked variations of the same question, and Chomsky offered variations of the same answer. They appeared to think he was ignoring the question and he appeared to think they were ignoring the answer.
  • The question that is on the ballot on November third,” as Chomsky said, is the reelection of Donald Trump. It is a simple up or down: do we want Trump to remain or do we want to get rid of him? If we do not vote for Biden, we are increasing Trump’s chances of winning. Saying that we will “withhold our vote” if Biden does not become more progressive, Chomsky says, amounts to saying “if you don’t put Medicare For All on your platform, I’m going to vote for Trump… If I don’t get what I want, I’m going to help the worst possible candidate into office—I think that’s crazy.” 
  • In fact, because Trump’s reelection would mean “total cataclysm” for the climate, “all these other issues don’t arise” unless we defeat him. Chomsky emphasizes preventing the most catastrophic consequences of climate change as the central issue, and says that the difference between Trump and Biden on climate—one denies it outright and wants to destroy all progress made so far in slowing emissions, the other has an inadequate climate plan that aims for net-zero emissions by 2050—is significant enough to make electing Biden extremely important.
  • This does not mean voting for Biden is a vote to solve the climate crisis; it means without Biden in office, there is no chance of solving the crisis.
  • TEXAS: If these capitalist institutions result in recurring ecological crisis, and existential ones, as they do, then isn’t the real fight against those institutions instead of a reform that maybe gets us over the hump in 30 years
  • CHOMSKY: Think for a second. Think about time scales. We have maybe a decade or two to deal with the environmental crisis. Is there the remotest chance that within a decade or two we’ll overthrow capitalism? It’s not even a dream, okay? So the point that you’re raising is basically irrelevant. Of course let’s work to try to overthrow capitalism. It’s not going to happen *snaps fingers* like that. There’s a lot of work involved. Meanwhile we have an imminent question: are we going to preserve the possibility for organized human society to survive?
  • The important point here is that the question is not whether we attack capitalist institutions “instead of” reforms. The reforms are necessary in the short term; you fight like hell to force the ruling elite to stop destroying the earth as best you can even as you pursue larger long-term structural goals.
  • Gray and Texas note to Chomsky that for people who are struggling in their daily lives, climate may seem a somewhat abstract issue, and it may be hard to motivate them to get to the polls when the issue is something so detached from their daily reality. Chomsky replied that “as an activist, it is your job to make them care.”
  • Some have pointed out a tension in Chomsky’s position: on the one hand, he consistently describes voting as a relatively trivial act that we should not think too much about or spend much time on. On the other hand, he says the stakes of elections are incredibly high and that the future of “organized human life” and the fate of one’s grandchildren could depend on the outcome of the 2020 election.
  • There’s no explicit contradiction between those two positions: voting can be extremely consequential, and it can be necessary to do it, but it can still be done (relatively) briefly and without much agonizing and deliberation.
  • However, if the presidential election is so consequential, can we be justified in spending only the time on it that it takes to vote? Surely if we believe Trump imperils the future of Earth, we should not just be voting for Biden, but be phone-banking and knocking doors for him. Well, I actually think it might well be true that we should be doing that, reluctant as I am to admit it.
  • I actually asked Chomsky about this, and he said that he does believe it’s important to persuade as many people as possible, which is why at the age of 91 he is spending his time and energy trying to convince people to “vote against Trump” instead of sitting by a pool and hanging out with his grandkids
  • one thing is evident: if we want to look toward electoral strategies for change, it had better be mass-based oppositional models like the Bernie campaign, not third-party protest candidacies or the threat of nonvoting
  • The question of how to win power does not have easy answers. What to do from now until November 3rd is, however, easy; what to do afterwards is much, much more complicated no matter who wins. But political activism is not an untested endeavor. We can study how social movements set goals and win them.
  • Noam Chomsky’s view of electoral politics is, I believe, a sensible one. In fact, it’s not his; as he says, it’s the “traditional left view,” just one that we’ve lost clarity on
  • People mistakenly assume that by saying “vote against Trump,” Chomsky is putting too much stock in the power of voting and is insufficiently cynical about the Democratic Party. In fact, it’s completely the opposite: he puts very little stock in voting and is perhaps even more cynical about the Democrats than his critics, which is why he doesn’t think it’s surprising or interesting that Biden is offering the left almost nothing and the party is treating voters with contempt.
Javier E

Should we even go there? Historians on comparing fascism to Trumpism | US news | The Gu... - 0 views

  • “What are the necessary social and psychological conditions that allow populists of Hitler’s ilk to gain a mass following and attain power?”
  • “There are certain traits you can recognize that Hitler and Trump have in common,” Ullrich says. “I would say the egomania, the total egocentricity of both men, and the inclination to mix lies and truth – that was very characteristic of Hitler.”
  • Like Trump, “Hitler exploited peoples’ feelings of resentment towards the ruling elite.” He also said he would make Germany great again. Ullrich also notes both men’s talent at playing the media, making use of new technology and their propensity for stage effects.
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  • “I think the differences are still greater than the similarities,” he says. “Hitler was not only more intelligent, but craftier. He was not just a powerful orator, but a talented actor who succeeded in winning over various social milieus. So not just the economically threatened lower middle classes which Trump targeted, but also the upper middle classes. Hitler had many supporters in the German aristocracy.”
  • Trump was also democratically elected, while Hitler never had a majority vote. “He was appointed by the president of the German Reich.” Then there’s the fact that Trump does not lead a party “which is unconditionally committed to him”.
  • “A further obvious difference is that Trump doesn’t have a private militia, as Hitler did with the SA, which he used in his first months after coming to power to settle scores with his opponents, like the Communists and Social Democrats. You can’t possibly imagine something similar with Trump – that he’ll be locking Democrats up into concentration camps
  • “Finally, the American constitution is based on a system of checks and balances. It remains to be seen how far Congress will really limit Trump or if, as is feared, he can override it. It was different with Hitler, who, as we know, managed to eliminate all resistance in the shortest space of time and effectively establish himself as an all-powerful dictator. Within a few months, there was effectively no longer any opposition.”
  • “Hitler profited from the fact that his opponents always underestimated him,” Ullrich explains. “His conservative allies in government assumed they could tame or ‘civilise’ him – that once he became chancellor he’d become vernünftig (meaning sensible, reasonable). Very quickly it became clear that was an illusion.”
  • “There were many situations where he could have been stopped. For example in 1923 after the failed Munich putsch – if he’d served his full prison sentence of several years, he wouldn’t have made a political comeback. Instead, he only spent a few months behind bars, [having been released after political pressure] and could rebuild his movement.”
  • The western powers made the same mistake with their appeasement politics, indecision and indulgence. “In the 1930s Hitler strengthened, rather than weakened, his aggressive intentions,” Ullrich says. “So you could learn from this that you have to react faster and much more vigorously than was the case at the time.”
  • llrich also contends that if Hindenburg, the president of the Reich, had allowed Chancellor Brüning, of the Centre party, to remain chancellor to the end of 1934, rather than responding to pressure from conservatives to dismiss him in 1932, “then the peak of the economic crisis would have passed and it would have been very questionable whether Hitler could still have come to power”.
  • At the same time, Hitler’s ascent was no mere fluke. “There were powerful forces in the big industries, but also in the landowning class and the armed forces, which approved of a fascist solution to the crisis.”
  • If fascism “now just means aggressive nationalism, racism, patriarchy and authoritarianism, then maybe it is back on the agenda,” Bosworth continues. But today’s context is fundamentally different
  • Schama is clear: Trump is obviously not Hitler. “But, you know, if you like, he’s an entertainment fascist, which may be less sinister but is actually in the end more dangerous. If you’re not looking for jackboots and swastikas – although swastikas are indeed appearing – there’s a kind of laundry list of things which are truly sinister and authoritarian and not business as usual.”
  • Today’s “alt-right” agitators “live in a neoliberal global order where the slogan, ‘all for the market, nothing outside the market, no one against the market’ is far more unquestionably accepted than the old fascist slogan of ‘all for the state, nothing outside the state, no one against the state’”.
  • Schama also points to deeply worrying messaging, such as “the parallel universe of lies which are habitual, massive, cumulative”; the criminalization of political opponents; the threat to change the libel laws against the press and the demonization of different racial and ethnic groups, going as far as proposing a Muslim registry.
  • “What is that if it’s not racially authoritarian?” asks Schama. “If you want to call it fascist, fine. I don’t really care if it’s called that or not. It’s authoritarian, you know, ferociously authoritarian.”
  • Don’t ignore what people vote fo
  • f you’re of German heritage, it’s hard to understand how so many people could have bought Mein Kampf and gone on to vote for Hitler. Maybe no one really read it, or got beyond the first few pages of bluster, or took antisemitism seriously, you tell yourself. “Or they liked what he said,
  • “I think one of the mistakes this time around would be not to think that the people who voted for Trump were serious. They may have been serious for different reasons, but it would be a big mistake not to try and figure out what their reasons were.
  • Hitler presented himself as a “messiah” offering the public “salvation”, Ullrich points out. With austerity and hostility to the EU and to immigrants riding high, there is fertile ground for European populists next year to seduce with equally simplistic, sweeping “solutions”.
  • The problem, in Mazower’s view, is that establishment politicians currently have no response
  • “The Gestapo was piddling compared with the size and reach of surveillance equipment and operations today,
  • “Very belatedly, everyone is waking up to the fact that there was a general assumption that no government in the west would fall into the wrong hands, that it was safe to acquiesce in this huge expansion of surveillance capabilities, and the debate wasn’t as vigorous as it could have been.”
  • “Now, there is a lot of discussion about allowing this kind of surveillance apparatus in the wrong hands,” he adds. “And we’ve woken up to this a bit late in the day.”
  • Ullrich calls crises, “the elixir of rightwing populists”, and urges that politicians “do everything they can to correct the inequalities and social injustice which have arisen in the course of extreme financial capitalism in western countries”
  • Jane Caplan, a history professor at Oxford University who has written about Trump and fascism, highlights the want of “dissenting voices against marketisation and neoliberalism
  • The failure to resist the incursion of the market as the only criterion for political utility, or economic utility, has been pretty comprehensive.
  • Paranoia, bullying and intimidation are a hallmark of authoritarian regimes. They are also alive and well in our culture today, where online trolls, violent thugs at rallies, threats of expensive libel action and of course terrorist acts are equally effective in getting individuals and the press to self-censor.
Javier E

Naomi Klein: How science is telling us all to revolt - 0 views

  • Serious scientific gatherings don’t usually feature calls for mass political resistance, much less direct action and sabotage. But then again, Werner wasn’t exactly calling for those things. He was merely observing that mass uprisings of people – along the lines of the abolition movement, the civil rights movement or Occupy Wall Street – represent the likeliest source of “friction” to slow down an economic machine that is careening out of control. We know that past social movements have “had tremendous influence on . . . how the dominant culture evolved”, he pointed out. So it stands to reason that, “if we’re thinking about the future of the earth, and the future of our coupling to the environment, we have to include resistance as part of that dynamics”. And that, Werner argued, is not a matter of opinion, but “really a geophysics problem”.
  • in November 2012, Nature published a commentary by the financier and environmental philanthropist Jeremy Grantham urging scientists to join this tradition and “be arrested if necessary”, because climate change “is not only the crisis of your lives – it is also the crisis of our species’ existence”.
  • what Werner is doing with his modelling is different. He isn’t saying that his research drove him to take action to stop a particular policy; he is saying that his research shows that our entire economic paradigm is a threat to ecological stability. And indeed that challenging this economic paradigm – through mass-movement counter-pressure – is humanity’s best shot at avoiding catastrophe.
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  • for any closet revolutionary who has ever dreamed of overthrowing the present economic order in favour of one a little less likely to cause Italian pensioners to hang themselves in their homes, this work should be of particular interest. Because it makes the ditching of that cruel system in favour of something new (and perhaps, with lots of work, better) no longer a matter of mere ideological preference but rather one of species-wide existential necessity.
  • Anderson points out that we have lost so much time to political stalling and weak climate policies – all while global consumption (and emissions) ballooned – that we are now facing cuts so drastic that they challenge the fundamental logic of prioritising GDP growth above all else.
  • Anderson and Bows argue that, if the governments of developed countries are serious about hitting the agreed upon international target of keeping warming below 2° Celsius, and if reductions are to respect any kind of equity principle (basically that the countries that have been spewing carbon for the better part of two centuries need to cut before the countries where more than a billion people still don’t have electricity), then the reductions need to be a lot deeper, and they need to come a lot sooner.
  • To have even a 50/50 chance of hitting the 2° target (which, they and many others warn, already involves facing an array of hugely damaging climate impacts), the industrialised countries need to start cutting their greenhouse-gas emissions by something like 10 per cent a year – and they need to start right now.
  • a 10 per cent drop in emissions, year after year, is virtually unprecedented since we started powering our economies with coal. In fact, cuts above 1 per cent per year “have historically been associated only with economic recession or upheaval”, as the economist Nicholas Stern put it in his 2006 report for the British government.
  • Only in the immediate aftermath of the great market crash of 1929 did the United States, for instance, see emissions drop for several consecutive years by more than 10 per cent annually, according to historical data from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre
  • If we are to avoid that kind of carnage while meeting our science-based emissions targets, carbon reduction must be managed carefully through what Anderson and Bows describe as “radical and immediate de-growth strategies in the US, EU and other wealthy nations”. Which is fine, except that we happen to have an economic system that fetishises GDP growth above all else, regardless of the human or ecological consequences, and in which the neoliberal political class has utterly abdicated its responsibility to manage anything (since the market is the invisible genius to which everything must be entrusted).
  • in order to appear reasonable within neoliberal economic circles, scientists have been dramatically soft-peddling the implications of their research. By August 2013, Anderson was willing to be even more blunt, writing that the boat had sailed on gradual change. “Perhaps at the time of the 1992 Earth Summit, or even at the turn of the millennium, 2°C levels of mitigation could have been achieved through significant evolutionary changes within the political and economic hegemony. But climate change is a cumulative issue! Now, in 2013, we in high-emitting (post-)industrial nations face a very different prospect. Our ongoing and collective carbon profligacy has squandered any opportunity for the ‘evolutionary change’ afforded by our earlier (and larger) 2°C carbon budget. Today, after two decades of bluff and lies, the remaining 2°C budget demands revolutionary change to the political and economic hegemony” (his emphasis).
  • there are many people who are well aware of the revolutionary nature of climate science. It’s why some of the governments that decided to chuck their climate commitments in favour of digging up more carbon have had to find ever more thuggish ways to silence and intimidate their nations’ scientists
  • If you want to know where this leads, check out what’s happening in Canada, where I live. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper has done such an effective job of gagging scientists and shutting down critical research projects that, in July 2012, a couple thousand scientists and supporters held a mock-funeral on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, mourning “the death of evidence”. Their placards said, “No Science, No Evidence, No Truth”.
Javier E

Clash of the Populists - The New York Times - 0 views

  • they nonetheless share a common enemy: Not just specific guardians of business as usual, whether Catholic or Republican, but the wider Western ruling class
  • the pope and the mogul are now leading critics of the neoliberalism that has governed the West for a generation or more.
  • what both Trump and Francis promise — deliverance “from inconvenient and unresponsive institutions, with all their strictures and corruptions” — downplays the value of rules, customs, and traditions in protecting people from the rule of novelty and whim.
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  • This is always populism’s peril: That it relies too much on the power of charisma, and tears down too much in the quest
  • the last thing they have in common in this: Everything that makes them interesting makes them dangerous as well.
kirkpatrickry

Marxism Failed In The World, But Conquered Western Academia | The Daily Caller - 0 views

  • One of the great lessons of the 20th century, paid for with the suffering and blood of hundreds of millions, is that communism was a failure in both economy and governance. This was demonstrated repeatedly with the fall of the Soviet Union, the switch in China from communes and central planning to capitalism, the vast slaughter of the Khmer Rouge, the breakdown of the Cuban economy, and the starving prison house that is North Korea.
  • The dirtiest word in the marxist vocabulary is “neoliberal,” which stands for an economy based on capitalist principles and processes. Students have learned that “neoliberal” is equivalent to evil. Two students, independently, recently said to me that “we need to replace capitalism,” although they had no suggestions about what to replace it with. That half the world tried to replace capitalism in the 20th century, with disastrous results, they apparently had no idea. That capitalism has brought unparalleled prosperity, if not peace and happiness, is unknown to students. They have been taught that the only products of capitalism are exploitation and oppression. Globalization is taught as the expansion of exploitation and oppression worldwide. The great economic developments in Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Thailand, and the economic progress in Africa, is terra incognita to students, taught only problems but no successes.
Javier E

Opinion | The Hard Road to Conservative Reform - The New York Times - 0 views

  • And while Trump was winning, a certain amount of evidence emerged to confirm his darker view of the American situation — the surging opioid epidemic
  • “deaths of despair” among lower-income white Americans, growing evidence that the opening to China had worked out far better for Beijing’
  • All of this has left conservative policy wonks, the erstwhile reformocons and others, with a dilemma. Should they defend the post-Reagan economic order against Trump’s blustering, blundering assault — defend the benefits of “neoliberalism” and free trade and global openness, warn against the sclerosis that protectionism and industrial policy often bring, champion the innovative culture of Silicon Valley against its populist despisers? Or should they take Trump’s success as evidence that even reform conservatism was ultimately too sanguine and too moderate, and that there are deeper problems in the economic order that require a more-than-moderate conservative response?
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  • the vigorous intra-conservative debate over a new book, “The Once and Future Worker,” written by the former Mitt Romney domestic policy director Oren Cass. In certain ways the book is an extension of the reform-conservative project, an argument for policies that support “a foundation of productive work” as the basis for healthy communities and flourishing families and robust civic life. But Cass is more dramatic in his criticism of Western policymaking since the 1970s, more skeptical of globalization’s benefits to Western workers, and more dire in his diagnosis of the real socioeconomic condition of the working class.
  • Cass’s bracing tone reads like (among other things) an attempt to fix reform conservatism’s political problem, as it manifested itself in 2016 — a problem of lukewarmness
  • The critics’ concerns vary, but a common thread is that Cass’s diagnosis overstates the struggles of American workers and exaggerates the downsides of globalization, and in so doing risks giving aid and comfort to populist policies — or, for that matter, socialist policies, from the Ocasio-Cortezan left — that would ultimately choke off growth.
  • the best reason to bet on Cass’s specific vision is that the social crisis he wants to address it itself a major long-term drag on growth — because a society whose working class doesn’t work or marry or bear children will age, even faster than the West is presently aging, into stagnation and decline.
  • Cass’s book also raises a larger question that both right and left are wrestling with in our age of populist discontent: Namely, is the West’s post-1980 economic performance a hard-won achievement and pretty much the best we could have done, or is there another economic path available, populist or social democratic or something else entirely, that doesn’t just lead back to stagnation?
  • If you emphasize the disappointment, then experimenting with a different policy orientation — be it Cass’s work-and-family conservatism or an Ocasio-Cortezan democratic socialism or something else — seems like a risk worth taking; after all things aren’t that great under neoliberalism as it is.
  • if you focus on the possible fragility of the growth we have achieved, the ease with which left-wing and right-wing populisms can lead to Venezuela, then you’ll share the anxieties of Cass’s conservative critic
  • In a sense the debate reproduces the larger argument about whether a post-Trump conservative politics should seek to learn something from his ascent or simply aim to repudiate him — with Cass offering a reform conservatism that effectively bids against Trump for populist support, and his critics warning that he’s conceding way too much to Trumpist demagogy.
  • it might well be, as some of his critics think, that the working class’s social crisis is mostly or all cultural, a form of late-modern anomie detached from material privation. In which case political-economy schemes to “fix” the problem won’t have social benefits to match their potential economic costs.
Javier E

The New Nationalism | Foreign Affairs - 0 views

  • Kwame Anthony Appiah tackles the supposed incompatibility of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, which he claims is based on a misunderstanding, since cosmopolitans believe in the possibility of multiple nested identities.
  • Andreas Wimmer notes that distinguishing good, civic nationalism from bad, ethnic nationalism is largely unhelpful, since the two share so many assumptions. For him as well, the contemporary battle is not to fight nationalism but to promote inclusive versions of it.
  • Robert Sapolsky offers a depressing take on nationalism’s cognitive enablers. When it comes to group belonging, humans don’t seem too far from chimpanzees: people are comfortable with the familiar and bristle at the unfamiliar.
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  • Jan-Werner Müller argues that the true challenge comes not from nationalism per se but from a particular populist variant. The best response is to avoid getting distracted and focus on delivering practical results
  • Yael Tamir suggests that the main problem today is a clash between nationalism and neoliberal globalism. Nationalists want states to intervene in the market to defend their citizens; their opponents favor freer trade and freer movement of people. Jack Snyder concurs, suggesting that the proper response is to allow governments greater freedom to manage capitalism
  • Underneath all the theory and history and science, everything boils down to politics. Leaders and governments need to produce real solutions to real problems. If they don’t, their disaffected publics will look for answers elsewhere. It’s as simple as that
lmunch

The Political Divide In Health Care: A Liberal Perspective | Health Affairs - 0 views

  • Classical seventeenth-century liberalism, a response to autocratic monarchies, promoted the freedom of the individual. The concepts of equality and the rule of law were added to classical liberal doctrine in the eighteenth century, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. 1 Eighteenth-century liberalism also advocated a universal humanitarian morality: “It is the goal of morality to substitute peaceful behavior for violence, good faith for fraud and overreaching, considerateness for malice, cooperation for the dog-eat-dog attitude.” 2 These precepts, also in the writings of world religions, are best expressed in the Golden Rule, “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.”
  • ohn Stuart Mill introduced the utilitarian idea that societies should be responsible to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. A corollary to this argument was that governments should provide for the overall welfare of the population—a communitarian rather than individualistic strain of liberalism. Liberalism and conservatism went separate ways, with most conservatives advocating that government restrict itself to ensuring individual liberties.
  • “Health care” refers to medical services, but not to a healthy state of being. The right to health care is distinct from the right to health.
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  • Rawls deduced that a just society would guarantee personal freedoms as long as they did not impinge on the freedoms of others, would promote equality of opportunity, and would allow inequality only if it would benefit the least advantaged in society.
  • Recently, a neoliberal movement has moved away from New Deal liberalism, partially returning to the classical liberal belief that the free market is the best way to handle societal needs. Neoliberals join conservatives in supporting smaller government and privatization of some New Deal programs.
  • In the health care arena, many liberals feel that governments (although they can be and often are corrupted by power and money) are the only social institutions that can implement the balance between the needs of each individual and those of all individuals—that is, the community.
  • Neoconservatives believe in an aggressive U.S. foreign policy with a strong military, at times placing them at odds with fiscal conservatives. Most conservatives support small government and low taxes and oppose progressive and corporate taxes, believing that economic health is best guaranteed by wealthy individuals and corporations having money to invest in job creation.
  • “Right” means that the government guarantees something to everyone. Rights come in two categories: individual freedoms and population-based entitlements.
  • The nineteenth century also saw the growth of social democracy, a brand of liberalism arguing that the market cannot supply certain human necessities: a minimum income to purchase food, clothes, and housing, and access to health services; governments are needed to guarantee those needs.
  • The liberal belief in health care as a right is based on two varieties of liberal thinking, as noted in the discussion of liberalism above: (1) the social justice argument advanced by Rawls that anyone unaware of his/her position in society would agree with health care as a right because it promotes equality of opportunity and is of the greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of society; and (2) the utilitarian view that guaranteeing health services increases the welfare of the greatest number of people.
  • If health care is just another commodity, it can be supplied by the market; if a necessity, the market is not adequate.
  • One caveat concerns the impact of taxes on public opinion. A 1994 survey found that fewer than half of respondents would pay more taxes to finance universal health insurance.
  • “socialized medicine,” meaning government ownership of health care delivery institutions; social insurance of the single-payer variety is socialized insurance but not socialized medicine.
  • Liberal doctrine argues that social insurance unites the entire population into a single risk pool. The 80 percent of the population that incurs only 20 percent of national health spending pays for the 20 percent who account for 80 percent of spending.
  • The health care system is now financed in a regressive manner. Out-of-pocket payments (about 15 percent of health care spending) consume more than 10 percent of the income of families in the lowest income quintile, compared with about 1 percent for families in the wealthiest 5 percent of the population.
  • Private health insurance is also a regressive method of financing health care because employer-paid insurance premiums are generally considered deductions from wages or salary, and a premium represents a higher proportion of income for lower-paid employees than for those with higher pay. 27 Moreover, the tax deductions for employer coverage benefit the higher-income.
Javier E

Why Do Trump Supporters Support Trump? - The New York Times - 0 views

  • Lind’s originating interest seems to be this
  • American democracy worked in a certain way in the three decades after World War II, it stopped working that way, and oligarchy ensued. At the heart of the old way was what Lind calls “war-inspired class peace treaties.” In various sectors of the economy and polity, the working class benefited from power-sharing arrangements with business and government, often the result of wartime mobilization. Strong unions helped keep wages high, local political power brokers and party bosses made sure that working-class needs were represented in the marble corridors, and mass-membership organizations put a check on runaway greed by elites.
  • starting in the 1970s, Lind says, what he calls the neoliberal “managerial elite” challenged this power-sharing and began turning the country into a casino where it always won
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  • A combination of actors, from the left and the right, pushed for ever more public decisions to be made by highly educated technocratic elites living at a remove from the working class. Big corporations pushed for more decisions to be made through global trade agreements than national legislation. Ivy League liberals pushed for more critical decisions to be made by Harvard-trained jurists than prejudiced lawmakers.
  • “When the dust from the collapse cleared,” Lind writes, “the major institutions in which working-class people had found a voice on the basis of numbers — mass-membership parties, legislatures, trade unions and grass-roots religious and civic institutions — had been weakened or destroyed, leaving most of the nonelite population in Western countries with no voice in public affairs at all, except for shrieks of rage.”
  • For Lind, “the populist wave in politics on both sides of the Atlantic is a defensive reaction against the technocratic neoliberal revolution from above.” To put it this way is to ignore all the evidence that the wave was driven more by the desire to stay on top, culturally and racially, than to survive at the bottom
  • As Emma Green put it in The Atlantic, summing up the research: “Evidence suggests financially troubled voters in the white working class were more likely to prefer Clinton over Trump
  • Besides partisan affiliation, it was cultural anxiety — feeling like a stranger in America, supporting the deportation of immigrants and hesitating about educational investment — that best predicted support for Trump.”
  • Oligarchy is indeed a big problem. But it stands alongside a second major aspect of American life that Lind almost completely ignores: a racial and social changing of the guard
  • So eager is Lind to be sympathetic to populists that he begins to take their talking points at face value
  • “The New Class War” lacks the texture and earth and seduction of real portraiture.
Javier E

Opinion | Yes, There Is a Clash of Civilizations - The New York Times - 0 views

  • In 1996 the political scientist Samuel Huntington offered several strong claims about the post-Cold War world.
  • Global politics was becoming not just “multipolar” but “multicivilizational,” he argued, with competing powers modernizing along different cultural lines, not simply converging with the liberal West.
  • “The balance of power among civilizations” was shifting, and the West was entering a period of relative decline.
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  • A “civilization-based world order” was emerging, in which societies “sharing cultural affinities” were more likely to group themselves into alliances or blocs.
  • And the would-be universalism of the West was setting the stage for sustained conflict with rival civilizations, most notably with China and the Islamic world.
  • These claims were the backbone of Huntington’s book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,” which was seen as a sweeping interpretive alternative to Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis, with its vision of liberal democracy as the horizon toward which post-Cold War societies were likely to converge.
  • often lately Huntington has been invoked either warily, on the grounds that Putin wants a clash of civilizations and we shouldn’t give it to him, or in dismissal or critique, with the idea being that his theory of world politics has actually been disproved by Putin’s attempt to restore a Greater Russia.
  • Christopher Caldwell also invokes Huntington’s seemingly falsified predictions about Orthodox Christian unity. But then he also offers a different reason to reject Huntington’s application to our moment, suggesting that the civilizational model has been a useful framework for understanding events over the last 20 years, but lately we have been moving back to a world of explicitly ideological conflict — one defined by a Western elite preaching a universal gospel of “neoliberalism” and “wokeness,” and various regimes and movements that are trying to resist it.
  • Caldwell’s analysis resembles the popular liberal argument that the world is increasingly divided between liberalism and authoritarianism, democracy and autocracy, rather than being divided into multiple poles and competing civilizations.
  • if you want to understand the direction of global politics right now, the Huntington thesis is more relevant than ever.
  • The first years of the 21st century, in other words, provided a fair amount of evidence for the universal appeal of Western capitalism, liberalism and democracy, with outright opposition to those values confined to the margins — Islamists, far-left critics of globalization, the government of North Korea.
  • American power has obviously declined relative to our rivals and competitors, or that our post-9/11 efforts to spread Western values by force of arms so often came to grief.
  • The specific divergences between the world’s major powers have also followed, in general ways, the civilizational patterns Huntington sketched out.
  • None of the emerging non-Western great powers have yet built grand alliances based on civilizational affinities, meaning that the third of the four big Huntingtonian predictions looks like the weakest one tod
  • wherever smaller countries are somehow “torn,” in his language, between some other civilization and the liberal West, they usually prefer an American alliance to an alignment with Moscow or Beijing.
  • This speaks to the West’s resilient appeal, to enduring American advantages even in a multipolar world. But it doesn’t mean that liberalism is poised for some sweeping return to the position it occupied when American strength was at its height.
  • while aspects of Fukuyama’s end of history have clearly spread beyond the liberal West, it’s as often the shadow side of his vision — consumerism and childless anomie — as the idealism of democracy and human rights.
  • Still less does the conflict in Ukraine mean that the export of American-style “wokeness,”
  • Quite the reverse: Most of wokeness feels inward-looking and parochial, a specifically Western and especially Anglo-American response to disappointments with the neoliberal period
  • the current culture war may actually be reducing ethnic polarization in our political parties — drawing some racial minorities rightward, for instance — while resurfacing some of the oldest divides in Anglo-American politics.
  • The woke often seem like heirs of the New England Puritans and the utopian zeal of Yankeedom; their foes are often Southern evangelicals and conservative Catholics and the libertarian descendants of the Scots-Irish; and the stakes in the debates are competing interpretations of the American founding, the Constitution, the Civil War and the settlement of the frontier.
  • if there’s going to be a clash of civilizations, the clash inside America is over what kind of civilization ours should be.
Javier E

Where We Went Wrong | Harvard Magazine - 0 views

  • John Kenneth Galbraith assessed the trajectory of America’s increasingly “affluent society.” His outlook was not a happy one. The nation’s increasingly evident material prosperity was not making its citizens any more satisfied. Nor, at least in its existing form, was it likely to do so
  • One reason, Galbraith argued, was the glaring imbalance between the opulence in consumption of private goods and the poverty, often squalor, of public services like schools and parks
  • nother was that even the bountifully supplied private goods often satisfied no genuine need, or even desire; a vast advertising apparatus generated artificial demand for them, and satisfying this demand failed to provide meaningful or lasting satisfaction.
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  • economist J. Bradford DeLong ’82, Ph.D. ’87, looking back on the twentieth century two decades after its end, comes to a similar conclusion but on different grounds.
  • DeLong, professor of economics at Berkeley, looks to matters of “contingency” and “choice”: at key junctures the economy suffered “bad luck,” and the actions taken by the responsible policymakers were “incompetent.”
  • these were “the most consequential years of all humanity’s centuries.” The changes they saw, while in the first instance economic, also “shaped and transformed nearly everything sociological, political, and cultural.”
  • DeLong’s look back over the twentieth century energetically encompasses political and social trends as well; nor is his scope limited to the United States. The result is a work of strikingly expansive breadth and scope
  • labeling the book an economic history fails to convey its sweeping frame.
  • The century that is DeLong’s focus is what he calls the “long twentieth century,” running from just after the Civil War to the end of the 2000s when a series of events, including the biggest financial crisis since the 1930s followed by likewise the most severe business downturn, finally rendered the advanced Western economies “unable to resume economic growth at anything near the average pace that had been the rule since 1870.
  • d behind those missteps in policy stood not just failures of economic thinking but a voting public that reacted perversely, even if understandably, to the frustrations poor economic outcomes had brought them.
  • Within this 140-year span, DeLong identifies two eras of “El Dorado” economic growth, each facilitated by expanding globalization, and each driven by rapid advances in technology and changes in business organization for applying technology to economic ends
  • from 1870 to World War I, and again from World War II to 197
  • fellow economist Robert J. Gordon ’62, who in his monumental treatise on The Rise and Fall of American Economic Growth (reviewed in “How America Grew,” May-June 2016, page 68) hailed 1870-1970 as a “special century” in this regard (interrupted midway by the disaster of the 1930s).
  • Gordon highlighted the role of a cluster of once-for-all-time technological advances—the steam engine, railroads, electrification, the internal combustion engine, radio and television, powered flight
  • Pessimistic that future technological advances (most obviously, the computer and electronics revolutions) will generate productivity gains to match those of the special century, Gordon therefore saw little prospect of a return to the rapid growth of those halcyon days.
  • DeLong instead points to a series of noneconomic (and non-technological) events that slowed growth, followed by a perverse turn in economic policy triggered in part by public frustration: In 1973 the OPEC cartel tripled the price of oil, and then quadrupled it yet again six years later.
  • For all too many Americans (and citizens of other countries too), the combination of high inflation and sluggish growth meant that “social democracy was no longer delivering the rapid progress toward utopia that it had delivered in the first post-World War II generation.”
  • Frustration over these and other ills in turn spawned what DeLong calls the “neoliberal turn” in public attitudes and economic policy. The new economic policies introduced under this rubric “did not end the slowdown in productivity growth but reinforced it.
  • the tax and regulatory changes enacted in this new climate channeled most of what economic gains there were to people already at the top of the income scale
  • Meanwhile, progressive “inclusion” of women and African Americans in the economy (and in American society more broadly) meant that middle- and lower-income white men saw even smaller gains—and, perversely, reacted by providing still greater support for policies like tax cuts for those with far higher incomes than their own.
  • Daniel Bell’s argument in his 1976 classic The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. Bell famously suggested that the very success of a capitalist economy would eventually undermine a society’s commitment to the values and institutions that made capitalism possible in the first plac
  • In DeLong’s view, the “greatest cause” of the neoliberal turn was “the extraordinary pace of rising prosperity during the Thirty Glorious Years, which raised the bar that a political-economic order had to surpass in order to generate broad acceptance.” At the same time, “the fading memory of the Great Depression led to the fading of the belief, or rather recognition, by the middle class that they, as well as the working class, needed social insurance.”
  • what the economy delivered to “hard-working white men” no longer matched what they saw as their just deserts: in their eyes, “the rich got richer, the unworthy and minority poor got handouts.”
  • As Bell would have put it, the politics of entitlement, bred by years of economic success that so many people had come to take for granted, squeezed out the politics of opportunity and ambition, giving rise to the politics of resentment.
  • The new era therefore became “a time to question the bourgeois virtues of hard, regular work and thrift in pursuit of material abundance.”
  • DeLong’s unspoken agenda would surely include rolling back many of the changes made in the U.S. tax code over the past half-century, as well as reinvigorating antitrust policy to blunt the dominance, and therefore outsize profits, of the mega-firms that now tower over key sectors of the economy
  • He would also surely reverse the recent trend moving away from free trade. Central bankers should certainly behave like Paul Volcker (appointed by President Carter), whose decisive action finally broke the 1970s inflation even at considerable economic cost
  • Not only Galbraith’s main themes but many of his more specific observations as well seem as pertinent, and important, today as they did then.
  • What will future readers of Slouching Towards Utopia conclude?
  • If anything, DeLong’s narratives will become more valuable as those events fade into the past. Alas, his description of fascism as having at its center “a contempt for limits, especially those implied by reason-based arguments; a belief that reality could be altered by the will; and an exaltation of the violent assertion of that will as the ultimate argument” will likely strike a nerve with many Americans not just today but in years to come.
  • what about DeLong’s core explanation of what went wrong in the latter third of his, and our, “long century”? I predict that it too will still look right, and important.
Javier E

History News Network | Which Country Has Better High Ed System - China or the USA? - 0 views

  • Since 1978, the Chinese Communist Party has built the largest higher educational system in the world with upwards of 30 million students; its 2,400 institutions of higher learning produce roughly eight million graduates per year, about five million more than American colleges and universities.
  • A thirty-year run of neoliberalism (a universalized logic of competition that justifies the transformation of institutions established for the public good into business enterprises) is depleting the American academy of its intellectual capital. The symptoms of that deterioration include the influx of corporate managerialism, administrative bloat, the erosion of shared governance, the near-disappearance of the tenure system, skyrocketing tuitions, the diminution of the humanities in favor of vocationally oriented STEM programs, and the deprofessionalization (or adjunctification) of the faculty as a cost-saving measure to compensate for exorbitant executive salaries.
  • the American academy has lost its way by jettisoning key features of its own historical and cultural heritage, including the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, academic freedom protected by tenure, and the importance of faculty oversight of the curriculum.
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  • Before long, international students will realize that the majority of their American professors are part-time faculty members, paid wages that impoverish, who toil in environments that resemble factory floors or fast-food kitchens more than traditional institutions of higher learning. American scholars of note will also “vote with their feet” as universities in other countries offer higher salaries, better resources, superior infrastructure, the freedom to pursue pure (disinterested) research—and the students will follow.
  • Simultaneously, English-speaking countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, are siphoning off students and attracting faculty members—and rapidly industrializing nations are investing in infrastructure and human resources to create international (English-speaking) hubs of higher learning containing world-class institutions
  • For this reason, the current supremacy of American colleges and universities on the world stage is largely a consequence of lingering perceptions of excellencethat no longer accord with reality
  • one of the most striking features of the Chinese situation, is a “strong commitment by both institutions and governments to the quest for world-class universities, something rarely found in most Western societies.”
  • too many Americans are failing to receive the necessary educational training essential to personal and national advancement, because families cannot afford the high cost of tuition. As income determines access to higher education, social mobility will further decline.
Javier E

What Gamergate should have taught us about the 'alt-right' | Technology | The Guardian - 0 views

  • Gamergate
  • The 2014 hashtag campaign, ostensibly founded to protest about perceived ethical failures in games journalism, clearly thrived on hate – even though many of those who aligned themselves with the movement either denied there was a problem with harassment, or wrote it off as an unfortunate side effect
  • ure, women, minorities and progressive voices within the industry were suddenly living in fear. Sure, those who spoke out in their defence were quickly silenced through exhausting bursts of online abuse. But that wasn’t why people supported it, right? They were disenfranchised, felt ignored, and wanted to see a systematic change.
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  • Is this all sounding rather familiar now? Does it remind you of something?
  • The similarities between Gamergate and the far-right online movement, the “alt-right”, are huge, startling and in no way a coincidence
  • fter all, the culture war that began in games now has a senior representative in The White House. As a founder member and former executive chair of Brietbart News, Steve Bannon had a hand in creating media monster Milo Yiannopoulos, who built his fame and Twitter following by supporting and cheerleading Gamergate. This hashtag was the canary in the coalmine, and we ignored it.
  • Gamergate was an online movement that effectively began because a man wanted to punish his ex girlfriend. Its most notable achievement was harassing a large number of progressive figures - mostly women – to the point where they felt unsafe or considered leaving the industry
  • The same voices moved into other geek communities, especially comics, where Marvel and DC were criticised for progressive storylines and decisions. They moved into science fiction with the controversy over the Hugo awards. They moved into cinema with the revolting kickback against the all-female Ghostbusters reboot.
  • no one in the movement was willing to be associated with the abuse being carried out in its name. Prominent supporters on Twitter, in subreddits and on forums like 8Chan, developed a range of pernicious rhetorical devices and defences to distance themselves from threats to women and minorities in the industry: the targets were lying or exaggerating, they were too precious; a language of dismissal and belittlement was formed against them. Safe spaces, snowflakes, unicorns, cry bullies. Even when abuse was proven, the usual response was that people on their side were being abused too. These techniques, forged in Gamergate, have become the standard toolset of far-right voices online
  • In 2016, new wave conservative media outlets like Breitbart have gained trust with their audience by painting traditional news sources as snooty and aloof. In 2014, video game YouTube stars, seeking to appear in touch with online gaming communities, unscrupulously proclaimed that traditional old-media sources were corrupt. Everything we’re seeing now, had its precedent two years ago.
  • With 2014’s Gamergate, Breitbart seized the opportunity to harness the pre-existing ignorance and anger among disaffected young white dudes. With Trump’s movement in 2016, the outlet was effectively running his campaign: Steve Bannon took leave of his role at the company in August 2016 when he was hired as chief executive of Trump’s presidential campaign
  • young men converted via 2014’s Gamergate, are being more widely courted now. By leveraging distrust and resentment towards women, minorities and progressives, many of Gamergate’s most prominent voices – characters like Mike Cernovich, Adam Baldwin, and Milo Yiannopoulos – drew power and influence from its chaos
  • These figures gave Gamergate a new sense of direction – generalising the rhetoric: this was now a wider war between “Social Justice Warriors” (SJWs) and everyday, normal, decent people. Games were simply the tip of the iceberg – progressive values, went the argument, were destroying everything
  • it quickly became clear that the GamerGate movement was a mess – an undefined mission to Make Video Games Great Again via undecided means.
  • Using 4chan (and then the more sympathetic offshoot 8Chan) to plan their subversions and attacks made Gamergate a terribly sloppy operation, leaving a trail of evidence that made it quite clear the whole thing was purposefully, plainly nasty. But the video game industry didn’t have the spine to react, and allowed the movement to coagulate – forming a mass of spiteful disappointment that Breitbart was only more than happy to coddle
  • Historically, that seems to be Breitbart’s trick - strongly represent a single issue in order to earn trust, and then gradually indoctrinate to suit wider purposes. With Gamergate, they purposefully went fishing for anti-feminists. 2016’s batch of fresh converts – the white extremists – came from enticing conspiracy theories about the global neoliberal elite secretly controlling the world.
  • The greatest strength of Gamergate, though, was that it actually appeared to represent many left-leaning ideals: stamping out corruption in the press, pushing for better ethical practices, battling for openness.
  • There are similarities here with many who support Trump because of his promises to put an end to broken neo-liberalism, to “drain the swamp” of establishment corruption. Many left-leaning supporters of Gamergate sought to intellectualise their alignment with the hashtag, adopting familiar and acceptable labels of dissent – identifying as libertarian, egalitarian, humanist.
  • At best they unknowingly facilitated abuse, defending their own freedom of expression while those who actually needed support were threatened and attacked.
  • Genuine discussions over criticism, identity and censorship were paralysed and waylaid by Twitter voices obsessed with rhetorical fallacies and pedantic debating practices. While the core of these movements make people’s lives hell, the outer shell – knowingly or otherwise – protect abusers by insisting that the real problem is that you don’t want to talk, or won’t provide the ever-shifting evidence they politely require.
  • In 2017, the tactics used to discredit progressive game critics and developers will be used to discredit Trump and Bannon’s critics. There will be gaslighting, there will be attempts to make victims look as though they are losing their grip on reality, to the point that they gradually even start to believe it. The “post-truth” reality is not simply an accident – it is a concerted assault on the rational psyche.
  • The strangest aspect of Gamergate is that it consistently didn’t make any sense: people chose to align with it, and yet refused responsibility. It was constantly demanded that we debate the issues, but explanations and facts were treated with scorn. Attempts to find common ground saw the specifics of the demands being shifted: we want you to listen to us; we want you to change your ways; we want you to close your publication down. This movement that ostensibly wanted to protect free speech from cry bully SJWs simultaneously did what it could to endanger sites it disagreed with, encouraging advertisers to abandon support for media outlets that published stories critical of the hashtag. The petulance of that movement is disturbingly echoed in Trump’s own Twitter feed.
  • Looking back, Gamergate really only made sense in one way: as an exemplar of what Umberto Eco called “eternal fascism”, a form of extremism he believed could flourish at any point in, in any place – a fascism that would extol traditional values, rally against diversity and cultural critics, believe in the value of action above thought and encourage a distrust of intellectuals or experts – a fascism built on frustration and machismo. The requirement of this formless fascism would – above all else – be to remain in an endless state of conflict, a fight against a foe who must always be portrayed as impossibly strong and laughably weak
  • 2016 has presented us with a world in which our reality is being wilfully manipulated. Fake news, divisive algorithms, misleading social media campaigns.
  • The majority of people who voted for Trump will never take responsibility for his racist, totalitarian policies, but they’ll provide useful cover and legitimacy for those who demand the very worst from the President Elect. Trump himself may have disavowed the “alt-right”, but his rhetoric has led to them feeling legitimised. As with Gamergate, the press risks being manipulated into a position where it has to tread a respectful middle ground that doesn’t really exist.
  • Perhaps the true lesson of Gamergate was that the media is culturally unequipped to deal with the forces actively driving these online movements. The situation was horrifying enough two years ago, it is many times more dangerous now.
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