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Nye Frank

CIV PRO OUTLINE - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 31 Dec 09 - Cached
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    This is the html version of the file http://students.law.ucdavis.edu/LSA/files/outlines/Civ%20Pro%20-%20Unknown%20-%200203.doc. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. CIV PRO OUTLINE As of 5/1 1. WHAT'S CIVIL PROCEDURE? 1. Prescribes and administers process for enforcing rights and duties specified in substantive law 2. EVOLUTION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (pgs. 18-32) 1. Significant Anglo-Saxon institutions at time of conquest: 1. Crown 2. Local tribunals 1. Slow and uncertain in operation 2. Earliest forms of royal intervention 1. Executive 2. Administrative 3. Writ 1. Written directive from king to royal official/to individual/group of individuals ordering addressees to do/refrain from doing designated act 2. Procedural steps by which prosecuted not uniform 3. Praecipe 1. Executive command made without inquiry 4. Novel disseisin/querela 1. Derived from procedure in which judicial inquest of complaints heard first and then executive action followed 4. king's direct entertainment of complaints of subjects 3. Early evolution of royal courts 1. Medieval central government 1. King's court/curia regis 2. Why separate branches? 1. Administrative necessity for orderly record keeping 2. Historical fact that early Plantagenet kings had domains in France that were more important to them than England and which required their presence on continent for long periods of time (king absent a lot) 4. Common law procedure 1. Background of all medieval litigation was hope of bringing parties to some sort of voluntary accord
Nye Frank

elder abuse - 0 views

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    This is Google's cache of http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/ncearoot/main_site/Library/CANE/CANE_Series/CANE_FinancialExploitation.aspx. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Jun 27, 2010 13:10:27 GMT. The current page could have changed in the meantime. Learn more Text-only versionThese search terms are highlighted: financial elderly person includes constitute property crimes regardless age victim california These terms only appear in links pointing to this page: exploytation acts thin includes U.S. Administration on Aging Home NCEA E-News State Resources Calendar About NCEA What We Do NCEA Partners NCEA Initiatives Find Help Help Hotline ElderCare Locator Find State Resources Resources for Families Adult Protective Services FAQ's Frequently Asked Questions Basics Resource for Professionals Nursing Home Abuse Resources Community Outreach Newsletter NCEA Listserve Online Links Promising Practice Library CANE Publications Events & Webcast Laws Statistic & Research Training Library Abuse Statistics Survey, Reports & Testimonies Research Briefs & Agenda National Incident Study Home > Library > CANE Printer Friendly Text Size: T T T Financial Exploitation of the Elderly: An Update of the Literature Financial exploitation of the elderly is becoming an increasingly familiar problem. Regular review of news headlines reveals that elders and vulnerable adults are victimized routinely by frauds, scams and identity theft, at the hands of strangers as well as loved ones, not only in the United States, but throughout the world. As technology advances, perpetrator
Nye Frank

http://www.diigo.com/post?url=http://search.universalclass.com/fastcgi/search... - 0 views

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    Join Now | Sign In | Shopping Cart Areas of Study Home Course Catalog A-Z List Teach Online My Transcript My Classes Accounting Alternative Medicine Arts and Photography Business Career Training Computers & Tech Cooking Crafts & Hobbies Entrepreneurship Finance GED Training General Education Health & Medicine History Home and Garden Homeschooling How To / Do It Yourself Industrial Technology Language Arts Law/Legal/Criminal Mathematics Medical Billing New Age Office Skills Parenting and Family Performing Arts Personal Care Pet and Animal Care Psychology Real Estate Reference Religious Studies Science Self-Help Social Work Special Education Spiritual Studies Staff Picks Teacher Tools Terminology Test Preparation Web Development Writing Skills New Courses WELCOME!VIEW COURSE LISTINGFAQs FAQs What are the technical requirements? Will I get a certificate at course completion? What are CEUs? Why is this class so cheap? Is there an instructor available to answer questions? How many hours will it take to complete this course? How long do I have to complete this course? What happens if I need more time to complete this course? Are there any additional costs? Do I need to buy any textbooks? Is this cost per lesson, per session, or for the entire course? Do you have a Demo Class I can try? What is your refund policy? I'm enrolling several students. How do I get a group discount? How can my school/company integrate UniversalClass™ courses? More Frequently Asked Questions...TOP 20 SEARCHES TOP 20 SEARCHES 1. accounting 2. medical terminology 3. psychology 4. medical billing 5. creative writing 6. basic writing 7. grammar and punctuation 8. spelling 9. science courses 10. shorthand 11. business 12. vocabulary 13. marketing 14. professional organizer 15. ms excel 16. event planning 17. american revolution 18. conflict resolution 1
Nye Frank

American Civil Liberties Union : H.R. 5107: The Justice for All Act of 2004 - 0 views

  • Title I of the Justice for All Act also provides grants for state, tribal and local prosecutors' offices, law enforcement agencies, courts, jails, correctional facilities and qualified public or private entities to develop, implement and maintain programs to enforce victims' rights and systems to provide notification of court dates and developments in the criminal proceedings to victims in a timely and efficient manner.  Jurisdictions that have victims' rights laws would qualify for grants under these provisions.  The legislation authorizes $20 million over five years for notifications systems, but does not specifically authorize funding for enforcing victims' rights.
Nye Frank

Federal Bureau of Investigation - Civil Rights Statutes - 0 views

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    Contact Us Your Local FBI Office Overseas Offices Submit a Crime Tip Report Internet Crime More Contacts Learn About Us Quick Facts What We Investigate Natl. Security Branch Information Technology Fingerprints & Training Laboratory Services Reports & Publications History More About Us Get Our News Press Room E-mail Updates News Feeds Be Crime Smart Wanted by the FBI More Protections Use Our Resources For Law Enforcement For Communities For Researchers More Services Visit Our Kids' Page Apply for a Job Civil Rights Statutes Civil Rights Home Federal Civil Rights Statutes Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241 - Conspiracy Against Rights Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242 - Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245 - Federally Protected Activities Title 18, U.S.C., Section 247 - Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 Title 18, U.S.C., Section 248 - Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act Title 18, U.S.C., Section 844(h) - Federal Explosives Control Statute Title 42, U.S.C., Section 3631 - Criminal Interference with Right to Fair Housing Title 42, U.S.C., Section 14141 - Pattern and Practice Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241 Conspiracy Against Rights This statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same). It further makes it unlawful for two or more persons to go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another with the intent to prevent or hinder his/her free exercise or enjoyment of any rights so secured. Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to ten years, or
Nye Frank

Standing to Assert Crime Victims' Rights - 0 views

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    JUSTICE FOR ALL ACT OF 2004 The federal Justice For All Act of 2004 (PL 108-405) enhances protections for victims of federal crimes and increases federal resources available to state and local governments to combat crime. Title I of the act, the "Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act," requires courts to ensure that crime victims are afforded the rights the act prescribes. It specifies that a crime victim, his lawful representative, or the attorney for the government may assert the rights in U. S. District Court. If the requested relief is denied, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus, which the appeals court must decide within 72 hours. A court's failure to afford a crime victim his rights is not grounds for a new trial, but a victim can move to reopen a plea or a sentence on that basis. The act does not authorize a cause of action for damages or create, enlarge, or imply any duty or obligation to any victim or other person for any breach by federal government officers or employees (§ 102). The act appropriates $ 7 million for fiscal year 2005 and $ 11 million each for fiscal years 2006-2009, in part, for the support of state organizations that enforce crime victims' rights and provide legal counsel and support services. The states where these organizations are located must have laws substantially equivalent to the federal law (§ 103).
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    JUSTICE FOR ALL ACT OF 2004 The federal Justice For All Act of 2004 (PL 108-405) enhances protections for victims of federal crimes and increases federal resources available to state and local governments to combat crime. Title I of the act, the "Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act," requires courts to ensure that crime victims are afforded the rights the act prescribes. It specifies that a crime victim, his lawful representative, or the attorney for the government may assert the rights in U. S. District Court. If the requested relief is denied, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus, which the appeals court must decide within 72 hours. A court's failure to afford a crime victim his rights is not grounds for a new trial, but a victim can move to reopen a plea or a sentence on that basis. The act does not authorize a cause of action for damages or create, enlarge, or imply any duty or obligation to any victim or other person for any breach by federal government officers or employees (§ 102). The act appropriates $ 7 million for fiscal year 2005 and $ 11 million each for fiscal years 2006-2009, in part, for the support of state organizations that enforce crime victims' rights and provide legal counsel and support services. The states where these organizations are located must have laws substantially equivalent to the federal law (§ 103).
Nye Frank

RICO ACT, Jeff Grell, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, RICO, Attorney at... - 0 views

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    In addition, a RICO claim would be aided by acts beyond mail or wire fraud. Some clients have complained about city officials threatening to reduce city services unless they cooperated with the condemnation proceedings and other clients relate threats of increased traffic enforcement around their business (i.e., the city threatening to ticket customers for little or no reason unless the business cooperates). Arguably, such activity could constitute extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The more blatant such extortion, the better the basis of a RICO claim.
Nye Frank

CRS/LII Annotated Constitution Fifth Amendment - 0 views

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    "This formal approach to the meaning of due process could obviously have limited both Congress and the state legislatures in the development of procedures unknown to English law. But when California's abandonment of indictment by grand jury was challenged, the Court refused to be limited by the fact that such proceeding was the English practice and that Coke had indicated that it was a proceeding required as "the law of the land." The meaning of the Court in Murray's Lessee was "that a process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country; but it by no means follows that nothing else can be due process of law." To hold that only historical, traditional procedures can constitute due process , the Court said, "would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable [p.1348] of progress or improvement." 23 Therefore, in observing the due process guarantee, it was concluded, the Court must look "not [to] particular forms of procedures, but [to] the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property." The due process clause prescribed "the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. . . . It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." 24"
Nye Frank

related:http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/content/full/35/4/537 - Google Search - 0 views

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    Lee Frank a 74 year old woman in Riverside County who witnessed her 68 year old husband killed by a 27 year old who seemed to be high on drugs or something. The young guys dad states his friend high up in da office told him how to get out of this. The 27 year old tells the sheriff on the video how he attacked Nye with judo moves. Ty Reddish was let out in 24 hours even though he was on probation and just killed someone. He and his parents stalked Lee Frank for 2 years now. Rod Pacheco knows Lee Frank cannot afford to enforce her rights. He has violated her rights with zero accountability. Please speak up for Lee Frank Riveriside County. Google Nye Frank Racing on You tube you can see pictures and audio, video.
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
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      The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
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  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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