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Nye Frank

CIV PRO OUTLINE - 0 views

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mandamus

shared by Nye Frank on 31 Dec 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 31 Dec 09
     
    This is the html version of the file http://students.law.ucdavis.edu/LSA/files/outlines/Civ%20Pro%20-%20Unknown%20-%200203.doc. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. CIV PRO OUTLINE As of 5/1 1. WHAT'S CIVIL PROCEDURE? 1. Prescribes and administers process for enforcing rights and duties specified in substantive law 2. EVOLUTION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (pgs. 18-32) 1. Significant Anglo-Saxon institutions at time of conquest: 1. Crown 2. Local tribunals 1. Slow and uncertain in operation 2. Earliest forms of royal intervention 1. Executive 2. Administrative 3. Writ 1. Written directive from king to royal official/to individual/group of individuals ordering addressees to do/refrain from doing designated act 2. Procedural steps by which prosecuted not uniform 3. Praecipe 1. Executive command made without inquiry 4. Novel disseisin/querela 1. Derived from procedure in which judicial inquest of complaints heard first and then executive action followed 4. king's direct entertainment of complaints of subjects 3. Early evolution of royal courts 1. Medieval central government 1. King's court/curia regis 2. Why separate branches? 1. Administrative necessity for orderly record keeping 2. Historical fact that early Plantagenet kings had domains in France that were more important to them than England and which required their presence on continent for long periods of time (king absent a lot) 4. Common law procedure 1. Background of all medieval litigation was hope of bringing parties to some sort of voluntary accord
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FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

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1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
    • Nye Frank
      Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
       
      The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Subjective intent is irrelevant in a search and seizure case to determiningwhether gove... - 0 views

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prosecutor intent

shared by Nye Frank on 21 Aug 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 21 Aug 10
     
    Subjective intent is irrelevant in a search and seizure case to determining whether governmental conduct violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and, therefore, has no bearing on the remedy granted in such a case.11 Similarly, violations of a defendant’s constitutional rights that do not involve a structural error in the proceedings require a harmless error analysis. If the government can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not contribute to the conviction, then the court may not grant a remedy despite the violation.12 Therefore, the Constitution does not provide a remedy to deter future prosecutorial misconduct, absent a finding of harm to the defendant
Nye Frank

AddThis Social Bookmarking Sharing Button Widget - 0 views

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due process amendment bookmarking addthis

shared by Nye Frank on 24 Feb 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 24 Feb 10
     
    Contents [hide] 1 Text 2 Rights under the Sixth Amendment 2.1 Speedy trial 2.2 Public trial 2.3 Impartial jury 2.4 Notice of accusation 2.5 Confrontation 2.6 Counsel 2.6.1 Self-representation 3 Related court cases 4 References 5 External links http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sixth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution#Rights_under_the_Sixth_Amendment
  • Nye Frank on 24 Feb 10
     
    Contents [hide] 1 Text 2 Rights under the Sixth Amendment 2.1 Speedy trial 2.2 Public trial 2.3 Impartial jury 2.4 Notice of accusation 2.5 Confrontation 2.6 Counsel 2.6.1 Self-representation 3 Related court cases 4 References 5 External links http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sixth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution#Rights_under_the_Sixth_Amendment
Nye Frank

CRS/LII Annotated Constitution Fifth Amendment - 0 views

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riverside annotated amendment constitution due process

shared by Nye Frank on 24 Feb 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 24 Feb 10
     
    "This formal approach to the meaning of due process could obviously have limited both Congress and the state legislatures in the development of procedures unknown to English law. But when California's abandonment of indictment by grand jury was challenged, the Court refused to be limited by the fact that such proceeding was the English practice and that Coke had indicated that it was a proceeding required as "the law of the land." The meaning of the Court in Murray's Lessee was "that a process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country; but it by no means follows that nothing else can be due process of law." To hold that only historical, traditional procedures can constitute due process , the Court said, "would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable [p.1348] of progress or improvement." 23 Therefore, in observing the due process guarantee, it was concluded, the Court must look "not [to] particular forms of procedures, but [to] the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property." The due process clause prescribed "the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. . . . It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." 24"
Nye Frank

Google Sidewiki entry about Anti-social behaviour | Home Office - 0 views

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crime victims laws

shared by Nye Frank on 24 Feb 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 24 Feb 10
     
    1999 Stalking Law changes. 1) Menacing by Stalking, a misdemeanor 1st degree, is enhanced on a second offense to a felony 5th degree regardless of whether the offenses involved the same victim. Multiple convictions of telephone harassment, regardless if the same victim is involved, is also a felony (except when there are only threats to property). (Eff. 3-30-99) 2) Stalking is enhanced to a Felony 4th degree for any of the nine factors listed in Section (B)(2), including priors, use of threats, trespassing, victim is a minor, history of violence, had a weapon, under protection order, serious damage to property, or prior mental illness. Bail may be denied (ORC 2937.222(A)) when stalking is a felony. The Criminal Stalking Protection Order has been expanded to include "the alleged victim or a family or household member of an alleged victim," who may request the order, must then be protected, and must be provided a copy of the protection order (2903.213(A) to (D) & (G) and 2919.26(A) to (D), (G), &(I). (eff.10-27-99) 1999 - Penalty for hit and skip drivers is increased to a felony. Drunk drivers were leaving the accident scene for two hours and then turning themselves in, since leaving the scene was a lesser crime than being tested and convicted for a DUI. (O.R.C 4511.75, 4549.99 - Eff. 3-22-99) 1998 - A new Civil Stalking Protection Order allows a Common Pleas Court to issue a stalking protection order regardless of whether or not criminal charges are filed against the alleged offender. The law also specifically states that an invitation by the victim does not nullify the order and that victim advocates are allowed to accompany the victim throughout the proceedings. (ORC 2930.214, Eff. 7-29-98) 1998 - Due to problems with judges dismissing domestic violence cases against the prosecutors wishes, the law was amended so that a judge does not have the authority to dismiss criminal charges solely at the request of the complaining w
Nye Frank

Federal Bureau of Investigation - Civil Rights Statutes - 0 views

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fbi federal law

shared by Nye Frank on 17 Mar 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 17 Mar 10
     
    Contact Us Your Local FBI Office Overseas Offices Submit a Crime Tip Report Internet Crime More Contacts Learn About Us Quick Facts What We Investigate Natl. Security Branch Information Technology Fingerprints & Training Laboratory Services Reports & Publications History More About Us Get Our News Press Room E-mail Updates News Feeds Be Crime Smart Wanted by the FBI More Protections Use Our Resources For Law Enforcement For Communities For Researchers More Services Visit Our Kids' Page Apply for a Job Civil Rights Statutes Civil Rights Home Federal Civil Rights Statutes Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241 - Conspiracy Against Rights Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242 - Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245 - Federally Protected Activities Title 18, U.S.C., Section 247 - Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 Title 18, U.S.C., Section 248 - Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act Title 18, U.S.C., Section 844(h) - Federal Explosives Control Statute Title 42, U.S.C., Section 3631 - Criminal Interference with Right to Fair Housing Title 42, U.S.C., Section 14141 - Pattern and Practice Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241 Conspiracy Against Rights This statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same). It further makes it unlawful for two or more persons to go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another with the intent to prevent or hinder his/her free exercise or enjoyment of any rights so secured. Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to ten years, or
Nye Frank

Police Misconduct and Civil Rights - Learn About the Law - 0 views

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due process amendment misconduct

shared by Nye Frank on 24 Feb 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 24 Feb 10
     
    "Civil Rights Laws and Police Misconduct A statute known as Section 1983 is the primary civil rights law victims of police misconduct rely upon. This law was originally passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was intended to curb oppressive conduct by government and private individuals participating in vigilante groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan. It is now called Section 1983 because that is where the law has been published, within Title 42, of the United States Code. Section 1983 makes it unlawful for anyone acting under the authority of state law to deprive another person of his or her rights under the Constitution or federal law. The most common claims brought against police officers are false arrest (or false imprisonment), malicious prosecution, and use of excessive or unreasonable force."
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Indexes 7th amendment Constitution, Jury Trial - 0 views

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law Constitution

shared by Nye Frank on 26 Feb 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 26 Feb 10
     
    Law
Nye Frank

California Victim Rights Amendment | Facebook - 0 views

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penal code civil rights

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Mar 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Mar 10
     
    Use of Prior Convictions. Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding. When a prior felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall be proved to the trier of fact in open court. As used in this article, the term "serious felony" is any crime defined in Penal Code, Section 1192.7(c).
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National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Project (NVCAP) - 0 views

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CRIME VICTIMS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

shared by Nye Frank on 11 Oct 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 11 Oct 09
     
    CRIME VICTIMS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
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