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As China's economic lifeline, the iron and steel industry used to be a black smoke maker and blue-sky killer in the eyes of many people. In 2007, SO2 emissions by China's large and medium-sized steel and iron enterprises were estimated at 756,368 tons, down 0.51 percent year-on-year. And the discharge of industrial coal ash was 382,275 tons with a 2.79 percent decline. Otherwise, soot discharges increased 3.02 percent, totaling 156,648 tons. The Long March of environmental protection and energy efficiency for China's steel and iron enterprises is still challenging, though many in the iron and steel industry have launched a green revolution in order to improve their old image. Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group) Corp (WISCO) is one such environmental protection warrior. As China's thrid largest steel and iron manufacturer, WISCO used to be a major polluter in Wuhan, capital of Hubei province. Many residents complained and criticized the firm, joking that sparrows would turn black after flying over WISCO's mills.

The Bretton Woods 2 system – where China and then the oil-exporters provided (subsidized) financing to the US to sustain their exports – will come close to ending, at least temporarily. If the US and Europe are not importing much, the rest of the world won’t be exporting much.

And rather than ending with a whimper, Bretton Woods 2 may end with a bang. In some sense Bretton Woods 2 has been on life support for a while now. China’s recent export growth has depended far more on Europe than on the US. US demand for non-oil imports peaked in 2006. One irony of the past year is that the US was borrowing far more from China that it was buying from China. Campaign rhetoric that the US was paying for Saudi oil with funds borrowed from China isn’t far off – though it leaves out the fact that the US also borrows from Saudi Arabia to pay for Venezuelan, Mexican and Nigerian oil.

If Bretton Woods 2 ends in 2009 – if US demand for imports falls sharply in the last part of 2008 and early 2009, bringing the US trade deficit down – it won’t have ended in the way Nouriel and I outlined back in late 2004 and early 2005. We postulated that foreign demand for US debt would dry up – pushing up US Treasury rates and delivering a nasty shock to a housing-centric economy. As Brad DeLong notes, it didn’t quite play out that way. The US and European banking system collapsed before the balance of financial terror collapsed. Dr. DeLong writes: All of us from Lawrence Summers to John Taylor were expecting a very different financial crisis. We were expecting the ‘Balance of Financial Terror’ between Asia and America to collapse and produce chaos. We are not having that financial crisis. Instead we are having a very different financial crisis. Catastrophic failures of risk management throughout the entire banking sector caused a relatively minor collapse in housing prices to freeze up global finance to a degree that has not been seen since the Great Depression. The end result of this crisis though could be rather similar: a sharp contraction in credit, a fall in US economic activity, a fall in US imports and a fall in the amount of foreign financing the US needs.* The US government is (possibly) trying to offset the fall in private demand by borrowing more and spending more — but as of now there is realistic risk that the fall in private activity will trump the fiscal stimulus.