Group items tagged demographics - Copper end use trends

Demographic projections and trade implications - 0 views

piaohaoreport.sampasite.com/...aphic-projections-and-trad.htm

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shared by Wade Ren on 22 May 08 - Cached

  To summarize the raw numbers, China’s population is expected to grow from 1.32 billion today to 1.46 billion in 2030, after which it will decline slowly, to around 1.42 billion in 2050.  Its working population is currently around 840 million.  This component of the population will rise in the next ten years to around 910 million and then will decline quite rapidly to around 790 million by 2050.
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The graph below shows the composition of China’s population by age group.  Needless to say the most dramatic change is the explosive growth of the over-65 population, followed by the decline in the share of the young.  Another way of understanding this is to note that China’s median age basically climbs over this period from 24 to 45 (which, by the way, may have favorable consequence for long-term political stability).
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I don’t have the figures yet from before 1990, but looking at other sources I would guess that China’s working population grew by about 2% or more annually during the 1970s and 1980s.  In the 1990s, as the table indicates, the growth rate of the working population slowed to 1.72%, declining further in the current decade to around 1.42% on average.  The number of working Chinese keeps growing until around the middle of the next decade, and then begins to decline by about half a percent a year.
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All this has important implications both for nominal growth rates and per capita growth rates in the next few decades.  For one thing, a country’s GDP growth rate can be expressed as a factor of the growth rate of its working population and the growth rate of average productivity per worker.  As the growth rate of the working population swings from positive to negative – by a little more than 2%, depending on what periods you compare – this will have a commensurate impact on Chinese GDP growth rates, i.e. all other things being equal (which of course they are not).  China’s equilibrium growth rate should be about 2% lower than the equilibrium growth rate of the past two or three decades.
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 This implies that over the last three decades China has had a demographic bias towards trade surpluses (working population, a proxy for production, grew faster than total population, a proxy for consumption), but over the next three decades it is likely to have a demographic bias towards trade deficits.  
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Three years ago I argued in a Wall Street Journal OpEd piece that because of the aging and declining populations of Europe and Japan (and to a lesser extent China and Russia), compared to the growing population and relatively stable age distribution in the US, it was not unreasonable for the former countries to run large current account surpluses with the US since they would need the accumulated claims against the US to pay for the current account deficits they would need to run to manage their demographic adjustments.  This is why I have never been terribly worried about the sustainability of the US trade deficit.  In the next decade it is likely that demographic changes will create pressures to reverse those US trade deficits.
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Using trends - 74 views

No attempt for a complete answer, but this summer, I've read through The Tipping Point, 'that magic moment when ideas, trends and social behaviors cross a threshold, tip and spread like wildfire'....

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started by Colin Bennett on 21 Sep 07 1 follow-up, last by Hans De Keulenaer on 21 Sep 07

Temporary Recession or the End of Growth? - 0 views

energybulletin.net/49798

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shared by Colin Bennett on 07 Aug 09 - Cached

Colin Bennett on 07 Aug 09

Economic Growth, The Financial Crisis, and Peak Oil For several years, a swelling subculture of commentators (which includes the present author) has been forecasting a financial crash, basing this prognosis on the assessment that global oil production was about to peak. (2) Our reasoning went like this: Continual increases in population and consumption cannot continue forever on a finite planet. This is an axiomatic observation with which everyone familiar with the mathematics of compounded arithmetic growth must agree, even if they hedge their agreement with vague references to "substitutability" and "demographic transitions." (3) This axiomatic limit to growth means that the rapid expansion in both population and per-capita consumption of resources that has occurred over the past century or two must cease at some particular time. But when is this likely to occur? The unfairly maligned Limits to Growth studies, published first in 1972 with periodic updates since, have attempted to answer the question with analysis of resource availability and depletion, and multiple scenarios for future population growth and consumption rates. The most pessimistic scenario in 1972 suggested an end of world economic growth around 2015. (4)

<div class="cArrow"> </div><div class="cContentInner">Economic Growth, The Financial Crisis, and Peak Oil For several years, a swelling subculture of commentators (which includes the present author) has been forecasting a financial crash, basing this prognosis on the assessment that global oil production was about to peak. (2) Our reasoning went like this: Continual increases in population and consumption cannot continue forever on a finite planet. This is an axiomatic observation with which everyone familiar with the mathematics of compounded arithmetic growth must agree, even if they hedge their agreement with vague references to "substitutability" and "demographic transitions." (3) This axiomatic limit to growth means that the rapid expansion in both population and per-capita consumption of resources that has occurred over the past century or two must cease at some particular time. But when is this likely to occur? The unfairly maligned Limits to Growth studies, published first in 1972 with periodic updates since, have attempted to answer the question with analysis of resource availability and depletion, and multiple scenarios for future population growth and consumption rates. The most pessimistic scenario in 1972 suggested an end of world economic growth around 2015. (4)</div>

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Home 2025: GE's Appliances of the Future - 0 views

www.geappliances.com/home2025

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shared by Colin Bennett on 14 Oct 13 - No Cached

GE has imagined the technological enhancements that will change the way we live and how our homes will look a dozen years from now after studying trends in advances in food science, demographic shifts, ecological issues, healthcare services, water scarcity and home delivery.
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