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In depth story about the Federal Reserve failure to act as an unregulated subprime mortgage industry raced out of control, and major banking and financial institutions bought into the wild wild west of high interest rate - predatory lending. excerpt:  during the years of the housing boom, pleas from consumer advocate groups failed to move the Fed, the sole federal regulator with authority over subprime mortgage businesses. Under a policy quietly formalized in 1998, the Fed refused to police lenders' compliance with federal laws protecting borrowers, despite repeated urging by consumer advocates across the country and even by other government agencies. The hands-off policy, which the Fed reversed earlier this month, created a double standard. Banks and their subprime affiliates made loans under the same laws, but only the banks faced regular federal scrutiny. Under the policy, the Fed did not even investigate consumer complaints against the affiliates.

Awesome!  Once again Rush takes us to school. excerpt: VAN SUSTEREN: I guess I mean a motive to -- an intentional motive to hurt the country, versus his (Obama) ideology is one that the way you achieve ideals is different values. LIMBAUGH: This is the question. We are living under a number of assumptions about Obama that have been presented to us by elites of both parties. One of the illusions is Obama's brilliant, that he's smarter than anybody else in the room, messianic. We have never had a politician like this in our midst, we were told in 2007, 2008. Nobody like Obama has ever trod our soil. He was going to unify us. The world was going to love us again. It's going to lower the sea levels. I mean, ridiculous stuff. So the question is, is he just dumb? Does he really believe this economic stuff? Does he really believe that taking capital, money out of the private sector and transferring it to government and unions is the way you grow the private sector? Is that the way (INAUDIBLE) Does he really believe that? Is he that ill educated? Is he the product of nothing other than the American education system and whoever influenced him at home when he was young? Or is he an ideologue? Is he a Marxist socialist who has an agenda that's oriented toward cutting the country down to size? I mean, that's the question. For me, the answer to the question is irrelevant. I think that whatever he's doing, why he's doing it, it's obvious he is doing it. He is taking steps, these 10 policies that are injurious to the country, injurious to individuals, targeting as the enemy the people who work in this country, targeting as the enemy that people that pay taxes. This business of this Occupy Wall Street crowd, which is his -- it was created I think on the basis that Romney was going to be the Republican nominee. Romney's Wall Street, so you get Obama's band out there, Occupy Wall Street, protesting. It was set up to oppose Romney -- Wall Street blamed for all these ills in the e

New-New Deal, bailouts, trillions in debt, antitax mindset spell disaster .... 1) Dot-Com Crash .. Stock market loses $8 Trillion ....2) SubPrime Meltdown: $8.2 Trillion taxpayer loses ....3) MegaBubble Cycles Continue to Hit: 41,000 special-interest lobbyist working a Congress determined to cut taxes while exploding spending, a credit crunch based on consumer debt of $2.5 Trillion, unfunded obligations in SS and Medicare now at $60 Trillion, hidden bailout costs of $5 Trillion, Fannie and Freddie $5 Trillion securitized subprime leveraged 40 times over into $200 Trillion of insured loans and custom derivatives. It's a mess ......

Whoa.  This is bad stuff.  The facts, the numbers, the players.  They all point to our Federal government, the Clinton Administration in 1993, Democrat obstruction of much needed reform, and a Democratic Congress in 2007 as the catalist that blew an $18 Trillion dollar hole in our economy.  Miserable socialist bastardos!! excerpt:  Fannie and Freddie's congressional sponsors-some of whom are now leading the administration's effort to "reform" the financial system-have a lot to answer for. Rep. Barney Frank (D., Mass.), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, sponsored legislation adopted in 2008 that established a new regulatory structure for the GSEs. But by then it was far too late. The GSEs had begun buying risky loans in 1993 to meet the "affordable housing" requirements established under congressional direction by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Most of the damage was done from 2005 through 2007, when Fannie and Freddie were binging on risky mortgages. Back then, Mr. Frank was the bartender, denying that there was any cause for concern, and claiming that he wanted to "roll the dice" on subsidized housing support. View Full Image Associated Press In 2005, the Senate Banking Committee, then controlled by Republicans, adopted tough regulatory legislation that would have established more auditing and oversight of the two agencies. But it was passed out of committee on a partisan vote, and with no Democratic support it never came to a vote. By the end of 2008, Fannie and Freddie held or guaranteed approximately 10 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages and mortgage-backed securities (MBS)-risky loans with a total principal balance of $1.6 trillion. These are now defaulting at unprecedented rates, accounting for both their 2008 insolvency and their growing losses today. Since 2008, under government control, the two agencies have continued to buy dicey mortgages in order to stabilize housing prices. There is more to th

Half of all subprime mortgage backed securities wound up on the balance sheets of banks. This fact surprises many people who think that the problem with securitization is that it let banks off-load risky loans onto investors. If that was the strategy, however, banks wouldn't have wound up with such huge holdings of subprime securities. So why did banks snap up so many mortgage backed securities? Even banks that were originating mortgage loans preferred to securitize them, and then hold the securities. Why would they do that rather than just hold the loans? The answer is that bank regulations encouraged them to own securities rather than loans. Under the international Basel capital requirements, a well-capitalized bank was required to hold $4 for every $100 in individual mortgages-a 4% reserve requirement. But if it held the securitized the AAA and AA tranches, the bank only had to hold $1.60 in capital. That's a huge incentive to trade in a loan for a mortgage backed security. But the capital regulations did more than just create incentives to own mortgage backed securities. They allowed banks to dramatically increase their balance sheets. The lower reserve requirement allowed banks to buy even more securities than it could make loans. A bank with $4 billion in reserve could hold $100 billion in loans. But that same $4 billion could instead be used to invest in $250 billion worth of mortgage backed securities.

But then a caller challenged Frank's continued insistence that the meltdown was brought on by Republican deregulation, citing the 1999 NY Times article concerning Clinton Administration efforts to force Fannie to ease mortgage standards in order to provide more minority and lower-income lending. The caller reminded Barney of his own words as ranking member from a 2003 Times piece reporting Bush's initiative to reign in Fannie and Freddie by creating new oversight under the Treasury Department:

This interview should be must reading for every citizen of this world.  Doug Casey lays it out, explaining in the simplest of terms the problem of corrupt governments and banksters.  Put this RSS feed right next to Sir Charles' Priced In Gold" blog as essential to start your day with reading. excerpt: "Anyone with any sense should withdraw whatever cash they have in European banks, whether in euros or any other currency, immediately. Cyprus demonstrated that governments are quite willing and able to confiscate money sitting in a bank account in order to preserve the banking system. We live in Bizarro World. L: Why would it spread? Cyprus was said to be particularly vulnerable because of its strong Greek connections; Cypriot banks had bought of lot Greek debt. Would people in Luxembourg be as exposed? Doug: All banks are in effect creatures of the state at this point. They all own a lot of government bonds, which are considered the most secure form of capital. Of course, that's the opposite of the truth; all these governments are bankrupt as well. The Greek government is just more overtly bankrupt than most. Actually, we should take a minute here to discuss what a properly run banking system looks like. Historically, banks offered two types of accounts: demand deposits and time deposits. Demand deposits are what we call checking accounts today, but the original idea was that you'd pay your bank to store your money securely, and you had the right to "demand" your deposit back immediately, and to transfer funds via check. The idea of time deposits, which became savings accounts, was that the bank would pay you interest when you deposited your money with them for a specific period of time. That's why it's called a "time" deposit; you lent the bank your money for a given time, as did other depositors, and the banks would always know how much money they could lend out - at higher interest rates. Furthermore, loans made against time deposits were always short term

Savings & Loan crisis regulator Bill Black testifies in front of the House in 2011.  He explains the financial collapse of 2008, the role of subprime and liar's loans, and the incredible fraud running rampant through the Bankster industry.  Lehman Brothers alone was responsible for near 80% of the fraudulent liar loan mortgage security packages sold throughout the world.  Black lays much of the blame on the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and three individuals: Greenspan, Bernanke, and Timothy Geitner (NY Federal Reserve).  He compares how regulators with limited authority were able to contain and minimise the Savings and Loan fraud problem, with the near total lack of effort by the Federal Reserve, FDIC and SEC regulators.  Extrordinary testimony.  And Congress, the Justice Department, the Federal rEserve, the SEC, the FDIC and all the other elite regulators continue to do NOTHING!

Another great piece of writing about the 2008 financial collapse, from Mike Taibi. excerpt: At first,  I couldn't remember where I knew that name from. But then I looked it up and saw an explosive Atlantic magazine story, published last year, called, "E-mails Suggest Bear Stearns Cheated Clients Out Of Millions." And then I remembered that piece, and it hit me: Jeffrey Verschleiser is one of the biggest assholes in the entire world! The story begins at Bear Stearns, where Verschleiser used to work, up until the company exploded, in large part because of him personally. Back in the day, you see, Verschleiser headed Bear's mortgage-backed securities operations. Toward the end of his tenure, his particular specialty began with what at the time was the usual industry-wide practice, putting together gigantic packages of crappy subprime mortgages and dumping them on unsuspecting clients. But Verschleiser reportedly went beyond that. According to a lawsuit later filed by a bond insurer called Ambac, Verschleiser also masterminded a kind of double-dipping scheme. What he would do is sell a bunch of toxic mortgages into a trust, which like all mortgage trusts had provisions written into their pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) that required the original lenders to buy the loans back if they went into default. So Verschleiser would sell bad mortgages back to the banks at a discount, but instead of passing the money back to the trust, he and other Bear execs allegedly pocketed the funds. From the Atlantic story:

From February 2013.

Technicality or Fatal Flaw? To foreclose on real property, the plaintiff must be able to produce a promissory note or assignment establishing title. Early cases focused on MERS' inability to produce such a note, but most courts continued to consider the note a mere technicality and ignored it. Landmark newer opinions, however, stress that this defect is not just a procedural. but a substantive failure, one that is fatal to the plaintiff's case. The latest of these decisions came down in California on May 20, 2010, in a bankruptcy case called In re Walker, Case no. 10-21656-E-11. The court held that MERS could not foreclose because it was a mere nominee and that as a result plaintiff Citibank could not collect on its claim. The judge opined: "Since no evidence of MERS' ownership of the underlying note has been offered and other courts have concluded that MERS does not own the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank. Since MERS did not own the underlying note, it could not transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to another. Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under California law."

Meeting the characters in "House of Cards," it's not easy to conceive of people less deserving of federal assistance. In 1997, Bear Stearns helped pioneer the subprime mortgage-backed security by serving as co-underwriter on a $385 million offering. By the mid-2000s, Bear was the leading issuer of such securities and a leader in collateralized debt obligations, which offered even less transparency to investors. Bear was a vertically integrated manufacturer of mortgage chaos, making individual loans to home buyers, servicing the loans, bundling them into pools for investors, marketing the securities and also borrowing huge sums to finance internal hedge funds that held onto these dodgy assets. House of Cards By William D. Cohan (Doubleday, 468 pages, $27.95) Mr. Cohan describes the succession of government policies that encouraged Bear and others to invest so heavily in mortgage finance, from the Fed's easy money to Clinton-era changes to the Community Reinvestment Act requiring more loans to low-income borrowers. But the firm itself deserves the lion's share of the blame for its own collapse. Suggestions to sell some of its risky mortgage assets, or to raise capital, or to consider merger partners were brushed aside in the years and months leading up to the debacle. Paul Friedman, chief operating officer of Bear's fixed-income division, tells Mr. Cohan that "we did this to ourselves. . . . It's our fault for allowing it to get this far, and for not taking any steps to do anything about it."

The best evidence that Obama's new mortgage scheme won't end well: look at the people who are the most excited about it. It's the same, smarmy mortgage guys that profited handsomely from the subprime crisis. In a great bit of deep dive reporting over at Salon -- hardly an outfit you'd expect to be critical of Obama -- Alyssa Katz, with help from The Nation Institute (also very liberal), shows how modifications are hardly the paragon of progressive idealism:

Good explanation of this 2007 FASB accounting rule that wrecked havoc in September of 2008 when GSA subprime mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both failed. When the bottom fell out from under the government backed securitized mortgage pools, banks were forced by this accounting rule to radically downgrade their assets. Since banks can only lend against their assets using government controlled ratios, as the asset value was marked to a market decimated by Fannie and Freddie failures and falling housing values, this accounting rule triggered the failure of Lehman Brothers. Because of credit default swaps used to insure these thought to be publicly guaranteed securities, the Lehman failure triggered a massive default at AIG as all Lehman security holders filed insurance claims. What a mess. The authors here propose an end or at the least suspension of mark-to-market accounting rules as an immediate solution. ".... In the 1930s, because mark-to-market accounting existed, we limited the amount of time available to fix problems. At the same time, the U.S. raised taxes, increased spending and economic interference, and became protectionist. This hurt growth. The reason the Great Depression was so bad is that we took away time and growth.

Washington a few months ago might have bought the entire stock of subprime mortgages for about half the money committed by the Fed and Treasury last week to prop up Citigroup and spur consumer and mortgage lending. Buying up bad mortgages would at least have left the private sector in charge of issuing new credit, which -- however bad its performance during the housing bubble -- would likely produce better results than government directing credit allocation in the economy. They (Federal Reserve-Treasury-FDIC-Congress) failed to douse the confidence/systemic-risk fire and now have moved on to fighting recession by turning credit allocation into a public utility. Vikram Pandit of Citigroup says: "We have gone from arm's length, free market, just-in-time availability" of funding to a system where big credit-reliant businesses now have only one place to turn, government.

Maybe Washington will succeed in forestalling a deep and prolonged recession. Maybe all the money ($8 trillion by one count) being printed to acquire or insure mortgages, student loans, credit card receivables, commercial paper and banking shares will be seamlessly withdrawn once those assets are sold back to willing parties in the private sector when the panic has passed. Maybe taxpayers will even make a profit on the deal.

There is a rising myth of the single bubble which suggests that The Great Unwind -- manifest as the global credit crunch -- is essentially about subprime mortgage default, a USD 1.5 trillion challenge. The truth is that there are as many as eight bubbles at play which are in the process of bursting, taking the form of deleverage on an unprecedented scale. Even 1929 pales in comparison. At a recent ATCA roundtable we posed the following questions for Socratic dialogue:

I've been reading John Mauldin's newsletter for some time now.  The guy is so grounded, and his writing style is fluid.  Mostly though i appreciate the depth of background information that surrounds the simplicity of his explanations.  Note his connections to George Friedman, Niall Ferguson David Rosenberg, Lacy Hunt and Gary Shilling.  Quite a murders row of economic thinking.  anyway, John's newsletter has become the bottom line of my economic thinking. excerpt:     "Our immersion in the details of crises that have arisen over the past eight centuries and in data on them has led us to conclude that the most commonly repeated and most expensive investment advice ever given in the boom just before a financial crisis stems from the perception that 'this time is different.' That advice, that the old rules of valuation no longer apply, is usually followed up with vigor. Financial professionals and, all too often, government leaders explain that we are doing things better than before, we are smarter, and we have learned from past mistakes. Each time, society convinces itself that the current boom, unlike the many booms that preceded catastrophic collapses in the past, is built on sound fundamentals, structural reforms, technological innovation, and good policy." - This Time is Different (Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff) When does a potential crisis become an actual crisis, and how and why does it happen? Why did most everyone believe there were no problems in the US (or Japanese or European or British) economies in 2006? Yet now we are mired in a very difficult situation. "The subprime problem will be contained," said now controversially confirmed Fed Chairman Bernanke, just months before the implosion and significant Fed intervention. I have just returned from Europe, and the discussion often turned to the potential of a crisis in the Eurozone if Greece defaults. Plus, we take a look at the very positive US GDP numbers released this morning. Are we final

Short intro to the Michael Lewis article in Vanity Fair about the AIG implosion: http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/08/aig200908?currentPage=1 excerpt: While nearly every other Wall Street firm had AIG's Financial Products group in Wilton, Connecticut on speed dial, Citigroup reportedly avoided doing business with them. Instead of off-loading risk onto the insurance giant by taking out credit default swap contracts, Citigroup prefered to keep one-hundred percent of the risk themselves, an AIG trader tells Michael Lewis in Vanity Fair. Lewis has a long article in this month's Vanity Fair that describes how AIG FP blew up. It's finally online and makes for an entertaining read. In case you are pressed for time, here's the short version: they sold lots of credit default swaps on subprime mortgage backed paper while no one internally had a clue what was going on.