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Gary Edwards

A history of the Mortgage - Housing dilemma by Arnold Kling | EconLog | Library of Econ... - 0 views

econlog.econlib.org/...my_fantasy_test.html

financial-crisis financial-solutions socialism mortgage-history banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 02 Mar 09 - Cached
  • Method A suffered a breakdown in the 1970's, because inflation was allowed to get out of control. The 6 percent mortgage interest rates that were commonly charged by savings and loans became untenable when inflation and interest rates soared to double-digit levels. The savings and loan industry went out of business. Whether Method B could survive a similar shock is unclear. The right lesson to learn from the 1970's was not that we should use Method B. The right lesson to learn is that we should not let inflation get out of hand.
    • Gary Edwards
      Gary Edwards on 02 Mar 09
       
      Government inflation (thank you Jimmy Carter) as the cause of the savings and loan collapse!
  • The secondary mortgage market began in 1968, when the United States formed the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). GNMA pooled loans originated under programs by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA) and sold these pools to investors. The purpose of this, as with the quasi-privatization of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) that took place that year, was to take Federally guaranteed mortgage loans off of the books. President Johnson, fighting an unpopular war in Vietnam, wanted to save himself the embarrassment of having to come to Congress to ask for larger and larger increases in the ceiling on the national debt. Thus, the first steps toward mortgage securitization were taken in order to disguise financial reality using accounting gimmicks. It has been the same ever since.
    • Gary Edwards
      Gary Edwards on 02 Mar 09
       
      There it is, in all it'snaked glory. The government created the secondary mortgage market, spinning up Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie for the purpose of taking federally subsidized and guaranteed mortgages off the the official government books. hence the quasi-gov orgs. It's an accounting gimmick!!!!
  • Gary Edwards on 02 Mar 09
     
    Excellent study of how we got into this problem that the socialist are now using to kill forever the American Dream: "..... Forty years ago, depository institutions handled mortgage credit risk very differently than they do today. Back then, the depository institution, which was typically a savings and loan association, held mortgages that were underwritten by its own employees, given to borrowers and backed by homes in its own community. These were almost always 30-year, fixed-rate loans, with borrowers having made a significant down payment, often 20 percent of the price of the home. Call this approach to mortgage lending "Method A." Today, mortgage loans held by depository institutions are often in the form of securities. These securities are backed by loans originated in distant communities by unknown borrowers, underwritten by mortgage brokers or other personnel not employed by the depository institution. The loans are often not 30-year fixed-rate loans, and the borrowers have typically made down payments of 5 percent or less, including loans with no down payment at all. Call this approach to mortgage lending "Method B." If you compare the two methods using common sense, then Method B does not pass a simple sanity check. In fact, the current financial crisis consists of banks that are up to their necks in Method B......"
Gary Edwards

AEI - The Error at the Heart of the Dodd-Frank Act - 0 views

www.aei.org/101077

DFA Dodd-Frank-Act Banksters financial-collapse

shared by Gary Edwards on 07 Sep 11 - No Cached
  • The underlying assumption of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) is that the 2008 financial crisis was caused by the disorderly bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
  • This is evident in the statements of officials and the principal elements of the act, which would tighten the regulation of large financial institutions to prevent their failing, and establish an "orderly resolution" system outside of bankruptcy if they do.
  • The financial crisis, however, was caused by the mortgage meltdown, a sudden and sharp decline in housing and mortgage values as a massive housing bubble collapsed in 2007. This scenario is known to scholars as a "common shock"—a sudden decline in the
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • 27 million loans—were subprime or otherwise weak and risky loans.
  • The reason for this was the US government's housing policy, which—in the early 1990s—began to require that government agencies and others regulated or controlled by government reduce their mortgage underwriting standards so borrowers who had not previously had access to mortgage credit would be able to buy homes. The government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration, and banks and savings and loan associations (S&Ls) subject to the Community Reinvestment Act were all required to increase their acquisition of loans to homebuyers at or below the median income in their communities. Often, government policies required Fannie, Freddie, and the others to acquire loans to borrowers at or below 80 percent, and in some cases 60 percent, of median income.
  • Sometimes it is argued that the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) prevented more failures. That seems highly unlikely. The first funds were made available under TARP on October 28, 2008, about six weeks after the panic following Lehman's failure. By that time, any firm that had been mortally wounded by Lehman's collapse would have collapsed itself. Moreover, most of the TARP funds were quickly repaid by the largest institutions, and many of the smaller ones, only eight months later, in mid-June 2009. This is strong ¬evidence that the funds were not needed to cover losses coming from the Lehman bankruptcy. If there were such losses, they would still have been embedded in the balance sheets of those institutions. If the funds were needed at all—and many of the institutions took them reluctantly and under government pressure—it was to restore investor confidence that the recipients were not so badly affected by the common shock of the decline in housing and mortgage values that they could not fund orderly withdrawals, if necessary. However, even if we assume that TARP funds prevented the failure of some large financial institutions, it seems clear that the underlying cause of each firm's weakness was the decline in the value of its MBS holdings, and not any losses suffered as a result of Lehman's bankruptcy.
  • This analysis leads to the following conclusion. Without a common shock, the failure of a single Lehman-like firm is highly unlikely to cause a financial crisis. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that in 1990 the securities firm Drexel Burnham Lambert—then, like Lehman, the fourth largest securities firm in the United States—was allowed to declare bankruptcy without any adverse consequences for the market in general. At the time, other financial institutions were generally healthy, and Drexel was not brought down by the failure of a widely held class of assets. On the other hand, in the presence of a common shock, the orderly resolution of one or a few Lehman-like financial institutions will not prevent a financial crisis precipitated by a severe common shock.
  • In effect, by giving the government the power to resolve any financial firm it believes to be failing, the act has added a whole new policy objective for the resolution of failing firms. Before Dodd-Frank, insolvency law embodied two basic policies—retain the going concern value of the firm and provide a mechanism by which creditors could realize on the assets of an insolvent firm that cannot be saved.
  • DFA will have important adverse effects on ¬insolvency law.
  • Gary Edwards on 07 Sep 11
     
    The underlying assumption of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) is that the 2008 financial crisis was caused by the disorderly bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This is evident in the statements of officials and the principal elements of the act, which would tighten the regulation of large financial institutions to prevent their failing, and establish an "orderly resolution" system outside of bankruptcy if they do. The financial crisis, however, was caused by the mortgage meltdown, a sudden and sharp decline in housing and mortgage values as a massive housing bubble collapsed in 2007. This scenario is known to scholars as a "common shock"-a sudden decline in the value of a widely held asset-which causes instability or insolvency among many financial institutions. In this light, the principal elements of Dodd-Frank turn out to be useless as a defense against a future crisis. Lehman's bankruptcy shows that in the absence of a common shock that weakens all or most financial institutions, the bankruptcy of one or a few firms would not cause a crisis; on the other hand, given a similarly severe common shock in the future, subjecting a few financial institutions to the act's orderly resolution process will not prevent a crisis. Apart from its likely ineffectiveness, moreover, the orderly resolution process in the act impairs the current insolvency system and will raise the cost of credit for all financial institutions. 
Gary Edwards

Goldman Sachs mortgage-backed securities settlement - Business Insider - 0 views

www.businessinsider.com/d-securities-settlement-2016-4

Goldman-Sachs Banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 11 Apr 16 - No Cached
  • “Goldman took $10 billion in TARP bailout funds knowing that it had fraudulently misrepresented to investors the quality of residential mortgages bundled into mortgage backed securities,” said Special Inspector General Christy Goldsmith Romero for TARP. 
  • “Many of these toxic securities were traded in a taxpayer funded bailout program that was designed to unlock frozen credit markets during the crisis.  While crisis investigations take time, SIGTARP is committed to working with our law enforcement partners to protect taxpayers and bring accountability and justice.”
  • $5 billion settlement with Goldman Sachs over the bank’s deceptive practices leading up to the financial crisis.
  • ...11 more annotations...
  • The settlement includes an agreed-upon statement of facts that describes how Goldman Sachs made multiple representations to RMBS investors about the quality of the mortgage loans it securitized and sold to investors, its process for screening out questionable loans, and its process for qualifying loan originators. 
  • Contrary to those representations, Goldman Sachs securitized and sold RMBS backed by large numbers of loans from originators whose mortgage loans contained material defects.
  • In the statement of facts, Goldman Sachs acknowledges that it securitized thousands of Alt-A, and subprime mortgage loans and sold the resulting residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) to investors for tens of billions of dollars. 
  • During the course of its due diligence process, Goldman Sachs received pertinent information indicating that significant percentages of the loans reviewed did not conform to the representations it made to investors.
  • Goldman also received and failed to disclose negative information that it obtained regarding the originators’ business practices.  Indeed, Goldman’s due diligence vendors provided Goldman with reports reflecting that the vendors had graded significant numbers and percentages of sampled loans as EV3s, i.e., not in compliance with originator underwriting guidelines. 
  • In certain circumstances, Goldman reevaluated loan grades and directed that such loans be waived into the pools to be purchased or securitized. 
  • In many cases, 80 percent or more of the loans in the loan pools Goldman purchased and securitized were not sampled for credit and compliance due diligence. 
  • Nevertheless, Goldman approved various offerings for securitization without requiring further due diligence to determine whether the remaining loans in the deal contained defects.  A Goldman employee overseeing due diligence for a particular loan pool noted that the pool included loans originated with “[e]xtremely aggressive underwriting” and “large program exceptions made without compensating factors.”  Despite this observation, Goldman did not review the remaining portion of the pool, and subsequently securitized thousands of loans from the pool. 
  • Goldman made statements to investors in offering documents and in certain other marketing materials regarding its process for reviewing and approving originators, yet it failed to disclose  to investors negative information it obtained about mortgage loan originators and its practice of securitizing loans from suspended originators. 
  • Attorney General Schneiderman was elected in 2010 and took office in 2011, when the five largest mortgage servicing banks, 49 state attorneys general, and the federal government were on the verge of agreeing to a settlement that would have released the banks – including Bank of America – from liability for virtually all misconduct related to the financial crisis.
  • Attorney General Schneiderman refused to agree to such sweeping immunity for the banks. As a result, Attorney General Schneiderman secured a settlement that preserved a wide range of claims for further investigation and prosecution.
  • Gary Edwards on 11 Apr 16
     
    If this doesn't qualify as fraud, nothing does. "We now know more about the $5 billion settlement Goldman Sachs has agreed to pay related to residential mortgage-backed securities it sold between 2005 and 2007. Regulators announced details of the settlement on Monday. Goldman Sachs initially announced the settlement in January. That nearly wiped out fourth-quarter earnings for the firm. "Today's settlement is yet another acknowledgment by one of our leading financial institutions that it did not live up to the representations it made to investors about the products it was selling," said one regulator, U.S. Attorney Benjamin B. Wagner of the Eastern District of California, in a statement. Morgan Stanley announced a similar settlement in February. It agreed to pay $3.2 billion over charges that it misled investors on the quality of mortgage loans it sold. And on Friday, the Justice Department announced that Wells Fargo had agreed to pay $1.2 billion to settle "shoddy" mortgage-lending practices. Here's what we learned about the Goldman settlement on Monday:"
Gary Edwards

Speculators, Politicians, and Financial Disasters : A history of Banking and Socialism - 0 views

www.commentarymagazine.com/...the-madness-of-crowds-13180

politics banking socialism fannie-freddie

shared by Gary Edwards on 29 Oct 08 - Cached
  • As the sorry tale of the S&L crisis suggests, the road to financial hell is sometimes paved with good intentions. There was nothing malign in attempting to keep these institutions solvent and profitable; they were of long standing, and it seemed a noble exercise to preserve them. Perhaps even more noble, and with consequences that have already proved much more threatening, was the philosophy that would eventually lead the United States into its latest financial crisis—a crisis that begins, and ends, with mortgages. A mortgage used to stay on the books of the issuing bank until it was paid off, often twenty or thirty years later. This greatly limited the number of mortgages a bank could initiate. In 1938, as part of the New Deal, the federal government established the Federal National Mortgage Association, nicknamed Fannie Mae, to help provide liquidity to the mortgage market.
  • it was, ironically, the New Deal that institutionalized discrimination against blacks seeking mortgages. In 1935 the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), established in 1934 to insure home mortgages, asked the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation—another New Deal agency, this one created to help prevent foreclosures—to draw up maps of residential areas according to the risk of lending in them. Affluent suburbs were outlined in blue, less desirable areas in yellow, and the least desirable in red. The FHA used the maps to decide whether or not to insure a mortgage, which in turn caused banks to avoid the redlined neighborhoods. These tended to be in the inner city and to comprise largely black populations. As most blacks at this time were unable to buy in white neighborhoods, the effect of redlining was largely to exclude even affluent blacks from the mortgage market.
  • In 1977, responding to political pressure to abolish the practice, Congress finally passed the Community Reinvestment Act, requiring banks to offer credit throughout their marketing areas and rating them on their compliance. This effectively outlawed redlining.
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  • in 1995, regulations adopted by the Clinton administration took the Community Reinvestment Act to a new level. Instead of forbidding banks to discriminate against blacks and black neighborhoods, the new regulations positively forced banks to seek out such customers and areas. Without saying so, the revised law established quotas for loans to specific neighborhoods, specific income classes, and specific races. It also encouraged community groups to monitor compliance and allowed them to receive fees for marketing loans to target groups.
  • the Clinton changes in 1995. As part of them, Fannie and Freddie were now permitted to invest up to 40 times their capital in mortgages; banks, by contrast, were limited to only ten times their capital. Put briefly, in order to increase the number of mortgages Fannie and Freddie could underwrite, the federal government allowed them to become grossly undercapitalized—that is, grossly to reduce their one source of insurance against failure. The risk of a mammoth failure was then greatly augmented by the sheer number of mortgages given out in the country.
    • Gary Edwards
      Gary Edwards on 29 Oct 08
       
      wow, there's that "40 to 1" lending to asset ratio that took down the big five investment banks in October of 2008!
  • Since banks knew they could offload these sub-prime mortgages to Fannie and Freddie, they had no reason to be careful about issuing them. As for the firms that bought the mortgage-based securities issued by Fannie and Freddie, they thought they could rely on the government’s implicit guarantee. AIG, the world’s largest insurance firm, was happy to insure vast quantities of these securities against default; it must have seemed like insuring against the sun rising in the West.
  • remaining at the heart of the financial beast now abroad in the world are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the mortgages they bought and turned into securities. Protected by their political patrons, they were allowed to pile up colossal debt on an inadequate capital base and to escape much of the regulatory oversight and rules to which other financial institutions are subject. Had they been treated as the potential risks to financial stability they were from the beginning, the housing bubble could not have grown so large and the pain that is now accompanying its end would not have hurt so much.
  • Gary Edwards on 29 Oct 08
     
    Fueled by easy credit, the real-estate market had been rising swiftly for some years. Members of Congress were determined to assure the continuation of that easy credit. Suddenly, the party came to a devastating halt. Defaults multiplied, banks began to fail. Soon the economic troubles spread beyond real estate. Depression stalked the land. The year was 1836.
Gary Edwards

How Government Failure Caused the Great Recession - The American, A Magazine of Ideas - 0 views

www.american.com/...ure-caused-the-great-recession

banksters obammunism financial-collapse

shared by Gary Edwards on 29 Dec 10 - No Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 29 Dec 10
     
    The banking crisis that began in August 2007 shocked markets and precipitated the Great Recession. To fully explain the banking crisis, one must account for its timing, severity, and global impact. One must also confront a startling historical contrast. If we define "banking crisis" to mean bank failures and system losses exceeding 1 percent of a country's gross domestic product (GDP), we find that in the period 1875-1913, a period of marked expansion in international trade and capital flows comparable to the last three decades, there were only four banking crises worldwide.1 By contrast, in the period 1978-2009, a period of much more extensive bank regulation, central bank intervention, government protection of depositors and other bank creditors, and government control of mortgage markets, about 140 banking crises occurred worldwide. Of these, 20 were more severe than any crisis from the earlier period of 1875-1913, in terms of total bank losses as a percent of GDP. Leading financial economists such as Charles Calomiris have argued that a necessary condition for a banking crisis is government policy that distorts the micro-incentives of banks. Likewise, University of Chicago scholar Richard Posner has argued the banks that got into trouble during the recent crisis were simply taking "risks that seemed appropriate in the environment in which they found themselves."2 In the period 1978-2009, about 140 banking crises occurred worldwide. But then why didn't a banking crisis erupt sooner-say, in the recession years of 1990-1991 or 2001-2002? What changed in recent years that led to business risk-taking capable of wrecking the U.S. housing market and the U.S. banking system and other banking systems throughout the world? Further, why were prudent credit practices reasonably maintained in credit card and commercial mortgage securitization in recent years, but wholly abandoned in residential mortgage securitization?
Gary Edwards

Why Banks Bought So Many Toxic Mortgage Bonds - 0 views

www.businessinsider.com/ny-toxic-mortgage-bonds-2009-8

financial-crisis obama-bailout Banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 08 Aug 09 - Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 08 Aug 09
     
    Half of all subprime mortgage backed securities wound up on the balance sheets of banks. This fact surprises many people who think that the problem with securitization is that it let banks off-load risky loans onto investors. If that was the strategy, however, banks wouldn't have wound up with such huge holdings of subprime securities. So why did banks snap up so many mortgage backed securities? Even banks that were originating mortgage loans preferred to securitize them, and then hold the securities. Why would they do that rather than just hold the loans? The answer is that bank regulations encouraged them to own securities rather than loans. Under the international Basel capital requirements, a well-capitalized bank was required to hold $4 for every $100 in individual mortgages-a 4% reserve requirement. But if it held the securitized the AAA and AA tranches, the bank only had to hold $1.60 in capital. That's a huge incentive to trade in a loan for a mortgage backed security. But the capital regulations did more than just create incentives to own mortgage backed securities. They allowed banks to dramatically increase their balance sheets. The lower reserve requirement allowed banks to buy even more securities than it could make loans. A bank with $4 billion in reserve could hold $100 billion in loans. But that same $4 billion could instead be used to invest in $250 billion worth of mortgage backed securities.
Gary Edwards

David Skeel: A Nation Adrift From the Rule of Law - WSJ.com - 1 views

online.wsj.com/...4184704577588822128122752.html

wsj rule-of-law David-Skeel

shared by Gary Edwards on 23 Aug 12 - No Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 23 Aug 12
     
    "No one doubts that the coming election will be the most important referendum on the size and nature of government in a generation. But another issue is nearly as important and has gotten far less attention: our crumbling commitment to the rule of law. The notion that we are governed by rules that are transparent and enacted through the legislative process-not by the whims of our leaders-is at the heart of that commitment. If legislators exceed their authority under the Constitution, or if otherwise legitimate laws are misused, courts must step in to prevent or remedy the potential harm. During the 2008 financial crisis, the government repeatedly violated these principles. When regulators bailed out Bear Stearns by engineering its sale to J.P. Morgan Chase, they flagrantly disregarded basic corporate law by "locking up" the transaction so that no other bidder could intervene. When the government bailed out AIG six months later, the Federal Reserve funded the bailout by invoking extraordinary loan powers for what was clearly an acquisition rather than a loan. (The government acquired nearly 80% of AIG's stock.) Two months later, the Treasury Department used money from the $700-billion Troubled Asset Relief Program fund to bail out the car companies. This was dubious. Under the statute, the funds were to be used for financial institutions. But the real violation came a few months later, when the government used a sham bankruptcy sale to transfer Chrysler to Fiat while almost certainly stiffing Chrysler's senior creditors. According to two leading legal scholars, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, rule-of-law violations are inevitable during a crisis. The executive branch takes all necessary steps, even if that means violating the law, until the crisis has passed. The argument is powerful, and its advocates are correct that presidents and other executive-branch officials often push the envelope during a crisis. Yet pushing the envelope isn't the same thing as f
Gary Edwards

Walking Away From Your Mortgage: Is it moral? Or is it a legitamate financial option b... - 0 views

www.businessinsider.com/away-from-your-mortgage-2009-3

financial-crisis obama-socialism banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 05 Mar 09 - Cached
  • MM CA said: Mar. 04, 1:28 PM Borrower_underwater: and your point is? defending the banks and mortgage industry? who said his house was dump? he said it was his dream home... pay attention... either way the man and his fmaily were smart enough to save 300k for a down payment. i live in california and the appreciation of housing the past 10 years was irrational and unsustainbale. he boguht three years ago. there was no crisis then. Why woudlnt he buy. Renting now is smart but then? i think you need to inderstand the crisis better. i understand a little bit more than you think i do: see my list of issues/predcitons i developed 3 mtonhs ago... most are coming true...
  • So here lies the squeeze. Originator gets paid per loan made. People in an iron lung are getting approved for subprime. Bank hopes to package loan into CMO and sell to Helsinki or some such. Who is supposed to make sure that the house is really worth what the guy in the iron lung is willing to pay? The appraiser. Not the Originator. Not the bank (we're clearly not talking the good old commmunity bank days were your loan officer knew your neighborhood).
  • it is easy to see where the bank's first protection against a borrower default, correctly establishing a home's value at the time of purchase, falls to the side. That's where it starts to look like the "pay me to rate you" goons at the rating agencies. The populace and ultimate debt holders have counted on the ratings and home valuation process to be clean but simple economic incentives should tell us otherwise.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • I agree that the argument that "it's priced into the rate" is insufficient, what is sufficient is the fact that the consequences of walking away are actually in the contract! If I stop paying, you take the house. That's why the bank gets to have a lien. It's all part of the deal we signed, remember?. I don't think walking away from the mortgage is even "breaking" the contract. We will simply be exercising a different clause of the contract: foreclosure in lieu of payment.
  • Gary Edwards on 05 Mar 09
     
    Mortgage lenders absolutely hate borrowers who walk away from underwater mortgages, especially those who could actually afford to keep paying off their mortgages but just decide it isn't worth it. They hate them so much that the term-of-art for these borrowers is "ruthless." But the ethics of mortgage lenders don't have much to recommend them. We need to decide for ourselves whether or not there's a moral obligation to keep paying off a mortgage. For some it's practically a patriotic duty. For others it's a matter of being a good neighbor, since foreclosures could hurt their home values also. Still others say it's just a matter of being a moral person who keeps promises. Great comments to this story. Check out the predictions from MM_CA. They have a diigo highlight. At the time of my reading of this story, the DOW was down 200 pts to 6678.95. The Supreme Leader is busy conducting a healthcare summit, claiming that "fixing" (read "nationalizing") the healthcare system will result in so many jobs that the economy will turn around. The comments are well worth the time!
Gary Edwards

Is This the End of Capitalism? Hardly, but it's a great excuse for the antiglobalizatio... - 0 views

online.wsj.com/...SB123862779016180329.html

financial-crisis obama-socialism reagan-capitalism G20 Banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 05 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 05 Apr 09
     
    Daniel Henninger Says Blaming Capitalism for the Crisis Overlooks the Housing Bubble - WSJ.com: "Heads of state, perplexed finance ministers, inflated retinues and journalists from 20 nations arrived in London yesterday to address "the greatest financial crisis since the Depression." By 4 p.m. London time today they will hold a press conference and go home." "Beware of real-estate salesmen. The housing bubble that floated into view in 2007 is turning into the blob that ate the world. Real-estate mortgages and their derivative securities are a significant problem. That discrete problem, however, has been pumped up to an historic "crisis of capitalism." Capitalism didn't tank the U.S. economy. Overbuilt housing did. Overbuilt housing tanked the economies of the U.K. and Ireland and Spain. If little else, we've learned that artificially cheap housing sets loose limitless moral hazard." "In a normal environment, the problems revealed by the crisis in mortgage finance would produce fixes relevant to the problem, such as resetting the ratios of assets to capital for banks and hedge funds, or telling the gnomes of finance to rethink mark-to-market and the uptick rule. More energetic reformers might consider Gary Becker's suggestion that as financial institutions expand in size, their capital requirements tighten, so that compulsive eaters like Citigroup can fit inside their capital base." "Two signal events in history are shaping the politics of the current economic crisis: the Great Depression and the Reagan presidency (and in Europe, Thatcherism)." "The Depression put in motion an historic tension between public and private sectors over who sets a nation's course. After 50 years of public dominance, Reagan's presidency tipped the scales back toward private enterprise. The economic life of the ensuing 35 years became "the American model." Every waking hour of this economically liberal era, the losing side has wanted to tip the balance back toward public-sector
Paul Merrell

Bank Of America's $17 Billion Mortgage Crisis Settlement Could Be A Total Bust | ThinkP... - 0 views

thinkprogress.org/...bank-of-america-deal-shrinkage

economic-collapse litigation BoA settlement criminal-fraud

shared by Paul Merrell on 11 Aug 14 - No Cached
  • Bank of America has agreed to a legal settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to avoid prosecution for the hundreds of billions of dollars in bad mortgage loans that it and its subsidiaries sold to unwitting investors in the run-up to the financial crisis, according to multiple new reports. The total on-paper cost of the deal is reportedly at least $16 billion and perhaps as high as $17 billion, which makes it the largest corporate legal settlement with the government in U.S. history. But that record price tag is deceptive. The deal is unlikely to cost Bank of America anywhere close to that amount.
  • the government’s decision to pursue civil settlements rather than criminal cases against banks that inflated the toxic mortgage bubble means that shareholders pay the price while executives who oversaw the misconduct earn large bonuses.
  • “If you let a thief buy his way out of jail, you should really make sure the check doesn’t bounce,” HDL national campaign director Kevin Whelan said in an email. “Even a record $17 billion settlement is a small fraction of the damage done by B of A and Countrywide. But it could do real good for a lot of families,” Whelan said. “The fact that the JP Morgan Chase settlement has not delivered any noticeable relief to families makes us skeptical.”
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • Even at face value, the reported settlement is minuscule compared to the harm caused by Bank of America companies. The on-paper cost of the deal is less than 7 percent of the value of the mortgage deals Bank of America and its subsidiaries Countrywide and Merrill Lynch made before the crisis that have since gone bad. (Bank of America bought Countrywide and Merrill Lynch at the height of the crisis.) Those three companies issued just shy of a trillion dollars in mortgage-backed securities in the run-up to the financial collapse, and $245 billion of those products have gone bad, according to Bloomberg. Bank of America had pushed for a much smaller settlement for months, arguing that it should not have to pay for the sins of the firms it bought at bargain-bin prices when the economy was reeling. But a court ruling last month regarding Countrywide’s most notorious mortgage swindle caused the bank to change its tune, according to the New York Times. Judge Jed Rakoff ordered the bank to pay about $1.3 billion for one tranch of defective mortgages sold under a program that Countrywide nicknamed “Hustle” because of its fraudulent nature. Having lost one court case over Countrywide’s notorious misdeeds, the Times says, Bank of America decided to stop resisting federal officials’ settlement demands.
  • After tax deductions, the settlement could easily shrink below the roughly $15 billion in profits the company has reported since 2011. And because the financial crisis sucked something like $14 trillion out of the economy and destroyed tens of trillions of dollars in wealth for homeowners, the DOJ can hardly claim to have delivered a proportional response. The department’s claims about the Bank of America settlement are likely to draw political scrutiny. A bipartisan bill from Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Tom Coburn (R-OK) would require government officials to state the full tax deductibility and true cost of corporate legal settlements in all public statements about them. That bill, inspired by the revelations that JP Morgan’s sweetheart deal with the DOJ didn’t come close to the portrait that Attorney General Eric Holder painted of it, was passed out of committee late last month.
Gary Edwards

Predatory lending with a smiley face; How tax payer subsidized "loan modification" prog... - 0 views

www.salon.com/...index.html

financial-crisis obama-socialism real-estate predatory-lending salon banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 05 Mar 09 - Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 05 Mar 09
     
    They say California is a harbinger of the future. If so, we should all be thinking about possible safe havens. The article begins with a description of loan modification seminars attended by the same mortgage brokers whose predatory lending practices got us into this fix. At the seminars, these predators learn how to make even more money off of the exact same clients they pushed off the ledge. It's all about fees and high pressure churning techniques. With one very big difference: Obama is banking on tax payer funded "loan modifications" to help struggling homeowners. The ugly truth is that mortgage brokers are the real winners. Just like mortgage brokers, loan mod companies are under no obligation to act in borrowers' financial interests, short- or long-term. Under California's model contract, which brokers are encouraged to emulate in their dealings with borrowers, almost any change to a mortgage is an acceptable result, whether or not it saves a borrower money. And while the client has to accept the proposed deal in order for the company to get paid in full, the sales forces at these firms are veterans of pressure pitches to people in tough financial situations. Both Carlson and a spokesman for Mortgage Bailout Assistance indicate that their clients almost invariably take the offers they are given. The proverbial fox is helping the hens hold on to their coops, and not just in California. Seventeen states now have laws on the books effectively banning "foreclosure consultants," but most make an exception for mortgage brokers. As consumer complaints about fraudulent loan mod operations proliferate across the country, other government officials, including New York's City Council, are now following California's lead and exploring the creation of an official registry of mod brokers.
Gary Edwards

Jim Kunstler's 2014 Forecast - Burning Down The House | Zero Hedge - 0 views

www.zerohedge.com/...14-forecast-burning-down-house

Banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 08 Jan 14 - No Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 08 Jan 14
     
    Incredible must read analysis. Take away: the world is going to go "medevil". It's the only way out of this mess. Since the zero hedge layout is so bad, i'm going to post as much of the article as Diigo will allow: Jim Kunstler's 2014 Forecast - Burning Down The House Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/06/2014 19:36 -0500 Submitted by James H. Kunstler of Kunstler.com , Many of us in the Long Emergency crowd and like-minded brother-and-sisterhoods remain perplexed by the amazing stasis in our national life, despite the gathering tsunami of forces arrayed to rock our economy, our culture, and our politics. Nothing has yielded to these forces already in motion, so far. Nothing changes, nothing gives, yet. It's like being buried alive in Jell-O. It's embarrassing to appear so out-of-tune with the consensus, but we persevere like good soldiers in a just war. Paper and digital markets levitate, central banks pull out all the stops of their magical reality-tweaking machine to manipulate everything, accounting fraud pervades public and private enterprise, everything is mis-priced, all official statistics are lies of one kind or another, the regulating authorities sit on their hands, lost in raptures of online pornography (or dreams of future employment at Goldman Sachs), the news media sprinkles wishful-thinking propaganda about a mythical "recovery" and the "shale gas miracle" on a credulous public desperate to believe, the routine swindles of medicine get more cruel and blatant each month, a tiny cohort of financial vampire squids suck in all the nominal wealth of society, and everybody else is left whirling down the drain of posterity in a vortex of diminishing returns and scuttled expectations. Life in the USA is like living in a broken-down, cob-jobbed, vermin-infested house that needs to be gutted, disinfected, and rebuilt - with the hope that it might come out of the restoration process retaining the better qualities of our heritage.
Gary Edwards

Taleb: I Have Discovered The Solution To The Global Financial Crisis - 0 views

www.businessinsider.com/global-financial-crisis-2009-7

financial-crisis financial-solutions mortgage-crisis socialism-debt capitalist-prosperity Banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 14 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 14 Jul 09
     
    Nassim Taleb and his hedge-fund partner Mark Spitznagel weigh in in the FT with an analysis of the world's problem (too much debt) and a reasonable solution (convert some of the debt to equity).  Taleb explains how banks can end the mortgage crisis, lowering monthly mortgage payments by converting mortgage debt to equity: Excerpt: The only solution is to transform debt into equity across all sectors, in an organised and systematic way. Instead of sending hate mail to near-insolvent homeowners, banks should reach out to borrowers and offer lower interest payments in exchange for equity. Instead of debt becoming "binary" - in default or not - it could take smoothly-varying prices and banks would not need to wait for foreclosures to take action. Banks would turn from "hopers", hiding risks from themselves, into agents more engaged in economic activity. Excellent excellent excellent!
Gary Edwards

Peter J. Wallison: The Price for Fannie and Freddie Keeps Going Up - WSJ.com - 0 views

online.wsj.com/...3278604574624681873427574.html

financial-crisis socialist-scourge obammunism banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 31 Dec 09 - Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 31 Dec 09
     
    Whoa.  This is bad stuff.  The facts, the numbers, the players.  They all point to our Federal government, the Clinton Administration in 1993, Democrat obstruction of much needed reform, and a Democratic Congress in 2007 as the catalist that blew an $18 Trillion dollar hole in our economy.  Miserable socialist bastardos!! excerpt:  Fannie and Freddie's congressional sponsors-some of whom are now leading the administration's effort to "reform" the financial system-have a lot to answer for. Rep. Barney Frank (D., Mass.), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, sponsored legislation adopted in 2008 that established a new regulatory structure for the GSEs. But by then it was far too late. The GSEs had begun buying risky loans in 1993 to meet the "affordable housing" requirements established under congressional direction by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Most of the damage was done from 2005 through 2007, when Fannie and Freddie were binging on risky mortgages. Back then, Mr. Frank was the bartender, denying that there was any cause for concern, and claiming that he wanted to "roll the dice" on subsidized housing support. View Full Image Associated Press In 2005, the Senate Banking Committee, then controlled by Republicans, adopted tough regulatory legislation that would have established more auditing and oversight of the two agencies. But it was passed out of committee on a partisan vote, and with no Democratic support it never came to a vote. By the end of 2008, Fannie and Freddie held or guaranteed approximately 10 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages and mortgage-backed securities (MBS)-risky loans with a total principal balance of $1.6 trillion. These are now defaulting at unprecedented rates, accounting for both their 2008 insolvency and their growing losses today. Since 2008, under government control, the two agencies have continued to buy dicey mortgages in order to stabilize housing prices. There is more to th
Paul Merrell

E-Mails Show Flaws in JPMorgan's Mortgage Securities - NYTimes.com - 0 views

dealbook.nytimes.com/...w-some-mortgage-deals-were-bad

banksters financial-collapse litigation

shared by Paul Merrell on 22 Feb 13 - No Cached
  • When an outside analysis uncovered serious flaws with thousands of home loans, JPMorgan Chase executives found an easy fix. Rather than disclosing the full extent of problems like fraudulent home appraisals and overextended borrowers, the bank adjusted the critical reviews, according to documents filed early Tuesday in federal court in Manhattan. As a result, the mortgages, which JPMorgan bundled into complex securities, appeared healthier, making the deals more appealing to investors.
  • The trove of internal e-mails and employee interviews, filed as part of a lawsuit by one of the investors in the securities, offers a fresh glimpse into Wall Street’s mortgage machine, which churned out billions of dollars of securities that later imploded. The documents reveal that JPMorgan, as well as two firms the bank acquired during the credit crisis, Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns, flouted quality controls and ignored problems, sometimes hiding them entirely, in a quest for profit.
  • The lawsuit, which was filed by Dexia, a Belgian-French bank, is being closely watched on Wall Street. After suffering significant losses, Dexia sued JPMorgan and its affiliates in 2012, claiming it had been duped into buying $1.6 billion of troubled mortgage-backed securities. The latest documents could provide a window into a $200 billion case that looms over the entire industry. In that lawsuit, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has accused 17 banks of selling dubious mortgage securities to the two housing giants. At least 20 of the securities are also highlighted in the Dexia case, according to an analysis of court records.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • The Dexia lawsuit centers on complex securities created by JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual during the housing boom. As profits soared, the Wall Street firms scrambled to pump out more investments, even as questions emerged about their quality.
  • Dexia’s lawsuit is part of a broad assault on Wall Street for its role in the 2008 financial crisis, as prosecutors, regulators and private investors take aim at mortgage-related securities. New York’s attorney general, Eric T. Schneiderman, sued JPMorgan last year over investments created by Bear Stearns between 2005 and 2007.
  • In a statement shortly after he sued JPMorgan Chase, Mr. Schneiderman said the lawsuit was a template “for future actions against issuers of residential mortgage-backed securities that defrauded investors and cost millions of Americans their homes.”
Paul Merrell

Jamie Dimon's $13 Billion Secret | The Nation - 0 views

m.thenation.com/...jamie-dimons-13-billion-secret

financial-collapse banksters fraud litigation settlement JPMorgan

shared by Paul Merrell on 23 Aug 14 - No Cached
  • In the end, the abject fear of Ben Wagner got Jamie Dimon to cave.For much of 2013, Dimon, the chairman and chief executive of the formidable JPMorgan Chase & Company, was telling anyone who would listen that it was unfair and unjust for federal and state prosecutors to blame him and his bank for the manufacture and sale of mortgage-backed securities that occurred at Bear Stearns & Company and at Washington Mutual in the years leading up to the financial crisis. When JPMorgan Chase bought those two failing firms in 2008, Dimon argued, he was just doing what Ben Bernanke, Hank Paulson and Timothy Geithner had asked him to do. Why should his bank be held financially accountable for the bad behavior at Bear and WaMu?It was a clever argument—and wrong. Dimon's relentless effort to spin his patriotic story soon collided with the fact that Wagner, the US Attorney for the Eastern District of California, had uncovered evidence that JPMorgan itself was guilty of many of the same greedy and irresponsible behaviors. Piles of subpoenaed documents and e-mails revealed that JPMorgan bankers and traders had underwritten billions of dollars' worth of questionable mortgage-backed securities that Dimon had been telling everyone had originated at Bear Stearns and WaMu. Worse, the bad behavior had occurred on Dimon's watch.
  • The likelihood that the Justice Department would file Wagner's civil complaint last fall—exposing publicly for the first time the litany of wrongdoing at JPMorgan and threatening to push it off the perch that Dimon had so artfully constructed for it over the years—ultimately brought Dimon to the table. On September 26, just weeks after the Justice Department shared a draft copy of Wagner's complaint with Dimon, the two sides arranged for a summit meeting between Dimon and Attorney General Eric Holder. By mid-November, the bank had agreed to pay $13 billion in a comprehensive settlement of mortgage-related securities claims with various branches of the federal government and a group of states, led by the attorneys general of New York, California, Illinois, Massachusetts and Delaware.It was the largest financial settlement of all time, and it kept Wagner's complaint away from the prying eyes of the public. One thing is clear: Dimon's claim that his own bankers and traders had done nothing wrong in the years leading up to the financial crisis wasn't true. "The investigators and the lawyers were uncovering very viable evidence," explains Associate Attorney General Tony West, who headed up the settlement negotiations on behalf of the Justice Department. "I think there was recognition that we had enough evidence there that would support the complaint and would support a robust lawsuit."
  • [A disclosure of my own: after JPMorgan Chase fired me as a managing director in January 2004, I brought—and lost—a wrongful-dismissal arbitration against the bank. Separately, I remain in litigation with the bank as the result of a soured investment I made in 1999.]
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Dimon was more circumspect. In a conference call the day the settlement was announced, he mostly kept quiet while Marianne Lake, the firm's CFO, led financial analysts through the details, including how $7 billion of the $13 billion fine would be tax-deductible.
  • Paul Merrell on 23 Aug 14
     
    In a Matt Taibbi-quality lengthy report, William Cohan takes the reader inside the lengthy negotiations of JPMorgan's $13 billion settlement with state and federal prosecutors. JPMorgan admitted to criminal wrongdoing, and the settlement does not include immunity from criminal prosecution for anybody. But the author notes that there is not even a hint that anyone is working on criminal charges. There's a lot of discussion of dissension within the ranks of different state and federal attorneys involved. The article paints Ben Wagner, the US Attorney for the Eastern District of California, as the hero.  In my book, no one involved deserves hero status because no criminal charges have been filed against any JPMorgan managers or board members, hence there is still no incentive for any of the fraudsters who brought down the economy in 2008 to behave differently in the future. JPMorgan emains not too big to fail but too politically connected for its principals to be jailed. According to the article, the government lawyers had iron-clad proof that a group of JPMorgan managing directors had been informed that pools of mortages they were planning to buy were toxic but "buy two of the loan pools anyway, including those with the squirrelly mortgages. JPMorgan then proceeded to bundle "hundreds of millions of dollars of loans from those pools into one security." Wagner found that between the start of 2006 and the middle of 2007-when the mortgage securitization frenzy was at its peak-JPMorgan packaged and sold securities containing thousands of mortgages that were rated by a third-party evaluator to be of extremely low quality, meeting few, if any, of the bank's underwriting standards." If true, that is very serious fraud deserving of the directors' prosecution for criminal fraud and lengthy prison sentences.   The article touches on A.G. Holder's too big to jail argument but that argument, in my opinion, deserves no credibility before antitrust actions are filed to c
Paul Merrell

Russia and China: Watch Out Moody's, Here We Come! | New Eastern Outlook - 0 views

journal-neo.org/...watch-out-moody-s-here-we-come

banksters ratings-agencies history Russia China

shared by Paul Merrell on 22 Jan 15 - No Cached
  • In 1945 it was easy to get a defeated Europe to agree to Bretton Woods Gold Exchange Standard in which all currencies would be fixed to the US dollar and the dollar alone fixed to gold at $35 an ounce, where it remained until the system collapsed in August 1971 and Nixon abandoned gold-dollar convertibility. By then Europe was booming with modern reconstructed industry and the USA was becoming a rustbelt. France and Germany demanded US gold bullion instead of inflated dollars, and US gold reserves were vanishing. After 1971, the dollar flooded the world unfettered by gold reserve requirements and US military might during the Cold War forced Japan, Western Europe and others including OPEC to accept constantly inflating paper US dollars. From 1970 until about 2000 the volume of dollars in the world had risen some 2,900%. Because the dollar was the world “reserve currency” needed by all for trade in oil, goods, grains, the world was forced to swallow a de facto mammoth inflation after 1971.First appeared: http://journal-neo.org/2015/01/22/watch-out-moody-s-here-we-come/
  • Paul Merrell on 22 Jan 15
     
    The established New York credit agencies would play a strategic role in this post-1971 dollar system. During the 1970's the US Government's Securities & Exchange Commission, charged with oversight of bond and stock markets, issued a ruling giving the then-dominant New York credit rating agencies-Moody's and Standard & Poor's (and later Fitch Ratings)-a de facto guaranteed monopoly in an unregulated market, when they ruled that only "Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations" would be qualified to issue appropriate ratings, i.e. only Moody's and S&P. Corruption was made endemic to the US ratings game and Washington was party to the dirty deal. By the end of the 1970's, using the vast amount of OPEC "petro-dollars" from the two oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979, New York international banks, using London, began to loan to the rest of the world to finance imports of oil and other essentials. The New York credit rating agencies, previously primarily rating US corporate bonds, expanded into the new foreign debt markets as the largest and only established rating agencies in the new phase of dollarization and globalization of capital markets. They set up branches in Germany, France, Japan, Mexico, Argentina and other emerging markets much like the US Big Five accounting firms. During the 1980s the rating agencies played a key role in down-rating the debt of the Latin American debtor countries such as Mexico and Argentina. Their ratings determined if the debtor countries could borrow or not. Financial market insiders in London and New York openly spoke of the "political" rating agencies using their de facto monopoly to advance the agenda of Wall Street and the Dollar System behind it. Then in the 1990's, the New York rating agencies played a decisive role in spreading the "Asia Crisis" of 1997-98. With the precise timing of its downgrades they could worsen the panic because they had been suspiciously silent right up un
Gary Edwards

Obama's Mortgage Modification: Just More Predatory Lending in Disguise - 0 views

www.businessinsider.com/ory-lending-in-disguise-2009-3

finacial-crisis real-estate mortgage-crisis

shared by Gary Edwards on 05 Mar 09 - Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 05 Mar 09
     
    The best evidence that Obama's new mortgage scheme won't end well: look at the people who are the most excited about it. It's the same, smarmy mortgage guys that profited handsomely from the subprime crisis. In a great bit of deep dive reporting over at Salon -- hardly an outfit you'd expect to be critical of Obama -- Alyssa Katz, with help from The Nation Institute (also very liberal), shows how modifications are hardly the paragon of progressive idealism:
Paul Merrell

Special Investigation: How America's Biggest Bank Paid Its Fine for the 2008 Mortgage C... - 0 views

www.thenation.com/...ge-crisis-with-phony-mortgages

banksters JPMorgan Chase Dimon fraud litigation

shared by Paul Merrell on 07 Oct 17 - No Cached
  • ou know the old joke: How do you make a killing on Wall Street and never risk a loss? Easy—use other people’s money. Jamie Dimon and his underlings at JPMorgan Chase have perfected this dark art at America’s largest bank, which boasts a balance sheet one-eighth the size of the entire US economy.1 After JPMorgan’s deceitful activities in the housing market helped trigger the 2008 financial crash that cost millions of Americans their jobs, homes, and life savings, punishment was in order. Among a vast array of misconduct, JPMorgan engaged in the routine use of “robo-signing,” which allowed bank employees to automatically sign hundreds, even thousands, of foreclosure documents per day without verifying their contents. But in the United States, white-collar criminals rarely go to prison; instead, they negotiate settlements. Thus, on February 9, 2012, US Attorney General Eric Holder announced the National Mortgage Settlement, which fined JPMorgan Chase and four other mega-banks a total of $25 billion.2 JPMorgan’s share of the settlement was $5.3 billion, but only $1.1 billion had to be paid in cash; the other $4.2 billion was to come in the form of financial relief for homeowners in danger of losing their homes to foreclosure. The settlement called for JPMorgan to reduce the amounts owed, modify the loan terms, and take other steps to help distressed Americans keep their homes. A separate 2013 settlement against the bank for deceiving mortgage investors included another $4 billion in consumer relief.3 A Nation investigation can now reveal how JPMorgan met part of its $8.2 billion settlement burden: by using other people’s money.4 Here’s how the alleged scam worked. JPMorgan moved to forgive the mortgages of tens of thousands of homeowners; the feds, in turn, credited these canceled loans against the penalties due under the 2012 and 2013 settlements. But here’s the rub: In many instances, JPMorgan was forgiving loans on properties it no longer owned.5 The alleged fraud is described in internal JPMorgan documents, public records, testimony from homeowners and investors burned in the scam, and other evidence presented in a blockbuster lawsuit against JPMorgan, now being heard in US District Court in New York City.6 JPMorgan no longer owned the properties because it had sold the mortgages years earlier to 21 third-party investors, including three companies owned by Larry Schneider. Those companies are the plaintiffs in the lawsuit; Schneider is also aiding the federal government in a related case against the bank. In a bizarre twist, a company associated with the Church of Scientology facilitated the apparent scheme. Nationwide Title Clearing, a document-processing company with close ties to the church, produced and filed the documents that JPMorgan needed to claim ownership and cancel the loans.
Gary Edwards

Is Standard and Poor's Manipulating US Debt Rating to Escape Liability for the Mortgage... - 0 views

firedoglake.com/...bility-for-the-mortgage-crisis

S&P Phony-Credit-Ratings national-debt-Ceiling Banksters banksters

shared by Gary Edwards on 31 Jul 11 - No Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 31 Jul 11
     
    Half way decent expose of those criminals at the S&P credit rating and risk analysis sham.  These clowns should be in jail for what they did with mortgage securities!  One thing the article doesn't mention is that without the S&P triple A credit ratings on the fraudulent mortgage security instruments, main street America 401K, city, state and county investment funds, and the bulk of pension funds could not have been invested in those phony securities.  Forget the Bankster losses and the taxpayers $23 Trillion bailout of the Banksters.  Real Americans got wiped out because of those phony triple A ratings! Another point missed in this article is that Dodd-Frank is designed for massive extortion instead of massive imprisonment, fines and retribution for criminal actions.  The way it works is that the Bankster pony up a billion plus in campaign funds, and the elected criminals pass on the prosecution of criminal violations and reporting failures.  Easy money for the ruling class.  And who pays the S&P's of the world anyway?  Right, the Banksters! Conclusion: It's becoming more and more obvious that Standard and Poor's has a political agenda riding on the notion that the US is at risk of default on its debt based on some arbitrary limit to the debt-to-GDP ratio. There is no sound basis for that limit, or for S&P's insistence on at least a $4 trillion down payment on debt reduction, any more than there is for the crackpot notion that a non-crazy US can be forced to default on its debt. Whatever S&P's agenda, it has nothing to do with avoiding default risks or putting the US on sound fiscal footing. It appears to be intertwined with their attempts to absolve themselves from responsibility for their role in the 2008 financial crisis, and they are willing to manipulate not only the 2012 election but the world economy to escape the SEC's attempts to regulate them. It's time the media and Congress started asking Standard and Poors what their political a
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