Arab-spring

plenty of commentators are drawing direct comparisons between the current events and the collapse of the eastern bloc. This approach performs an ideological function, in that it discursively integrates the current upheaval into a pre-existing approved ideological narrative – the dictatorships of the Middle East are merely the latest in a long line of tyrannies to have been undermined by the relentless march of progress and liberal democracy. Thus these upheavals represent further confirmation of the moral and organisational superiority of the western order.

The dynamic of change in countries such as Egypt is much more radical. In Marxist terms, the "political revolution" (reorganisation of the political institutions and changes among the leading state personnel) threatens to carry over into a "social revolution" (a more far-reaching reconfiguration of social relations and of the economic system). This can be seen in the way the focus of struggle, post-Mubarak, has shifted from Tahrir Square to the political-economic space of factories as workers organise strikes, articulate demands that are both political and economic, and start to challenge the power of Egypt's "little Mubaraks" – the country's economic elites. The revolution is deepening and taking on a definite class dynamic.

the pressures which are driving the revolts in north Africa are just as much systemic, economic ones as they are to do with political repression in Arab states

Après l'euphorie révolutionnaire, ils connaissent une sorte de gueule de bois. Ils sont avant tout inquiets et à la recherche d'ordre

Une arène démocratique s'est mise en place, avec des institutions de lutte contre la corruption, des comités de réformes, etc., qui doivent accompagner la transition.

Les discussions se focalisent sur deux courants anxiogènes, occultant d'autres problèmes politiques et économiques majeurs. Il y a d'un côté la peur d'un retour des élites de l'ancien régime, de l'autre la peur de l'islamisme. La dictature est tombée, mais ses structures n'ont pas complètement disparu. Des enclaves autoritaires de l'époque Ben Ali sont toujours présentes dans le domaine de la sécurité, des relations entre les différents ministères, entre les élites et le peuple... Le pays n'a donc pas complètement dépassé ce traumatisme et a du mal à trouver une routine démocratique

personne ne sait vraiment d'où est partie la rumeur. Mais il cache à peine qu'elle lui a bien servi : « C'était le symbole rêvé. Le mépris du pouvoir sur la pauvreté. Et ça a marché ! 

Sur la place de Sidi Bouzid, aujourd'hui, la photo de Mohamed Bouazizi a disparu. « Sa famille ne porte pas vraiment les valeurs de la révolution », dit sobrement Attia Athmouni. On dit qu'elle aurait touché de l'argent, sur cette affaire. En tout cas, elle a quitté Sidi Bouzid.

Meanwhile NATO told CNN Tuesday that it could not confirm reports Gadhafi was hiding rocket launchers at UNESCO World Heritage site Leptis Magna — ruins of a Roman city between Misrata and Tripoli — and refused to rule out bombing it if it was a relevant target.

Those calling for new support seem to forget that the deposed regimes already received plenty of international aid finance. Under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, they presided over elaborate privatisation and reform programmes, which benefited those close to power but did little to help the wider population. In truth the regimes tended to use this support to strengthen their rule, building state security apparatuses and creating kleptocratic governments accountable only to their foreign bankrollers.

Generous aid programmes mean leaders do not need to please their citizens, or gain their trust to secure power; they can instead use donor money to build a security state and buy off their opposition.