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Nye Frank

An Elder Fights the Denial of Medicaid by Division of Medical Assistance and the Hearin... - 0 views

www.falseallegations.com/elderly-medical-assistance.htm

denial of medicaid constitutional rights

shared by Nye Frank on 16 Mar 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 16 Mar 10
     
    STANDARD OF REVIEW When determining a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, allegations of the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences [and annexed exhibits] which may be drawn therefrom in plaintiff's favor, are to be taken as true. Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 318, 321 (1998). Eyal v. Helen Broadcasting Corp., 411 Mass. 426, 429 (1991) and cases cited. See also Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kosteas, 378 Mass. 85, 87 (1979); Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977). Dismissal is also not appropriate where GiGi is entitled to any form of relief for any wrong or injury. Brum, at 321. Citron v. Nader, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Mass.R.Civ.P. 8(f). Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, article XI. "A complaint is not subject to dismissal if it could support relief on any theory of law" [Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kosteas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979)], "even though the particular relief [which plaintiff] has demanded and the theory on which he seems to rely may not be appropriate." Nader, 372 Mass. at 104 (citations omitted). "A complaint should [also] not be dismissed simply because it asserts a new or extreme theory of liability or improbable facts." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 934, 934 (1983). "[I]t is important that new legal theories be explored and assayed in light of actual facts rather than a pleader's suppositions." New England Insulation Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 26 Mass.App.Ct. 28, 30 (1988) quoting 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §1357 at 603 (1969 and supp. 1987). Patriarca v. Center for Living and Working, Inc., 1999 WL 791888 at 4 (Mass.Super. Sept. 8, 1999) (Wernick, J.). ARGUMENTS 1.Where Article V of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires all public employees of the three branches of the government of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to be accountable to the people at all times, this court is precluded from applying
Nye Frank

Riverside NYE FRANK RACING HOMICIDE: LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT... - 0 views

visualizedevelopment.blogspot.com/...ndividual-state-and-local.html

State Court Liability victims rights pattern

shared by Nye Frank on 16 Oct 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 16 Oct 09
     
    Lee Frank has been denied her civil rights in the State Courts in Riverside County
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

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1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
    • Nye Frank
      Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

ScienceDirect - Journal of Clinical Forensic Medicine : Clinical forensic medicine - ma... - 0 views

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forensic medicine

shared by Nye Frank on 25 Sep 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 25 Sep 09
     
    rticle Outline * Defining clinical forensic practice and its components * Specific responsibilities of the forensic medicine specialist in trauma * Investigation of trauma * Preservation of evidence * Physical evidence * When to collect evidence * Processing of clothing * Investigation of wound characteristics * Certifying death * Standards and liability issues * Role of clinical forensic medicine * Forensic nursing and trauma care * Role of photography in clinical forensic medicine * Role of the ambulance and rescue workers * Conclusion * References Corresponding Author Contact InformationCorresponding author. Correspondence to: Dr. B. R. Sharma, Tel.: +91-172-665545; Fax: +91-172-608488 Journal of Clinical Forensic Medicine Volume 10, Issue 4, December 2003, Pages 267-273 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WHN-49W33W3-1&_user=10&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F2003&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=3550fb628d8b58851a28da49eab06979
  • Nye Frank on 25 Sep 09
     
    rticle Outline * Defining clinical forensic practice and its components * Specific responsibilities of the forensic medicine specialist in trauma * Investigation of trauma * Preservation of evidence * Physical evidence * When to collect evidence * Processing of clothing * Investigation of wound characteristics * Certifying death * Standards and liability issues * Role of clinical forensic medicine * Forensic nursing and trauma care * Role of photography in clinical forensic medicine * Role of the ambulance and rescue workers * Conclusion * References Corresponding Author Contact InformationCorresponding author. Correspondence to: Dr. B. R. Sharma, Tel.: +91-172-665545; Fax: +91-172-608488 Journal of Clinical Forensic Medicine Volume 10, Issue 4, December 2003, Pages 267-273 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WHN-49W33W3-1&_user=10&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F2003&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=3550fb628d8b58851a28da49eab06979
Nye Frank

bivens federal tort law, legislative interferance - Custom Search | Diigo - 0 views

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Riverside County crime victim

shared by Nye Frank on 04 Feb 10 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 04 Feb 10
     
    581 F.2d 390After carefully considering both the legislative history surrounding the enactment ... While Bivens created a federal tort for certain violations of the fourth amendment ..... While this court has never directly held that a Federal law enforcement ... misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. ... ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/581/581.F2d.390.77-1919.html Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, § 1680 (Bancoult v ...United States, 507 U.S. 197 (March 8 1993) (noting from the legislative history ... libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: ..... The idea is that State tort law is more fully developed than U.S. ..... Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, ... homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/bancoult-ftca.html Cleo F. Shoultz, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc ...This provision does not support a claim for such interference with a .... With respect to his claim based on the constitutional tort theory of Bivens v. ... Plaintiff argues that the intentional tort provision in the Federal Tort Claims ... liability without legislative aid and as at the common law" because it was ... cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/754/318/319372/ 00-1672.01A - USCA1 OpinionDavric and the man who owns it, Joseph Ricci, filed suit in federal court against ... The court also dismissed the state law tort claims against the official on the .... As the defamation and tortious interference claims Davric advances clearly .... under state tort law but it is not recoverable in a Bivens action. ... www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=00-1672.01A From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied Constitutional Remedies ...between the legislative and judicial branches, this political catchphrase ..... Interestingly, the Bivens majority considered the implications of state tort law and ... In The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, Professor Thomas
Nye Frank

LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS: THE PRIMA FACIA CASE - 0 views

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state court victim crime liability riverside county

shared by Nye Frank on 16 Oct 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 16 Oct 09
     
    Now, it is an effectual denial by a State of the equal protection of the laws when any class of officers charged under the laws with their administration permanently and as a rule refuse to extend that protection. If every sheriff in South Carolina refuses to serve a writ for a colored man and those sheriffs are kept in office year after year by the people of South Carolina, and no verdict against them for their failure of duty can be obtained before a South Carolina jury, the State of South Carolina, through the class of officers who are its representatives to afford the equal protection of the laws to that class of citizens, has denied that protection. If the jurors of South Carolina constantly and as a rule refuse to do justice between man and man where the rights of a particular class of its citizens are concerned, and that State affords by its legislation no remedy, that is as much a denial to that class of citizens of the equal protection of the laws as if the State itself put on its statute-book a statute enacting that no verdict should be rendered in the courts of that State in favor of this class of citizens."
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