Yadkin Docs

Let’s examine rebar consumption. First, we’ll examine apparent consumption (apparent consumption is net domestic consumption plus imports) and then we’ll calculate capacity utilization: 2007 – 9.824m short tons 2008 – 8.374 m short tons 2009 – 5.359 m short tons 2010 – based on current 2010 run rates, the industry will ship 5.1m short tons If you compare the peak of the market (2007) with today, the US rebar industry operates at a 62% capacity utilization rate; the overall steel industry operates at a 72.9% capacity utilization rate as of June 26, 2010. Two rebar facilities are currently shut down, one in New Jersey and one in Oklahoma. Many of the other facilities that run both mixed merchant/rebar mills are also running at less than capacity If we were to develop a map of the United States and mark US rebar plant locations by geography (assuming each mill can ship up to a 300 mile

First, the last time the US steel market was at 120m tons of consumption was in 2006. The 2009 estimated steel consumption was 59m tons, data courtesy of the USGS. Prior to 2006, the only other year in which apparent steel consumption met or exceeded 120m tons was in 2005. The rest of this past decade, steel consumption hovered in the lower 100m ton range (e.g. less than 110m tons)

the question of technology transfer ought to be considered heavily

–Lisa Reisman

And we all know that US construction markets (the biggest application for rebar products) remain in troubled waters. Take a look at annual expenditures for both commercial and residential construction here. Incidentally, 2010 data is tracking 8% below 2009 numbers. In other words, rebar capacity utilization rates are even less than overall steel industry capacity utilization rates

This is not “compelling”… it is unreasonable.

It is not proper for parties to share incomplete information via the press in these types of proceedings until the discussions yield an agreement or officially cease.  Neither has occurred.

From the beginning, the County’s goals have been to ensure: (1) that the river is environmentally protected for generations to come, (2) that the use of water from the Yadkin River is best determined by citizens of North Carolina, and (3) that the flow of the river is used to maximize the impact of its resources for the benefit of its citizens.  

The goal of environmental protection is being addressed in the state 401 water quality permit process and includes the NC Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Alcoa/APGI, Stanly County and the Yadkin Riverkeeper.

he County believes its intervention in this process will lead to numerous water quality improvements.

(1) The Board of Commissioners is legally responsible for the public health and well-being of its citizens.  These basic environmental protection measures will lead to cleaner surface and ground water for our citizens now and for generations to come.  It is impossible to put a price tag on the value of one citizen’s life or well-being.   (2) The value of water will only increase as growth demands in the Charlotte region, Piedmont Triad and along the I-85 corridor strain our available water resources.  Regional organizations to the east and west of the Yadkin River basin are planning for water use over the coming decades and our citizens need to be doing the same. (3) The water of the Yadkin belongs to the people and has tremendous value from an electrical generation perspective.  The benefits should not simply be given away to a global corporation to support its operations in other states and foreign countries. This simply transfers wealth out of our community and that is unacceptable. 

The County is seeking fair and reasonable compensation for the long-term use of the river.

  However, without long-term financial assurances these jobs and the associated taxable investment will remain over the course of a 30, 40 or 50 year license term, it would not be wise to simply drop our reasonable demands.

  Should our citizens accept a static amount for a settlement when the value of the resource will increase exponentially over the term of the license?

We, as Commissioners, will continue to seek the best outcome for Stanly County.

I’m so proud of (and awed by) the Commissioners for thinking of the bigger picture and the long term needs of the community. This is nothing short of blackmail — and failing that, bribery! –on Alcoa’s part. The only reason they’ve ever offered anything is because of the Commissioner’s strong stand against a massive corporate giveaway. Good for you Commissioners! I salute you.

Stanly County upheld its end of the bargain for 50 years. It’s time to reclaim use of the water for the betterment of all Yadkin Valley communities. Looks to me like Alcoa is the one stalling, not the commissioners.

We must put our fate in our own hands not with a corporation who has no responsibility to our region or our state.

I applaud the Commissioners’ continued resolve to do what is in the best interests of our citizens. Future prosperity in Stanly County depends on the Yadkin hydropower. Since the beginning of time, communities have only thrived because of their access to water …for drinking, recreation, trade and fuel. Had our water not been under the control of Alcoa for the last 50 years, we would be in much better shape economically. By leveraging the Yadkin hydropower, we could have already replaced our lost manufacturing jobs with higher paying jobs that reflect the needs of the 21st century. We would be absolute fools to once again relinquish control of our waters to Alcoa for another 50 years. We need to reserve the flexibility to control our own destiny—not “outsource” it to a multinational corporation that has a poor record of stewardship and corporate responsibility in our region.

“Since the operation of the Badin smelting works is dependent upon the availability of power supply, Carolina Aluminum must regard its smelting activities at Badin to be limited to the term of the license of the Yadkin Project, which is its source of power supply. In formulating its plans, and weighing the advisability of the $37,000,000 program, the management of Carolina Aluminum had to assume, therefore, that power would be available from the Yadkin Project at economically feasible rates only during the original license term. Under Section 14 of the Act, any project may be “recaptured” at the expiration of the license term. In formulating its plans, therefore, the management of Carolina Aluminum could not rely upon any assured source of power supply after the expiration of its license for the Yadkin Project”

The “project properties” are held in trust by the Government for the people. It is the “project properties” that a multi-national, foreign controlled, private enterprise is trying to “hijack” away from “we the people”.

Alcoa has never owned “the riverbed”. The do pay taxes in an attempt to lay claim to the riverbed. The state constitution and federal law does not support their claim. With that said, refer back to the 1958 license agreement. Alcoa gave up rights to the submerged land “the project property” in exchange for the monopoly use of the water as free fuel for a guaranteed profit for 50 years. Article 14 of the The Federal Power Act clearly spells out the option Alcoa gave the Federal Government in exchange for the use of the “peoples waters”.

And investing in natural and energy resources is a nice way to hedge against future increases in commodity prices, though large-scale resource investment may make some in developed nations nervous.

China’s new venture with Kazakhstan deviates from the “oil-for-loans” formula. The $5 billion loan from CNPC will give Chinese oil firms a 50 percent stake in the joint purchase of MangistauMunaiGaz (MMG), Kazakhstan’s biggest private oil and gas company (Reuters, April 17). This deal is more like a “loan-for-oil assets” transaction than one of “loan-for-promised-oil supply," which characterizes the previous three contracts, and CNPC will receive half of the oil that will be produced by the jointly owned MMG (the other 50 percent will be owned by the Kazak state-owned firm KazMunaiGas).

The recent large energy activities are not the first time Chinese NOCs have entered “loans-for-oil” deals. In 2004, Chinese banks financed Rosneft’s acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz with a $6 billion loan and CNPC received a pledge of long-term supply contracts via rail in exchange (Platts Community News, February 19)

These “loans-for-oil” activities will remain an active component of the Chinese overseas resource acquisition strategy given the current global economic and energy conditions.

After two years of all-round and in-depth structural adjustment, the single line of aluminum business in the past was expanded into nine lines of business including aluminum, copper, rare metals & rare earth, resource exploration, international engineering, international trade, energy, finance, and overseas investment, and we already had the structure of a diversified mining company.

Xiong Weiping: Yes. During the first year of the "12th Five-Year Plan" period, we have set a strategic goal of "becoming a world-class mining company with the biggest growth potential".

To become a world-class mining company, we need to create another CHINALCO in the next 10 years. Obviously, it would be very hard to realize this goal within China's territory, and we must go out and participate in global competition and collaboration.

The ups and downs in the collaboration can also be positive and meaningful. CHINALCO has established its status in negotiation and cooperation with major western mining companies, and has obtained certain participation right and a bigger say.

Alcoa